JNANA-PITHA MOORTI DF^T JAIN GRANTHAMALA

ENGLISH SERIES I

SAMAYASARA

OR

THE NATURE OF THE SELF

By

SRI KUNDA KUNDA

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION
AND COMMENTARY BASED UPON

AMRITAQHANDRA'S

ATMAKYATI TOGETHER WITH
ENGLISH INTRODUCTION BY

PROF. A, CHAKRAVARTI

PUBLISHERS

BHARATIYA JNANAPITHA, KASHI

DURGAKUND ROAD, BANARAS

PUBLISHER A

. P. GOYALIYA, SECTARY, BHARATIYA JNANAPITHA, KASHI

"DURGAKUND ROAD, BANARAS:

FIRST EDITION

May .1950

Price - Rs. 8/-

PRINTED BY J, ']. "SHARMA AT THE ALLAHABAD LAW JOURNAL PRESS
..._..,. ALLAHABAD -

CONTENTS

4ft

L PUBLISHER'S NOTE . . v

II. PREFACE . . ix

III. ENQLISH INTRODUCTION :

* (a) Self in European Philosophy . . . . xi

(b] Self in Indian Philosophy . . . . . xxxviii

(i) Self in Modern Science . . . . . . cxli

*
IV. SANKARA AND KUNDA KUNDA . . . . . . cxlvii

V. TEXT WITH TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY . . i

PUBLISHER'S NOTE.

The BHARATIYA JNANAPITHA has been founded by the
welF-known industrialist and business magnate Seth Shanti Pra-
sad Jain and his talented wife, Shrimati Rama Jain, with a view
"to recover from old Shastra Bhandaras, to edit and to publish
all available ancient te^ts in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Apabhransha, Hindi,
Kanarese, Tamil, etc. on subjects like philosophy, mythology,
literature and history etc. The Institution was founded on the
1 8th February, 1944. It has published several important books
in Sanskrit, Prakrit, and Hindi languages. It has been the priv-
ilege of the Jnanapitha to receive from the very inception the
co-operation and valuable guidance of Rao Bahadur Prof. A.
Chakravarti, M.A., IKS. (Retd.). He is the Editor of our Eng-
lish and Tamil series. A branch of the Jnanapitha has been
established at Madras under his guidance, primarily as a result of
his inspiration.

We are happy to commence our English series with the
publication of the SAMAYASARA whose authox Acharya Kunda
Kunda holds a unique position amongst the authors of Jaina Philo-
sophy and Metaphysics. The SAMAYASARA is indeed a work of
outstanding merit and has attained unparalleled authority so far
as understanding of The Nature of the Self is concerned. Though
there have been quite a few editions of the SAMAYASARA, the
present one is noteworthy because of the lucid exposition that
the accompanying commentary of Acharya Amrita Chandra
presents. Rao Bahadur Prof. A. Chakravarti has enhanced the
value of the work by his explanatory notes' in a form easily com-
prehensible by the modern mind. In a masterly introduction
Prof. Chakravarti has brought out the essential features of Indian
and Western thought on this all-important topic of the SELF.
We have every hope that the present edition of, the SAMAYASARA
will receive attention and approbation of all lovers of Indian
philosophy and of Jaina thought,

. SAMAYASARA

The Jnanapithahassofar published the following works:
PRAKRIT :

1. Maha.Bandha (Jain Siddh^ta Grantha)

2. Karlakkhan (Samudtika Shastra)

.SANSKRIT:*

1. Nyaya Vinishchaya (Pratham Bhag)

2. Tattwartha Vritti

3. Madan Parajaya

4. Kandada Prantiya Grantha Suchi

(List of Palm leaf manuscript in Kanarese)

5. Keval Gyan Prashna Churamani

6. Nam Mala

7. Ratoa Manjusha

HINDI :

1. Muktidoot

2. Pathachinha

3. Do Hazar Varsha Puram Jain Kahaniyan

4. Pashchatya Tarkashastra

5. Sher-O-Shaiyari
'~(r. Milan Jamim

7 . Vaidic Sahitya

8. Adhunik Jain Kavi

9. Jain Shasan'

10. Hindi Jain Sahitya Ka Itihas

11. Kunda Kunda Charya Ke Tin Ratna.

ENGLISH:
i. Samayasara

The following books are in the Press:-

1. Nyayavinishchaya (II Part)

2. Adi Puran

3. Jatak

4. Bapu (Poem)

5. Shraman Mahavir ,

6. Sukarat Ka Jivan Darshan

7. Siddhashila

PUBLISHER'S NOTE vii

The following books are already edited and are being sent

to the Press:

1. Tattwartha Raj Yartika

2. Ganita Shastra

3. Tattwartha Sub^dha Vriti

4. Dahsabhaktyadi Sangrah

5. Jainendra Mahavriti

6. Amogha Vriti

7. Dwisandhan Maha Kavya

The following works are being edited by the Jnanapitha
Scholars:

1. Harivaasha Charitra (Apabhransha)

2. Siddha Vinishchaya (Tika)

It is the wish of the founders of the Jnanapitha that their
modest efforts may inspire people to read, understand and assi-
milate the great teachings of our ancient Acharyas. They seek
the co-operation of all scholars and of other literary societies
towards popularising the books of the Bharatiya Jnanapitha.
This will be an impetus to bring out further publications. All
books of the Jnanapitha are made available to the public at net
cost, and in most cases even below cost.

PREFACE

Samayasara is the most important philosophical work by Shri
Kunda Kunda. It deals with the nature of the self, the term
Samaya being used synonimously with Atman or Brahman. The
translation and commentary herein published are based upon
Amritachandra's Atmakyati but some other commentaries are
also consulted. Jayasena's Tatparyavriti and Mallisena's Tamil
commentary were also consulted. The extra gathas found in
Jayasena's Tatparyavriti ^do not give any additional information
nor do they affect the general trend of Atmakyati. Hence the
present English translation confines itself to the gathas found
in Atmakyati. It may be mentioned that the Tamil commentary
by Mallisena seems to be based upon Atmakyati by Amritachandra.
Since the work deals with the nature of the self from .the Jaina
point of view the introduction also deals with the nature of the
self from other points of view. The introduction is divided into
three main groups ; the nature of the Self dealt with in Western
Philosophy, the nature of the Self in Indian Philosophy and the
same topic according to Modern Science. A rapid survey of
Western thought beginning with the Greek philosophers is
given in the first part of the introduction. The second part., Indian
Philosophy begins with a concise account of the Upanishadic
thought with which Sri Kunda Kunda appears to be acquainted.
The modern scientific approach towards the problem of self is
also given in the introduction. It is not a detailed account of
modern scientific thought; but here an attempt is made to
present the modern scientific attitude which is quite different
from that of the latter, half of the i9th century. The
Scientists and Philosophers of the Victorian period were
not sure about the nature of the self. Orthodox Physists
and Physiologists treated consciousness as a bypr9tuct in the
evolution of matter and motion. Following this dominant
attitude of physical science, psychologists also tried to discuss

SAMAYASARA

the problem of consciousness without a soul or self. All that
is changed now. Scientific waters mainly influenced by the
results obtained by the Psychic Research Society now openly ack-
nowledge the existence of the conscious entity the self or the
soul which is entkely different in nature from matter; it
survives even after the dissolution of the body. Researches in
Clairvoyance and Telepathy and veridical dreams clearly support
the attitude of modern thinkers as to the survival of the human
personality after death. Though nothing definite is established
scientifically this change of attitude is itself a welcome one This
change introduces the rapprochement, between Western thought
and Indian thought as is evidenced in the writings of persons like
41dous Huxley. This must be considered as a good augury
because in war-worn world bankrupt of spiritual values .there js a
ray of hope that the Indian thought of perennial nature may feed
the spiritually starved world .which is in search of some genuine
idea serving as. a solace and hope for the spiritually famished

humanity.

This book is published as the first of the English series in
the Bharatiya Jnanapitha publications. This publication will
reveal to the world what Indian thinkers 2000 years ago had to
say about the problem of the Self.

CONTENTS OF ENGLISH INTRODUCTION

?lf in European thought
Greek Philosophy
Christian thought
Renaissance

Bacon and Scientific Method
Cartesianism Mathematical Methods
The English Empiricism
The German Idealism

II

Self in Indian Thought

The Age of.. Upanishads

The meaning of 'Upanishad'

The date of the Upanishads

The origin of the Upanishads

The Fundamental Doctrine of Upanishads

The Upanishads and the Western Thinkers

Deusseii on the Upanishads

The Chaiidogya Upanishad

The true way to Brahma World
Katha Upanishad
Mundaka Upanishad
Brihadaranyka Upanishad

Rudiments of Upanishadic Thought in the Samhitas
and the Brahmaiias

Sankhya Philosophy
Sankhya Philosophy
Sankhya Method
The Sources of Sankhya

The Sankhya System ** ,,..,-,

PAGE

xi

xi

xiii

xvi

xvii

xix

xxv

xxix

xxxvm

sli

xliv

xlv

xlvi

1

li

Hi

liv

lix

Ix

Ixiv

Ixv

Ixxvii

Ixxxiii

Ixxxvi

Ixxxvii

Ixxxvlii

Prakrit!

The Nature of Prakriti . -

Uttara Mimamsa or Vedanta

Responsibility of the Creator .. . -
A discussion of Dreams and Hallucinates . .

Sankara and Vedantism

Sankara and the Doctrine of Maya

Brahman -

Jainism, its age and its tents .

The Age of Jainism

Moksha Marga

The Concept of Dravya . .

Asti-Nasti-Vada

Jiva or Soul

Self in Modern Science . . :
Sankara and Kunda Kunda
Sankara and his point of view
The Individual and the Samsara
Nature and the external world
The origin of the concrete world
The Doctrine of Causation . .
One and the many
Sankara and Amritachandra

PAGE
Ixxxix

xc
xcii
c
ci
cv
cv
cxi
cxii
cxiv
cxvii
cxxvi
cxxxi
cxxxiii
cxxxv
cxli
cxlvii
ci
cli
civ
civ
clvi
clix
clx

CONTENTS OF THE TEXT WITH TRANSLATION AND

COMMENTARY

PAGE

CHAPTER jl . . . . . . , . . . I 42

Jiva Padartha or Category of Soul

CHAPTER II . . 42 63

Ajiva or Non-Soul

CHAPTER III 63108

Karta and Karma The Doer and the Deed

CHAPTER IV .. .. .... .. .. 1Q9 117

Punya and Papa Virtue and Vice

CHAPTER V . . . . . . . . n, 125

Asrava^ Inflow of Karma

CHAPTER VI .. .. .. . . .. . 126131

Samvara Blocking the inflow

CHAPTER VII . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 n5

Nirjara Shedding of Karmas

CHAPTER VIII . . . . . . 4 . . . . . 155 130

Bandha Bondage of Karmas

CHAPTER IX 1 80 _190

Moksha Liberation

CHAPTER X . . . . . . . . _ 191 238

All-Pure Knowledge

SAMAYASARA

Sll ' '

the opponent gets confounded in the debate andismade to confess

^

fhollowness of the so-c*Eed learned Sophists
Then he realised himself and made others realise
ow was the Pledge of the ^ed schola^Tto
why he obtained the singular tesamony from the Delphic
b L he was the wisest man living because he knew that
he knew nothing.. This process of dialectical analysts so
a% Tmployed by Socrates resulted in the building up
Athenian Acidly which gathered under its roof a number
of ardent youths with the desire to learn mote about human per-

sociality and its nature. .

Plato a disciple and friend of Socrates was the most illustrious
fieure of the school In fact all that we know about Socrates and
the conditions of thought about that period are all given to us by
Plato through his immortal Dialogues. He systematized the van-
ous ideas revealed by his master, Socrates. He constructed a philo-
sophical system according to which sense-presented experience is
entirely different from the world of ultimate ideas which was the
world of Reals. He illustrates this' duality of human knowledge
by his famous parable of the cave. According to this parable
human being is but a slave confined inside a cave chained with
his face towards the wall. Behind him is the opening through
which all-illuminating sunshine casts shadows of moving objects
on the walls of the cave. The enchained slave inside the cave is priv-
ileged to see only the moving shadows which he imagines to be
the real objects of the world. But once he breaks the chain and
emerges out of the cave he enters into a world of brilliant light and
sunshine and comes across the real objects whose shadows he was
constrained to see all along. Man's entry into the realm of reality
and realization of the empty shadow of the sense-presented world
is considered to be the goal of human culture and civilisation by
Plato. Instead of moving in the ephemeral shadows of the sense-
presented world, man ought to live in the world of eternal ideas
which constitute the scheme of Reality presided over by the three
fundamental Ideas-Truth, Goodness and Beauty. This duality of

* INTRODUCTION xili

knowledge necessarily implies ^the duality of human nature.
Man has in himself this dual aspect of partly living in the
world of realities and partly in, the world of senses. The
senses keep him down jn the world of shadows whereas his true
nature of reason urges him on to regain his immortal citizenship
of the ultimate world of ideas. On the basis of this conflict of
reason and the senses, Plato builds up a theory of ethics accord-
ing to which man should learn to restrain the tendencies created
by Senses through the help of Reason and ultimately regain his
lost freedom of the citizenship in the world of Ideas. The two
worlds which he kept quite apart, the world of ideas and the world
of sense-perception, were brought into concrete relation with
each other by his successor Aristotle who emphasised the fact that
they are closely related to each other even in the case of concrete
human life. Human personality is an organised unity of both
reason and sense and hence the duality should not be emphasised
too much to the discredit of the underlying unity in duality.

A few centuries after Socrates, we find the same metaphysical
drama enacted in the plains of Palestine. The Jews who believed
to be the chosen people of Jehovah claimed the privilege of
getting direct messages from Him through their sacred prophets,
the leaders of the Jewish thought and religion. On account
of this pride of being the chosen people they maintained a sort
of cultural isolation from others whom they contemptuously
called Gentiles. A tribe intoxicated with such a racial pride had
the unfortunate lot of being politically subjugated by more do-
minant races such as the Egyptians, the Babylonians, and finally
the Romans.

Christian Thought

When Palestine was a province of the Roman Empire ruled
by a Roman Governor there appeared among the Jews a religious
reformer in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. As a boy he exhi-
bited strange tendencies towards the established religion and
ethics which sometimes mystified the Jewish elders congregated
in their temples and places of worship. After his twelfth year
we know nothing about his whereabouts till he reappears in the

SAMAYASARA.

age of thirty in the midst of the Jews with an ardent desire to
communicate his message. When he began his mission, the
Jewish society was marked by an extreme type of formalism both
in religion and ethics. The scholars amc*ig them who were the
custodians of the religious scriptures-Pharisees and Scribes-
were so much addicted to the literal interpretation of their dogmas
and institutions that they pushed into the background the under-
lying significance and spirit of the Hebrew thought and religion.
In such a society of hardened conservatives, Jesus of Nazareth
first appeared as a social curiosity evoking in them an intellectual
shock which ended in hatred. Here was a person whose way
of life was a challenge to the established traditions of the Hebrew
religion. He freely moved with all classes of people, disregard-
ing the social etiquette. The elders of the Hebrew society
therefore were shocked when they found the so-called reformer
moving freely with the publicans and sinners. When challenged
he merely replied that only the sick required the healing powers
of a doctor. He was once again questioned why he openly
violated the established rules of conduct according to the Heb-
rew religion. He answered by saying. Sabbath is intended for
man and not man for Sabbath, thereby proclaiming to the world
in unmistakable terms that the various institutions, social and
religious, are intented for helping man in his spiritual devel-
opment and have no light to smother his growth and impede
his progress. He enthroned human personality as the most
valuable thing, to serve which, is the function of religious and
ethical institutions. He told the Pharisees and Scribes frankly
that the kingdom of God is within. Though in this conflict:
between the new reformer and the old order of Pharisaism the
latter succeeded in putting an end to the life of the new leader,
they were not able to completely crush the movement. His
disciples recruited from the unsophisticated Jewish society
firmly held fast to the new ideas of the Master and went about
all corners of the country publishing this new message. From the
Roman province of Palestine they made bold to enter into Home
the very capital city of the empire and ardently preached what
they learnt from their Master. They were suspected to be a

INTRODUCTION

subversive organisation and persecuted by the Roman autho-
rities. Undaunted and uncrushed'by persecution the movement
was carried on in the catac6mbs till the new idea' permeated to a
large section of the Roman population. The Romans had hither-
to a naive realistic form of religion after the pattern of the Greek
Religion of the Homeric Period. The advent of Christianity result-
ed in the breaking down of these primitive religious institutions
of the Romans, This break-down of traditional Roman reli-
gion brought many recruits to the new faith from the upper
strata of Roman society, till it was able to convert a member of
the Imperial household itself. The condition of the Roman
society was extremely favourable to this wonderful success of
the new faith. .

The Roman Empire which had the great provincial reve-
nues pouring into the Imperial Capital converted the Roman citi-
zens from ardent patriots of the Roman Republic into debased
and demoralised citizens of the Imperial Capital sustained by
the doles offered by the provincial pro-consuls. They were
spending their time in witnessing demoralising entertainments
and in luxuries. For example, the Roman citizens were
entertained in the amphitheatre to witness the slaves being
mangled and torn by hungry lions kept starving for this purpose.
It is no wonder that such demoralised social organisation com-
pletely collapsed when it had the first onslaught from a more
powerful idea and certainly a more soul-stirring message.

The Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire in
which there was a coalition of the authority of the States with
that of the Church. This Holy Roman Empire which had- the
Church and the State combined had rendered wonderful service to
the whole of Europe by taking the barbarian hoardes of various
European races and converting them into chivalrous Christian
knights by a strict religious discipline imposed on them by the
various self-sacrificing orders of the medieval monastries. This
education of the inferior races through strict discipline enforced
by the Roman Church had in its own turn a drawback cautioned
against by the founder of Christianity. The Roman church so
jealously guarded its power and influence that it did not promote

XVI SAMAYASARA

any kind of free Intellectual development suspected to be of a
nature incompatible with the established traditions of the Church.
This process of" disciplinary suppression of the development of
human intellect went for several centuries which are designated
as the "dark ages" by the historians of Europe. But human intel-
lect can never be permanently suppressed like that.

Renaissance

There were murmours and revolts within the Church itself.
The unwarranted assumption of the priest-craft that it formed the
intermediary between man and God was openly challenged.'
This movement of reform within the Church had strange co-
operative forces from other sources. In the field of astronomy,,
Copernicus introduced his new and modern conception of the
constitution of the Solar system which completely displaced the
old Ptoleymaic astronomy accepted by the Church. The earth
which was considered to be the centre of the Universe around
which the heavenly bodies moved for the purpose of shedding
light on the earth's surface, was relegated to a minor planet
among the several plantes revolving round the sun which forms
the centre of the Solar system. This astronomical revolution
suddenly introduced a new angle of vision opening up immense
possibilities of research revealing the wonders of an infinite
Universe.

Similarly the discovery of the new world by Columbus in-
troduced a revolution in geographical knowledge revealing new
routes of travel and conquest unknown to Alexander the Great,
who had to turn back from the banks of the Indus because his
army would not move any further, as they thought they were
approaching the ends of the earth. To add to these two dis-
coveries there was the flight of the Greek scholars towards Rome
as a result of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks
These Greek scholars carried with them rich treasures of Athenian
culture, which was a revelation to the starved intellect of the
medieval Europe, an intellect which had nothing but the Chris- ,
ton Bible and Aristode's logic to feed upon. This wonderful
Athenian culture and civilisation had produced a fervour of

INTRODUCTION XVll

enthusiasm among the few thinking individuals of medieval
Europe who devoted themselves to the development of the new
arts such as architecture, sculpture, painting music etc. The whole
movement is called Renaissance or the rebirth, when man dis-
covered his true nature. This movement of Pvenaissance incor-
porated with the religious Reformation ushered In the new world
of Europe which was so fruitful of important results, such as
the origin and growth of modern science, a new intellectual de-
velopment which completely transformed the modern world. The
growth of modern science resulted, in- a conflict between the

o

established religion and the new Thought.

The intellectual development just after the Renaissance took
two different forms, one associated with Francis Bacon, who
emphasised the importance of experimental method adopted
by science, and the other associated with Descartes who em-
phasised the mathematical method as the necessary intellectual
discipline for the reconstruction of philosophy.

Bacon and Scientific Method

Francis Bacon who felt the inadequacy of the old Aristotelian
method of intellectual discipline proposed a new method suitabe for
modern scientific research, in his book called "Novum Organon"
The New Instrument. This new method suitable for scientific re-
search, Bacon describes in detail According to him it should neither
be purely imaginary as the spider's web spun out of its own body
nor it should be merely mechanical collection of facts by obser-
vations like the ant. Scientific method must adopt the way of
the honey-bee which collects materials from various sources and
transforms them into useful honey. Such an intellectual trans-
formation of facts observed will ultimately unlock the secrets of
Nature for the benefit of man, . Such a discovery of Nature's
secrets for the purpose of utilizing them for social reconstruction
ought to be the ideal of science according to Bacon. In order-
to Successfully apply such a scientific method, Bacon prescribes
certain conditions as a necessary intellectual preparation. Gene-
rally the mind of a scientist may be crammed with certain tradi-
tional beliefs and superstitions. Such preconceived notions

SAMAYASARA

which Bacon calls <Jdok' should be entirely got rid of and the
student of science should approach Nature with an unbiassed open
mind which alone will give a correct insight into the Laws of
Nature This experimental method prescribed by Bacon if adopt-
ed by a student of science will give inductive generalisations
relating to the constitution of Nature and her Laws, generabsa-
tions which would be of a certain amount of high probability.
Thouo-h the inductive generalisations arrived at by scientific
research do not have the absolute certainty, characteristic
of mathematical propositions, they were considered by Bacon
to be of great practical value for the benefit of mankind. This
attitude has been perfectly justified by the development of modern
science with the practical application of scientific generalisations
which have transfomed the life of man in the modern world. Such
a reconstruction of human society based upon scientific achieve-
ments was foreseen by Bacon in his essay on the New Atlantis.
This new experimental approach to. Nature has conquered for
science realm after realm departments of Nature as Astronomy,
Physics, Chemistry, Geology etc. This successful conquest
of the realms of Nature by science resulted in complete elimina-
tion of mind of man as a factor for interpretation of natural events.
This elimination of consciousness completely from the field of
research ultimately resulted in scientific reconstruction of Nature
as a huge mechanical system in which the Law of Causation
was the only principle of operation. In this mechanical
system all events are guided by necessary causal conditions.
There is no scope of intellectual interference either to modify
or to suppress the occurrence of natural events according to the
desires of man. The old thought which entertained the possi-
bility of interference with the natural events by supernatural
agencies was completely discredited as a pure mythology having
no place in the realm of Nature, whose constitution is revealed
to the student of Science, This inductive method adopted by
modern science finally resulted in the generalisation of conser-
vation of mass and energy as the basis of nature and in relegation
of consciousness to an extremely subordinate place as a sort of
a by-product in the operation of natural events. Such a general-

INTRODUCTION XIX

isation suggested by the physical science was "also adopted by
Charles Darwin to explain the phenomena relating to the animal
kingdom. He also fell in with* the general trend of physical science
and formulated his famous Law of Evolution, based upon natural
selection and survival of the fittest. This principle of explana-
tion of the origin of species also relegated consciousness as an un :
necessary factor not required for the explanation of life pheno-
mena which he considered to be quite intelligible on the same
principle of mechanical Law of Causation. This intellectual
attitude which attempted to explain both the organic and the
inorganic realms of Nature purely on the principle of mechanical
Law of Causation was designated Naturalism as contested with
prescientific thought which introduced supernaturalism. Such
was the state of modern thought at the end of 191*1 century.
But this triumph of Naturalism was .openly challenged in the
beginning of the zoth century especially by Biologists and Psycho-
logists who exposed the inadequacy of the naturalistic method
of interpretation in dealing with biological and psychological phe-
nomena. This open challenge to Naturalism which started in
the beginning of the present century had led to the recognition
of consciousness as an important factor in the evolution process
of both biological and psychological and restored consciousness
to its own status of dignity and importance. Such a challenge
and the consequent recognition of the importance of consciousness
which is relevant to our general enquiries as to the nature of the
self will be dealt with later on.

Cartesianism Mathematical Methods.

In the meanwhile let us turn to Descartes. He was a mathe-
matician and philosopher and he formulated another method neces-
sary for the reconstruction of philosophy. Being a 'mathema-
tician he wanted to reconstruct metaphysics on certain foundation.
Just as Euclid started with certain undeniable and axiomatic
propositions on the basis of which he raised the whole structure
of mathematics, Descartes opened to examine human experience
and discovered some absolutely certain and undeniable propo-
sitions as the foundation for metaphysical tecp&struction. Like

SAMAYASARA

Bacon he also prescribes certain preliminary conditions as neces-
sary preparation for such a course. He examines the contents
of human experience in order to find out whether there is any-
thing of the nature of mathematical certainty, which cannot be
challenged by anybody. All the traditions and principles Accepted
on the authority of a great person or of the Church, principles and
beliefs on which the religious and moral aspects of human life
are based, he found to be open to challenge and denial The very-
fact that every religious dogma or moral principle has a rival
or opponent in another system reveals the inadequacy of such
religious beliefs. Since they lack the absolute certainty of ma-
thematicaj, propositions they could not be taken as the basis for
philosophical reconstructions. Even the sense presented world
Descartes finds to be inadequate as the world of sense presented
experience is liable to illusions and hallucinations and hence the
object of the sense presented world cannot be taken to be of abso-
lute certainty. Thus step by step he clears the whole of human
experience as inadequate foundation for philosophy according
to his mathematical principle. Is there no intellectual salvation?
Does such a sceptical analysis of our experience leave nothing
to the student? Descartes says there is one thing which is ab-
solutely certain. Even if we doubt every item of experience
the act of doubt cannot be denied. That there is thought even
when in the process of challenging experience must be accepted
as an undeniable fact. If we accept thinking as an undeniable
fact we have necessarily to accept some entity which is respon-
sible for such a thinking Thus he arrived at the famous conclu-
sion Cogito Ergo Sum I think, therefore, I am. Such a scep-
tical analysis through which Descartes approached the 'problem
of metaphysics led him to the thinking self as of absolute cer-
tainty whose reality cannot be doubted at all. This principle
of Cogito Ergo Sum forms the foundation of what is known
as Cartesianism, a philosophical reconstruction just after the
Renaissance in Europe.

Because thought exists therefore the soul exists, is a pro-
position which emphasises the relation between a substance and
its essential .attribute The principle of cogito is an inference

INTRODUCTION

from the reality of an essential attribute to the substance in which
the attribute inheres. The metaphysical bedrock on which Des-
cartes wanted to raise a superstructure was thus arrived at through
a sceptical analysis of human experience. Having arrived at
this inevitable conclusion Descartes tries to bring back all those
ideas which he dismissed as improbable and unreal When he
examines the contents of thought he is able to perceive certain
ideas entirely distinct in nature from the ideas acquired through
sense-perception. The latter are only contingents whereas the
former are found to be necessary and certain. All ideas relat-
ing to mathematics are such necessary ideas. These, cannot
be contradicted; s hence they are absolutely certain. Such neces-
sary ideas which he calls '"innate" must be traced to a different
origin altogether. One of such ideas which he chooses for in-
vestigation is the idea of a perfect and infinite Being, God. Man
could not have acquired this idea through sense perception. Nor
is it possible for him to construct such an .idea from elements
supplied to him by the senses. Hence he concludes that this
idea of a perfect and infinite Being must be an item of thought
from the very beginning of man. Man from the very moment
of his origin should have started with this idea and hence Des-
cartes infeis that this idea necessarily leads to the conclusion
that .there is a real being who is the original of this idea God.
He stamped his own mark on man from the very beginning. By
such an argument Descartes emphasises the reality of a perfect
and infinite Being, God, besides the thinking substance, Soul,
whose reality he established through the famous cogito. Given
the reality of Soul and God, the rest of experience which he dis-
missed as unreal is brought back again. The external world
which he dismissed on the supposition that it might be due to
sense deception is now recognised to be real, for sense deception
would be a blot on the character of the Creator the Perfect Being.
Such a being cannot indulge in deceiving his creatures. Hence
the external world must be accepted to be real. The reality of
the extenal world though admitted to be real is considered to
be entirely distinct from the soul. The external world which
consists of material objects is made up of a different substance

XX11 - SAMAYASARA

altogether matte/, whose essential attribute is extension. Thus
Descartes recognises two distinct substances, the thinking thing
and the extended thing. These two substances constitute the whole
of reality. The physical realm made of extended things is
entirely based upon the mechanical "principle of causation. Any
event in this physical world is necessarily conditioned by ap-
propriate physical antecedents. Human body as a part of this
realm of extension is controlled by the same physical law of
nature, whereas the soul and its behaviour since they are
guided by a different system of laws are not subjected to the
operation of physical laws. This duality consisting of thinking
things and the extended things forms the main characteristic
of Descartes' philosophy. Though he recognises that these
two substances are present in a human being, his body a part
of physical realm and his soul the thinking substance related to
his body, he does not consider that the rest of the animal kingdom
is of this type. The animals have no soul. The animal body
being thus unrelated to the thinking substance, is considered
to be purely a mechanical apparatus, unguided by a think-
ing thing. The animal is a soulless physical automaton. This
Cartesian belief persisted till the end of the 2nd half of the i9th
century when the Biologists proclaimed the fundamental unity
of the animal kingdom and emphasised the kindred nature of
the man and animal. Once again we have to emphasise that the
thinking substance or the soul is the central doctrine of Cartesian
philosophy and this is relevant to our study of the self.

His successor Malebranche took up the problem relating
to the nature of man. According to Descartes man has a dual
nature, his body belonging to the realm of extension is associat-
ed with the soul which belongs to another realm altogether. Each
is a closed system controlled by the operation of distinct laws
In sp lt e of this distinctness the behaviour of man illustrates the
strange phenomenon that a particular change in the mind pro-
duces a corresponding change in the body and vice versa
How could there be such a relation between two things which
are absolutely distinct from each other in nature and attributes.
The body is subject to the laws of the external world, the mind

INTRODUCTION XXJ11

Is the subject to the psychological laws and 'strangely- these two
appear to be related in the human* being. This is a problem for
Malebrancbe to explain. How could there be a- correspondence
between an event in the physical realm, and an event in the mental
realm when they belong *to the isolated systems. The solution
offered by him consists in his throwing the responsibility on
the shoulders of God for maintaining such a correspondence
between events belonging to two different and isolated systems
of reality.

According to Maiebranche, God so arranges things that
there is a parallel and harmonious correspondence between events
in the physical realm and events in the psychical realm. Such
a solution of a harmony secured through divine intervention was
found inadequate. His successor Spinoza, the famous God in-
toxicated philosopher took up the trend of thought as left by
Malebranche and developed to a wonderful pantheism. He
found the dualism of substances-, thinking thing and the extend-
ed thing, which was the legacy of Descartes to be an inadequate
explanation of experience, necessitating the intervention of a
third substance to make the relation between the two intelligible.
Spinoza thought such a multiplication of substances to be purely
unnecessary. According to Spinoza there is only one substance,
God, endowed with a number of attributes of which the exten-
sion and thought are but two important attributes. All phy-
sical objects in the external ? world are but modifications of this
ultimate substance through the attribute of extension J and all
the living beings, the souls are again the modifications of the ulti-
mate substance through the other attribute of thought. The theory
of harmony through divine intervention introduced by Male-
branche for the purpose of explaining human behaviour was
considered to be quite irrelevant and unnecessary by Spinoza.
Man being a modification of the ultimate substance must exhi-
bit corresponding changes both in extension and thought, the
ultimate substance being the necessary condition for correspond-
ing changes. Thus the thinking substances with which Des-
cartes started passed through the two natured man of Malebran-
che and ended with the all-absorbing pantheism of Spinoza.

SAMAYASAR4-

The Spinozistic pantheism though extremely fascinating did not
last long. It reduced human personality to an entirely inadequate
and unimportant position and whenever there is such,, a deterio-
ration of human personality there is always the inevitable reaction.
The Spino2istic pantheism which absorbed all thinking things
and reduced them to non-entities was followed by Leibniz'

monadism.

Leibniz wanted to restore the reality of individual personality.
He did not relish the theory of an all devouring ultimate subs-
tance. Hence according to Leibniz the whole system of reality
consisted of monads or Individual units, some of which are think-
ing monads and others with a dormant thought. Thus though
thought is the necessary characteristic of all monads it was
explicitly present in some monads and in others it existed in a
latent form. These latter monads whose thought was latent practi-
cally appeared to be unthinking substance and thus constituted
the physical realm. The unity emphasised by Spinoza between the
external world and the thinking souls was thus retained by
Leibniz though he threw overboard" the utlimate God substance
which Spinoza introduced to bring about the unity. According to
Leibniz the unity is the Identical nature of the monads throughout
the realm of reality,, though some of these constituted the appa-
rently unthinking physical objects as contrasted with the think-
ing monads or souls. Thus at one stroke, the ultimate God
substance of Spinoza was split up into an infinite number of
monads, all identical In kind though they appeared with differ-
ent degrees of developments. 'This theory which reduced the
world to an infinite number of monads has introduced a problem
in itself. Leibniz 5 monad was considered to be completely self-
sufficeint. Development of thought was purely an internal affair.
Even in the matter of sense presentation Leibniz does not believe
that the monad has an access to the external world. The monad
is windowless and completely shut up within itself. There is no
external world or internal world in the case of monads. The
monads being completely windowless and shut up, how could
they have a common object of perception? Several individuals
may perceive the same tree or stone in the external world. Monads

INTRODUCTION XXV

being windowless, the common perception of single object in
the external world will remain unintelligible because there is
no perception at all, much less a common perception. Percep-
tion is an inner development in the monad and hence the supposed
common perception of the same thing in the external world could
only be interpreted as a correspondence in the perceptive cons-
ciousness of the various windowless monads unrelated to one an-
/other. Here Leibniz introduces his theory of pre-established har-
mony which is merely a modified form of Malebranche's theory of
divine intervention. When the monads were first created they
were so arranged that each developed in. its own way and main-
tained a correspondence with the other monads which develop-
ed in their own way. In order to illustrate this pre-established
harmony, Leibniz compares Monads to several clocks which
may show the same time though unconnected with one another.
The different clocks may be wound up and may be set up at a
particular time and they will all show the same time at subse-
quent periods, not because they are connected with one another,
but because their mechanism is so constructed that they are bound
to show an inevitable correspondence. This he calls pre-esta-
blished harmony which he introduced for the purpose of. explain-
ing the mysterious correspondence in experience among the vari-
ous windowless monads.

THE ENGLISH EMPIRICISM

Let us turn to the empirical philosophy of Locke, Berkeley
and Hume. Here we have a complete change of attitude. In-
stead of trying to understand the nature of the substance, the
Ego, the English empirical philosophers confined themselves
to the analysis of human understanding. Technically there is
a shift from the ontological point of view to the epistemologi-
cal point of view. Here is an attempt to comprehend the nature
of the self by trying to analyse the nature and the process of know-
ledge and by examining the nature of the contents of .knowledge.
We saw that, the Cartesian philosophy was based upon what is
called in the innate idea, the idea of the Supreme and the infinite

r r r | SAMAYASARA

Bein, The Cartesians recognised the importance of such neces-
fa "Ideal besides sense perception, But the English empiri-
7plsophers start with this assumption that there is nothing
n th mind which was not obtained through the senses.
Hence all the contents of the human understanding may be traced
to sense perception. The mind itself is compared to a sort o
photographic camera with the sensitive plate inside the mind on
Lch the sense impressions are created by the stimuh from the-
environment. What the mind perceives is just the impression
on this sensitive plate caused by the objects in the external world.
The mind itself being a passive receptacle of impressions from
outside and the contents of the mind must be ultimately traced to
the impression caused by external objects. Starting with this as-
sumption Locke tries to make a distinction among the impressions
so created by external objects. Some of the characteristics of these
sense impressions or images in the mind such as colour, taste, smell,
etc., are dependent upon the nature and function of the sensory
organs. These qualities are referred by the mind to the external
objects. These are caUed secondary qualites as contrasted with the
primary qualities of extension etc. The spatial object perceived by
the senses thus appears to be a complex constituted by the spatial
properties of extension, solidity etc., and the sense created pro-
perties of colour, taste, smell etc. According to Locke, the latter
secondary qualities are purely mental and are present in the mind
alone though they are referred to external objects. The object
existing in space has only space qualities without these secondary
qualities. Thus the external object is analysed into two groups
of properties, the primary properties residing on the object in
the external world and the -secondary qualities as colour, taste
and smell are really present in the mind though referred to the
external object by the mental habit. By this analysis Locke empha-
sises the importance of the stimuli from the external world and
reduces the mind or the self to a tabula rasa an inactive
passive receptacle for impressions and converts the objects of
the external world into colourless entities though endowed with
spatial properties. This bifurcation of experience partly consist-
ing of colourless external objects and partly consisting of

INTRODUCTION xxvii

mental impressions inside -the consciousness is taken up by his
successor, Berkeley.

Berkeley, being a clefgyman is influenced 'by his religious
predilections. He is not satisfied with Locke's classification of
properties as primary and* secondary. Even the spatial properties
which Locke considers primary and which are supposed to reside
in the external world are really dependent upon the nature and
. function of the perceiving agent. Intrinsically there is no
distinction between the spatial qualities of the object and the pro-
perties of colour, taste and smell. The whole group of proper-
ties thus being taken to be mental images, the only form of
reality consists of a number of perceiving spirits for there sis no
external reality of objects. The spirit and its ideas constitute
the experience of the individual self and the whole world and the
nature is but the perceived body of the supreme spirit, God.. Just-
as one individual spirit appears to another individual spirit as an
embodied entity so the supreme spirit of God appears to the
individuals as the world of Nature which is really the body of
God. Thus according to Berkeley, the external objects cease
to exist" and the reality consists of an infinite number of indivi-
duals, spirits presided over by the Supreme Spirit. One spirit
appears to another in the form of body whereas the body itself
is really the mental image in the mind of the perceiving spirit.
What we are sure about is our own self. Our knowledge of the
external world is based upon an inference from the directly per-
ceived ideas or images inside the mind and even that inference
is unwarranted and erroneous. What we surely know is our own
spirit and the ideas present in mind which we wrongly assume to
be the objects of the external world. This empirical idealism
of Berkeley is taken up by the Scotish philosopher, Hume.

Hume, is not influed by religious bias. He carries the em-
pirical analysis rigorously to its logical conclusion. He accepts
Berkeley's analysis of the external world as sound. The contents
of the mind are but ideas. Imagining them to be objects in the
external world is certainly unwarranted and erroneous as is main-
tained by Berkeley. But Berkeley's certain assertions about the
nature of the spirit is but the result of religious prejudices, Bet-

SAMAYASARA,.

must have directed his attention towards this nature of
ram. If he had done so he would have obtained a different result.
-Tor whenever 1 turn my attention inwards" says Hume I stum-
ble upon some idea or other and what they call the Soul I
am not able to perceive". Thus wten experience is thrown
into the crucible of philosophical analysis by Hume not only the
external world disappears but also the supposed undoubted
entity called the spirit or the self which could not withstand the
logical analysis of experience. According to Hume therefore
consciousness consists of a series of successive ideas or images,
a stream of psychic entities and nothing more. Beliet in
the spirit or the soul is as unwarranted as belief in the ex-
ternal objects. Belief in these instances is but a psychological
habit which could not stand the test of rational analysis. The
popular assumptions of the external world and the existence ol:
a self are thus dismissed to be unwarranted social prejudices by
Hume, social prejudices which cannot be accepted as philoso-
phical truths. Thus Locke's empiricism ends logically in the
' Hume's Nihilism according to which there is no reality except
the stream of conscious ideas. As a result of this nihilistic con-
clusion Hume is bound to discard even the Law of Causation
which is the bedrock of modern science. The belief that events
in nature are inevitably determined by their antecedent causal
conditions is also taken to be purely a habit of the mind having
no rational foundations. The fact that A precedes B dn so
many occasions creates in the mind the habit to expect B
whenever A occurs and on account of this habit A is called the
cause of B. Beyond this mental habit of expecting B whenever
A occurs there is no rational connection between .A and B.
There is no reason why B may not occur after X or Y. There is
no fundamental reason to prove that B will occur only after
A and not after any other event, X or Y. Therefore the Law
of Causation which is made so much of by modern science is also
converted by Hume's analysis to be a popular prejudice based
upon the mental habit having no rational foundation. This
nihilistic conclusion of Hume is exacdy parallel to the Buddhistic
conception of experience in Indian thought. Buddhism also

INTRODUCTION

is a sort of Nihilism for which neither the external world nor the
Self or Atma has any reality. What really exists is a stream of
momentary and mental impressions and nothing more. Thus
the English empiricism practically ends in the denial of both
the self and the external world.

THE GERMAN IDEALISM

Hume's sceptical analysis resulted in reducing not only
the Law, of Causation to an empty mental habit but also in reject-
ing all propositions such as mathematical ones which are consi-
dered absolutely certain and unchallengeable. Propositions in
mathematics according to Hume depend upon the same mental
habit which is the foundation of the Law of Causation. We
have been accustomed to observe for example the angles of a
triangle are together equal to two right angles. Merely because
the fact that this proposition has been observed to be true in the
past in all cases that we examined., it does not follow that it would be
true in other cases. Thus even mathematical propositions accord-
ing to Hume are only highly probable statements but not neces-
sarily binding on the human intellect to be absolutely true. This
sceptical result obtained by Hume was the starting point of idealism.
Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher admits that he
was roused from his dogmatic slumber by Hume. According
to Kant, Hume's result though logically inevitable from the
empirical assumptions shows the frustration of reason. Neither
the dogmatic philosophy of Descartes nor the sceptical philoso-
phy of Hume would be a satisfactory solution of the metaphysical
problem. Kant therefore attempted to reconstruct metaphysics
in such a way as to avoid both these extremes. As he himself
confesses "The starry heavens above and the moral law within
always fill me with awe and reverence". His task as a philosopher
therefore is to explain nature and constitution of the cosmos and
iinclerstand and explain the significance of the moral " Law,
The former he takes up in his first book of Pure Reason
atid the latter he takes up in ' his second book of Practical
Reason. His attempt to salvage metaphysics from Humean
scepticism constrains him to examine first the foundations of

,_. r SAMAYASARA

A.A.A. '

mathematics. Are the mathematical propositions really necessary
and true or are merely contingent and probable statements.? He
is not prepared to accept the latter alternative. Hence he con-
centrates his attention to find a suitable explanation for the necessary
truth of mathematical proposition. According to Kant the typical,
mathematical proposition is associated with geometry. Hence tor
him space is the foundation of mathematics. The problem there-
fore resolves itself into the study of the nature of space and its
properties. Locke's attempt to give space an independent
existence in the external world proved to be futile in the hands
of his successors Berkeley and Hume. If space therefore is
assumed to be an external entity then we have to get ourselves
entangled in the inevitable scepticism of Hume. Hence Kant
is compelled to adopt a new method. The external world no
doubt is the region of sense stimuli. But the object perceived by
the sense is the result of a combination between the stimuli suppli-
ed from the external source and the shape given to it by the mind
itself. The contribution which the mind makes in the process
of perception is the form of space. Space and time according
to Kant are the forms contributed by the mind while it is engaged
in the process of perceiving external objects. The external world
as seen by us is thus the result of two different factors, one the
sense stimuli from an external source, the other the space which
the mind impresses upon these sense stimuli. Thus no object-
can become an object of perception for us unless it is compelled
to take the form of space. Since it is the combined product of
sense stimuli and space-form it necessarily follows that all objects
perceived by us must necessarily have the form of space impressed
on the materials by the mind itself. Spatial quality therefore
becomes a necessary property with all perceived objects in our
sense-presented experience. This world of experience therefore
must necessarily conform to spatial form and hence the objects
of experience must necessarily be in conformity with spatial pro-
perties. If spatial form is indispensable and necessary concomi-
tant of physical objects, the space properties are similarly inevitable
and necessary in a sense presented experience. It automatically
Follows according to Kant that spatial properties which are neces-

INTRODUCTION

sary and inevitable form the foundation of mathematics. Hence
mathematical propositions since they are based upon the proper-
ties of space must also share the nature of space and thus must
be necessary and inevitable. Thus having secured a safe foun-
dation for mathematical propositions, Kant next goes to further
examine the implications of human understanding. Just as in
the process of perceptual activity mind contributes the forms of
space and time so also in the higher intellectual activity of under-
standing mind contributes certain other elements which he calls
categories, the most important of which is Causation. Since
the construction of experience is to be in conformity with the
categories of human understanding they must be according
to the pattern of causation which happens to be the frame work
of the whole edifice, according to Kant. Hence causation is
the inevitable and necessary frame-work of human experience and
events therein must necessarily happen according to this causal
sequence on which the whole structure rests. Thus after securing
a foundation for the principle of causation in the very structure
of human experience, Kant surveys the whole of experience which
is the result of mainly the activity of the mind in contributing '
the forms and categories according to which the sense-materials
are shaped and arranged. The sense material which is thus
fashioned into the human experience by the mind comes from
beyond. What is the source from which this sense stimulus
comes to the mind? Have we any access to this? Kant frankly
admits that this 'Beyond' from which sense stimuli proceed is
inaccessible to the mind and therefore not known. For accord-
ing to him anything that is to be known by the mind must become
a part of human experience and hence must be already subject
to operational activity of mind and must bear its impression.
Hence what is not so subjected to the intellectual operation must
necessarily be outside our experience and hence must necessarily
be unknown. This thing which is outside our experience and
which is unknown and which is the source of sense stimuli,
Kant calls the "Thing in itself." Similarly the mind we are
aware of is the one engaged in its operational activity in the ex-
perience. What the mind is when it is not so engaged in the

SAlylAYASARA

fabrication of human experience is unknown, since it is also out-
side the human experience. Therefore the Ego in itself also is
beyond our knowledge as the Thing r in itself. The Ego in itself
and the Thing in itself since both lie outside our experience must
necessarily be unknown to us and hefice we cannot state anything
about them. Nevertheless we are certain of their existence though
we are not aware of their nature. .This unknown region of the
Thing in itself and the Ego in itself is the region of real existence
according to Kant which is the "Noumenal" region as contrasted
with the phenomenal nature of our experience. Thus our ex-
perience is confined to the phenomenal region whereas the ulti-
mate reality is the region of Naumena of the, thing in itself and
the ego in itself. This result obtained by Kant is rather unsatis-
factory. The ultimate region of reality remains unknown for
ever and what we know is the phenomenal one which is merely
an unimportant appearance resulting from the operation ot the
mind upon the stimuli supplied by tiling in itself. Thus we are
destined to be shut up within the phenomenal experience never
hoping to come out beyond this magic circle. Kent's attempt
to salvage metaphysics from Humean scepticism thus results in
an inevitable agnosticism according to which man can never
know the nature of reality and must be satisfied with the unim-
portant illusory appearance of the phenomenal world. In split
of this unsatisfactory conclusion., Kant proceeds with an undaunted
spirit to reintroduce some of the important moral concepts which
got exploded in the first part of his Critique of Pure Reason. The
conclusion of the Critique of Pure Reason does not permit Kant
to speak with any amount of certainty as to the nature of Kj$o,
whether it is -mortal or immortal, whether its ultimate destiny is
to achieve the combination of .virtue and happiness, lie frankly
says that according to pure reason we can never be certain about
this. In his Critique of Practical Reason many of these concept s arc
admitted by the back door which were driven out by the front
door. He proceeds with the assumption that virtue must neces-
sarily be associated with happiness. If virtue is not associated
with happiness ultimately there can be no moral foundation at
all. But in ordinary experience, virtue is not always associated

INTRODUCTION XXX111

with happiness. That is why in cases of weak men they forsake
virtue in pursuit of pleasure., because they find that virtue is not
always rewarded with happiness. This contradiction of moral
experience, Kant attempts to solve by his metaphysical suggestion,
the ultimate summum bonum of life necessarily be the combination
- of virtue and happiness. This would happen though not now
ultimately in some far off future. If this proposition is accepted
it necessarily follows that the short span of life which man enjoys
in the phenomenal world persists beyond the phenomenal birth
and death and hence the immortality of self should be accepted
if the moral proposition that virtue and happiness coincide some-
' how is to be accepted; Thus according to Kant in order to justify
moral life of our existence we are bound to accept the reality and
immortality of the self which could not be guaranteed according
to the pure reason of his first book. Thus in spite of the Agnos-
ticism in his first book he attempts to restore the centre of gravity
in the second book, the Practical Reason, where he tries to explain
the reality and immortality of the self and provides rational justi-
fication of his moral pursuit in search of happiness. In spite
of his service to religion and morality his metaphysical system as
a whole remains unbalanced since it rests upon a meaningless
dualism of Naumena, the Unknown Reality and the phenomena,
the unimportant illusory experience, which is the only source of
knowledge for us.

Kant's philosophy is taken up by his successor Fichte.
Fichte directs his attention to the criticism of the Thing in itself.
The Noumenal world which was considered to be the ultimate
reality by Kant which was also said to be unknown and unknow-
able Fichte considered to be an unnecessary metaphysical en-
cumbrance. Why speak about the thing which is unknown
and unknowable? What is the value of your statement as to
the existence of such a reality ? Since nothing is known as to its
existence and its nature, Fichte dismisses that as unworthy of
metaphysical consideration and confines himself to what Kant
called the phenomenal world of appearance. Therefore Fichte
recognised the ego and the phenomenal world which it constructs.
He does not worry himself as to the source of the sense stimuli.
3

SAMAYASARA

necessary because of the fuU moral - growth for the self. The
es the .odd of experience, a sort of ****^
which it struggles in order to gain moral strength and to
^w Till stature of moral personality. Thus with
fichte there is nothing more than the setf and the phenomenal
world of experience which it creates for its own purpose; there
is no other reality besides this. Thus Kantian idealism in the
hands of Fichte turns out to be merely the self and the phenomenal
world of experience which it creates, a result more or less same
as the Berkeley's idealism in English empiricism. This dis-
missal of the foundation of external reality and converting it into
merely an appearance created by the self was considered to be
extremely unsatisfactory and it was rejected by his successor
Hegel. Hegel is one of the great world thinkers. He saw
how a careless analysis led to an unsatisfactory and incomplete
system of metaphysics. He was not satisfied with Fichte's moral
idealism. Nor was he satisfied with Kant's bifurcation of reality
into a thing in itself and the phenomenal world of appearance.
The whole attempt of Hegel is to restore the ultimate unity of
reality and to avoid the inconvenient corollary of mistaken
bifurcation. He does not like to postulate the reality as unknown
and unknowable far off from the world of experience. He can't
think of a reality detached from the world of experience. The
reality must be in the world of experience and there must be an
intimate relation between this reality and what Kant called the
phenomenal appearance. The thing in itself dissociated from the
world of appearance and appearance dissociated from the under-
lying reality, both are meaningless abstractions according to Hegel.
The appearance is just the appearance of the reality and the
reality cannot exist apart from and independent of its appearance
which is but its manifestation. The contradiction between the
reality and appearance is but the result of mental abstraction,
and as such has no basis in a genuine metaphysics. The function

INTRODUCTION XXXV

of metaphysics is to understand the significance of our great
experience and any conclusion that nullifies the reality of our ex-
perience must be self condemned. Hence Hegel tries to bring
back the reality which was located in a far off beyond by Kant
and restore it to its legitimate place in the world of experience.
According to Hegel the great world of experience consists of or-
ganic entities which are characterised by continuous growth and
development. Organic development is significant and symbolic
of the nature of reality itself. What do we find in the nature of
organism? What is the process of growth of a particular tree or
a plant? A seed that does not sprout out must be considered to be
defunct and worthless. If it is to grow into a plant it must some-
how change its nature as a seed breaking itself up so that the seed-
ling may sprout out. The tender plant that comes out of the seed
must also change its nature and put on foliage. Further growth
must necessarily depend upon sprouting out of the new leaves
and shedding of the old ones. Thus the growth of an organism
consists in a process of dying in order to live a combination
of two opposite processes united and integrated in the life
of the organism. This process of organic growth which con-
tains within itself the process of breaking up and building up
while maintaining its intrinsic identity and unity is the central
idea of Hegel's thought. He calls that "dialectic". According
to this dialectic we have the thesis, the antithesis and synthesis.
Thesis refers to the postulation of affirmation characterising this.
Antithesis is just the opposite negation of this characteristic, and
synthesis is the combination of the two processes in the same nature
of organic identity. The growth of organism is the illustration
of this dialectical process. If you fix your attention to a particular
stage in its growth you have to postulate its nature at that moment.
If what is true at that moment does not change but perpetuates
itself then the plant will practically die. If it is to live it must
give up its nature and change into something else. It must
shed off its own leaves and put on new sprouts. It must change.
It must be displaced by antithesis. Without antithesis there cannot
be growth, no reality. Yet the change must be consistent with its
thesis. A margosa plant all of a sudden will not put on the charac-

SAMAYASARA

teristics of a mango tree. That will be a mass self-destruction.
No reality in nature behaves in this erratic fashion. Even
while the old leaves are shed off and'the new sprouts are springing
up, the intrinsic identity of the plant is not destroyed. There
is a mysterious process of synthesis Vhich maintains the ultimate
identity and unity throughout the process of this change. This
dialectical process which we found illustrated in the life of
a single organism is taken to be a symbolic process of the whole
of Reality. Viewed from this point of dialectic, the whole of
reality of our experience is characterised by this process of
change, a change which is held together by an underlying inevitable
identical unity. Identity in the midst of difference, unity in the
midst of multiplicity, reality in the midst of appearance are the
significant phrases used by Hegel in describing the nature of
reality. To speak of identity in isolation from the diversity or
unity apart from multiplicity or of a reality apart from appearance
should be said to be an empty abstraction in the place of reality and
these empty abstractions can never sustain their stability long, even
tb se though they are set up in metaphysical throne by careless
thinkers. They must quit the realm of abstraction and come back
to the world of experience where alone they can live and have
significance. This realisation of reality in its proper place in the
realm of experience and the recognition of its importance in the
midst of appearance and diversity must be considered to be the
greatest contribution of Hegel to modern philosophy. He
accepts the Kantian doctrine that experience is the result of the
activity of mind though he rejects Kantian abstraction of reality.
When viewed from his own dialectical process this world of
experience is but the appearance and the manifestation of the ulti-
mate reality. The whole is an organic process of development
^underlying reality being spiritual. He calls this ultimate
reality, the Idea. v The great world of experience is the dialectical
manifestation of this ultimate Idea. This ultimate idea is also
caUed the Absolute, a term which has become more popular
among the philosophers. The absolute is ultimate reality, the
manifestation of which is experience of this great world. The
great world of experience therefore is considered by Hegel as

INTRODUCTION XXXV11

an organic growth. Hegelianism became very popular throughout
the thinking world and practically aU. the European thinkers have
been influenced by Hegel's -metaphysics. Absolutism of Hegel
became dominant world concept. It immensely influenced the
world in all the fortunes of life. Universities in England and
in the continent of Europe and even in the distant America
were subject to the influence of Hegelian absolutism, and thinkers
began to introduce Hegel's point of view and the dialectical devel-
opment as a necessary panacea for the intellectual troubles created
by the earlier thinkers. Besides its influence directed in the face
of metaphysics which completely brushed aside the other forms
of thought as English Empiricism, Kantian idealism etc.
Hegel's influence was felt in two important directions which led
to the complete transformation, of the concept of State and concept
of the society. When Hegel postulated that the ultimate reality
is absolute and the whole of our experience is the manifestation of
this absolute, every department of human activity including
religion and morality is given a subsidiary place in this develop-
ment of the absolute idea. The most important manifestation
of this absolute according to Hegel is the State organisation.
The state is the greatest and the highest manifestation of this
absolute idea, and every other social organisation must subordinate
to this. Even the Church must be subordinate to the State and
religion becomes an instance in the manifestation of the State
organisation. The ultimate result of this State absolutism of Hegel
reduced human personality to the status of building material for
raising the edifice of a State. Man is but a brick to be utilised
for constructing the State edifice and besides this function there
is no justification for the existence of man. This result is unfor-
tunately the contradiction of the noble idealism of man by Kant
who declared that man is an end to himself and should not be
reduced to a means for any end. Hegel's absolutism completely
changes this picture and reduces man to be merely the material for
building up the State. Man derives his significance and impor-
tance only because of his services to the State. Apart from the
State organisation he has no significance and no right of indepen-
dent existence. Thus from a genuine metaphysical contribution,

SAMAYASARA

a perverse political philosophy is developed which pervaded the
whole European culture and ^civilisation and resulted in the two
destructive world wars.

The other development of this Hegelian absolutism is in the
economic direction. Karl Mas,- the founder o communism claims
himself to be a disciple of Hegel. His masterpiece c< The Capital" is
the Bibe of the Communist. He postulates that the socio-political
development is according to the process of the Hegelian dialectic-
materialistic. Tracing the growth of economic development up
to 1 9th Century, he points out the intrinsic contradiction between
capital and labour and emphasises the intrinsic identity and unity of
both. The capitalist who controls the productive machinery is but
the creature of labour and as such should be made subordinate
to labour which is the ultimate creator of wealth. The economic
organisation which allows the concentration of wealth in the
hands of a few capitalists who happen to control the productive
industries and who engage thousands of labourers to run the
.machinery according to Marx is an iniquitous economic system.

Hence the restoration of the economic organisation accord-
ing to Karl Marx must consist in restoring the true controlling
agency to that power which creates wealth, i.e. the labour which
creates wealth must necessarily be controlling agency of the
capital and must run the industrial organisation. The creator
of wealth must have the right to control it and to enjoy it. This
economic revolution is also the result of Hegelian absolutism
in subjugating the organisation of society. Thus the modern
civilisation of Europe which started with Hegelian absolutism ex-
hibits both the beneficial influence as well as the baneful influence
of the Hegelian absolutism.

II

SAMAYASARA
INTRODUCTION H-SELF IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Before we begin the systematic study of the Darsanas let us
try to acquaint ourselves first with the general tendencies, of
Indian thought prior to the rise of Buddhism, All the mil-

INTRODUCTION XXXlX

able information is to be gathered from three sources, (i) The
later Samhitas, the Brahmanas, and the Upanishads. (2) Jaina
literature secular and religious. (3) Buddhistic literature secular
and religious. A broad survey of the first group certainly indi-
cates the existence of a rival school of thought side by side with
what may be considered the main current of orthodox think-
ing. This early protestant school among the Aryans had its im-
portant influence in moulding the thought of the Aryans in general,
sometimes because of its strong opposition and sometimes be-
cause of sympathetic reconciliation. Roughly speaking this school
of Aryan Protestantism may be associated with the Kshatriyas
of the Ikshavaku line whereas the Aryans of the Kurupanchala
may be identified with the orthodox school. In this connec-
tion it is better to remember that the term orthodox simply means
implicit acceptance of the. ritualism of Vedic sacrifice whereas
protestantism merely means opposition to the sacrificial ritualism
either in a complete or a partial form. This Ikshavaku house of
Kshatriyas is associated with Ayodhya, in the country of Kosala.
Puranas as well as the literature of the Jains and the Buddhists,
all vie with one another in singing the praises of the kings of
the Ikshavaku line. It is enough to mention the fact that one of
the two great epics " of India is about on Ikshavaku hero. The
Ikshavaku heroes have so much dominated the thought of the
later Vedic period that about the time of Puranas, some of the
members of the Ikshavaku line were elevated to the avatarship
of Vishnu. In describing generally the characteristics of the
Raghus, Kalidasa says "The Raghus during their youth are
engaged in study, during the period of manhood are engaged
in their daily household life, in old age renounce the house-
hold life and become Munis and finally relinquished the body
after performing Yoga".

In Samhitas the self or atman only means that self existing in free
form of spirit. It is the life of all lives and the moving power of all
things. This idea of the atman is further elaborated in the Brah-
manas and the Upanishads until it is made to absorb all the other
ideasanditmeanstheonlyreal'existence. In the beginning the world
was the atman alone. There was nothing else near to it. It thought

xl SAMAYASAflA

"let me create the universe" and the universe was created. Here
also atman figures as the Loid and King of all. "As the spokes
of a wheel in the chariot so all the souls of the world are fastened
in one that soul the Gods adore as the light of all lights. That
divine self is not fully grasped by tradition nor by understanding
nor by all revelation. It is him whom the self chooses. By
him alone is the self to be grasped". Spiritual immortality consists
in the perceiving of the Divine self the atman as the only existing
thing. The other conception that runs parallel to this until it
finally becomes identified with it is the Brahman. In the Rig
hymns Brahman signifies force or will. It means the sacred
hymn or prayer invoking the aid of Gods. This hymn or Prayer
is endowed with a mystic power an occult force which inevitably
binds the Gods towards men. This meaning of the word Brahman
slightly changes and becomes applicable to the magic utterance
at the sacrifice. Thus the term gets a new connotation, and the
term itself most probably was derived from a different root BriA
which means to grow or spread. Finally it came to signify the
priest who uttered the sacrificial mantra. Thus the term Brahman
became identified with the sacrificial priest. Finally this term is
used to designate a person of a particular community whose
general occupation would be sacrifice. The term now became a
term of masculine gender and that is the present significance in as
much as it refers to a member of a particular caste. But from the
original vedic meaning of prayer or magic power of prayer there
is another line of connotation ending with Upanishadic Brahman.
The term Brahman in the sense of prayer is constantly used in the
vedic hymns and in the Brahmanas. This magic power denoting
some thing of spiritual order behind the visible universe forms the
foundation of Brahman in the sense of God, though this import
is not quite prominent in the period of the Rig Veda'until it is
explicitly present in the Brahmanas. Brahman is spoken of as a
God dwelling in the highest place whose head is the sky, whose
measure is the Earth and it is this significance which becomes
prominent in the Upanishadic period. Throughout the Upanish-
adic- texts we find this as the ruling conception. Towards the
close of the Upanishadic period there is the identification of Biah-

IISCTRODUCTION xH

man with atman. These terms ate indiscriminately used to refer
to the ultimate reality of which mn and the nature are but the
special manifestations. "From him the universe springs, to Him
it returns." "Thou art the self of all and maker of all." In
Maxmullers' words "it was "an epoch in the History of the Human
mind when the identity of self with the neuter Brahman was for
the first time conceived though the name of the terms the ultimate
reality which is the import of both is very often referred to as
Sat existence. Tatwamasi that thou art. This famous Upanish-
adic formula represents the development and the final identifi-
cation of the terms atman and Brahman. Then it becomes a
transcendental concept thereafter. The significance of personality
which was associated with atman gets submerged in the neuter
concept of Brahman. The Upanishadic Brahman is said to be
beyond description. It can be described only negatively. It
is not man or woman nor is it neuter. It is without breath, with-
out mind., higher than the Highest, the Imperishable. The only
adequate description we can have of this is Neti Neti-not .this,
no-no. When we go to study the Upanishads in detail we shall
see more of this.

The Age of the UpamshadsTkt Upanishadic age has certain
marked characteristics peculiar to itself and not found either in
the Samhita or Brahmana period. During the Rig Vedic period
the Aryans were mainly of a homogeneous society. Their Gods
were magnified human beings actuated by human sympathies and
sharing even human failures. The vedic singer invoked their
aid both in war and peace to fight the enemy and to promote
his own prosperity. This age corresponds to the Homeric age in
the Greek civilisation. All this primitive simplicity disappears
when we enter into the Upanishadic period. Here we have a
different order of society. We are no more with the Aryans whose
life was mainly pastoral, whose wealth was cattle and who spent
most of their time in offering sacrifices to Indra or Agni and drinking
their favourite soma. To bring the Greek parallel once again we
are quitting the world of Agamemnon and Odysseus and entering
the world of Socrates and Euripides. Now we are concerned with
a people already divided into different sects and we are face to face

xlii SAMAYASAR-4

with a race highly contemplative. Sacrifices and rituals do not
retain their importance though they are still extant. These per-
sist merely as vestigial institutions preserved by tradition and
custom. They ceased to be the genuine ideals of religion. The
intellectual atmosphere is surcharged with sophistical ideal-
ism. In short -we are in the centre of the world of Indian
sophists who are actuated by theoretic curiosity as to the nature of
man and the universe. With such a change in the body politic of
the Aryans, the old order must have elapsed. We already noticed
the internal social differentiation even during the period of the
Brahmanas. The Vedic bard has somehow lost his enthusiasm for
life. The joy of living present is somehow surreptitiously replaced
by the ennui of life. Life in this world is nothing but a link in
the endless chain of births and deaths. Link after link may come
and go but the chain will go on for ever. This mysterious
whirligig of life, endless and aimless rotation of births and deaths
is considered by the upanishadic thinkers as an evil to be avoided.
The theory of transmigration and the corollary of karma have
somehow taken possession of the thought of this age. Further
the social organisation has resulted in the establishment of
certain religious customs as well. Besides the differentiation
into several castes the upanishadic society recognised four
distinct stages of individual development. This evidently
refers to a process of spiritual probation and development to
which every one irrespective of birth was entitled. The period
of youth is to be spent as a Brahmachari when the young man is
to be educated under the personal guidance and supervision of
a master. During this period he has to live away from his home
in his master's ashram. Learning and service are the only two
occupation for him. Intellectual development of the highest
order associated with personal humility would equip the indivi-
dual to discharge his duties in the best possible manner. So
Wped the Brahmachari after education returns home and enters

h7detanTl *f* **"*** Now he becomes a house-
holder and looks after his personal property, gets married and
lives as a husband.and father. As a member of the ToZ then
he does not forget Hs obliations _ H rto

INTRODUCTION

duties and thus contributes to the general welfare of society.
But he is not to be here for ever. He has to enter the third stage
of his life. He is to become a parivrajaka or a religious mendi-
cant wholly devoted to the spiritual affairs. Having served
society well and to the best- of his ability he now depends upon
society for his maintenance devoting his whole time to philoso-
phical research. Now he spends most of his time outside the
grama or nagara staying in the adjoining vana or woodland.
On account of this habit of dwelling in the Udyanas or' Vanas
outside the city, the third stage is very often referred to as the stage
of Vanaprastha. This is to be followed by complete renunciation
which is the last stage Sanyasa which marks the close of the
spiritual development. The Upanishads and their associated
Aranyakas perhaps refer to the third stage, Vanaprastha. It calls
to our mind a picture of life closely akin to that of St. Francis
of Assissi in the medieval Europe. His associates were the beasts
and the birds of the forest. He had untrammelled spiritual
peace, that passeth understanding in the undisturbed solitude of
forest full of charm. It is something like this that we have to
imagine as the characteristic of the Upanishadic period. We
are ushered into a world of congregations of preachers and dis-
ciples, the former elaborately expounding, the latter reverently
listening to the theosophic rahasya otherwise known as Upanishadic
secrets. The change from the world of sacrificial ritual to the
world of philosophic speculation brought with it new claimants
to honour and Truth. The sacrificial mantras and the sacrificial
procedure were mainly cultivated and practised by the priestly
class during the earlier period. But the Brahma vidya or atman
cult of the Upanishads has nothing in common with the reci-
tation of sacrificial formuii. This new philosophic speculation
seems to have had its origin in the king's courts. It is asso-
ciated with the Kshatriyas perhaps on account of peace and pros-
perity or perhaps the fruits of life are eaten to surfeit by them.
The Kshatriyas were the first to experience the emptiness of life
and to turn their attention inwards in search of the underlying
spiritual principle, atman or Brahman. Whatever be the social
conditions that brought about this new outlook on life this

. SAMAYASARA

much Is certain that the Kshatriyas of the Upanishadic age were
mainly engaged in the speculation about man and the universe
whereas traditional sacrifices were still important to the priestly
class. Perhaps this is not quite an accurate description. Even
the priests could not escape the influences of this new thought.
We see them therefore disturbed by this new discontent. They
go about from place to place from thinker to thinker with the
object of getting initiated into the new wisdom, the atma vidya.
.This craving for the Brahma vidya becomes almost universal.
The whole age is thrown into feverish activity intellectually and
every one desires to participate in the new knowledge par
excellence as against the earlier learning associated with ritualism.
Like a pillar of light this new paravidyawts leading the Aryans
into the promised land of wonderful philosophical wisdom which
constitutes the treasure of Aryan learning and to which all the later
systems of Indian thought point out with pride as the source of
authority and inspiration.

The meaning of ( Upamskad'The term as used in the Brah-
manas normally denotes the secrets of some word or text. But
in the Brihadaranyaka it is already used in the plural as the de-
signation of a class of writings no doubt actual existing. Thus
the term came to be used to denote the writing containing the
secret doctrine. The exact primary sense of the term is doubt-
ful. The natural interpretation of the word adopted by Max
Muller makes the word mean first a session of Pupils, hence
the secret doctrine communicated to a select number of disci-
ples. Secondly it is the title of a work on such a secret doctrine.
Oldenberg traces the word to the original sense of worship. Ac-
cording to this interpretation Upanishad primarily means a secret
form of worship. Deussen combines both these interpretations
when he explains the meaning of the word. For him the word
originally meant a secret word or a secret text. Then it came
to refer to secret import of secret doctrine. This order of mean-
ing is improbable as is suggested by McDonald. The term is
explained by Sankara in his commentary as that which destroys
ignorance or that which leads to the knowledge of Brahman.
Indian writers use the term in the sense of secret doctrine or

INTRODUCTION xlv

Rahasya. Upanishadic texts are generally referred to as Para-
vidya, the great secret. The Indiarf usage distinctly implies some-
thing secret. Further as Deussen points out it "was an ancient
custom all over the world to preserve certain important spiri-
tual truths as a secret and" to communicate them only to the ini-
tiated few. Among the Pythagoreans the philosophical doc-
trines were confined only to the members of that order. Similar
was the case during the medieval ages. Numerous passages
from the Upanishads point to the same reference. There is in-
ternal evidence to show that Upanishadic truths were communi-
cated to others with great discretion and very often with great
reluctance. The father would select his eldest son as his fit dis-
ciple. If the disciple is a stranger to the master the applicant
has to serve several years of probation before he can be initiated
into the mysteries. Even among the learned men evidently all
were not acquainted with the Upanishadic truths. These facts
go to support the traditional meaning of the term Upanishad
that it is a secret doctrine that it is a Rahasya, sometimes in the
primary sense of secret doctrine. These differences do not matter
much. When the initiated talked to one another they must in-
dicate their meaning only by signs which would be understood
only by the initiated. This fact explains why the term is used
in the sense of a secret word or text.

The Date of the Upanishads 1000 to 500 B.C.: The Upani-
shads do not form the composition of a single author. They
are many in number. Most probably even a single Upanishad
is due to the co-operation of several persons. The Upanishads
taken as a whole collection would cover a period of several cen-
turies. Some of the earliest Upanishads take us to the period
of Vedic thought and rituals and some of the latest exhibit dis-
tinct traces of modern thought and would even bring us to the
period of Mohammedan rule in India. To ask for a chronology
of the composition stretching across so many centuries would
be neither scientific nor useful Indian commentators such
as Sankara recognised certain Upanishads as genuine and wrote
commentaries on them. Scholars generally confine themselves
to such Upanishads as are recognised by the well known commen-

x lvi SAMAYASAEA

tators. Even here there is no consensus of opinion. Tradi-
tion speaks of ten UpanishadS; whereas different commentators
mention different numbers. If we confine ourselves to the most
important and the recognised ones we can say this much of their
period of composition. They are distinctly anterior to the rise
of Buddhism. So we can safely mention that the Upanishads, the
important of them at least, must be placed eatfier than the jth
Century B.C. Can we say anything as to the beginning of these Upa-
nishdas ? The period generally accepted by Orientalists is about
1000 B.C. Hence the duration from 1000 to 500 B.G would pro-
bably represent the period when the Upanishads were composed.
The Origin of the Upanishads. An interesting controversy
is associated with the origin of the Upanishads. We need not
emphasise the fact that the Brahma Vidya of the Upanishads is
quite opposed to Vedic ritualism based upon sacrifice. The
question therefore arises, "How copld this theosophic specu-
lation be logically connected with the Vedic form of ceremonial-
ism?" Many important passages in the earlier Upanishads
supply us with a clue. Thus in the Chandogya we find five
learned Brahmins requesting one Oudgalya to instruct them
concerning the atman; he confessing inability takes them to As-
vapati Kaikeya to whom all the six appeal for initiation into the
Atmavidya. Again in Brihadaranyaka the famous scholar Gargya
offers to expound the knowledge of Brahman to the king Ajata-
satru of Kasi. But his explanation is rejected by the king as
erroneous whereupon the vedic scholar presents himself as a
disciple to the king to be instructed in the knowledge of Atman.
The king does accordingly prefacing his exposition with the re-
marks that it is a reversal of the rule for a Brahmin to enter him-
self as a pupil under a Kshatriya in order to have Brahma know-
ledge expounded to him. Again in the Chandogya, a king fig-
ures as the teacher to a priest whom he addresses as follows:
"Oh Gautama! This doctrine has never upto the present time been
.in circulation among the Brahmins. Therefore in all the world
the Government has remained with the warrior caste." From
these passages scholars like Deussen and Gaibe conclude with
a very high degree of probability that the doctrine of the Atman

INTRODUCTION

standing as it did in such sharp contrast to all the principles of
Vedic ritual was taken up and cultivated primarily not in the Brah-
min but in the Kshatriya circle and was adopted -by the former
in later times. As against this view it is contended that Brahma
Vidya had its origin in the earlier Vedic literature itself and that
the Brahmins themselves had as much to do with it as the Ksha-
triyas. In order to understand the full significance of this con-
troversy we have to remember certain important and relevant
facts.

Even earlier than the Upanishadic period, in the period of
Brahmanas^we have traces of rivalry between Brahmins and Ksha-
triyss. We need not go back to the legendary period of Viswa-
mitra vs. Vasishta, when the former asserted his equality of
status with the latter. What is contained 14 the Brahmana lite-
rature is much more historical than such legendary anecdotes.
We have a reference to an Aryan tribe in the countries of Kasi,
Kosala, Videha and Magadha. The term Kasi is used in plural
to denote the people thereof. The Kasis and the Videhas were
closely related because of their proximity. Sometimes the Vi-
dehas were clubbed with the Kosalas. These were always con-
sidered by the Kurupanchalas as a hostile group. It is a fak
conclusion that between these two groups of people there did
exist some political conflict, probably based upon some difference
of culture. The Satapatha Brahmanas in which occurs the story
of the advance of Aryan civilisation over Kosala and Videha,
preserves a clear tradition of its time and furnishes a piece
of evidence that in the Kuru Panchala country, lay a great
centre of Brahaman cult. From these it appears to have been
brought to the countries of Kasi and Kosala probably by the
settlers of a later date. It is probable that the Eastern Coun-
tries were less Aryan than the West as they were less completely
brought under Brahmin supremacy as the rival systems of Jainism
and Buddhism indicate. Among the Kosalas, Videhas and Maga-
dhas the Kshatriyas were ranked above the Brahmins. The so-
cial supremacy of the Kshatriyas in these countries is further
corrobated by the fact that the later Vedic texts display towards
the people of Magadha a marked antipathy which may be reasonably

SAMAYASARA

explained by that people's lack of orthodoxy which may per-
haps be traced as fat back as Vajasaneya Samhita. In this Samhita
(the earlier of the Rig Samhitas) we have a contemptuous reference
to the current language used by the Magadhas which perhaps
indicate the use of 'prakrit' in those parts. Even in the Brah-
mana period there is reference to a prevalent unbelief which is
deplored. "Then the unbelief took hold of men, those who sacri-
ficed became more sinful and those who sacrificed naught be-
came more righteous." "No sacrifice then came to the Gods
from the world/ 3 The Gods thereupon said to Brihaspati An-
girasa "Verily unbelief has come upon men. Ordain thou
the sacrifice to be done." This Brihaspati Angirasa seems
to have accepted and thus revived the sacrificial culture. The
Kshatriyas referred to in the Upanishads as the custodians
of Upanishadic Rahasya are all -of the Kosala Videha country.
Ajatasatru is the king of Kasi, Janaka the king of Videha. The
other important names mentioned therein also appear to be Ksha-
triya names. In Satapatha Brahmana there is a reference to the
fact that king Janaka became a convert to Brahminism a fact
which indicates the traditional Brahminical lore reasserting itself.

The founder of Buddhism was himself a Kshatriya of the
Magadha country. He was a contemporary of Mahavira. This
latter is claimed by the Jains as the last .of religiou's teachers. Ori-
entalists generally accept this claim and suggest that his predeces-
sor one Parsvanatha was the real founder of Jainism. Leaving
open the question of the origin of Jainism we may note the in-
teresting fact about Mahavira's predecessor. According to Jaina
tradition Parswanatha belongs to the ruling family of Kasi. His
father was the ruler and his name was Viswasena. The relevant
fact for us here is that one of the Kshatriya founders of Jainism
belonged to Kasi. If we remember that the central doctrine of
Jainism "Ahimsa" originated as a protest against Vedic sacri-
fice, then we may not be far wrong if we maintain that the "Ksha-
triya heretics" referred to in the Brahmana literature were pro-
bably the earlie'r founders of Jainism. The Brahmana literature
as we already saw had a sinister reference to the people of Kasi
and Videha. The country^ Videha also had a religious impor-

INTRODUCTION

tance for the Jainas. Jaina tradition speaks of Videha as a Nitya-
punya Bhoomi, a place where Dharma is always flourishing. The
Jaina teachers who succeeded Mahavira, whenever they had any
doubt on scriptural matters, went to Videhakshetra to clear these
doubts. The very place which is pointed as the abode of heterodoxy
is held in high esteem according to Jaina and Buddha traditions.
The unbelief referred to in Satapata Brahmana, the unbelief which
manifests in opposition to the Brahmanas, must therefore refer
to some sort of Kshatriya movement 'that must have been pre-
valent in the countries of Videha and Magadha even prior to the
rise of Buddhism. All these facts constitute strong circumstantial
evidence supporting the theory that Atma Vidya the central
doctrine of Upanishadic culture first arose from the Kshatriya
as a sort of protest against the Vedic sacrificial ritualism, jealously
defended by the Brahmins. Upanishadic thought is mainly in-
fluenced by the Ahimsa cult associated with Lord Rishabha, a
cult prevalent in India even prior to the Aryan invasion. Since
the Upanishadic thinkers have accepted this, Ahimsa doctrine as
superior to Vedic ritualism there was a spirit of compromise at
that period. Except for rival claims for social domination there
was most probably no great difference between the Brahmins
and the Kshatriyas of those ages. Both were Aryans and both
defended their culture and civilisation from non-Aryan inroads.
This is substantiated by the fact that many learned Brahmins
welcomed the new movement of Atma vidya and were willing
disciples under Kshatriya teachers to learn the new truth. If
they had any antipathy to the new form of faith they would have
exhibited it. They would not have manifested so much eagerness
to' assimilate it. In fact about the time of Brihadaranyaka we
find the tables are completely turned. Yagnavalkya a great teacher
in Brihadaranyaka figures as the towering personality. He,
a Brahmin becomes the instructor now and Janaka the king places
himself as his disciple. This represents a later stage in the develop-
ment of Upanishadic thought. Yagnavalkya being a master-
intellect successfully Incorporated the new! doctrine into the
old. Kshatriya protestantisln in the reform of Atma vidya was
completely assimilated that it ceased to exist as an Independent

i SAMATASARA

movement, a phenomenon which is often repeated in the later
histoiy of Indian thought; for example Sankara completely
assisted Buddhism which led to its extinction This con-
jecture is further supported, by the nature and development
of the Upanishadic thought itseE On account of teconvct-
tion of Janaka to the old orthodox ritualism which evidently
implies an effected compromise between two rival schools, ra-
dical reformers of the extreme left, had to secede entirely from
the orthodox centre. They persisted in their protestantism
and emphasised their opposition to sacrificial ritualism as a re-
sult of which we have the birth of Buddhism. Reading facts
in this light would agree well with the theory suggested by some
oriental scholars on 'the evidence of the Upanishadic passages
themselves' that the Upanishadic doctrine of Atma Vidya first
started in the Upanishads as a protest against the sacrificial, rites
of the Vedas and there afterwards assimilated and recognised by
the priestly class as well.

' The Fundamental Doctrine of Upanishads We have already
noticed the Vedic concept of Atman or Brahman. We have
' to touch upon two other doctrines, Transmigration or metem-
psychosis and Karma. The latter is in a way the corollary of the
former. The doctrine of metempsychosis is peculiar to the age
of the Upanishads. There is no trace of it in the Vedic period.
So much so scholars are of opinion that the Aryans must have
borrowed this from the non-Aryans. We know the Kgyptians
believed in the doctrine. It is certainly a difficult question to
settle whether the Upanishadic thinkers borrowed this doctrine
from the non-Aryans or the Egyptians. Probably the truth is
that they borrowed from non-Aryans who were living in the
land at the time of Aryan invasion. They were evidently
having a higher form of culture and thus they were champions
of a more satisfactory doctrine of self. The value of any theory
depends upon its offering satisfaction to intellectual curiosity.
Any theory of creation, any philosophy that retain the importance
of human personality and maintains it to be an eternal principle
will be forced not only to look forward to an infinite future but
also to trace back to an infinite past. The human personality

INTRODUCTION H

that is associated with the short span of the present, must some-
how be related to a hoary past as well as a glorious future, making
the present but a step in this spiritual evolution. It is this pro-
cess of spiritual development that is the inner meaning of the
doctrine of transmigration. It is because of the Truth of this
principle of spiritual progress that the Indian mind persists in
tenaciously clinging to that doctrine. If this is remembered then
we can very well understand that the attitude of Gough and others
is more guided by inborn prejudice than by an endeavour to in-
tellectual appreciation. Upanishadic thought is not the babbl-
ing of a primitive race but it marks an important stage in the
philosophic development of Indian culture. Associated with
this doctrine of metempsychosis is the doctrine of Karma. Sani-
sara, the cycle of births and deaths is supposed to be the result of
Karma as a man soweth so doth he reap. Samsara for the Upa-
nishadic thinker meant a meaningless chain of births and deaths
heralding a gloomy prospect. The summum bonum of life for
the Upanishadic thinker therefore consisted in liberation from
this chain. The very term Moksha implies "Deliverance" "Li-
beration." Pessimistic aversion may be present with an in-
born optimism of the future, the inherent evil of Samasara and
the implied possibility of moksha. These constitute the correla-
tive doctrine to that of Brahman which together form the message
of Upanishadic thought. All the latter Indian systems in spite
of their mutual differences are permanently based upon these ideas.
This fact stands as an evidence of the unity of their origin, i.e.
all the- Indian systems are born of the Upanishadic speculations.
The Up am shads and the Western thinkers. The first know-
ledge of the Upanishads gained by European jscholars is an in-
teresting historical fact. A Mogul prince, one of Shah Jehan's
sons, evidently influenced by Akbar's dream of universal reli-
gion attempted to bring about a union between Hinduism and
Islam. With this purpose he translated the Upanishads into
Persian for the benefit of his coreligionists. A copy of this Per-
sian translation was presented to a French scholar who was in-
terested in the study of Zoroastrianism. This French scholar
translated the Upanishads from Persian to Latin-. This Latin

Ill SAMAYASARA

version fell into the hands f of Schopenhauer, who by personal
temperament and philosophic tradition was eminently fit to appre-
ciate the philosophy of the Upanishads. It was- he who first
popularised its study among German students. He himself used
them as a Bible. "It has been the solace of my life and I hope
it will be the same in my death." The Upanishads peculiarly ap-
pealed to the German students, because they themselves at the time
ofSchopenhauerwere in possession of aphilosophy quite analogous

to this.

Deussen on the Upanishads. Spooking of the concepts of
the Upanishads in their relation to Philosophy, Deussen
writes: "The whole of religion and philosophy has its root
in the thought that the universe is only appearance and not reality,
This fact that philosophy has from the earliest times sought to
determine a first principle of the universe proves that it started
from a more or less clear consciousness that the entire Empiri-
cal reality is not the true essence of things, that in Kant's words
is only appearance and not the thing-in-itself. There. have been
three occasions on which philosophy has advanced in a clearer
comprehension of its recurring task and of the solution demanded.
First in India in the Upanishads, again -in Greece in the philo-
sophy of Parmenides and Plato and finally at a more recent time in
the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer" Deussen adds "All
great religious teachers therefore, whether in earlier or later times,
nay even all those at the present day whose religion rests upon
faith are alike unconsciously followers of Kant. The new testa-
ment and the Upanishads, the two toblest products of the reli-
gious consciousness of mankind are found, when we sound their
deeper meaning, to be nowhere in irreconcilable contradiction,
but in a manner the most attractive serve to elucidate and com-
plete one another." The purport of these words of Deu'ssdn
is that Kant's philosophical agnosticism is the last word
in philosophy and that a religion not associated with Kantian
metaphysics is far from being a genuine religion. It places the
philosophy of the Upanishads on a par with that of Kant and
Plato,, If he wants to express his admiration of ( the philosophy
of the Upanishads by comparing it to his own national philo-

INTRODUCTION llil

sophy we have nothing to quarrel about. He is at liberty
to choose his own method of critical appreciation. He may
quite well regard the philosophy of Kant and Pkto as the only
genuine philosophy. But when he says that the philosophy of
the Upanishads is the same as that of Plato we have to protest.
This is an unwarranted philosophical attitude with certain Euro-
pean scholars who started the study of Indian thought with the
unwarranted assumption that the Advaita Vedanta was the one
fruit to produce which the whole of Indian life and culture cons-
pired. This bias was further strengthened by the tendencies
of European thought moulded by such German thinkers like
Kant and Hegel. It requires no serious argument to show how
unfounded the assumption is even if we admit for the sake of
argument such an interpretation of the Upanishadic philosophy.
We cannot consistently explain the claims put forward by other
systems of Indian philosophy that they are also resting on the
Upanishadic authority. The real fact is that all the Indian sys-
tems whether orthodox or heterodox are based updn the funda-
mental concepts of Upanishadic thought and that all have the
right to claim the authority of their source. This simple fact
of History cannot be denied in the face of so much preponderat-
ing evidence. To maintain that the Upanishadic thought is
the Indian counterpart of Plato or Kant is quite an unwarranted
dogma sustained more by personal predeliction than by objective
evidence. Further Prof. Deussen justified in maintaining
that Plato T Kantian idealism is the best system of philosophy.
In spite of the beauty of conception and grandeur of diction Plato's
idealism is but a temporary aberration of Hellenic thought which
was brought to its equilibrium by his friend and desciple Aris-
totle. Similar is the case of Kant's transcendental agnosticism.
It is but a'n episode in the career of modern thought quite uncon-
nected with the course of modern culture. As against Deussen's
obiter dictum we take the liberty % to state that the idealism of
Plato oj; Kant is distinctly of a modern thought and marks but
the refuge of the defeated intellect sustained more by per-
sonal mysticism than by logical necessity. Champions of such
a philosophy of the type of Deussen always make the

jj y SAMAYASARA

mistake of believing that any other form of philosophy will
be incompatible with the* highest aspirations of religious
and moral culture. In short they think that the only alter-
native to such an effective idealism is an impossible materialism.
It is because of this assumption that they try to escape into some
form of idealism. The birth of idealism is very often due lo such
intellectual confusion. In order to safeguard the eternal values
of- life from the alleged menace of materialism some thinkers
propound the doctrine of idealistic metaphysics which ultimately
results in nullifying the very eternal values. It ends in repu-
diating the distinction between truth and error, good and evil
and beauty and ugliness. Let us go back to Dcussen. 1 !e makes
the astounding proposition that the true religious philosophy must
have as its background something of the Kantian transcenden-
talism. He says in so many words that the value of a religion
consists in its allegiance to a philosophy to which the concrete
world is an illusion or maya and life is but a mockery,
There may be some kind of religious satisfaction resting on such
a metaphysics. But we doubt very much if the Upanishiidic reli-
gion is of much value only because of this attitude, A^ain. he
seems to think that modern Christianity has its value because
of its metaphysical idealism which he assumes to be its foundation.
We are quite sceptical about this. Neither the founder of Chris-
tianity nor his followers ever believed that the concrete world
of reality is but an illusion or an appearance. We rather think,
that the success and popularity of Christian religion are entirely
due to its grasp of concrete life and its emphasis upon the value
of human personality. Take away these, it would cease to have
any value and with that perhaps it would cease to be a religion.
We can only look with dismay when.Deusscn connects modem
Christianity with Kantian idealism. His congratulations on Upani-
shadic thought because of its ' similarity to Kantian Idealism we
are rather prone to decline because his attitude is corroborat-
ed neither by historical development nor by philosophical evidence
of later thought in India.

The Oiandogya UpamshaJ.Tht Upanishad belongs to the
Sama veda as evidenced by "Chandas." It is one" of the

INTRODUCTION v

oldest Upanishads, and is divided into eight parts of varying
lengths. The first two are related to rituals which go to show
that this Upanishad was once a Brahmana treatise dealing with
ritualistic procedure. The really Upanishadic or philosophic
portion is very interesting mainly in the form of dialogues re-
minding one of Platonic dialogues. This Upanishad may be taken
as a typical of the Upanishads 1 in general. Some of the impor-
tant characteristic of the Upanishadic thought are found here.
The fundamental concept of the Upanishad has been mentioned
' as Brahman. This concept is introduced in the very beginning
of this Upanishad. Even in the ritualistic chapter it is not for-
gotten. Some of the syllables of the mantras uttered are identi-
fied with Brahman or atman. This attitude of philosophical
interpretation of even dry ritualistic formulae is a distinct mark
of Upanishadic period. The spiritualistic interpretation has re-
placed the materialistic interpretation of the Rig Vedic Period,
for example "Self transcends all magnitude. He is myself within
the Heart, smaller than the canary seed or the kernal of a canary
seed. He also is myself within the heart, greater than the earth,
greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these
worlds. 53 There is no physical measure which is able to compre-
hend the non-physical. The self is completely incommensurable with
anything physical. The Upanishadic truth relating to the Brahman
or Atman was considered to be a secret by the teachers and was
communicated to others with great caution. This aspect is
well brought out by the legend of Satyakama who goes to a
teacher with the idea of becoming his disciple. "I will lead % the
life of a student of the Sacred knowledge, I will lead the life of
a student of Sacred self." Thus he addressed himself to Gautama.
"Of what family art thou my dear" asked Gautama. In reply
to this Satyakama said "I do not know Sir," of what family I am,
I asked my mother. She answered in this manner. "When
I went about a great deal serving as a maid I got you. So I do
not know this of what family you are. However I am Jabala
by name and you are Satyakam by name! So I am Satyakama,
son of Jabala, Sir," The teacher was attracted by the frankness
of the bpy and admitted him as a disciple. "I will receive you

SAMAYASARA

as a disciple for you have not deviated from the truth." His
discipleship consisted of tending the master's cows for a number
of years 'and such patient service was finally rewarded and he
obtained the knowledge of Brahman.

In the V chapter an allegorical representation of Life is
given. The several senses quarrel among themselves saying "I am
. better I am better/' They all went to the great father The All
Creator and asked Him "Sir, who is the best of us?" lie replied,
He by whose departure the body seems worse than worst., he is
the best of you. Then first speech departed from the body.
Returning after some time he found the person still alive though
mute. Convinced of its own impotence according to the criterion
proposed by the All Creator, speech returned the wiser. The
eye went off: Having remained a year away it came round again
and said "How have you been able to live without me ?" Like
the blind people not seeing but breathing with the Breath, speak-
ing with the tongue etc. Thus have I been able to live. The
eye entered in. Next was the turn of the ear. The person
though deaf nevertheless lived. Then the mind tried its
"worth. Nevertheless the person lived mindless. Lastly it was
the turn of the vital breath. Now the breath, when on the point
of departing, torn up 'the other senses as ahorse going to start
might tear up the pegs to which he is tethered. Then they
all came to it and said "Sir Remain, thou art the best among
us. Be thou our Lord. Do not depart from us/ 3 This alle-
gory distinctly implies that the spiritual principle on account of
whose presence the senses function is the Atman or self. It is
the life principle itself , that is the foundation of existence. This
vital breath is certainly more than the material conception of
the Rig Vedic period. It is identical with that which makes all
sense activities possible. In the .same V chapter again we have
an important dialogue indicating the nature of the problems
especially discussed in the Upanishad. A young man by name
Svetaketu Amneya goes to an assembly of scholars from Pancha-
la. The boy is subjected to severe cross-examination,, when he
told the assembly that he had been fully instructed. He was
asked, "Young man, has your father instructed you ?' Yes Sir,

INTRODUCTION Ivii

"Do you know where men go to from here?" "No Sir.' "Do you
know the parting of the ways, one leading to the God and the
other' to the fathers." c No Sir/ "Do you know how the yonder
world is built up ?" 'No Sir/ Then the teacher scolds him.
"Why do you say you were instructed."

T^his dialogue is instructive and points^ out the nature of
the topics dealt with and studied in those days. The study
of the" traditional type was confined to the Vedas and Vedic
rituals. Besides this traditional course there was the charac-
teristic interest of the age centering round the philosophical
studies as to the nature of the self. It was the latter which was
prized and coveted by the scholars of the age. Of course the
dialogue ends with the boy returning to his father to ascertain
the answer to the above questions. The father also had to confess
his ignorance. The lad and his father returned to the king for
the information. Then Gautama went to Janaka's court when
the king offered him proper respect. In the morning the king went
up to the assembly and announced. "Ask of me such a boon as
men desire." Gautama replied "Such things as men possess may
remain with you Sir. Tell me the speech which you addressed
to the boy." The king was perplexed and said "Wait a while."
Then the king said "As to what you have said to me" 'Oh Gau-
tatna, this knowledge did never yet come to any Brahman before
you and in all the world the truth belonged to Kshatriyas only/
Two points may be noticed from this interesting dialogue, (i)
The new thought, the knowledge of the atman was considered
to be richer than the richest possession in all the world. (2)
It originated among the Kshatriyas and was preserved as a secret
doctrine for some time. The very same fact is emphasised in
another section of the same chapter. Five great theologians
held a great discussion as. to what is Self and what is Brahman.
After a few days, deliberation they go to a great scholar Uddalaka
who is reputed to be in possession of the knowledge of the seE
But the great scholar promises to enlighten them on .the matter
and asks them to accompany , him. He takes them to a king

SAMAYASAKA

Asvapathi Kaikeya. This king also offers them rich presents
which they decline begging him -to impart the much prized know-
ledge of Brahman. In the VI chapter several illustrations are
given to explain the nature of Brahman.
The scene is as follows:

The boy is given a small seed and asked to break it open.
Then the father asks the*boy ? "What do you see there?" "Nothing
inside it. Sir" replied the boy. Then the father said "the
central essence you do not see there. Of that central essence flits
great tree exists. But it'is in the essence of it. In it all ( hat exists
has its self. This is the truth. It is the self and that thou ait!"
Similarly the all pervading nature of this principle is taught to
the boy in the following way. The boy is asked to dis-
solve a little salt in a cup of water. He is thcii oskcxl to fake
a sip of it from different parts. He finds it everywhere s-ihish.
Then the boy is instructed "Though the thing is not perceived
by the senses, still the salt is there. That which is the finest
essence of the world is the soul of reality. That thou art 1" The
boy who wants further instruction is taught by the father that
life here is one of bondage and escape from it is the form of
realisation of self. But as one might tread his way home
even if he be stranded in a foreign country so can we in-
dividuals tread our way back to the Universal Being. To-
wards the close of the Upanishad the scene is placed in' Dcva-
loka. The thirst for knowledge possesses even the Gods.
Narada goes to Sanatkumara with this appeal. "Sir," leach me
the doctrine." Narada is asked to give a list of all the
sciences he learned. After enumerating the names of different
sciences, such as the four Vedas, mathematics, astrology and
so on, he addresses Sanatkumara thus "but Sir with all this
1 could not know the self/ I have heard that he knows the
self who overcomes sorrow. I am in grief. Do help me to
overcome the grief/' Then Brahma knowledge is imparted
toNmda/ty-S^ se]J , Naruhls

then progressively instructed by Sanatkumara as to the nature

of self. tlm% the Chapter condudes w . th the ^

INTRODUCTION Ik

"The soul is Indeed below, the soul is above, the soul will be in
this whole world. Verily he who -sees this, who thinks this,
who understands this, who has pleasure in the soul, who has .
delight in the sou], he is autonomous. He has Swarajya. He has
unlimited freedom in all the worlds. But they who know other-
wise than this are without Swaraj. They have perishable
worlds. In all the worlds they have no freedom/',

The True way to Brahma World The way to realise
the true self and to enjoy the spiritual bliss is not by
following the traditional rituals but by purity of conduct.
"Now what people call sacrifice, Yagna is really the chaste life of
a student of sacred knowledge. For only through the chaste
life of a student of sacred knowledge does he who Is a knower
find that world. Now what people call that what has been sacri-
ficed is really the chaste life of a student. Now what people
call the propriety of a sacrifice is also the chaste life of a student.
Now what people call silent asceticism is really the chaste life
of a student. Now what people call hermit life is really the
chaste life of a student/*

Next we have the instruction of Indra by the Lord of. Crea-
tion, Indra is actuated by the desire for Brahman knowledge.
He goes to the Lord of Creation to beg of him the same know-
ledge. The self which is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrow-
less, hungeriess, thirstless, whose desire is Real, whose conception
is the Real. It is such a self that Indra wants to realize. The
Indra here is quite different from our old friend of the Rig Veda.
Indra here seeks to obtain a knowledge of the Brahman which
is the ultimate principle both of the individual and the world.
He is tolcl that even the gods in Brahmaloka reverence their selves
shaking off evil, shaking off the body as the moon shakes itself
from the mouth of Rahu, a perfected soul passeth off into the
uncreated world of Brahman 'and into it, it may pass. Such is
the consolation of the perfected soul which has become perfect
by knowing its own self. Thus we have a complete change of
intellectual attitude. Life in the world according to ceremonies
and customs is looked down as a source of misery. It is merely
to sell one's birthright of freedom, to be ruled over by anything

Is SAMAYASARA

other than our own self. The true relief from grief is to secure
the freedom from the danger of the non-self. This is the funda-
mental truth of the new thought. This seems to have actuated
both men and. gods. The reference to the Devas, the mytholo-
gical personalities which we have in the Upanishadic writings
is really interesting. We find in Vedic period, for example,
Indra who wanted casks of wine to infuriate the strength of
him in the battlefield is now met with as a docile disciple of
the samit in his hand begging to be instructed in this new
knowledge of the self. Here heroes are not measured by phy-
sical prowess. Self-control and purity of thought constitute the
real worth of life both for men and Gods. This aspect will
become more and more prominent as we go to study the other
Upanishads.

Katha Upanishad 1}^ belongs to Yajurvcda. It is mainly
associated with' a particular kind of sacrifice called Nachikctas.
But the Upanishad is interesting for us not because of this
sacrifice but because of the important problem discussed therein-
The great problem of the Hereafter. What is the nature of
the soul? Does it survive death? If it does whither docs it
go? These are the questions which are discussed in this
Upanishad. These questions have occupied the serious attention
of thinkers all over the world. In fact these. problems form the
pivot of religions and philosophy. Socrates, Plato, Buddha, and
Christ have all had their attention to these facts and the very
same problems are here discussed by the Upanishadic thinkers
who were evidently the forerunners of the above mentioned
great world teachers. The Upanishad opens with a simple house-
hold scene. A Brahman wants to obtain certain benefits by offer-
ing sacrificed He promised to offer all his valuable possessions
for sacr.fice to seek his end. He was offering his cows and sheep
and other thmgs of great value. He had an intelligent boy who
^watching ,he whole thing. His name was NachLtas.
The sacrifice mentioned in this Upanishad is named after him It
means the sacrifice of Nachiketas. This boy perhaps in a coft'
mg mood redded his father that he did not offer hi. most v 1
able thing referring of course to himself. The boy importunate^

- INTRODUCTION xi

asked his father "whom are you going to offer me to ?" When
this question was repeatedly put, tlie father got angry because
of this disturbance during the sacrifice and he answered in a rage,
"To Yama, thou shalt go; thou art offered to Death." Before
his father could revoke his command the boy started on his
journey to Yama's land. Having reached that place he could
not meet the Lord of Death, for he was not at home. The boy
had to wait three nights without being attended to. Yama
returned on the fourth day, and he regretted very much for the
neglect shown to the Brahman boy waiting as a guest at his door.
As a compensation Yama offered three boons to the boy and
he was asked to choose any .three. As his first boon the boy
cleverly asked that he might rejoin his father and that his father
sfcould forgive and forget and welcome him to his household.
This was granted by Yama. As his second boon the boy chose
to be instructed in the well-known sacrifice Nachiketas leading
to heavenly bliss. Yama initiated the boy into the mysteries
of the desired ritual and honoured the boy by naming the sac-
rifice after him. The boy had his third boon still left. When
Yama asked him to choose the third, the boy said "When a man
is dead where is this doubt about him some say that he is and
other that he is not. Let me know the truth and let this
be the third boon." When the boy asked Yama to lay open the
door of Hereafter there was a good deal of hesitation and reluc-
tance on the part of the teacher. Whenever the Great religious
teachers of the world are asked about the Hereafter they offer
only an evasive reply. Yama too wanted to avoid this question
and tried to turn away the boy's curiosity from awful and sub-
lime. He says "The Gods themselves have been perplexed about
this. It is no -easy tiling to discover." Hence he asked the
boy to choose an alternative boon. The evasive answer only
whetted the curiosity of the boy. Yama himself admitted
that the problem to be of very important and subtle and that it
perplexed even the minds of the Gods. Certainly such a thing is
worth knowing and if knowledge is to be had at all it must be
from the Lord of the Great Hereafter. The boy would not loose
this golden opportunity. Hence he insisted on getting an answer.

Ixli SAMAYASARA

But Yama tempted Bis disciple's youthful imagination. Like the
great temptation of another" great Personality this youth Nachi-
ketas had the sovereignty of the world, human and divine, placed
at his feet. The whole aggregate wealth was at his disposal.
He was promised heavenly damsels. He had the chance of being
feasted with their divine music. But none of these things appeal-
ed to him. He would not budge. Like Gautama Buddha this
boy spurned the pleasure of the world as worthless, lie must-
have that one priceless boon the knowledge of the hereafter j.V< >m
the only person whd had an authority to speak on the nuticr.
Man is not to be satisfied with wealth. Wealth we shall obtain
ourselves. Tell us about that life that Gods themselves do
not know. Thus the boy would not have any othci: boon
but would rent the veil which hid Yama. Thus the strengtfa
of will exhibited by the boy ultimately succeeded in clioii'n^
the sympathy of Yama who was willing to offer the truth.. Tim's
there is the revelation of the Upanishadic teaching as to Hu na-
ture of the soul and its survival after death. The teach in <r
begins with the good and the pleasurable. Both these en-a^e
a man though the ends are diverse. Of these it is well with ' him
that takes the good. He that chooses the pleasurable is tied to
the wheel of life dwelling in the midst of illusions infatuated
by the pleasures of the world. These fools are subject to
repeated births and deaths and go round and round like the blind
. led by the blind. He is even under the subjugation of Yama.
But the path of good leads to the self. Wonderful is he thaf
teaches and wise is he that attains it. This goal is attained only
by renouncing the other path leading to the misery of Samsura
Thus we notice in this teaching of Yama the emphasis on self-
relation as the goal of life. This goal is to be obtained only
by self renunciation, freedom from the allurement of the envmm-
ment. The cult of sacrifice is subordinated to this path of
spiritual discipline. Here we notice the movements of great
religious thought. Continuing this teaching, Yama describes the
nature of the Atman. The self is not born and it dies not It is '
omniscient. It is not created and it creates nothing. It has no
beginning nor end. It perishes not even when death overtakes the

INTRODUCTION

Ixiii

body. If the skyer thinks that he slays" and 'the skin thinks that
he is skin neither of them knoweth'the self for the self neither
slayeth nor is skin. It is bodiless and yet in all bodies unchang-
ing and yet in all changing things. The sage that knows the
infinite, the all pervading self no longer has any grief. The nature
of the soul is therefore distinct from that of the body. Appre-
hension of this truth is the gate to wisdom. But- this great
self lies in the midst of different senses which lead him astray
towards the worthless treasures of the world. This self is not
to be obtained by mere learning or even by much sacred lore. It
is obtainable only by the grace of the great self. It is by a process
of minute spiritual development that spiritual freedom is to be
acquired. The allegory of the chariot is introduced here. Yama
continues his teaching and compares the soul to the chariot and
the senses to the restive horses. Only by controlling the senses that
the self gains freedom. We are reminded here of the same allegory
in Plato. He compares the soul to a chariot dragged by horses. In
the case of the gods the winged horses are good and controllable
and they never lead reason astray but in the case of man one of these
horses is restive and is dragging the other one. Hence the ethical
conflict in man's nature is due to the . conflict between reason
and the senses. The same analogy is obtained in Yarna's teach-
ings. The release from the chain of births and deaths is to be
had only through spiritual purity. Here again we notice the
subordination of the sacrificial cult to moral discipline. Then
Yama comes to the point which started the discussion. "Oh
Gautama, I will proclaim again this mystery; The everlasting
self and his hereafter. Some souls pass to other births. Some to
enter into other bodies according to their worth and knowledge."
Hence we have the emphatic sanction of the doctrine of metem-
psychosis. Souls after death pass into another birth determined
by their own Karma and Jnana. This is the basic principle on
which the future Indian systems arose. The self that is still
after pleasures is tied to the wheel of births and deaths; some
going up and some going down; some endowed with happiness and
others with misery, but all sharing the universal merry-go-round of
Samsara. But only that self which realizes its true spiritual nature

SAMAYASARA

only that which saves itself from the allurements of the world
and imposes on itself the rigorous spiritual discipline can know
the truth, can escape from the illusion and attain that never-
failing bliss of true freedom.

Mundaka UpaniskadsThis Upanishad belongs to Adharvana

Veda. It is divided into a number of Khandas. Its main purpose

is to teach the knowledge of Brahman. Hence it may be taken

as the farthest litpit of the antiritualistic culture of the age. This

Upanishad starts with the distinction between the two kinds of

knowledge. Lower knowledge consists of the study of the Vedas

and the secular sciences such as grammar, astronomy, astrology

etc. The higher is the knowledge of the indestructible Brahman.

It is this indestructible Brahman that is the source of all things,

Its nature is described thus. "That which is invisible, unsellable

without family or caste that which has no eyes, or ears, no hands,

nor feet, the Eternal, the omnipresent, Infinitesimal, and imperi-

shable. That it is which the wise regard as the source of know-

ledge. As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as,

plants grown on earth as the hairs of the head shoot forth from

every person thus does everything arise from the imperishable/'

These two verses clearly illustrate the spiritual nature; of Brah-

man and he is the root principle of all existence. Knowledge

of this is claimed to be knowledge Par-excellence. What is the

value of the lower knowledge of the traditional religion of the

sacrificial mantras and the skill in arranging sacrifices, but frail

in truth are those boats, (the sacrifices). Fools are they that praise

this as the highest for they are subjected again and again to old

age and death. Fools who hold this vedic scholarship or rituals

wise in their own conceit and puffed up with vain knowledge go

round and round staggering to and fro like blind men led by the

blind. If at all it is* of any use to a person who offers sacrifice

it will lead him to Swarga which is merely a kind of lower hap-

piness since that state of existence is also included in the samsaric

cycle. How is the higher knowledge to be obtained? "By

truthfulness, by penance, right knowledge and abstinence must

that Self be gained." The Self whom spotjess anchorites gain is

pure, and like a light within the body. Further the Upanishad

INTRODUCTION

emphasises that that Atman cannot be gained by the Veda nor by
understanding nor by much learning nor is that Self to be gained
by one who is destitute of strength or without earnestness or
without right meditation. Having well ascertained the object
of the knowledge of the Vedanta having purified their nature by
yoga or renunciation, all anchorites enjoying the highest immor-
tality become free at the time of the great end in the worlds of
Brahma. This imperishable Brahman is the soul and the goal
of all beings. He is the supreme person who is the source of
human personality as well as the cosmic universe. He is in short
the source of the world and the individual Because of him the
senses are active, all doubts are cut off and one's karmas cease
when He is seen. The highest golden sheaf is Brahman without
stain without parts.' The sun shines not there nor the moon and
the stars. There lightnings shine not, much less this fire when
He shines then everything shines after him. This whole world
' is illumined with his light. That immortal Brahman is before, is
behind, is right and left, is below and above. Brahman indeed
js this whole world it is indeed the excellent. Not by sight
is it graphed not even by speech nor by another sense organ
austerity or work. By the light of the knowledge of one's nature
becomes purified in that way, by medicating one does not behold
him who is without parts. The cause of rebirth and Samsara is
said to be desire, those who attain to the Brahma jnana ate free
from these desires and pass beyond the seed of rebirth. But
he who is still in the meshes of desires is born again here. The
reward of attaining this Brahma jnana is to assume the nature of
Brahman himself. He who knows that supreme Brahman be-
comes the very Brahma. He crosses all sorrow. He crosses all
s i n _Hberated he becomes immortal. This is the truth. So ends
this short Upanishad.

Brihadaranyka Upanishad This perhaps represents a later
stage of the Upanishadic culture". In this we have an attempted
reconciliation between the traditional ritual cult and the new
theosophic wisdom of Brahma vidya. We referred to the implied
rivalry on a former- occasion between the Kurupanchalas on the one
hand and Kosalas and Videhas on the other. The latter countries

Ixvl SAMAYASARA

were associated with heretical antisactificial civilisation. In an in-
teresting chapter in the Satapata Brahmana there is mentioned
an attempt by the Kurupanchalas to reconvert the Kosalas and
the Videhas to Vedic traditions. Such a successful reconversion
most probably marks the period of the Brihadaranyakas. One of the
champions of the old traditional culture studies the new thought
successfully and finally assimilates it so completely that the
theosophic Brahma jnana once? originated by the rival school
dominated by the Kshatriyas ceases to have an independent
existence. This personality who contributes to the complete
annihilation of the rival school by the successful assimilation
of the same by the old culture is Yagnavalkya. From the point
of view of culture and philosophic insight he is head and shoulders
above his contemporaries. He is looked upon with awe and
reverence by other priests. He is welcomed and honoured by
kings. Having studied the new thought and made it his own
he is able to reassert the supremacy of the traditional Vedic cult
thus in this Upanishad. We have all the characteristic conflicts
symptomatic of a transition period. The Upanishad begins
with the conception of Aswamedha. Here it has only a sym-
bolic meaning. The whole world is compared to one grand
process of cosmic sacrifice. There is an account of the creation
which starts from asat non-being and evolves into beino-.
Here we have merely an echo of the Vedic hymn which
describes the origin of the world sat from asat. After comparing
the evolution of the world to the grand horse sacrifice, the Upanishad
goes to describe the nature of human personality. Breath or
Prana is said to be superior to the other bodily functions. This
leads indirectly to a glorification of the chanting the Vedic hymns
which is possible only because of breath. In the next section
there is another account of the creation of the world. Starting
with the lonely Purusha who is the beginning of all things the
narrator proceeds to describe the appearance of a mate from him-
self. Fiom these primaeval pair the whole of the human race
is supposed to have originated. But the primitive mother all of a
sudden develops a resentment to the unconventional matrimo-
nial alliance and tries to hide herself from her companion. Thus

INTRODUCTION xv

she becomes a cow but he became a bull and thus originates an-
other species of animals. Then she changes herself into other
animals and the primitive Purusha longing to meet his mate under-
goes a corresponding transformation. Thus are created the
different species of animals. In the next passage there is an interest-
ing and novel version of the hymn of Purushasukta of the Rig
Vedic hymns. In the Rig Veda there was a description of the
origin of the four castes. Here is a different account. Purusha
exists originally as Brahman. Being lonely it was not developed.
It created still further a superior form of the Kshatrahood* even
those who are Kshatras rulers among Gods. This higher
principle of Kshatrahood is represented by Indra, Varuna, Soma
Rudra, Yama, and Isana. Therefore there is nothing higher
than Ks,hatra. Therefore at the Rajasuya ceremony the Brah-
man sits below the Kshatriya. Upon Kshatrahood alone does
he confer his honour. Yet this same thing viz., Kshatrahood
has as its source Brahmanhood. Therefore even if the king attains
supremacy he rests finally upon Brahmanhood as his source,
so whoever injures Him (that is a Brahmin) attacks his own source.
He fares worse in proportion as he injures one who is better.
This passage is characteristic of the spirit of compromise Ksha-
triyahood and Rajasuya sacrifice are clearly acknowledged to be
supereminent and at the same time the rank is derived because
they originate from Brahmanhood. Unlike the Purushasukta
of the Rig this account suggests a caste organisation even among
the Gods. Brahman's manifestation was not yet complete.
Then he produced his the Vysya element which is represented
among the gods by the Rudras, Adityas, the Maruts, and the
Viswadevas and among men by the Vysya. Brahma was not
yet developed and he created the Sudravarna of which caste the
divine representative is Pushan identified with the Earth the all
nourisher and among men the same is represented by the fourth
caste. The process of creation is not yet complete. Then
Brahma created a still further form in the shape of Dharma or
Law. It is the source of all. This is the power of the Kshatriya
caste. Therefore there is nothing higher than Law. Verily
that which is Law is truth. This law is higher than Gods as well as

SAMAYASARA

men. It is because of this Law and in conformity with it the
world order subsists. The'Kshatriya order on earth is but an
aspect of the sovereignty of Law over all. In this interesting
passage we have several instances. We are distinctly in a philo-
sophical age when an intrinsic principle of Law or Dharma is recog-
nised as highest to which even the traditional gods are subordi-
nated. This reminds us of the corresponding period of the
Hellenic civilisation represented by the age of Eurepides. Just as
the conception of Law in Greek thought formed the central doc-
trine of the later Stoic Philosophers so the conception of Law
is to be elaborated by the later Buddhistic school in which it would
occupy the central position in the shape of the doctrine of Karma.
But we quit the age of an intellectual conflict and enter
into an age of compromise. The old rivalry and struggle between
the two rival communities are in abeyance. There is a spirit of
mutual give and take. From the one point of view, the Rajasuya
sacrifice associated with the Kshatriyas is the highest and from the
another point of view the Vajapeya sacrifice associated with the
Brahmins is the highest. Kshatriya is taken to be superior because
of his strength and Brahmin is equally powerful because of his
religious inspiration. Thus we have a note of compromise indicat-
ing that both the aspects are necessary and important from the
point of view of social economy.

In the II adhyaya we are introduced into the scene in Aajat-
asatru's court. A learned priest by name Gargya Balaki goes to
Aajatasatru, King of Benares and offers to expound the doctrine
of Brahman. The king was very much pleased and promised
to give him a present of a thousand cows for such a speech
before him, for it was a general fashion among the philosophers
m those days to run to the Court of Janaka of Videha; then
Balaki narrates his views about Brahman. He identified Brah-
man with sun, moon, lightning, ether, air, water, fire and so
on. He even suggests the identity of Brahman with the image
in the mirror. All these things are rejected by Aajatasatru as
inadequate . Is that all? Asked Aajatasatru. Gargya replies
That * all . Aajatasatru: OH! With that, much is not known.
a: Let me know.

INTRODUCTION

Aajatasatru: Verily It is contrary to course of things that a

Brahmin should come to a Kshatriya with the object of gaining

Brahma knowledge ! But anyhow Gargya was willing to be ins-

tructed by Aajatasatru. Balaki was taken to a man who was asleep,

But when he was touched with the hand he arose. From this

object lesson Aajatasatru drew the following conclusion. When

this man was fallen asleep thus then the person who consists of .

intelligence having taken to himself, the intelligence of these

senses rests in that place which is within the heart. When that

person restrains the senses he is said to be asleep. The breath,

the voice, the eye, the ear and the mind are all restrained. When

he draws in his senses the worlds are all in him. Then he becomes

a great Brahman as it were. Verily as a youth, as a "great king,

or a great Brahman when he has reached his summit of bliss so

he rests now. As a spider might come out with its thread as

small spark come out from the fire even so from this Soul come

forth all vital energies all worlds, all Gods, all beings. The mystic

meaning thereof is the real of the real. Breathing creatures

are really the Real, but He is their Real. Thus according to

Aajatasatru the self in the movement of sleep is not only the cus-

todian of the senses of the individual but is also indentical with

the soul of the world. AE breathing things are real but He is

their Real. Continuing the discourse Aajatasatru speaks of the

two forms of Brahman Murta and Amurta the formed and the

formless the mortal and the immortal, the actual and the beyond.

This doctrine of duality of Brahman is interesting in this way.

The ultimate reality includes both the actual concrete experience

and the transcendental principle which expresses itself in this.

The transcendental is described by negatives. The actual and

the normal portions of reality are recognised to be real and are

described by the positive designation. This section lends support

to that particular school of Vedanta Visishtadwaita. The

organic world consisting of breathing things is real and not

Maya. It represents the Murtha form of Brahman but this does

not exhaust the complete Brahman because there is the Amrutha,

the formless aspect of that on account of which he is called the

real of the real.

SAMAYASARA

Next we find ourselves in Yagnavalkya's household. The
scene is laid in his home. Yagnavalkya proposes to take leave of
his wife and retire from the householder's status. Yangnavalkya
wants to make a final settlement of his property but Maitteyi
asked Yagnavalkya whether by possession of wealth one would
obtain immortality. This interrogation perturbed the philo-
sopher a bit and he had to answer the question in the negative.
Maitreyi would not be satisfied with anything else than that
which lead to the highest bliss, -"What you know Sir that indeed
tell me." Then we have Yagnavalkya' s teachings as imparted to
his wife Maitreyi. The only thing in the universe which has in-
trinsic value is Atmanor self. It is this that is dearest to us. Every-
thing that we desire to have obtains a derivative value from this
atman. This is the end in itself. This is associated with the
unconditioned and absolute value. Domestic life, worldly posses-
sions, social status and even religious ceremonials and national
traditions have their value only so long as they serve us as means
to the realization of the atman. A Brahmin who prides on his
birth without knowing this ceases to be a Brahmin and the same
is the case with the Kshatriya. One may possess riches. One
may carry out every commandment of his religion and all this would
be of no avail if the knowledge of the self is not the guiding star
of life. Conventional notions of value of social status anckank
are all things that dwindle into insignificance by the side of this
One truth the Great Purusha. Communion with this is the only
safety for and the only guarantee of true life. Even the much
prized Vedas and the other sciences own their origin and impor-
tance to this one. It is this one inspiring principle the unitary
Purusha that lends lustre to anything that is shining. From Him
comes the elements into them also they vanish. After death
there^ as consciousness. Thus say I, says Yagnavalkya. This
doctrine that after death there is consciousness bewildered
Maitreyi. She demanded an explanation. Accordingly Yacna-
valkya said thus:, to

Consdousness is entirely based upon the subject object duality

Dwaita . On account of this dualism we have an agent who

has an object, presented to him who hears a sound who speaks

INTRODUCTION

to another person, who thinks of another thing, but if this subject
object dualism is transcended and if we are left with one only
without a second then whereby and whom one would hear and
whereby and whom one would speak to, whereby and whom
one would understand. Naturally all objects of thinking and
consciousness would cease to be because consciousness implies
duality. Unity cannot therefore accommodate consciousness.
Thus we have not only the identification of subject object into one
soul but the identification of the universe with the one soul.
Thus we obtain an unqualified advaita, an uncompromising ad-
vaitism diametrically opposed to Aajatasatru's doctrine of the
two kinds of Brahman. This conflict only proves that we don't
have a systematic doctrine worked out in the Upanishads but we
have embodied therein the germs of all possible speculations.
Next we are in Janaka's court, and we meet there the great
Yagnavalkya again. Janaka was going to perform a great sacri-
fice. Several learned Brahmins were assembled. Janaka had
a desire to know which of these Brahmans was the most learned.
He offered a tempting prize of 1000 cows with ten gold coins tied
to each horn. "Oh the venerable Brahmins! Let him who is
the cleverest among you drive these co\vs." No one came forward.
Yagnavalkya said to his disciple "Drive these cattle home." This
excited the other Brahmans who challenged him to a metaphysical
discussion. He proved himself more than a match to these rivals.
Several eminent scholars tried their strength with Yagnavalkya.
But no one of t%m would stand his cross examination. Finally
turn it was the truth of a lady philosopher Gargi. She proposes
three important questions as to the nature of the Imperishable
and the Ultimate. The way in which she addresses Yagnavalkya is
expressive of her real greatness. She announces that if Yagnavalkya
answers all her questions then they must all recognise and acknow-
ledge that they are vanquished and disgraced. Three questions
proposed by Gargi were all about the self indestructible both
in the individual and in the Universe. Yagnavalkya answered
all of them to the great satisfaction of the questioner. The whole
physical universe ultimately depends upon space and space itself
ultimately depends upon the atman. This is the meaning of his

SAMAYASARA

answers. Yagnavalkya makes out that the soul is transcending
all notions of humanity and devoid of all sense qualities.
c<c Thou shalt not see the seer nor hear the hearer. That is the self
that is within all. It is above the heavens beneath the Earth., and
embracing past, present and future. Whosoever not knowing
the indestructible offers oblations and performs penances even for
one thousand years is a miserable slave whereas he who knows
the self as imperishable is real Brahman. This indeed is the true
form free from evil. This is filled with bliss and is free from sor-
rows. Yagnavalkya explains the different stages of consciousness
a doctrine which becomes more prominent in later metaphysics.
The first stage is waking consciousness. The second is sleep
where we have dream consciousness. Third is the dreamless
stage of deep sleep, and the fourth the stage beyond which we
reach the inmost self. According to Yagnavalkya the true nature
is identical with the fourth or the Turiya state. This may be
spoken of as the "Ego in itself." Self which is distinctly metem-
pirical and transcendent.

The next scene is where we see Yagnavalkya again in the court
of Janaka of Videha who asked Yagnavalkya the purpose of his
visit whether it is for philosophical disputation or for rich presents.
Yagnavalkya is shrewd enough to answer that his aim is both,
Then begins the discussion. Janaka is asked to expound all that
he learned about the doctrine of Brahman. The king narrates
the different doctrines of Brahman which he learnt from various
scholars. He tries to identify Brahman with sight, speech
hearing, mind etc. All these doctrines are recognised by Yagna-
valkya to be only partially true. He completes the teaching by
supplementing Janaka's doctrine of the self.

According to Yagnavalkya the atman is the condition of the
operation of the different senses as well as manas. As condi-
tioned by atman, these sense activities may reveal in their own
way the nature of Ahe underlying Brahman. But to identify cons-
ciousness or any one of the senses with Brahman would be un-
justifiable and erroneous. The soul isVhat subserves these func-
tions though it is not identical with any one of these. Its true
nature lies far beyond the strata of consciousness. We should

INTRODUCTION Ixxiii

have to dive deep into the consciousness in order to have a glimpse
of this Brahman. In his teaching, Yagnavalkya exhibits a width
of learning quite manifest from his discussion. We can also point-
out that this is corroborated by modern psychical research. What
\ve are aware of as consciousness is but a fractional aspect of our
true personality a great portion of which lies hidden in the depths
of subconsciousness. Yagnavalkya' s teaching therefore rightly
and justifiably repudiates this shallow intellectualism and tries
to bring to the forefront of discussion the magnitude and the
importance of the subconscious self which more than anything
else determines the conduct of the individual and contributes to
his worth. This subconsciousness of our personality is always
felt by the conscious individual as something other than ourselves
which makes for righteousness. It is this sublime mysticism
that forms the solid contribution of Yagnavalkya's teaching in
Janaka's court. No wonder that at every stage of discussion his
speech is punctuated with a present of 1000 cows. This time
Yagnavalkya leaves Janaka's court with his well earned present
of several thousands of cows, a good fee for a noble work.

Janaka is the examiner in another occasion and Yagnavalkya
the examinee. Consistent with his antecedents here also Yagna-
valkya surprises Janaka with his sublimity of thought and intensity
of philosophical insight. It is here that Yagnavalkya describes in
suggestive verses the true nature of Brahman. This is indeed
in true form free from desires, free from evil, free from fear,
knows not anything within or without. This indeed is his true
state. * There is no wish in him left unfulfilled and hence is he
free from sorrow. In that state ordinary relations of social life
have no meaning, a husband is not a husband, a mother is not a
mother, the chandala is not a chandala, saint is not a saint, it is
a state beyond Good and Evil. Then we have transvaluation of
all values. From Him procedeth all that has value, Himself being
beyond all valuation. Side by side with this uncompromising
pantheism Yagnavalkya propounds the doctrine of Karma. A
person is after all a bundle of desires. His desires determine his
conduct and according as one acts so doth he become. The
doer of good becomes good, the doer of evil, evil. One

SAMAYASARA

becomes righteous by righteous action and bad by bad action. He
does not accept that desires have no connection with acts. Some
say that man is judged by his desires and not by acts. Yagnavalkya
rejected this erroneous notion. The springs of desires are in the
action. What a man desires that he tries to achieve. Hence
there is no discrepancy between desire and conduct and each pers-
on is the architect of his own. The true meaning of salvation
consists in getting rid of desires which drag the soul along all
points of the compass. Man free from desires has but one desire
to realise his true nature or to become the released person.
He verily becomes the Brahman. As the slough of a snake lies
on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, even so is it with this body.
But this incorporeal immortal life is Brahman indeed, is life indeed.
The rest of the Upanishad is concerned with Yagnavalkya's attempts
at justifying the rituals symbolically by giving thenil metaphori-
cal interpretation. He tries to identify the vedic conception of
diversity of Gods with the supreme concept of Brahman. This
part of the Upanishad is characteristic of the attempt to reconcile
the Atmavidya with the traditional Vedic culture. Yagnavalkya
by embracing this new philosophical doctrine was not evidently
prepared to snatch himself away from the traditional vedic rituals.
We may also note here that Yagnavalkya probably did not belong
to the orthodox Brahmins of Kurupanchala and hence was
looked with an amount of suspicion by the latter. This is quite
evident from Yagnavalkya's conversation with Ikalya who resents
to Yagnavalkya 's reference to the Brahamanas of Kurupanchala
and retorts "Yagnavalkya ! because thou hast decried the Brah-
manas of the Kurupanchalas what Brahman dost thou know."
We see Yagnavalkya throughout this Upanishad mustering all
his resources to prove that in the various rituals there are the same
tendencies, the same doctrines embodied in the Upanishads.

The General Tendencies of the Upanishadic Period The study
of these important Upanishads has revealed to us some main
characteristics of this age. The most prominent idea is the
Brahman, the ultimate principle in the universe as well as in the
individual. This is represented in various discussions where
the self is identified with Prana or Akasa or sometimes with

INTRODUCTION

*

Vedic gods such as Surya, Soma, and Indra, Many of the Vedic
terms ate used synonymously to denote this new Upanishadic con-
cept of atman. But all these synonymous terms are brushed aside
as inadequate. Brahman is identified as the principle of Chetana
or the ground of consciousness which manifests in various forms
of activities. That is the truth revealed by Aajatasatru. That
is the truth learned by Narada from Sanatkumara. That again
is the teaching of .the celebrated Yagnavalkya. Brahman is cons-
ciousness or Chetana plus something more than that. Hence
it cannot be identified with any particular aspect of experience.
He being the knower cannot be one of the known. He is within
the heart of man and yet has his abode in far off Heaven. He is
neither the sun nor the moon of the vedic thought but he is the
Purusha. He is quite near us and yet not seen by us. He is within
us and yet illuminates things outside of us. This is the message
of the Upanishadic thinkers. The identity between Brahman
as the cosmic principle and atman as individual personality is
generally acknowledged by all the Upanishads. Is the identity
contemplated here of the nature of absolute identity ? Is it one
or many? Are the objects of the world real or illusory? Is
there existence besides the Self? These are some of the questions
for which we have no unanimous answer. Some passages in the
Upanishads emphasize the identity of the Brahman and the indi-
vidual whereas many of the important passages tend towards
pantheism. Everything in the universe is maintained and sus-
tained by the Brahman. This Upanishadic pantheism does not
contemplate the unreality of the external world. The process of
evolution, the birth and growth of the world from this spiritual
principle according to this Pantheism is compared to the spin-
ning of cobwebs by the spider. Besides this pantheistic tendency
there is also a clear idealistic note sounded by Yagnavalkya. His
doctrine (Brihadranyaka Upanishad) may be taken as the basis
of Advaita. According to Brihadranyaka the Brahman is shown
to be the transcendental Identity beyond the knower and the
known. Hence it is metempirical and beyond consciousness.
He is to be described only by negatives because no category of our
experience can truly explain this transcendental Idea. Besides

SAMAYASARA

this advaitic attitude there are also symptoms of theistic ten-
dency. Brahman is spoken as identical with Rudra and Vishnu.
He is spoken of as the creator and sustainer of the Universe. The
individuals are to lookup to him for spiritual guidance and help
and for final emancipation from Samsara. Besides these general
tendencies there are other characteristics of the Upanishadic Age.

I. The Upanishads are mainly antiritualistic. Since they
are antiritualistic they are in a sense anti-Vedic also. Internal
evidence indicates that the new thought had its origin mainly
among the Rajarishis.

II. Asceticism and the practice of Yoga seems to be the
characteristic institution of the Upanishadic age. The practical
course of realising the Brahman contemplated by the Upanishads
involves an elaborate process of self discipline. As against the
older forms of fire sacrifice the Upanishads contemplate a new
kind of sacrifice. Sacrificing one's own attractions towards
the woild. "These two are unending immortal oblations referring
to the saciifice of speech and other sense qualities. Whether
waking or sleeping one is sacrificing continuously uninterruptedly.
Now whatever other oblations there are they are limited, for they
consist of works-Karma- maya. Knowing this very thing verily
indeed the ancients did not sacrifice the agnihotra saciifice."
(Kaushithak Upanishad II Adhyaya.) This passage indicates
that Yoga or Tapas is considered as an ancient institution and has
taken the place of the traditional agnihotra about the time of the
Upanishads. This is further strengthened by circumstantial evi-
dence that the Upanishadic age must be of very long duration com-
prehending within itself an earlier conflict between antiritualism
and ritualism and a later attempted reconciliation of some sort.
Asceticism of the type of spiritual agnihotra must necessarily imply
what is elsewhere called the pther worldliness. . The concrete of
our everyday life is associated with evil and suffering. The goal
of life is emancipation from samsaric cycle. The means of attain-
ing this goal consists in eradicating all desires by performing Tapas.
All that is of the nature of evil in Life must be burned in the spi-
ritual fire of the Atman. This is the path of self-realisation.
Instead of the sacrifice of various animals to realise the aim of one's

INTRODUCTION

life one has to offer one's own desires as the sacrificial victim in
his higher agnihotra. The Yagakunda of the Upanishadic age
is in the very heart of one's own self. It is a sort of crucifying the
old Adam in man for the glorification of the new one. Thus
we have in this age of theosophic wisdom all the terms of a later
systematic philosophy. Here we are able to trace the Vedantic
idealism as well as the Sankhyan realism. Here we find the traces
of all theistic tendencies in India. We have also in the same age the
ground of the intellectual condition that ultimately developed into
the religion of peace and harmony which preached the glory of
renunciation. Max Muller says "The Upanishads are to my mind
the germs of Buddhism while Buddhism is in many respects the
doctrine of the Upanishads carried out to its last consequences.
The doctrine of the highest goal of Vedanta the Knowledge of the
true self is no more than the Buddhism the common property of
the Sangha fraternity open alike to_ the young and old, to the
Brahman and the Sudra, the rich and the poor, the literate and the
illiterate." In the Upanishads we have the germs of all the philo-
sophical system not only to the Vedic and the orthodox but also
those religiophilosophical systems which are non-vedic such as
Jainism and Buddhism. We may repeat our statement that it
was an age of general philosophical outbursts . in which there
were several tendencies with multifarious characteristics. Crys-
talisation of these tendencies and forces ultimately resulted in the
rise of several systems of Philosophy which adorned the suc-
ceeding period.

THE RUDIMENTS OF UPANISHADIC THOUGHT IN THE SAMHITAS
AND THE BRAHMANAS

Upanishadic literature practically forms a part of Vedic litera-
ture in general. Thus it is a part of Sruti as opposed to Smriti.
When we spoke about the various Brahmanas we saw what these
Brahmanas treated about. The Brahmanas are associated with
different Vedic groups, i.e., we have the Brahmanas belonging
to Rig, Yajur and so on. Thus we have the mantras or the
sacrificial hymns constituting the Samhita portion of a parti-
cular Veda .followed by the Brahmanas which explain the" sacri-

SAMAYASARA

ficial procedure. These Brahmanas contain what are known
as aranyakas or forest-treatises and Upanishads, a sort of Phiio-
sophkal discourse. These Upanishads constitute the last of the
sruti or Vedic literature. Hence they are sometimes known as Ve-
danta, the last of the Vedas which name was specialised to repre-
sent I particular school. of Philosophy later on. Now we have
to consider this third stage of Vedic literature known as the Upa-
nishadic literature. It is here we have the origin of genuine phi-
losophy. There are two fundamental conceptions implicitly
present throughout the early vedic literature which finally be-
come the central ideas in the Upanishads. These are atman and
Brahman. Atman is derived from a Sanskrit root meaning
Breath. It implies soul or spirit of the individual and indirect-
ly of the universe as well In a verse of the Rig Veda it is used
in the sense of Life. "Increase or Bright Indra this our mani-
fold food thou givest us like sap." This life principle was early
recognised to be inside of and different from body. The next
step in the history of Vedic thought is to recognise the soul or
life of the universe. Just as there is a non-material principle cons-
tituting the essence of man there is an essential principle at the
centre of the universe. This spiritual principle at the core of the
universe is also designated by the same term atman. Another
verse of the Jag Sanihita runs thus; where was the life the
blood; the soul of the universe who went to ask this avoca-
tions, in their old age all take,, to Sanyasahood or to use his
own words become Munis and finally give up their bodies
through the performance of yoga or tapas. Thus taking to
the life of a muni and performing tapas or yoga was
considered the general career of the Kshatriyas of the Iksha-
vaku family. Further we have to notice this fact that the Iksha-
vaku line is traditionally traced to series of Manus who were a
sort of mythic rulers and organisers of humanity. Reference
to the same house is made by the Jaina writers relating to the origin.
The founder of Jainism according to their own tradition was one
Vtishabha, king of Ayodhya belonging to the Ikshavaku line and
a descendant of the Manus. After ruling the country for some
time he abdicated the throne in favour of his son, Bharata and

INTRODUCTION

became a Muni engaged -in tapas or yoga. This Vrishabha is
supposed to be the founder of the doctrine of ahimsa that it is
wrong to inflict pain on any living thing on any account even in
the name of religion or God. From this Vrishabha the tradi-
tion speaks of a succession of Jaina prophets ending with the last
and the twenty-fourth Mahavira Vardhamana an elder contemporary
of Gautama Buddha. The date of His nirvana is fairly well
determined to be 527 B.C. The Jaina tradition associated his
immediate predecessor Parswanatha with Kasi, He was the
son of the King of Kasi, whose name was Viswasena.
The interval between Parswa and Mahavira is 250 years and
this would place him about 777 B.C. This date is recognised
to be fairly accurate and the personality of Parswa is accepted
to be quite historical. The fact we have to notice in connection
with this Jaina tradition is this. Of the 24 Jinas nearly 20 aie
associated with the Ikshavaku house and all of them are connected
with the Royal houses of Kasi, Kosala, Videha and Magadha.
Throughout the sacred Jaina writings the country of Videha is
referred to as a sacred land, mthyapmyabhum, where the Dharma
never dies Dharma referring to the doctrine of Ahimsa. The
importance of Videha, we shall know in another connection also.
The Upanishadic thought mainly centred round Janaka of Videha
and Yagnavalkya also of Videha. Perhaps we have to make a
slight distinction between Eastern Videha and Western Videha.
The portion bordering on Magadha, what is known as Purva
Videha, evidently retained the anti-sacrificial culture whereas the
north-west part of Janaka's country finally accepted a sort of
compromise between these sacrificial ritualism and the antisacrificial
protestantism. The same importance of the Ikshavaku house
we find in Buddhistic literature. The very first chapter of
RockhilTs life of Buddha contains an account of the life of
the Sakyas clan to which Gautama Buddha belongs. In this
account we find the Sakya clan traced to the house of the
Ikshavakus. This evidently implies the general belief in those
days, that to trace their lineage to the Ikshavaku house was con-
sidered to be a proud distinction among the Kshatriya clans.
Such a distinction could be claimed by this Ikshavaku house

SAMAYASARA

only because of the solid contribution they made towards the cul-
ture and the civilisation of the early Aryans and yet these Iksha-
vakus are hardly known and rarely mentioned m the Rig vedic
period Hence we have to think of the two different schools of
culture even among the fold of the Aryans and we are constrained
to accept Bloomfield's hypothesis that the Aryans of the Eastern
countries in the Gangetic plain mainly dominated by the Kshatri-
yas constitute an early group of Aryans who migrated into India
much earlier than the Aryans of the Kurupanchala whose ritualistic
culture was dominated by the priests. Rivalry between the two, not
merely in culture but in political relations, there must have been;
for we have constant references to expeditions of the Kurupancha-
las into the countries of Kosala and Videha which appear to be
partly for the purpose of proselytisation and partly for the purpose
of political aggrandisement, the spirit of the conquest being associat-
ed with the missionary spirit a frequently found phenomenon in
modern history. One other thing we have to notice and that
is about the sacred language of the respective clans. The Eastern
Aryans mainly used a form of Prakrit as their language a corrupt
and an easier form of Sanskrit, a fact very often referred to by
the Kurupanchalas. The Kurupanchalas sneered at the Eastern
Aryans because of their incapacity to pronounce accurately many
of the Sanskrit names. But the language sneered at by the priests
of the Kurupanchalas, was not only the language of the masses
among the Eastern Aryans but also the medium of this sacred
literature. The Jaina and Buddhistic scriptures were all written
in the form of Prakrit language, for Pali the language of the Bud-
dhist scriptures was but a slight modification of * Prakriti . We
cannot have a clear history of the beginning of this protestant
school among the Aryans till we are able to understand the
several obscure references which are scattered in the later Samhitas
as well as in the Brahrnana literature. It is enough to mention
only two. The institution of Yatis and Vratyas constitute extreme
obscure topics of the Vedic literature. The term Yati occurs
in the Samhitas literature where they are said to be destroyed by
Indra by offering them to the wolves of the forest. These
Yatis are described to be Sanyasins who did not accept Indra wor-

INTRODUCTION

Ixxxi

ship, who would not chant the vedic mantras and who were
opposed to the Brahmavadins. The -description is quite clear
and it implies that the yatis were a group of ascetics quite opposed
to sacrificial ritualism for which they were evidently punished
and persecuted by the more dominant branch of the ritualistic
Aryans. The school of the yatis must have been at a certain
period more influential and consequently more popular a fact
indicated by the Brahmana literature, which speaks of the giving
up of Indra worship and the Soma sacrifice for several years.
It is very ^significant to note that the reason given for giving up
the Indra worship and Soma sacrifice is the series of murders
committed by Indra beginning with the slaughter of Vrithra ending
with that of the yatis. Does it not suggest that at a certain period
of the later Samhitas and at the early Brahmana period the anti-
sacrificial school was more popular than the other which led to
the discarding of Indra worship and of the consequent sacrificial
ritualism? The same note of opposition is associated with the
institution of the Vratyas. The Vratyas are sometimes extoled
for their virtues and very often, condemned for their anti-
sacrificial unconventionalism. In an important book of the Athar-
vana Veda the traditional deities of the Vedic pantheon are made
subordinate to him and they go about as his attendants. He
is the greatest and the highest among the Gods and yet he is des-
cribed as a wandering mendicant, an ascetic who has to occasional-
ly visit a householder for his food, a description quite in keep-
ing with later Jaina and Buddhistic accounts. A Jaina yati or
Buddhistic bhikshu of a later period had to live mainly in the
outskirts of his city and had to go in the streets of the city
only during the time of meals and that too occasionally. The
description of Vratya is almost identical with a wandering ascetic.
He is one who has given up the traditional rituals of a Brahmin,
the samskaras of a brahmacharin. In spite of this fact they are
not considered as complete alien racially because the orthodox
fold devised ceremonies as a sort of prayaschitta after the perfor-
mance of which the Vratya could be. taken back into the Brah-
manical fold. This fact completely rejects the hypothesis suggest-
ed by some scholars that the Vratyas were some soft of abori-

J xsx |] SAMAYASARA

ginai nomades living in the midst of the Aryans. The orthodox
literature even while condemning the ways of the Vratyas never
speaks of them as non-Aryans. They are only corrupt Aryans
speaking a corrupt language found in Magadha and the sur-
rounding districts Magadha was the seat of Jaina and Buddhistic
cultures. Taking all these into consideration it is not an implausible
hypothesis to suggest that long before the rise of Buddhism
there was a liberal school of thought existing side by side with
the orthodox vedic school. To stop here with the sugges-
tion that the protestant school was dominated by the .Kshatriyas
just as the other was by the Brahmins would rather be inaccurate.
There must have been militant proselytising on either side and
also dominant free thinking. So much so we find several schools
led by Vedic ritualism and the Kshatriyas just as Janaka accepting
a modified form of ritualism. Among this school of protestan-
tism we are able to recognise through the ha2y past two inner
currents one indicating the origin of Vaishnavism and the other
Jainism. Vaishnavism to be accurate is a mixture of several
currents of thought and culture with a vedic nucleus is well
brought out by Dr. Bhanderkar in his monograph on the 'His-
tory of Vaishnavism 3 . The vedic nucleus is associated with
Narada a disciple of Sanatkumara. Narada must have been one
of the great opponents of the sacrificial cult involving Himsa as
was Viswamitra of the Rig vedic period. This Narada school
of the Upanishadic period constitutes the Vedic nucleus for later
Vaishnavism characterised by the full recognition of the doctrine
of Ahimsa except in the case of sacrifice. This is borne out by
the closing verse of the Chandogya where the qualifications of
a person who reaches the Brahma world are given. After
mentioning the condition of Vedic study the following is added,
"He who has concentrated all his senses upon the atman,
He who practises Ahimsa all things elsewhere than at Tktha
who indeed who lives thus throughout the length of life reaches
the Brahma world and does not return again." This verse indi-
cates a spirit of compromise. We see a split in the very body
of the antiritualistic school the right one representing the Upanish-
adic thought. This thing must have gone on for some centuries

INTRODUCTION

when there was the necessity and the occasion of a more radical
school Buddhism which threw open the gates of Dharma to all
irrespective of the distinction between the Aryan and the .non-
Aryan. Many of the schools or darasanas must have been codi-
fied just after the time of Buddha.

Sankhya Philosophy Kapila The Sankhya system propounded
by Kapila is perhaps the oldest of the traditional systems of
philosophy. It is referred to both in the Jaina and Buddhistic
sacred literature. Jaina work describing the origin of Jains
Dharma associates the origin of Sankhya school with one Marichi
who was a grandson of Vrishabha the founder of Jainism accord-
ing to Jaina tradition. This grandson of Vrishabha even during
his grandfather's life time is said to have started a rival school
though based upon the fundamental doctrine of Ahimsa. The
difference between Marichi and Vrishabha's school is in the phi-
losophical background of each and Kapila is referred to as one
of the disciples of Marichi. This suggestion is borne out both
from internal and other reference. From internal evidence
Sankhya school clearly appears to be a revolt against the. Vedic
sacrificial ritualism in no unmistakable terms. Further Gunatatna
in Ms commentary on Haribhadra's Shad-darsana Samuchya refers
to the Sankhya school thus: Sankhyas were opposed to the Vedic
doctrines of Himsa and were interested in Adhyatmavada. Again
this Kapila, the reputed author of Sankhya is referred to in the
Buddhistic account as to 'the origin of the Sakya ..clan of Ksha-
triyas to which Gautama Buddha himself belonged. We referred
to the fact that the Sakyas claimed to be descendants of the Ik-
shavaku family. One of the kings of the Ikshavaku's Viruddaka
declared Ms youngest son as his successor and exiled his four
other sons by his first wife. The princes accompanied by then
sister and a great many people travelled towards the Himalaya
mountains and reached the hermitage of Kapila. The Rishi
showed them where to build a town and they built it according
to his directions. The Rishi Kapila having given the soil Vastu
of the place they called the town the soil of Kapila-KapJlavastu,
and this Kapilavastu is the birthplace of Gautama Sakya Mum,
son of the ruling prince Suddhodana. According to this account,

SAMAYASARA

Kapila is aa ancient rishi much earlier than the rise of Buddhism.
In the puranic literature he is sometimes referred to as the son
and sometimes as the avatar of Vishnu. Kapila is referred to in
the Mahabharata and Ramayana. Bhagavat Gita which is a part
of Mahabharata is mainly based upon Kapila's Sankhya philosophy
and distinctly mentions the name of the Philosopher as well as
the philosophy. By the time Mahabharata was composed Kapila's
Sankhya system must have been prevalent and was probably very
popular. Kapila again figures in the Ramayana. He is associated
with King Sagara who wanted to perform an Aswamedha. The
horse let loose by him to have its triumphant march was stolen
by a Rakshasa. It was taken to the netherworld and tied to a tree
close by which Kapila was performing tapas. The persons sent
out to search the animal found it by the side of the rishi. Mis-
taking the rishi to be the culprit they began to molest him. En-
raged at this he punished them by burning them all to ashes
through his mystic powers. Again Kapila is referred to in the
Upanishads, Here not only the name* of the author but also
several characteristic doctrines of the system are also men-
tioned. This reference in the Upanishads indicates that Sankhya
school was one of the dominant schools of revolt against
vedic ritualism. The literary references cast a good deal of
mystery round the personality of Kapila the great thinker
responsible for Sankhya philosophy. But he is always referred
to with great awe and reverence and in Sanskrit Literature
he has the unique distinction of owning the title Paramarishi.
This unique title of Paramarishi is clear evidence to show
his importance in the early philosophical literature of India.
The followers of Sankhya school are called after the founder's
second name Paramarish. But at present this school is not
represented by distinct followers. Most probably all the San-
khyas were absorbed into the fold of later Vaishnavism; for it
is clear from the introductory remarks of Gunaratna that they
were the worshippers of Narayana. This absence of a school
claiming a number of devotees is sometimes explained by the fact
of the antirituaHstic and antitheistic tendencies of the system.
Because of these tendencies Kapila's teaching according to

INTRODUCTION

rxxxv

some European scholars never secured a good following. This
view of European scholars cannot be accepted. Though at pre-
sent there are no representatives of the Sankhya school still we
have evidence to show that in earlier period of Indian history
about the time of Gunaratna there were a number of devotees
professing the Sankhya faith. Therefore it is not quite accurate
to state that Kapila "Left no traditions and found no school."
(David's Sankhya Karikas.) In Gunaratna's commentary we
find the following introductory note to the chapters on Sankhya.
"In order to distinguish who the Sankhyas are I mean to describe
certain of their characteristic marks and habits of dress. They
carry three sticks but some of them carry only one. They all
had red-coloured clothes and carried with them deerskins, as their
asanas. Whenever they met each other they saluted nomona-
rayana which would be returned narayanaja namaha. These
were called Parivrajakas." From this description we [have to
admit that at one time there were a large number of Sankhya as-
cetics in the country which belied obita dicta of the Orientalists
who believe that there were no school of the Sankhyas. Most
probably these Parivrajakas were absorbed into the general
Hindu fold as was suggested. From the characteristic saluta-
tion referred to by Gunaratna we can infer that Sankhya Parivraja-
kas had something to do with the growth of modern Vaishna-
vism which is a result of several tendencies of Thought.

i. The Upanishadic doctrine of Brahman which is closely
allied to the Sankhya doctrine of Purusha or Atman. (z) The
Vasudeva cult and the traditions which have grown around the
Yadava prince Krishna. (3) The traditions associated with
the Pre-Ramanuja period represented by the alwars of the South.
From Tamil literature two things are quite evident, (i) The
great alwars-the religious devotees of the Dravidian country
were worshippers of Narayana. (2) The earliest Tamil _ reference
Tolkapyam speaking about the religious faiths. It is impossible
for us to say with any amount of exactitude when the Krishna
cult came to the South. This much we can assert that it must
be several centuries before the Christian era much earlier than
the introduction of Buddhism. This suggestion is borne out by

SAMAYAS4RA

the fact that some of the founders of Vedic schools Apasthambha
and Kathyayana are spoken of as Dravidian and the Tamil work
already referred to also speaks of the prevalent Indra worship in
the South. Taking all these facts we have to assign the Aryan
migration somewhere about the yth Century B. C. The migra-
tion of Aryans with their characteristic Indra worship must
certainly have been associated with the Sankhya school which
was manily opposed to Indra worship and animal sacrifice, that
is the two schools of thought must have come down to the south
almost simultaneously. Another thing we may notice in this
connection is this. The school of revolt against Brahminical
ritualism must generally be more liberal in its social aspect. This
is clearly borne out in the case of Jaina and Buddhistic
schools. The Sankhya school was evidently at one with these
two schools in removing the social barriers against religious devo-
tees. Such an assumption well borne out by sister 'schools of
thought would explain the fact that among the alwars of the
south we find representatives from among all strata of so-
ciety irrespective of the distinction of Arya and Dravida. The
Vaishnava tradition is confirmed even by RamanujYs teachings
though by a strange irony of fate his followers at present repre-
sent the most bigoted form of orthodoxy.

Sankhya Philosophy The term Sankhya according to European
scholars is derived from Sankhya 3 or number, because -Kapila enu-
merates a number of Tatwas as constituting elements of reality.
The term is supposed to be related to number. But according to
Indian thinker the term is synonymous with discrimination. This
is the meaning in which the term is used in the Mahabharata.
Vignanabikshu a famous writer of the Sankhya school also ex-
plains the term as discrimination or setting forth the distinction
between spirit or atman on the one hand and matter or Prakrit! on
the other. Sankara also adopts the same interpretation. Hence
the traditional meaning may be accepted, as more correct and the
other one suggested by European scholars has to be rejected
as farfetched. Some of them even go to the length of connect-
ing the Sankhya system with the Pythagorean school. Pythago-
reanism is also connected with the mystric doctrine of numbers.

INTRODUCTION IxXXVli

Reality is somehow constituted by numbers according to Pytho-
gares. It is scarcely necessary to point out how unfounded such
a suggestion is. It is a sample of that method which very often
builds up fantastic theories merely on the strength of verbal

analogy.

Sankhya Method The philosophical method adopted by^the
Sankhya school is just the method of discrimination or vive-
kagnana. This method of discrimination is expounded as a means
of salvation from Samsara. By the way, we may point out that
this is the motive of all the Indian systems of thought how to
obtain liberation from the Samsaric cycle of births and deaths. Such
a freedom according to Sankhya philosophy is to be obtained by
"discrimination" or knowledge of the distinction between the
spkitual principle or Purusha and the environmental existence

or Prakriti.

The Sources ofSankbja The existing works through which we
can have an idea of the Sankhya system are mainly the follow-
ing: Some of these are in the sutra form and the others in the
form of commentaries, (i) Sankhya sutras or otherwise known
as Sankhya pravachanasutras is traditionally ascribed -to Kapila
himself.' But this belief is quite unfounded. There is clear
evidence to show that this 'is quite a modern work. Sankara
and Vachaspati Mishra the great philosophical commentators
never refer to this work at aU. Gunaratna, the commentator
on Shaddarsanasamuchaya while mentioning several other works
on Sankhya does not refer to this work even by name. Hence
this is considered neither important nor an authoritative work
on the Sankhya school of thought.

(2) Tatvasamasa: This work also is erroneously attribut-
ed to Kapila. Max Mullet elaborately argues that this work is a
genuine work of Kapila. His arguments are far from convincing
and hence his view is not. accepted by modern scholars. (3)
Sankhyasara: This is by Vignanabikshu who wrote a commentary
on the Sankhyapravachanasutra. Hence this work is a compendium
of his commentary. (4) Sankhya-karjka of Iswara Krishna:
This work contains a clear exposition of the Sankhya system, it
is a small work of jz couplets and may be considered as an early

Ixxxviii SAMAYASARA

authoritative work on the Sankhya system. This work is referred
to by several philosophical writers. Gunaratna bases his com-
mentary,, on the chapter on Sankhya mainly on this work from
which he freely quotes. This may be taken as an evidence of
its antiquity as well as its authoritativeness. Besides this work
Gunaratna speaks of a number of other Sankhya Treatises many
of which are not available.

The Sankhya System The chief purpose of philosophical study
in ancient India was to get rid of the sorrows of life. This ideal
is stated at the very beginning of the system. Life according to
Kapilais subject to three kinds of sorrow. Moksha or liberation
consists in the extinction of pain and misery originating from
these three sources. The three sources of sorrow according
to Sankhya are (i) adhyatmika, that which is dependent on self (2)
adhibhautika, that which is dependent on the environment (3) adhi-
daivika, that which is dependent on supernatural and divine in-
fluences. Adhyatmika Dukkha, sorrow dependent on self may
be due to two reasons (a), bodily conditions or Sariraka (b) mental
conditions or Manasika. Sorrow due to bodily condition relates
to suffering in pain due to diseases etc., which pertain to the body.
Sorrows due to mental conditions are the unpleasant experience
associated with certain emotions such as anger, fear etc. The
second class of sorrows known as Adhibhautika is due to environ-
mental conditions. The interference from environmental source
may be from fellow-human beings or animals or birds or other
natural conditions. The third kind, Adhidaivika, refers to sorrow
originating from the influences of a supernatural agencies. The
wrath of the deities, adverse conjunction of planets the mischief
of the Yakshas and Rakshasas would all come under this head.
The summum bonum for life is to escape from these kinds of
Dukkha or sorrow. This escape from suffering and pain is
to be achieved by the knowledge of the several Tatvas and hence
the desure to know the Tatvas. All souls long to escape from
such misery and to seek liberation. The Sankhya method pro-
pounds the means of escape from sorrow and of the attainment
of the consequential bliss. The Sankhya method of liberation
is quite different from the traditional vedic method which was

INTRODUCTION

by sacrifice. Kapila condemns the sacrificial cult. The revealed
vedic method is quite useless according, to Kapila because of its
defects which are three.

Impurity Destruction and excess or enormity. The vedic
method of sacrifice is impure because it is caused by bloodshed
due to slaughter of animals. This method of sacrifice though .sup-
posed to expiate all sins even Brahmahatya is rejected by Kapila for
all such rites according to him are impure. Further it leads to
mere destruction. The method of sacrifice instead of leading
to complete liberation from Samsara merely leads to another state
of Samsaric existence. The end aimed at is happiness in Swarga
and certainly this is not tyEoksha. Hence the path of sacrifice is
the path of destruction and not of salvation. The traditional
method is excessive or unequal. Sacrifice generally involves lot of
expenditure, e.g., in an Aswamedha sacrifice sometimes hundreds
of horses have to be sacrificed. Hence this method is not within
the reach of all. Therefore as against such an impossible way
of escape Kapila proposes a method which is quite adequate and
feasible to all'. The path to liberation according to Sankhya
philosophy consists in the progress of acquiring discriminative
knowledge of the nature of the self from its environmental
existence. This discrimination that the spirit or Purusha is
quite different from Prakriti or matter that leads to self reali-
sation which is the true Moksha. The material environment
which practically imprisons the spirit is called by Kapila
Prakriti. The whole physical universe is but a manifestation
of this Prakriti. Hence the discriminative knowledge also
means the knowledge of the number and the nature of the several
Tatvas ultimate principles. The problem relating to the path
to Moksha resolves therefore into the problem as to the nature of
the Tatvas. The next question therefore is what are the Sankhyan
Tatvas? Kapila starts with the assumption that the self or
Purusha is quite distinct from Prakriti or the ultimate matter.
The former is the spiritual principle in man whereas the latter,
the primeval basic principle of the material universe. The cos-
mos is evolved out of this Prakriti. In the midst of .this unfolding

xc SAMAYASARA

and developing Prakrit! the several Purushas are situated. Accord-
ing to Kapila the Purushas are infinite in number. Thus in the
technical language of modern metaphysics the Sankhya system
may be said to be the dualistic as well as pluralistic. Dualistic
because it postulates two classes of reals Chetana and Achetana,
spiritual and non-spiritual and pluralistic because it postulates
an infinite number of Purushas or souls. Each Purusha is encir-
cled by Prakrit! or Pradhana which is another name for describ-
ing matter. In the earlier form of the Sankhya system each Pur-
usha was supposed to have his own peculiar and individual Pra-
krit!. But later schools of Sankhya maintained that all the diffe-
rent Pradhanas relating to different Purushas are really one in
nature since they are all evolved from?" one and the same Prakrit! ,
The Purusha who is encircled by an alien and extraneous matter
forgets its true nature and pristine purity, identifies itself with
bodily activities and conditions. This ignorance of its true heri-
tage is the real cause of human misery. Hence the realisation
of the true nature of the Purusha as distinct from the material
conditions is the ideal to be aimed at.

'Evolution oj the cosmos from the 'Primeval Prakriti This Prakrit!
is uncreated and self-existing. It is from this Prakrit! all
other things emanate except the Purusha. This primeval matter
or Prakrit! is endowed with three gunas or qualities. When-
ever the harmonious equilibrium of the quality in the Prakrit!
is disturbed it begins on the career of manifestation or differen-
tiation. This process of differentiation really constitutes the
process of the building up of the Cosmos. The first thing that

emanates from this unmanifested Prakrit! is Buddhi or Mahat

the Great. The term Buddhi is sometimes translated as intellect
but we should remember this fact that it is mainly- of the nature of
matter since it evolves from achetana reality-Prakrit!. Intellect
in modern psychology suggests a relation to a mind or self but
Prakrit! in Kapila's system corresponds to Descarte's unthink-
ing thing. Therefore Buddhi which is evolved from this Prakrit!
subtle though it be is still a material mode. This Buddhi or
Mahat must therefore mean in the Sankhya system some sort of
.subtle material environment quite in the proximity of the Puru-

INTRODUCTION xcl

sha or self. It is only through the medium of this Buddhi that
Purusha has knowledge of the external world. Sankhya writers
compare Buddhi to a sort of mirror which reflects the knowledge
of the external world for the benefit of Purusha. On the
one hand, it reflects the outer world and on the other it reflects
also the Purusha. Buddhi is that peculiar medium in which
the Purusha and his material environments are brought into
relation which is the ultimate source of Samsara. It is because of
this relation of Buddhi between the self and the non-self that there is
a chance for the Purusha to mistake his true nature and to identify
himself with Prakriti and thus to imagine that he is responsible
for all the changes in the material environments. The next
step is the birth of "ahankara" from Buddhi. It is the I or the
Ego which is the ground of our personal identity. Here also
we, have to notice that ahankara, the Sankhya ego is not quite
identical with the conception of the. Ego or self of modern psy-
chology. The ego of modern psychology corresponds to Puru-
sha whereas the Sankhyan ahankara merely means some further
modification of the subtle Buddhi which itself is a modification
of achetana Prakriti. The Sankhyan Ego probably refers to
a process of individuation a process culminating in organic body.
The self or Purusha becomes an organic individual through
the means of ahankara. Next we have the origin of the five
senses known as the Tanmatras. This term is a technical term
of the Sankhya school meaning the sense qualities. These sub-
tle sense qualities emanate from that principle of individuality
known as ahankara. The Tanmatras are five in number, sound,
touch, smell, taste and visibility. Even these tanmatras we
have to remember are material categories. These sense ele-
ments or Tanmatras form the primary basis for the evolution
of the grosser matter. This grosser matter which is derived
from these Tanmatras is again of five kinds, the Panchabhutas.
(Ether) -Akasa, air, earth, water and fire. Ether arises from
sound air from touch, earth from smell, water from taste and
fire from visibility or light. Thus the five bhutas are respectively
derived from the five Tanmatras, the basic categories of the phy-
sical universe. This line of development from ahankara to the

SAMAYASARA

world of physical things represents only one side of the process.
There is another process of development from the same source
from ahankara or the principle of individuality. We have
the principle of building up the organic. This process of
building up the organic body consists in the evolution of the
five buddhi-indriyas or organs of sense perception and five
karmendriyas or the organs of activity and manoindriya
the organ of thought. The five organs of sense percep-
tion are the five familiar sense organs Eye, ear, nose,
tongue and the skin. These sense organs according to the
Sankhya system are evolved out of the principle of individuality,
ahankara. So also are the five Karmendriyas which are the
vocal organs for speech, the hands, the feet, the organs of excre-
tion and the generative organs. These five Buddhindriyas and
the five Karmendriyas together with the manas are the eleven
Indriyas derived from Ahankara. Thus the primeval cosmic
principle Prakriti evolving upto ahankara branches off into two
lines of development one leading upto the cosmos and the
other to the building up of the body which serves as the temporal
tabernacle for the purusha. Thus the Sankhya tatvas which
are derived from Prakriti are 24 in number. These together
with Purusha constitute the 25 Sankhya tatvas.

The Nature Of Prakriti Prakriti is otherwise called Avyakta
or the unmanifest or Pradhana or the primary basis of existence.
When we look to the process of evolution of the different Tatvas
enumerated above we find this Prakriti as the fountain source of not
only the elements that go to build up the physical universe
but also of those that lead to the origin of organised living bodies.
This primaeval subtle matter Prakriti may be some kind of Ether
which early Sankhyas may be said to have imagined. This is the
connecting link between the. gross matter on the one hand and
life activity on the other, the fountain source of both the in-
organic and the organic. Even according to modern Science
Ether is the primeval source of matter. According to what is
known as the electron theory of matter, the physical atom
is a complex system of electrons. Thus the physical basis of
matter is traced to Ether which is the basis of forces like elec-

INTRODUCTION XC111

tricity, magnetism, light, heat, etc. The process of development
of physical science is interesting in this respect. Towards the
close of the i9th century there was the wonderful analysis of
the physical realm into a definite number of chemical elements out
of which the whole cosmos was built. Science then recognised
two fundamental concepts mass and energy as constitutive
of matter. The speculation of Maxwell and Thompson ulti-
mately indicated that Mass was but a derivative concept, Energy
being the primary one. The next step was reached when the
electrical theory of matter was propounded. This leads to the
complete identity of all forms of physical energy, heat,
light, magnetism and electricity. The next and most important
step of advance is marked by the discovery of radio activity.
On the one hand it discovered the extremely complex nature
of the atom which resembles the Solar system in miniature in-
asmuch as it contains a nucleus around which a number of nega-
tive electrons revolve with incredible velocity. The second
result of this discovery is equally important. The chemical
element which were considered to be completely isolated are
now shown to be merely of quantitative differences brought about
by the electronic changes in the intra atomic constitution. The
dream of the alchemist that all the chemical elements had a com-
mon basis and hence transmutable is no more a matter of historic
curiosity suggesting merely how men went wrong in their
early scientific speculations. It becomes a matter of scientific
possibility for unquestionably it is indicated that all the elements
have a common source. If this theory as to the constitution
of the cosmos is accepted and there is evidence enough sup-
porting it then ether becomes the primeval fountain source
of all energy constituting the physical realm. This again
conversely implies that due to the intra atomic changes the
physical universe may altogether get dissolved and then
disappear into the very same primeval Ether. On the side of
the organic world we have had a similar development pointing
towards some such source as the Ether. We are all acquainted
with the Darwinian conception of biological evolution which
traces the diversity of animal life to a single source of organised

SAMAYASA&A

protoplasmic matter. No doubt modem ^^
able to bridge up the gulf between the inorganic and the organic
Nevertheless* the life activity in protoplasmic matter --^s th
ultimate source for the wealth and richness of animal life may be
^v Try intra atomic energy, probably controlled and guided
I" a higher category not yet fully known to moderr i sctence
and most probably indicating to the same source of Ether. To
tarthe'side J psychology many an abnormal phenomenon
such as telepathy and clairvoyance are supposed to be due to
some kind of Ether which is capable of transmitting thought
waves. Thus from every direction speculation leads to the
same kind of origin. When different departments of modern
science agree to postulating a common entity-Ether, for the
purpose of explaining their respective phenomena we may very
well imagine that Kapila contemplated some such ultimate basis
which would account for the evolution of the cosmos as well
as the organic world. Kapila's system not only describes the
building up of things living and unliving from a primeval ira-
kriti but also contemplates the possibility of their loosing their
concrete form and thus disappearing into the original Prakriti.
Thus as a tortoise throws it limbs backwards so also will the
universe retract all its emanations and evolving tilings back to
its own bosom. This 'in short is the account of the evolution
of the world according to Kapila. ^

This primeval Prakriti or Pradhana is considered to be the sub-
stratum of the three gunas, Satva, Rajasa and Tamasa. The Sankhya
system emphasises the importance of the three gunas of Prakriti.
Satva means good, or Truth; Rajasa means activity or passion.
Tamasa means darkness or inertia. This conception of gunas is
really an obscure doctrine in the Sankhya system. These three
gunas are supposed to inhere in the primeval matter Prakriti.
These do not belong to Purusha. The uncreated and indestruct-
ible Pradhana which has the potency of life and consciousness has
also this privilege of owning these three Gunas which somehow
are interested in the evolution of the Cosmos. The interplay
of the three gunas in the Prakriti forms the starting point in
the evolutionary process. When the three gunas are harmo-

INTRODUCTION XCV

niously settled there Is a sort of internal equilibrium and peace
within the Prakrit!. Somehow this primeval harmony is dis-
turbed when one of the gunas gets predominance over the rest
and this starts the process of evolution. On account of this
original and unexplained disturbance, the Prakrit! enters into a
sort of creative evolution though itself is not created. Thus
it carries in its bosom in a latent form the richness and multi-
plicity of the well ordered universe. The original disturbance
of harmony which is the beginning of the process of evolution
remains an ultimate metaphysical assumption on which Sankhya
system rests. Why there should be a disturbance at all in
the primeval peace, Kapila does not trouble to explain. But
this is an assumption without which subsequent changes would
remain inexplicable. By some mysterious internal disorder,
Prakrit! is -set moving and then follows change after change and
at each step the progressive making of the universe. In the
fully evolved univese Kapila assigns each Guna its respective
region. The satvaguna which is associated with light, fire or
flame is the symbol of purity. The spotless shining quality of
Satva is present in the ordinary fire and flame. The presence
of this, quality makes the flame turn skywards thereby indicating
its divine origin from above. In air there is the predominance
of Rajasaguna. Hence it is marked by its violence. It roams
about horizontally in the middle region of the universe. Solids
and liquids stand for Tamasa guna. Hence their opacity to
light and hence their inert and impervious nature and hence
their tendency to sink downwards. Thus the evolution
of the denser and grosser matter is the result of the pre-
cipitating of the Tamasa guna. Thus the three gunas have
their part in the evolution of the inorganic world. They also
have their part to play in the origin and growth of the organic
world. Organisms are but the modifications of the same Pra-
kritt, and hence they ate also subject to the influence of the three
gunas. The living world is divided into the upper, the middle
and the lower. The upper region of the cosmos traditional
swarga is the abode of the devas. The lower one is associated
with the animal and trees whereas the middle region is the natural

XCV1 SAM ATA SARA

habitation of man. The swarga abode of happy divine being
is also the place where Brahma and Indra reside. The elemental
beings like Gandharvas and Yakshas also reside there. These
beings of the higher regions have in them the satvaguna in abun-
dance. Hence they are marked by mutual goodwill and general
happiness. In man there is a predominance of Rajasaguna.
Hence arises the feverish activity of man who is destined to
eat the fruits of his karmas. His life is marked by the dominant
note of struggle the misery and the few cases of mo-
mentary happiness which he now and then manages to experi-
ence only go to accentuate' his general unhappiness and misery.
The last is the region of the animals. This has the maximum
of Tamasa guna or darkness. Hence all the inhabitants of this
region are marked by general unconsciousness and stupor. All
these three regions of the world constitute the one whole world of
samsaric cycle according to Kapila. The same chain of births and
deaths binds the three kinds of beings animals, men and Devas.
Even the prominent residents of Swarga, Brahma and Indra
who generally enjoy unalloyed happiness throughout their lives
have to meet with death. Hence their life is equally subject to
the visicitudes of Samsara and suffers from the bondage of births
and deaths. Theirs is not the life of pure and liberated Purusha.
Thus not only in the building up of the inorganic world but also in
the evolution of the organic including the super and subhuman
regions, the part palyed by the three gunas of Prakriti is felt in
no mean degree. These gunas are invoked by the Sankhya
thinkers to explain the birth of. world and the process of Samsara.
Moksha or liberation: According to Sankhyas Moksha or
liberation consists in getting rid of all the root causes of Samsara
which are the three kinds of bondage, mentioned above. Kapila
curiously expects the means of salvation from the very Prakriti
which is the original source of the bondage, The intelligent
Purusha is inactive by nature and hence is incapable of being
the architect of his own destiny. Achetana-the unenlightened-
Praknti has all activity and force in itself and is quite blind
by nature. The Purusha is intelligent but enert and Prakriti
is all activity but blind. The union of the two-the blind and

INTRODUCTION XCV11

the cripple leads to living things. It is that the soul may be
able to cdntemplate 0^1 its own nature and entirely separate itself
that the union is made as of the halt of the cripple and the blind
and through that union the universe Is formed. It is Prakriti
that is privileged to carry the Purusha to its final goal. It is
through the manifestation of Prakriti that the soul acquires discri-
mination and obtains moksha. Is there any conscious cooperation
between Purusha and Prakriti? No, that cannot be for Prakriti
is Achetana and the Purusha cannot live in peace with it and yet
there is this union between the two. Kapila vehemently pro-
tests against postulating a higher intelligence than Prakriti, Iswara
in order to explain the union between the two. He advances
arguments to show that there can be co-operation even in the
region of the unconscious. Purposive adaptation according to
Kapila need not necessarily imply the operation of an intelligent
agent. Secretion of milk from the cow is no doubt necessary and
useful for the calf. This secretion is no doubt a case of purposive
adaptation, but all the same the cow is not consciously responsible
for this. Similarly the relation between Prakriti and Purusha
is a case of purposive adaptation without the necessity of an intelli-
gent adjuster. Prakriti unconsciously itself operates for the bene-
fit of Purusha and is a case of unconscious inner necessity to
serve the purpose of the soul. The adaptation between the two
is absolutely unconscious though suggestive of an intelligent
designer. Again through the help of Prakriti Purusha is able to
obtain discriminative knowledge about his true nature. The Purusha
is able to realise himself to be absolutely independent of and unin-
fluenced by the Prakriti activities. He knows he is different from
the senses, Buddhi and ahankara. This realisation of independence
from the environment including his own psychophysical mecha-
nism leads to perfect knowledge. Then the purusha is able to
perceive that the activities are all due to Prakriti while he himself
remains in unruffled peace. Prakriti ceases to affect him. Prakriti
retires from the stage saying 1 have been seen. I can no more
please the Purusha 5 and then the Purusha remains calm and peace-
ful saying "I have seen her; no more can she please me." This
discriminative knowledge and the consequent retirement of the

SAMAYASARA

Purusha from the cosmic stage is an interesting philosophical
metaphor. Prakriti or nature continues to spin round on account
of its own original impulse even after Purusha's liberation.
But this activity can no more influence the liberated Purusha
because through knowledge he obtained freedom or Moksha.

The main objection is that Kapila starts his system as a panacea
for the evils in this world. He thereby recognises at least to some
extent the importance of ethical value. But the system as finally
wrought out by him is incapable of accommodating any such
moral value. Human volition and consequent human conduct
as such are said to be the effects of achetana Prakriti virtue and
vice are alien to the Purusha. They are associated with the non-
spiritual Prakriti and hence they do not affect the soul and yet
with a strange inconsistency it is the fate of Purusha to enjoy the
fruits pleasurable and painful of the karmas directly and immediately
due to the activity of Prakriti. Why it is the fate of Purusha that
he should vicariously suffer the consequences of an alien being is
left entirely unexplained. To be consistent with his own presupposi-
tions he ought to have made Purusha indifferent to the consequen-
tial pleasure or pains of conduct. But that would have made the
Purusha an altogether unintelligible shadow of reality. It is
this inherent paralysis of his system that strikes us as an important
defect. In spite of the various defects we have to pay our homage
to the great ancient thinker for the courageous application of the
rational method for the problem of life and reality. In a remote
age of Indian -thought when customary dogmas played the domi-,
nant part in the explanation of philosophical problems it is really
a matter for admiration to see such a rigorous and rational thinker
as Kapila. In philosophical study the method is more important
than the results. The results may be modified but the method
leaves a permanent impression and contributes an endowing value
in creating the right intellectual attitude. If the method of ana-
lysis and explanation is admitted to be of greater philosophic
value than the actual doctrine obtained thereby Kapila judged
by this standard must occupy a place on a par with the world's
greatest thinkers.

It was stated in a previous section that the doctrine of Ahimsa

INTRODUCTION XC1X

was prevalent even before the time of the Rigvedic period, pro-
bably due to the influence of the Lord Vrishabha of thelkshavaku
clan. This school of thought continued to have a parallel exis-
tence to the vedic culture of the sacrificial tenets. There must
have been mutual influence between these two schools, one em-
phasising sacrifice and the other condemning it. That there were
such counter currents of thought is obvious from the conflicting
passages found in the Rigvedic literature. It sometimes emphasises
sacrifice, in such passage as Ajena Eshtavyaha, and sometimes
condemns sacrifice Ma-himsyat. In this struggle between ^the
two schools of thought, we find the rival school to Vedic sacrifice
becoming more dominant now and then, leading to giving up of
sacrifice and Indra worship. But about the time of the rise of
the Upanishadic literature the schools standing for Ahimsa
championed by the succession of Kshatriya teachers became
quite supreme. The sacrificial cult championed by the Priests
evidently gave up the struggle as hopeless and entered into a
compromise. They recognised the new thought characterised by
Ahimsa and Atmavidya as distinctly superior to their own sacri-
ficial cult which they accepted to be distinctly inferior. This
compromising effect by welcoming the new thought as Paravidya
and assigning an inferior place to the sacrificial cult as Aparavidya
must have secured intellectual peace and harmony only for some
time. Becaur - H the latter Upanishadic literature while accepting
the new doctrine of Atmavidya they surreptitiously smuggled into
the Upanishadic cult the doctrine of sacrifice as a specially exemp-
ted one. Thus we find in Upanishadic literature an open recog-
nition of the doctrine of Ahimsa and at the same time introducing
a clause except in the case of religious sacrifice. This ingemus
method of smuggling into the new thought, the old objected
doctrine of sacrificial ceremony was evidently virulently protest-
ed by the rival schools. The struggle continued within-
creased strength, because by that time, the old Vrishabha thought
of Ahimsa gained additional strength by the rise of Buddhism
and also from the co-operation of the Sankhya and Yoga schools
which crystalised out of the Upanishadic cult itself. Strange
to say there was the unexpected co-operation from free thinking

C SAMAYASARA

school of Charvakas, when they joined the struggle a school of
thought identical with school of modern materialistic philosophy.
Though the Charvakas did not believe in the existence of Atma, or
in the future world, they were opposed to the vedic culture as an
ineffectual waste. In this renewed struggle abounding in destructive
criticisms against Vedic sacrifice there must have been a distinct
damage caused to the traditional edifice. Hence the orthodox think-
ers were bound to reconstruct the cultural edifices and re-habilitate
the same from the destruction caused by the rival intellectual
bombardment. They had to re-examine the notion of )harma
as well as the notion of Atma. As a result we have the two schools
of thought, the Poorvamimamsa and Uttaramimamsa or Vedanta.
The Poorvamimamsa school concedes many of the points of
the rival schools in order to safeguard its main doctrine of Vedic
sacrifice. They openly reject the doctrine of creation and the
existence of Ishvara or Sarvajna. They do not recognise anything
higher than the human personality itself, the point emphasised
by the Jamas, Sankhyas and theBuddhas. In spite of this conces-
sion they try to maintain with elaborate arguments that Dharma
means the Vedic Dharma in the sense of sacrificial ritual. Thus
it is an enquiry into the nature of Dharma and hence the work
begins with the sutra Athatho Dharma Jignasa.

Uffara Mtqumsa or Vedanta: Who are qu ilified to Brahma Vidya
Surprisingly in conflict with the Upanishadic tendencies the
Brahma sutras take the attitude that only the Dwijas are eligible.
As a matter of fact about the period of the Sutras, caste conservatism
was rampant. That is the reason which explains the retrograde
tendency herein implied. The critical examination and represen-
tation of Sankhya is again taken up. Pradhana as the basic prin-
ciple of the Universe is rejected. The scriptural terms Aja "non-
generated" cannot refer to Avyakta pradhana. It must imply
Brahman who is the author of all. ' He is the only Aja. Brahman
is not only the guiding intelligence .of cosmic evolution but
also is the constituting substance of the cosmos. Brahman
is not only the Nimittakarana but also the Upadanakarana, the
material cause of the universe. Brahman is the stuff of which
the world is made. All that exists partakes of the nature of

INTRODUCTION Cl

Brahman. It is the beginning as well as the end of things. It
is the origin as well as the goal of individual souls. Here ends
the first book.

The second book also begins with the same topic. Yoga
is taken up for criticism. According to Yoga there is a control-
ling Iswara superintending the cosmic evolution proceeding from
Pradhana. This Iswara of Yoga is said to be identical with
Brahman. It is said to represent only an inappropriate and im-
perfect aspect of Truth. Consequently Yoga Iswara is taken to
be an incomplete description of ultimate reality which is Brahman.
Incidently there is an attempt to answer several Sankhyan objections
against Iswara. The author formulates his own doctrine of cau-
sation. Vedantic view of causation does not recognise any cause
or effect. Karanakaryaabheda is their' characteristic doctrine.
The Sankhya concept of causation is therefore rejected as unreal.
According to Vedanta cause and effect are identical. This
is corroborated both by Vedic authority and concrete experience.
The cause of cloth is thread. There could be no quarrel about
this that yarn in a particular arrangement constitutes cloth.

Responsibility of the Creator Sankhya emphasises the fact
that an Iswara being an intelligent cause of the universe must
be responsible for the whole of the cosmos including the faults
thereof. The defence put in the Brahma sutras is something
obscure. Here the author takes his stand on the separateness
of Brahman from Jivatma. According "to the Sankhya view
activity implies desire and motive. Creation as an act must
therefore imply a desire and motive in the agent. The desire
of Brahman to bring about the world, cannot be a desire
to help various beings, for .they are still uncreated and non-
existent. If there is a motive for the activity the motive must
imply some sort of want in the creator. The answer is 'that there
is no genuine motive for the creator. According to the Vedantic
defence Brahman creates the universe merely out of sport or Leela.
But the next is the more important objection. It relates to the
responsibility of the creator for uneven distribution of pleasure
and pains. The answer offered by Vedanta is a bit strange. The
act of creation is not said to be quite arbitrary but takes into consi-

di SAMAYASARA

deration the merit and the demerit of the individual soul. This
defence naturally implies that the individual souls should have their
separate and independent existence and that they are not really
created though they are destined to undergo a periodic cosmic
slumber from which they get awakened at the beginning of
creation. How such a doctrine of individual selves could be
reconciled to Vedantic monism is not clearly shown. Neither
the sutras nor the great commentary of Sankara is helpful.
The latter part of the second book is devoted to the refutation of
the other theories such as Vaiseshika, Boudha, and Jaina. The
author again and again returns to the criticism of Sankhya. There
is an interesting point to be noticed before we take leave
of this. Buddhism is condemned to be unreal. We shall
be surprised to see both the Sutrakara and the commentator
Sankara reject the Bouddha conception for this reason that
according to Buddhistic view the world of external reality is
purely mental and unreal. This reason offered for rejecting the
Buddhistic view is certainly perplexing. The Bouddhas are found
fault with because they annihilate the fundamental distinction
between the concrete world of reality and the dream world of
unreality and they believe that the world is made of such stuff
as dreams are made of. And yet this is the very conclusion to
which Vedanta.is striving. This surprising philosophical atti-
tude has a parallel in western thought. Kant establishing the
phenomenality of the external world to his satisfaction gives vent
to righteous indignation at Berkleyan idealism to refute which he
devotes one full chapter. Berkley would be much more akin to
the ordinary view and yet Kant in the west and Sankara in the
East claim the privilege of protesting against their own conclu-
sions^ when 'they are heard from alien quarters. To us it is in-
teresting in this way. Idealism' which is considered to be the
claim of philosophic thought even in its most triumphant exis-
tence has an unconscious desire to hide its true identity from the
ordinary world and attempts to appear as some thing different.
The latter part of II Adhyaya again takes up the discussion
of the doctrine- of creation. According to Vedantism, there
is no process of creation at all. The evolution and involution

INTRODUCTION Clll

of the world during periodic kalpas is but an appearance. If
creation is a real process of evolution then they cannot reason-
ably object to Sankhya evolution. The Avyakta unmanifest
of Kapila is the primeval matter. But the Vedanta takes this
Avyakta to be his intelligent Brahman. From Avyakta proceeds
Akasa or ether. From this proceeds Vayu, then Agni, and then
water and then the earth. This description of creation occurs
both in the vedic tests of the Mantras and the Upanishads. The
elements created out of the Brahman get reabsorbed by him in
the reverse order. Thus describing the process of creation the
scriptural texts demand an explanation from the Brahma Sutras.
According to the Vaiseshika view Akasa or space is eternal or un-
created. It is the substratum of Sabda or sound. This Vaiseshika
doctrine will conflict with the ultimate concept of Brahman. There
would be two eternals Akasa and Brahman. Hence the Vendanta
school is constrained to show that the Vaiseshika doctrine of
infinite space is unique and they must show that space is created by
Brahman. According to Sankhya the starting point of evolution is
Achetana Prakriti. The Vedanta school emphasises the psychical
nature of Buddhi and Ahankara. But these according to Sankhya
are derived from achetana Prakriti. Brahma sutras therefore rightly
criticise that Sankhya view of deriving Chetana entities from Ache-
tana Prakriti. Buddhi and ahankara are therefore considered as the
manifestation of Brahman or Sat. Similarly the Nyaya and Viaseshi-
ka view of Self is rejected by Brahma Sutras. Nyaya sutras main-
tain that the individual souls are uncreated. In this respect the
Vedantic doctrine conflicts with Nyaya and Vaiseshika view.
Though the Vedantin accepts the uncreated and eternal nature
of individual selves in a way still he does not recognise the subs-
tantiality thereof. Individuality is an illusion for him. Birth
and death, creation and destruction of the individual souls are
all due to the body. The Self in itself is beyond birth and death.
Its essence is Chetana. Hence the view of the Brab?ma sutras
is different from that of the Vaiseshika school according to which
consciousness is an accidental quality of the Self brought about
by its contact with manas or mind.

The doctrine of the size of the Atman is next critised in the

civ SAMAYASARA

Brahma sutras. The atomic size of atman is as old as the Upani-
shad. This doctrine is accepted by the Vaiseshikas. The Brahma
sutras reject this view in spite of the Upanishadic authority.
To speak of the size of soul or atman is to confound its nature
with body. The categories of spatial magnitude are inadequate
to describe the soul which is intrinsically of the nature of thought
and the spiritual entity may be spoken of either as an atom or
as an infinite. It may be both infinitesimal as well as infinite.
The individual self is also a karta or agent. He is able to act
and thus he is able to produce karma. Being the author of karma
he is obliged to enjoy the fruits thereof. Karta must be bhokta
also. In this respect the Vedantic view is different from the Satikh-
yan system where Purusha is merely the enjoyer and not an actor.
But when we examine more closely the vedantic view the prima
facie objection disappears. Activity is not the intrinsic quality of
the soul. Activity is due to its accidental conjunction with the
body. In the technical language of Vedanta Atma becomes a
karta only because of the Physical conditions or Upadhi. On
account of the same upadhi it becomes a bhokta. Thus action
and enjoyment are both due to extraneous conditions. The
' so-called upadhis are constituted by the several indriyas or sense
organs. In this respect many doctrines are common to Sankhya
and the Vadanta. The activity of the individual self though
appearing as a difference between the two schools does not cons-
titute a real difference. The activity is explained away ultimately
in the sutras. Activity in the individual is really due to Brahma
himself or the Antaryam. Hence the individual soul is not a
free agent. He acts because of the Iswara in him. But this
control exercised by Iswara is assumed to be entirely consistent
with the karmas of the Individual. The inference of an Iswara is
not an instance of an arbitrary act. He is himself determined
by the karmas of the individual self.

The third chapter of Brahma sutras contains the same topic
about the soul. Transmigration is taken up. The soul retains
its manas and sookshma sarira after death. Hence it is not Free
from Upadhi. It is still subject to decay and death. It is still
tied to the wheel of Samsara. After death it may have its sojourn

INTRODUCTION CV

in different lokas. But nevertheless the individual must come
back to the world because it is from here that it has to obtain

final liberation.

A Discussion of Dreams and Hallucinations -The doctrine
of the four stages of the Self mentioned in the Upanishads
finds a place here. The two kinds of knowledge; absolute and
relative, Paravidya and. Aparavidya. The lower knowledge
or aparavidya refers to the sacrifice and it is supposed to
be related to Saguna Brahman whereas the higher knowledge
leads to Nirguna Brahman. The last and fourth chapter leads
to Moksha. The two Vidyas lead to two different paths. The
lower associated with worship of Iswara leads to Swarga
whereas the higher resting upon the contemplation of Nirguna
Brahman leads to Self Realisation and identification with Brah-
man. There is no distinction between the individual and the
absolute. The upadhis being eliminated the conditions being des-
troyed the individual self finds the absolute. This is known as
Mukti. It is direct of immediate realisation of the Self, where-
as the former path through lower knowledge may ultimately lead
to Mukti though not directly and immediately. The realisation
of the self and the consequent liberation is brought about by
Samyakdarsana, the true path. There is true knowledge of
the sdf. It is the state of perfect Nirvana. All qualities have
withered away from Brahman. It is nirguna nirvisesha. Thus
qualityless and formless He is beyond description niwachaniya.
Thus ends the Brahma sutras indicating the true nature of
ultimate reality. The un-conditioned Brahman.

Sankara and Vedantism Sv&asA represents a stage in the
development of Vedantism. He lived about the 8th .century,
a contemporary of. Kumarila Bhatta a student of Govinda,
who was a disciple of Gaudapada. Sankara's Vedantism is
expressed in his great commentaries on the Upanishads as well
as Brahma Sutras. His advaita is the logical outcome of Gau-
dapada's advaitism. It is most influential among the current
schools of Indian thought. In his introduction to the great Bhasya
on Brahma Sutras he says 'It is a matter not requiring any proof
that the object and subject whose respective spheres are the

CVl SAMAYASARA

notions of Thou and Ego and which are opposed to each other as
light and darkness. The two cannot be identified. Hence it follows
that it is wrong to superimpose on the subject the attributes
of object and vice versa." Thus he starts with a sufficient warn-
ing that the subject and object are quite distinct and they should
not be confounded with each other. He warns against the
superimposition of attributes Adhyasa. The subject should
not be associated with the attributes of the object nor the object
with those of subject. The., two are distinct in kind. One is
a chetana entity and the other an achetana thing. Sankara
starts just where Sankhya started. There also Chetana Purusha
is different frorii achetana Prakriti. Again the starting point of
modern thought in Europe was the same. Descartes started
with the distinction between the thinking thing and the ex-
tended thing. Yet by an inscrutable logic adopted by both
Descartes and Sankara the goal reached by them is funda-
mentally different from the starting point. Cartesianism ends
in Spinozistic monism where the ultimate substance engulfs all
things Chetana and Achetana within itself. And similarly San-
khara ends with an all devouring absolute which could not brook
by its side any other entity. Sankara in the same introductory
passage suggests that this Adhyasa is a common vice of our ex-
perience and is due to our ignorance or avidya. The only way
to get rid of it is by Vidya or knowledge. Thus Adhyasa or mu-
tual confusion of self and nonself is the result of ignorance. It
is on ignorance that all the duties enjoined in the scriptures are
based. Hence the doctrine of Pramanas includes perception
and inference. Several vedic tests enjoining various religious
duties all have for their objects world which is the resultant
of the avidya or ignorance. The world of objective reality is
thus due to ignorance and even the vedic rites and injunctions
are not excepted. These have no value for one who possesses
real knowledge. Distinctions of caste, status in society etc
are all due to adhyasa. The conception of Vedic Dharma has
meaning only with reference to Adhyasa, accidental conjunction
at the true self with the extraneous conditions of caste, birth etc
But for this false conception Vedic Dharma could have no mean-

INTRODUCTION CVll

ing and no validity for Dharma pertains to Varna, which in turn
depends upon the body and not upon the soul. Because of the
false identity between soul and body we speak of one as
a Brahmin or a Kshatriya. These attributes are true only
of the body and yet are falsely associated with the self. Thus
Sankara not only indicates the truth that the self and the environ-
ment are distinct but also suggests that the confusion and
false identity is due to avidya. From a thinker who empha-
sised the danger of this philosophical error we should naturally
expect consistently a system of philosophy strictly maintaining
the opposites. On the other hand, Sankara offers just the re-
verse. He dismisses the distinction between self and non-self
as unreal and unphilosophical. What is the nature of the exter-
nal world according to Sankara ? Gaudapada already compared
it to a dream. Sankhara accepts the same without question.
The diversity and objectivity of the world of things and persons
are all illusory. The objective world around is but the maya
of the juggler, the juggler in this case being Atman himself.
Since the juggler himself is not a victim to his own illusion so
the highest self is not affected by the world-Illusion. The whole of
the external world is but the manifestation of Brahman or Atman.
The substance of which this world is constituted being Ghetana
is genuinely akin to dreams. That it is a dream will not be evident
to us so long as we are dreaming, so long as there is avidya.
When we wake from this dream to another world then the dream-
world will vanish. When the individual wakes up into high-
est selfhood then he will understand the dreamlike illusory nature
of his former experience. When he rids himself of overpower-
ing avidya the multiplicity and objectivity will automatically dis-
appear.

Is the individual atman real according to Sankara? -The
individual self shares the same fate as the objective world. All
the other Indian systems of thought recognised individual atman
to be eternal and uncreated. But in the hands of Sankara
the individual soul dwindles into a shadow of a higher reality.
In the passages emphasising his own advaita view he rejects the
panhetistic view according to which the objective world and the

CV111 SAMATASARA

individual self can be real and yet subsisting in the same universal.
Several passages in the Upanishads compares the Brahman to
a tree and the individuals to various branches thereof. Unity
and multiplicity are both real in organic life. So is the ocean
one though the waves are many. So the clay is the same though
the pots are many. These Upanishadic passages do not and need
not necessarily imply the doctrine of the illusoriness of the world
and individual selves. But such an interpretation Sankara does
not want. He sternly rejects that as erroneous. He emphasises the
unity as absolute. If the phenomenal world and individual souls
are unreal then it would be against the practical notions of
ordinary life. Such consequences are not disconcerting to
Sankara. Such objections do not damage his position, be-
cause the entire complex of phenomenal existence is still true
to a person who has not reached the true knowledge and realised
his true self. As long as one is in ignorance the reality of the world
and self is vouchsafed for him. He may behave as if these were
true and his life not affected by the higher philosophical doctrine.
Sankara's self is thus an absolute a sort of Parmenidean absolute-
eternal and unchanging.

What has Sankara to say about the several passages in the'
Vedic scriptures which speak of the creation and evolution of
the world ? If the world of concrete reality is illussory the Vedic
doctrines of creation would have no meaning. This objection he
wards off with the remark that the creating qualities of Brahman
depends on the evolution of the germical principles Nama and
Rupa. The fundamental truth that we maintain is that the crea-
tion, destruction and sustenance of the world all proceed from an
omniscient and omnipotent principle and not from an unintelligent
Pradhana. While maintaining absoulte unity or Advaita of self how
can the above be maintained ? The longing of the self-the name
and form are the figments of Nescience. These are not to be either
as being the same or different from it. The germs of the entire
phenomenal world is called in the Sruti, Maya or illusion, Sakti
or Power, Prakriti or Nature. Different from these is the omni- *
saent world. Hence the Lord depends upon the limiting adjuncts
of Maya and Rupa the products of the avidya out of which Is-

INTRODUCTION C1X

wara creates the world. His being a creator, his omniscience
and omnipotence all depend on the limitations due to those very
adjuncts whose nature is avidya. From these passages extracted
from Sankara Bhasya we have an idea of Sankara's philosophy.
Ultimate reality is undivided and indivisible unity same as Upani-
shadic Brahman. The several vedic gods are but fractional aspects
of this. Sankara wants the reader not to confound his system
with the Vedic theology. He clears away adhyasa or error. His
system is a streneous atttempt at an accurate definition of atman.
Through a very skilful dialectic all the qualities of the external,
world are shown to be alien to Brahman. Spatiality, objectivity,
colour sound etc. all are with a psychological insight shown to b^e
non-spiritual. By this process of elimination the essential nature of
atman is clearly defined as Atman. It is the only thinking thing
Chetanadravya. Thinking is not merely an attribute of the Self. Self
is thought. Atman is Chit. Having gone thus far Sankara is
tied down to a philosophical doctrine which appears to be inconsis-
tent with his own standpoint and also with thought and general
tradition. Such a result is probably due to the following reasons.
The Upanishadic writers spoke of the Brahman as the spiritual
essence the leaven which leavens all things. In these passages
the doctrine of atman exactly corresponds to Cartesian thinking
substance. The Upanishadic passages did not negate the reality
of the phenomenal world." When Sankara took up the doctrine
he was confronted with a difficulty. Sankara could not accept
the naive Upanishadic pantheism. He wants a clear definition
of Atman. This naturally widened the gulf between subject and
object. While these according to Upanishadic writers had vague
common substratum. Not satisfied with this philosophic "vagueness
Sankara wanted to shift reality to the side of the subject or Chit.
Hence Sankara not only finds atman identical with Chit but it
is also identical with existence or Sat. If the Brahman is the
soul and if the soul is the Brahman then the Sat must be Chit-exis :
tence and thought must be identical. If existence and thought
are absolutely identical then anything other than thought will
be unreal or Asat. The objective world is not Chit or thought.
Hence it cannot be real or Sat. Sankara is compelled to pro-

CX SAMAYASARA

pound the doctrine of the unreality of the objective world. What
is the justification for such a conclusion. There is no doubt he
is supported by certain Upanishadic passages as well as by some of
his predecessors like Gaudapada. But we have to remember
that many Upanishadic passages that declare the external world
as unreal do so only metaphorically and comparatively. The
Upanishadic doctrine compares with the Cartesian doctrine of
gradation. The ultimate substance has the maximum of reality
whereas man has less of that. But with Sankara it is other-
wise. For him a thing must be Sat or an Asat. To be real, a
thing must be Chit and what is not Chit must necessarily
be Asat. Thus after establishing the reality of atrnan and the
illusoriness of the rest Sankara is confronted with an extraordi-
nary difficulty to reconcile his philosophy with the common sense
view on the one hand and the traditional Vedic religion on the
other. He manages this by his distinction between Vyavaharika
and Paramarthika points of view. For all practical purposes
and for the ordinary affairs of religion the world may be taken as
real though philosophically it is no more than the phantom of
a deluded personality. Many Vedantins bring in the parallel
of Kant who also has a duality. The world is empirically real
but transcendentally ideal. But we should protest against such
a comparison. For Kant recognises the so called thing-in-itself
which is the ultimate source. The phenomenal world is the resul-
tant of the interaction between thing-in-itself and Ego in itself
the one supplies the stuff and the other the form. That is one of
the reasons why Kant protests against Berkley and wanted to keep
his philosophy entirely different from that. Sankara's advaitism
is fundamentally different from Kant's phenomanilism. He is
more akin to Fichte's. Even this resemblance is superficial for
the monistic idealism of Fichte is only a metaphisical explanation
of moral value. According to Fichte the world of objective reality
is a stage or an arena created by the Ego for its own moral
exercise. Moral value is the pivot on which Fichte's monism
revolves. But for Sankara all these values have reference to
human life and human personality and therefore must be rele-
gated to the realm of illusions from the higher point of View.

INTRODUCTION CXl <

In his own words "The external world as well as individual
personality are maya, asat, nothing else."

Sankara and the Doctrine of Maya Speaking of the External
world Sankara says it is all maya or illusion and yet he with
other vedantins repudiates the doctrine of Buddhism that the
external world is purely psychical and as such has no subs-
tantiality of its own. What is the significance of this paradoxi-
cal attitude. According to the Sankhyan doctrine as to the origin
and nature of the world the External world is evolved out of
Prakriti which being opposed to Pursha is Achetana. It is
more or less similar to the modern scientific "Matter". Besides
this Prakriti Sankhya postulate the existence of the Purushas.
Now for the Vedantin everything existing is the manifestation of
Brahman. The Brahman being Chetana entity it is not difficult to
derive individual souls therefrom. But the Vedantin derives the
external world also from the same. But the external world is ache-
tana entity and is therefore opposed to thought. Hence it cannot
be easily derived from Brahman. Sankara certainly has recognised
the fundamental difference between the two Chetana and Achetana
and warns the reader against confusion. Yet he wants to logically
maintain that every thing living and nonliving is derived from the
same Brahman. He tries to reconcile the two irreconciliable doc-
trines. First he maintains that the subject is quite Independent
of the object and the two have nothing in common and that all
ills of life are due to confusion between the two. Secondly he
wants to show that there is only one existence ultimate and
real and that all else is purely derivative. If he is successful
in establishing the former doctrine (the distinction between the
subject and object) he cannot at the same time maintain the latter.
The actual result is he introduces -a sort of make-believe recon-
ciliation. The objective world is something derived from. maya.
Maya is the substantial and constitutive of the external world.
The stuff of which objective world is made is variously described
as Maya Prakriti and Pradhana. He thus introduces Sankhyan
terminology in order to emphasise its distinction from Purusha.
Pursuing this line of thought he ought to have got the conclusion
that the external world is constituted by a substance fundamentally

SAMAYASARA

distinct from and incompatible with Self or Brahman, This would
have landed him in a dualism which he streneously .tries to avoid.
Thus the problem with him was to retain the Sankhyan dualism
just to emphasise the distinction between the subject and object
and at the same time to maintain Vedantic monism. In this attempt
at a compromise his language becomes ambiguous and his own
attitudewavers between Dualism and monism. He satisfied himself
by introducing two kinds of existence or sat corresponding to
Purusha and Prakriti and yet these two kinds of Sat he wants to derive
from the Chetana Brahman. Beyond the Brahman there could be
no existence,, he being the only sat as well as the only Chit. Hence
the Prakriti which Sankara requisitions to explain the external
world is not only achit, non-thought, but also asat -non-real.
Being asat in as much as it is distinct from Brahman it must be
identical with mere nothing and yet it must be substantial enough
to be the basis of the objectvie world. It is such an impossible
function assigned to Maya by Sankara. He cannot condemn it
altogether to be nothing for he expects real work out of it and
so far it must have some causal potency. But on this account
he dare not recognise its reality lest it should set up an imperium
in imperio a rival claimant to the throne of Brahman. There-
fore Sankara relegates Maya to the metaphysical purgatory where
it is expected to live the life of something midway between abso-
lute being and absolute nothing. What he further means by this
curious amalgam of something-nothing we do not clearly appre-
ciate. It is because of this precarious reality of Maya that he is
able to make his readers believe that in his monism the objective
reality maintains a greater dignity than assigned to it by the
Buddhists. In short to avoid the sunyavada Sankara invents the
impossible doctrine. of maya which lends plausibility to his system
which would other wise be untenable and also indistinguishable
from Buddhistic nihilism. It was because of this indisti^guish-
ability between Buddhism and advaitism that Indian critics con-
demned advaita as Buddhistic nihilism in camouflage and called
Sankara a Pracchanaa Bouddha, a bouddha in disguise.

Brahman: Sat as well as Chit, Existence and Intelligence,
but for Vedantinit is something more. It is not merely the subs-

INTRODUCTION CX1U

tratum of the concrete world, it also stands for the transcendental
goal of life. It stands for the other world to which every Indian
thinker looks forward. It is 'that higher reality which the In-
dian aspires to as a haven from the ocean of Samsara, a place
of rest from the toils of transmigration. It corresponds to Bud-
dhistic Nirvana, the Samadhi of the Yogin, the Liberated Purusha
of the Sankhyas and the God Iswara of Nyaya Viaseshikas. If
it is to be the negation of the ennui of Samsara to be the end of the
misery of concrete life, to be the place from where there is no return,
it must embody in itself something unique and that is absent
in the world of Samsara, an unalloyed and unchanging Bliss
which knows not its opposite. The Brahman therefore besides
Sat and Chit is Ananda as well. . It represents that transcenden-
tal bliss which no man has tasted here and which everyone is
entitled to have if he walketh the path of liberation. Such a
transcendental bliss is entirely different from the ephemeral pleasure
of the world. Else it would not be sought after by the wise.
Hence the Brahmna must also be Ananda Bliss or Joy. This
absolute reality Sat Chit Ananda is the ultimate concept of
Vedantism. It not only serves as the metaphysical cause of things
existing, but also stands for the light shining in individual souls.
It also represents the goal to which the whole creation moves.
It is not only the beginning but also the end of things. Climb-
ing the pinnacle of Metaphysical monism Sankara finds it hard
to recognise the claims of ordinary mortals in his system.
He cuts the Gordian Knot by invoking the aid once again of
the doctrine of the distinction between the relative and the
absolute points of. view. There is no justification for the
demands of either religion or morality in an absolute monism.
In the rarified atmosphere of monism neither morality nor reli-
gion can breath and live. The inevitable conclusion of his logic
may not be realised by the ordinary man nor accepted by the ortho-
dox scholar. The Vedic scholars have faith in the injunctions
of the Vedas and may still believe in the beneficial effect of sacri-
fice. The unsophistical man of the religion associates with abso-
lute reality, the object of his religious adoration and worship
and maintains that to be the fountain head of all good and valuable.

SAMAYASARA

The metaphorical conception of Brahman therefore must live
side by side with the popular religion and must live in accordance
with Vedic ritualism. Sankara manages to satisfy all these de-
mands by postulating the fictitious deity of a lower Brahman
who may be considered real from the practical and relative point
of view though he cannot hide his real inanity from the vision
of the enlightened. The ordinary man may continue his traditional
worship, the orthodox vaidika may perform his usual sacrifices
quite unperturbed on the assumption that there is an object of
devotion and worship in his Iswara. In this matter, Sankara
seems to take a lesson from the Mimamsakas who repudiate
the conception of a God at the same time insisting upon the
efficacy of worship and sacrifices which they hold are intrin-
sically efficacious not depending upon Iswara. Sankara agrees
with Kumarila the great Mimamsaka teacher and lets alone the
traditional ritualism unhampered by metaphysical speculation.
It is a peculiar mentality the like of which we have in Hume.
After proving the unsubstantiality of human personality and the
external world Hume exclaims that the world will go on, neverthe-
less, as if these things were quite real. This kind of estrangement
between life and metaphysics life getting on in spite of metaphy-
sics would only establish the undeniable truth that life is more
than logic. To allow concrete life to exist by sufference, to re-
cognise its reality from the vyavaharic point of view, may instead
of proving the reality of the concrete world, really establish the
bankruptcy of the underlying Metaphysics.

JAINISM, ITS AGE AND ITS TENETS

The term Jainism which means faith of a Jaina is derived
from the word Jina which means, the conqueror or the
victorious. Jina means one who conquers the five senses, des-
troys all the karmas, and attains Omniscience or Sarvagnahood.
The person who performs tapas or yoga attains such a self-reali-
sation and omniscient knowledge or kevala jnana. After attaining
self-realisation and after acquiring Omniscience, the Jina spends the
rest of his time in Dharmaprabhavana or preaching the Dharma
to the mass of human beings. Not satisfied with his own self-

INTRODUCTION CXV

realisation, he engages himself in the noble task of helping his
fellow-beings with his message of Dharma which would enable
the ordinary mortals to reach the sum man bonum of life and attain
the same spiritual status of perfection which he himself has acquir-
ed. Because of this noble task of showing the path of spiritual
realisation or Mokshamarga, Jina is also called Thirtharikara. This
term. Thirthankara means one who helps human beings to cross
the ocean of Samasara by providing them with a vessel to sail
with in the form of Dharma. Jinadharma is the boat which
is provided for the human beings for the purpose of crossing
the ocean of Samsara and because of this noble task of helping
the mankind Jina is also called Thirthankara. The divine per-
sonality Jina, who by his act of benevolence is called Thirthankara
is therefore called Arhanta which means one worthy of adoration
and worship. Arhat Parameshti is therefore the Lord worship-
ped by all the Jains. He is represented by a pratibimba or
image which is installed in a Chaityalaya or a Jain temple built for
the purpose. The pratibimba is always of the form of a human
being because it represents the Jina or the Thirthankara who
spent the last portion of his life on earth in the noble task of pro-
claiming to the world Mokshamarga or path to salvation. The
idol will be either in a standing posture or Kayotsarga or in
the posture of Padmasana-sitting-technically called Palyankasana.
Whether standing or sitting it represents the Divine Lord absorb-
ed in the self-realisation as a result of Tapas or Yoga. There-
fore the facial expression would reveal the intrinsic spiritual bliss
as a result of self-realisation. People who worship the Jina in
this form installed in Jinalaya or the Jain temple and who follow
the religious tenets proclaimed by the Jina are called the Jainas
and their religion is Jainism.

The same faith is also designated by the term Arhatamata,
which means religion followed by Arhatas or Jainas, since the term
Arhata means one who follows the religion of the Arhat Parameshti.
The terms Jina, Thirthankara and Arhat Parameshti all refer to
the divine person or Sarvagna who lived in the world with his
body, and it refers to the period after attaining Sarvagnahood
or Omniscience and the last period of the parinivana, when the

CXVl SAMAYASARA

body is cast away and the self resumes its own intrinsic pure
spiritual nature and it becomes Paramatma or Siddha. This is
the last stage of spiritual development and is identical with the
Self completely liberated or Muktajiva or the Self which attained
Moksha. This Sidhaparameshti is identical with the Vedantic
conception of Parabrahman or Paramatma which terms are also
used by the Jaina Thinkers. This Siddhaswarupa or Paramatma
Swarupa is without body Asarira, and without form, Arupa.
Hence its nature can be understood only by yogic contemplation
for which the individual must be fit and highly qualified. Ordi-
nary people who are not endowed with the capacity of realis-
ing the nature of the pure self Paramatma or Siddha Parameshti
whose pratibimba is installed in Jaina temples for the worship
by the ordinary householder. This practice prescribed a mode
of worship for the ordinary people who were expected to
concentrate their attention on the image of Jina or Arhat Para-
meshti corresponds to the Vedantic attitude, which while recog-
nising that the highest state of spiritual development is repre-
sented by the Parabrahma, provides for the ordinary man some-
thing lower than this as the object of worship, or what is called
the popular of vyavaharic point of view. As a matter of fact,
it may be said without contradiction that this distinction bet-
ween vyavaharic and paramarthika points of view was adopted
by the great commentator Sankara who took the suggestion from
the earlier Jaina thinkers, especially Sri Kunda Kunda. This
term Siddha, since it implies the complete destruction of all the
karmas which enshrow'ds the intrinsic purity of the self is also
called Nirgrantha, who is devoid of all attachment. The term
Kandazhi which occurs in the Tamil work Tholkapya means
the same thing as Siddha or the self which is completely liberat-
ed from all the shackles of karmas. Though the temple worship
is associated with Arhat Parameshti or Thirthankars, Jainas
have not forgotten the fact that the Siddha represents the highest
spiritual development. Hence the practice of silent salutation,
Nama Siddhebhyaha or Siddhan Namaha is a common practice
among Jains whenever they begin any good work either literary
or of ordinary kind. Probably this practice of beginning with

INTRODUCTION CXVI1

adoration of Siddhan Namaha or Nama Siddebhyaha was pre-
valent among the non-Jainas also especially in South India where
the people when they begin their daily work in school are taught
to start with this salutation Siddhan Namaha.

The Age of Jainism: There is a good deal of incorrect views
prevalent among even educated people as to the age of Jainism.
It is an unfortunate fact that Indians had to learn their history
from foreign scholars. Foreign writers with incorrect and insuffi-
cient knowledge of the Indian historical background wrote
textbooks on Indian history which provided the historic infor-
mation to Indian student in Schools. These history text-books
were mainly responsible for a good deal of erroneous views
prevalent among the educated Indians as to the past history of
their land. One of these deplorable errors is the view that Jain-
ism is an off-shoot of Buddhism and Hinduism. This error
we are glad to say is no more prevalent among the oriental scholars
both in the West and East though the error persists among the
educated Indians whose knowledge of history is not uptodate.
The origin of this -error is to be found in the fact that
the founder of Buddhism Goutama Sakyamuni and Mahavira
Vardhama the last of- the Jaina Thirthankaras were contem-
poraries. Buddhistic literature contains references to Mahavira
and his followers, and similarly Jaina literature composed at the
time of Mahavira contains cross references to Buddha and his
religion. Persons who studied first the Buddhist literature and
who had no knowledge of Jaina scripture come to the hasty conclu-
sion that Jainism must have been the branch of Buddhism. Later
on when oriental scholars came to study the subject they corrected
their erroneous views and were constrained to call that Jainism
must have been earlier than Buddhism. As a matter of fact,
Buddha was a younger contemporary of Lord Mahavira. Buddha
himself in* his conversation with his friend and disciple Sariputta,
narrates the fact that he himself in his earlier days was adopting
Jaina practice of austerity which he had to give up because of the
rigorous discipline which he did not like. The date of Maha-
vira^ parnirvana, 527 B.C. is accepted as a land mark in the his-
tory of India. According to Cambridge history of India, the 23rd

SAMAYASARA

THrthankara, Lord Patswa who lived 220 years prior to Lord
Mahavira is also considered a historical personage. According to
this view Jainism must have been prevalent in India nearly three
centuries prior to Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism.
Though writers of Cambridge history of India did not go
beyond Lord Parswa, we may point out the fact that Jainism
was in existence even prior to this period. The Thirthankara
prior to Lord Parswa, the 22nd Thirthankara, according to the
Jaina tradition is Lord Arishtnemi, who is said to have attained
"his Nirvana on the Mount Girnar in Junagadh State,
which is a place for pilgrimage for the present day Jainas. This
Arishtanemi was a cousin of Sri Krishana of Mahbharatha fame
and the name Arishtanemi occurs in Vedic literature as one of the
great Rishis. This Jaina tradition circumstantially supported
by non-Jaina Vedic literature may also be accepted as having some
historical basis. If Sri Krishana of Mahabharata war is accept-
ed as having some historical basis then we have to accept the
history of Arishanemi also. According to the Jaina tradition,
there were twenty-four Thirthankaras >] beginning with Lord
Vrishabha and ending with Mahavira Vardhamana. Of these
the last three may be taken to be personalities of the historic
period. The rest are persons of prehistoric age and we need
not trouble ourselves about their history till we know something
more than merely tradition. The first of these Thirthankara
Lord Vrishabha who is considered by the Jainas to be responsible
for revealing Ahimsa Dharma for the first time to the world
seems to be a very interesting personality. According to the
Jaina tradition, he was a hero of the Iksavaku family. His father
was Nabi Maharaja the last of the Manus and his mother Maru-
devi. Vrishabha's period represents a complete change of World
conditions. Prior to this the country was called Boga Bhumi where
the people were satisfied with all their wants by the mere wish
through the help of the traditional kalpakavriksha . During the
time of Lord Rishabha these happy conditions completely dis-
appeared and the people were in a preplexity as to the way of
life which they were expected to carry. Then they all went to
Lod Rishabha praying for help. He is said to have consoled

INTRODUCTION CX1X

them by showing the way o life. He taught them how they
could obtain food by tilling the soil, that they should take
upto agriculture for the production of food, which they could
obtain in plenty by their own toil in spite of the fact that the
Kalpakavrikshas disappeared. He taught some other people
to carry his agriculture produce to different peoples and supply
to those that were in need. He again " set apart a number of able-
bodied men for the purpose of defence. Thus the first social
organisation owes its existence to Lord Vrishabha who divided
the society according to its functions into three groups,
agriculturists, traders, and soldiers. After ruling over his king-
dom for several years, he abdicated his throne in favour of bis
son, Lord Bharata and went into the forests to perform tapas.
After the practice of tapas for several years he attained KavaJa-
jnana or Omniscience: then he went about from place to place
preaching his Ahimsa dharma to the people of the land, so that
they may also have spiritual relief. Thus Lord Rishabha is
known among the Jainas as Adijina, Adi Bhagavan and so on.
This first Thirthsnkara's life is repeated verbatim also in non-
Jaina puranas for example Bhagavatapurana (V. skanda.) e The
same story is repeated in Vishnupurana and Vayupurana also.
All these Hindu puranas maintain that Lord Rishabha preached
the doctrine of Ahimsa after performing yoga for several years.
He went about from place to place completely discarding all
ornaments and clothes, and hence he was misunderstood by the
people to have gone mad. The repetition of this life history
of Lord Risbabha in non-Jaina puranas can only be explained
by the fact that at one time when the story was a common
property to both Jainas and non-Jainas the hero must have been
considered as worthy of worship by all.

According to Jaina tradition when Lord Rishbha attained his
Nirvana in Mount Kaila?, his son and the ruling emperor of the
land, Lord Bharata built a temple in the place of Nirvana and ins-
talled an image of Lord Rishabha for the purpose of worship for
himself as well as for the general public. This worship of Lord
Rishabha 3 s idol must have been prevalent throughout India from
far-off ancient period of the Indian history. That it was so

SAMAYASARA

valent in ancient India we may infer from certain facts available
in the Vedic literature. Vedas constitute the earliest record avail-
able. They form three distinct groups, the Samhitas, Brah-
manas and the Upanishads. The Samhitas are four in number.
The Rig Veda, Yajutr Veda, Samaveda and Atharvana Veda.
The Rig Veda mantras are uttered for the purpose of invoking
the aid of the Vedic Gods. Indra is the most important of the
Vedic deities. The religious life of the Aryans in the Rig
Vedic period centred round the personality of Indra, the
Vedic God. 'His aid is invoked by the Aryans of the Rig
Vedic period to obtain prosperity in their agriculture and also
in their cattle wealth. His aid is also invoked for the purpose of
destroying the enemies, the people of the land, who resisted
their advance.. Thus the Aryans had to encounter opposition
from among the people of the land whom they considered
their enemies, who strongly resisted the invading Aryans. The Rig
Vedic hymns composed with such a back ground of racial conflict
furnishes us with certain interesting facts as to the life and charac-
teristics of the people of the land who violently opposed to the
incoming Aryans. These hymns referred to a section of the
Ikshavakus or Purusha who were in existence in the land long long
before the Aryans of the Rigvedic period came into the scene.
These Ikshavakus are recognised to be of the Aryan race and they
are referred to in terms of respect and adoration. This Ikshavaku-
vamasa otherwise called the Raghuvamsa, evidently was an
important and a famous ruling dynasty of ancient India, which
must have been in existence even prior" to the Aryans of the Rig-
vedic period. That this Ikshavakuvamsa was famous is borne
out by the fact that most of the ancient Kshatriya families traced
their origin to these Ikshavakus and even the Sakya clan to which
Gautama Buddha belonged claimed its origin from the Ikshavakus.
The heroes of this family are celebrated in Kalidasa's Raghu-
vamsa. According to Kalidasa, these heroes began their life in
early childhood as students, then they lived their household
lives, after which they completely renounced their worldly attach-
ment and roamed about in the forests performing Tapas or Yoo-a
and then finally discarded their bodies after-realisation. This

INTRODUCTION CXXl

description in full corresponds with the life history of Lord
Rishabha, the greatest hero of Ikshavakus and the first revealer of
Ahimsa to the world and the importance of tapas or yoga for the
purpose of self-realisation. We suggest that this Rishabha cult
must have been prevalent even before the advent of the Aryans
and the Rig-vedic tradition. In support of this thesis we note
the following facts revealed by the Vedic literature. The Aryans of
the Rig Vedic period it is stated, were resisted by the people
the land who are called Dasyas. The term Dasya is interpreted
sometimes as enemy and sometimes as a slave. These two inter-
pretations represent two different stages. First when the people of
the land resisted they were called the enemies, and when the enemies
were subjected after a military conquest and taken as prisoners
and made to work as slaves, the same Dasyas became slaves.
Facts that deserve emphasis in this connection are the descriptive
terms used by the Aryans to describe these enemies, the people
of the land. These Dasyas are described as Ayagna, Anindra,
Avrata, Anyavrata and so on. These terms respectively mean
those that are opposed to Yagna, Indra-worship, those that
observe a different religious practice, and those that do not prac-
tise the religion of the Aryans. From these descriptive terms it is
quite clear that the people of the land were dead against the
Vedic institution of Yagna or animal sacrifice. Their opposi-
tion to the invading Aryans must therefore be due to two factors.
The people of the land politically resisted the invading foreigner,
and secondly because the people of the land were afraid of the
fact that their culture would be destroyed by the invaders whose
culture and religion were entirely different from their own. These
Dasyus 'the people of the land, are also described to have been
of dark skin' and to have been speaking a different tongue. There-
fore they must have been the early Dravidians who were present
all over India at the time of the Aryan invasion. After describ-
ing the" practice of these Dasyus in negative terms, the Vedic
literature uses a very significant term to describe their religion.
The early Dasyus, the enemies of the Aryans, who were ^ op-
posed to Yagnas and Indra worship were worshippers of Sisna-
deva. This is- a very interesting revelation. European oriental

CXX11 SAMAYASARA

scholars translate this term Sisna Deya as worshippers of Linga.
The Sanskrit term Sisna is not identical with the Linga which is
now worshipped by the Saivites. Sisna represents the male sex
organ whereas the Linga designates both Sisna and Yoni.
Hence the term Sisna cannot be interpreted in any way to mean
the Linga which is a combination of Sisna and Yoni of
phallie worshippers. Therefore the only interpretation that we
could have is our theory that the ancient Dasyus who were the
people of the land and who resisted the invading Aryans were
in the habit of worshipping a nude idol as their God, which
can be called consistently as Sisnadeva. If the prerigvedic people
of the land had for their worship a nude male image called
Sisnadeva by the Aryans all the other descriptive terms may
fit in with this theory if you take that this Sisnadeva wor-
ship must have been the characteristic of the Rishabha cult
introduced by Lord Rishabha, the first Thirthankara, and encour-
aged by his son Bharata in the form of a temple worship. The
excavations of Harappa and Mohenjadoro circumstantially cor-
roborate our theory, because among the discoveries resulting
from the excavations we have nude- images of a yogi considered
to be idols used for worship by the people of the Indus Valley
civilisation and the symbol of the bull is found in abundance in
coins and seals belonging to that period. Hence it will be
consistent to maintain that the religious life of the people of the
Indus Valley civilisation must have been associated with the
Rishabha cult which must have been prevalent throughout the
.land from Himalayas down to Cape Comirin and further south
m Lanka. After some time when the invading Aryans com-
pletely conquered the whole of Northern India, the people of the
land who are called Dasyus must have withdrawn to the south
viz to this side of the Vindya hills. That there must have been
such a withdrawal by the people of the land to the south is corro-
borated by the traditional account both in Jaina puranas, and
Hindu puranas. According to the Jaina tradition the Northern
Indu was completely occupied by five Kshatriya dynasties,
namely, the Ikshavakuvamsa, Harivamsa, Kuruvamsa l>ra-
vamsa and the Nathavamsa. These five Kshatriya groups com-

INTRODUCTION CSX111

pletely occupied the whole of the Northern India and the
people of the land who are called Vidyadharas by the Jaina
tradition had to be satisfied with the peninsula to the South of
the Vindyas. These Vidyadharas are represented by two important
dynasties of ruling families, one of which was more powerful to
which Ravana the emperor of Lanka belonged. The other group
was represented by Vali, Sugriva and Hanuman. According to
Jaina tradition, these Vidyadharas were highly cultured people,
in fact more cultured than the rest and they were specially skilful
in applied science, or Vidyas, on account of which they were
called Vidyadharas.. They had the privilege of travelling in their
air by some sort of aerial vehicles or vimanas which they were
skilful enough to build for themselves. Since they were skilful
people of very high culture, the ruling chiefs of the Ikshavaku
family very often entered into matrimonial alliances with these
Vidhyadhara families, in fact, the Jaina tradition mentions that
Lord Rishabha himself married a Vidyadhara princess by whom
he had his son Bharata, the first ruler of the land and who gave
his name to the land, Bharatavarsha. These Vidyadhara rulers
who were designated as Rakshasas by their political enemies, Aryans,
are recognised to be highly cultured by the Aryans themselves. .
TV Jaina tradition makes these Vidhyadharas followers of
RHiabha cult, strictly practising Ahimsa Dharma and sternly
opposed to Vedic Yagna. There is an interesting chapter
in jaina Ramayan, Padmapurana of the Jainas, which narrates
the life story of Sri Rama. The chapter refers to the elaborate
preparations made by one Kshatriya prince called Marutha for the
purpose of vedic sacrifice. The chapter is called Maruthayagna-
duamsa sarga. These preparations for the performance of yagna
are made in' the borders of Ravan's territory. Narada who happens
to pass by that way observes these elaborate preparations.
Accordin- to the Jainas, Narada is considered to be a champion
of Ahimsa. He advised the Kshatriya prince Marutha not to
perform the sacrifice. Narada's advice was rejected. He then
aoes to Ravana straight and informs him of the vast preparations
made by a Kshatriya prince quite in violation of Ahimsa. Ravana
sends a few officers to stop these preparations.. These officers

SAMAYASARA

were sent away unceremoniously by the prince Marutha. But
Ravana himself appears in person officially with his soldiers. Then
Marutha confessed that he was instructed by the Vedic priests to
perform this yaga though he was not very well informed about
this. Then Ravana rebukes him, stops the preparations, releases
all the animals intended for sacrifice and threatens the priests.
Then Marutha was initiated to the practice of Ahimsa Dharma
and he was made to give a solemn promise that he would be no
more a party to animal sacrifice or yagna. This story found in
Jaina Ramayana clearly indicates that the Vidyadharas since
they were followers of Ahimsa cult were sternly opposed to any
performance of yaga within their borders. Perhaps that explains
why according to Valmiki Ramayana, the Rakshasas were always
bent upon preventing the performance of yagas and whenever
an attempt is made to perform yaga the parties had to seek the
aid of military protection before they could carry on the ceremony.
This is illustrated in Ramayana where Viswamitra takes the military
aid of the royal princes, Rama and Lakshmana before he starts
the rituals. Thus the circumstantial evidence goes to support
the theory that the people of the land were all followers of
Rishabha cult and they were staunchly defending their cult of
Ahimsa whenever there was an interference from outside. This
theory implies that even before the advent of the Rigvedic Aryans,
the people of the land had a higher form of religion. The Rishabha
cult of Ahimsa is further borne out by an evidence supplied by the
later Brahmanas and the Upanishads. When the Aryans of the Rig-
vedic period prominently settled in Northern India, their vedic
culture of Yagas, must have been prevalent side by side with
the religious practice associated with the earlier Rishabha cult.
The royal families representing the Ikshavakus clan and other
clans must have been driven towards the East by the conquering
hoards of the rigvedic Aryans who came and settled in the Punjab.
The earlier Aryan families who adopted the Ahimsa cult of
Lord Rishabha must have' been opposed to this new cult of
the Aryans. Therefore we have a reference to the Prachya-
desa > the Eastern countries in the Brahmanas. The most im-
portant of these . the Satapadabrahmanas refers to the people of

INTRODUCTION CXXV

these Prachyadesas which include, Kasi, Kosala, Videha and
Magadha as Aryabrashtas. The orthodox Brahmins of Kuru-
panchaladesa are advised not to travel in the Eastern countries.
Because the corrupt Aryans completely gave up the performance
of yaga they adopted an opposite Dharma altogether. They
hold that not performing yaga is thek Dharma and per-
forming yaga is a contradiction to Dharma, or Adharma.
Further these people of the Eastern countries do not recognise
social eminence of the priests. Socially the Kshatriyas claim to
be' superior to the Brahmin priests. Hence the orthodox priests,
if they travel in the Eastern countries will not be respected ac-
cording to their social status. These reasons given in the Sata-
padabrahmanas clearly indicate that the people of the Eastern
countries of Gangetic valley were all opposed to the Vedic culture
of the yaga, and were followers of Ahimsa Dharma. Here
we have to note the fact that the followers of Ahimsa Dharma
the intellectual leaders of the Eastern countries of the Gangetic
valley were all Kshatriyas. All the twenty-four Thirthankaras
of the Jainas and the founder of Buddhism Gautama Buddha
all claimed to be Kshatriyas; that the Kshatriyas were cham-
pions of Ahimsa Dharma that they were opposed to vedic
sacrifice, yaga championed by the priests of the Kurupanchala
country is further corroborated by the Upanishadic literature
which forms the Vedanta -or last form of vedic literature.
When we turn to Upanishadic literature we observe a complete
change in the intellectual attitude towards life and problems. Prior
to that the whole of Vedic culture is Swargakama Yajethavyaha
if you want happiness in Swarga you must perform sacrifice.
But when we turn to the Upanishadic period the idea is entirely
different. We notice that the intellectual leaders of the Upani-
shadic period do not attach any importance to the utilitarian idea.
Prosperity here and Swarga happiness hereafter are considered
both as worthless acquisitions. One is advised to look to some-
thing far more valuable than this. That Nachiketas rejects the
blessings of prosperity offered by Yama, that Mytreyi, the wife of
Yacmyalkya refused the offer by her husband of all his riches show
cleariy that the ideal of the Upanishadic principle is far higher than

CXXVi SAMAYASARA

that presented by the previous age of the vedic culture. Spiritual
yaga is considered to be inferior. Upanishads emphasise a meta-
phorical yaga of kindling the spiritual fire by yoga in which all
the impurities associated with the self are to be burnt for the pur-
pose of self purification and spiritual realisation. The priests of
Kurupanchala countries throng to the royal courts of the Prachya-
desa with a request to be initiated into this new culture of Atma-
vidya which is championed by the Kshatriya scholars of the land.
What is the origin of the new change of the attitude in the Upa-
nishadic culture. The only answer that we can think of is the
Kshatriya intellectuals of the Eastern countries of the Gangetic
valley staunchly defended their Ahimsa cult given to them by
Lord Rishabha till they were able to convince the priest: of Kuru-
panchala that their sacrifice was distinctly inferior to this cult of
Ahimsa or Atmavidya. Thus we have the Jaina tradition fully
corroborated by non- Jaina Vedic literature in these three distinct
historic groups of the Samhitas, Brahmanas, and the Upanishads.
These facts supplied by the Vedic literature taken in conjunction
with the evidence supplied by the excavations of the Indus valley
civilisation will constrain us to believe that the Rishabha cult of
Ahimsa and the practice of tapas or yoga must; have been the
ancient cult of the Indians throughout the land prevalent even
before the advent of the Aryans who sang the hymns of Rig-
veda. Thus the Ahimsa cult revealed by Lord Rishabha was the
most ancient of religious cults which must have been prevalent
in the Northern India and which must have been the practice in
religion of the people of the land at the time of Aryan invasion.

Moksha Marga: What is the Mokshamarga which is peculiar
to Jainism ? What are its special features ? How is it different
from the religious principle associated with the other Indian
Dharisanas. Mokshamarga is defined by Umaswami thus:
Samyak Dharsana Jnana Charitrani Mokshamargaha : Right
faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct, these three con-
stitute the path to salvation. This is the first Sutra of Uma-
swami's monumental work called Tatvartha Sutra. The emphasis
is laid on all the three only when all the three characteris-
tics are combined they can constitute to Mokshamarga. Each

INTRODUCTION CXXVll

by itself is imperfect and therefore insufficient. To depend
entirely on faith as is maintained by some Hindu Dharasana
will not lead one to happiness or Moksha. Similarly Jnana or
knowledge alone cannot lead one to happiness. Nor can
Charitra by itself however admirable the conduct be, is sufficient
to lead to the desired goal. Hence faith, knowledge, and con-
duct must be presented together by an individual if he is to walk
the path of righteousness. Further it is emphasised that these
three-faith, knowledge and conduct must be of the right type.
Hence it is called right faith, right knowledge and right conduct
alone when combined together would constitute the Mokshamarga.
Mere faith which is not of the right type will not be founded
upon the ultimate nature of reality. Similarly right knowledge and
not any other knowledge will constitute the Mokshamarga.
Right knowledge will therefore exclude all incorrect attitude and
disruption of the nature of reality. Hence the prefix Samyak is
used in each of the terms. The Commentator of the Sutras gives
an interesting metaphor to bring out the force of the sutra. A
person suffering from a disease, say fever, if he desires to cure him-
self of the' disease must have faith in the capacity of the doctor and
must know the exact nature of the medicine prescribed by him for his
disease and must drink the medicine according to the instructions
of the doctor. Mere faith in the doctor will be of no use. Faith
in the capacity of the doctor and the knowledge of the nature of
the medicine would equally be useless unless the patient takes the
medicine. The person who expects to be cured of his disease
must not only have faith in the doctor's capacity, and full know-
ledge of the nature of the medicine but also take the medicine
according to the prescription. In this case beings in the world
of Samsara are assumed to be patients suffering from a spiritual
disqualification or disease who desire to get rid of this disease
and to attain perfect spiritual health. Thus for the purpose of
helping such persons this Mokshamarga is prescribed as a spiritual
remedy and the spiritual remedy therefore must be associated
with all three characteristics of right faith, right knowledge and
right conduct in order to be effective. These three constituent
elements of the path to salvation are called Ratnatraya or the

CXXVlii SAMAYASARA

three jewels. These Ratnatraya or the three jewels of the Jaina
Dharma should not be confounded with the three jewels or
the Ratnatraya of the Buddhas, where they mean three different
things. The Buddha, founder of Buddhism and Dharma, the
message revealed by Buddha, and the Sanga, the social federation-
organised by him. Therefore the three jewels of the Bouddhas
are Buddha, Dharma and Sanga which are quite different from
the Ratnatraya of the Jainas, which constitute the Mokshamarga.

What is Samyak Dharsana or Right faith ? Samyak Dharsana
is defined in the following sutra:

Thatvartha Sraddhanam, Samyak Dharsanam: Faith or belief
in the nature of the reality is right faith or Samyak Dharsana.
Belief in the Tatvas or the reals as they exist forms the foundation
of Jaina faith. What are these Tatvas ? Belief in it is emphasised
as the important foundation of Jainism, These tatvas or the
reals are said to be seven in number. Jiva, the living entity
Ajiva non-living entity, Asrava, Bhanda, Samvara, Nirjara, and
Moksha. Asrava means flow of karmic matter into the nature of
self or soul. Bhanda implies the mixture of the karmic matter
with nature of the soul on account of which the soul looses its
intrinsic purity and brilliance. , Samvara represents the act of
preventing the inflow of the karmic matter and hence it is the
' blocking of Asrava. Nirjara represents the act of destroying the
karmic matter which may adhere to the soul. As a result of block-
ing up the flow of fresh karmic matter and destruction of the old
karmic matter clinging to the soul you have the emergence of
the soul in its pure form, free from karmic upadhis, whose state
is represented by the term Moksha. These are the several funda-
mental realities proclaimed by the Jaina Dharsana, which every
Jaina is expected to believe. Of these the first two Jiva and Ajiva
the living and the non-living, form the primary categories and
the others are only secondary. The third and fourth represent
the association of the first and the second. The fifth and the
skth represent partial dissociation of the first (Jiva) from the
second Ajiva or matter. The seventh represents the complete
dissociation of the first.

Before examining these categories in detail let us explain

INTRODUCTION CXX1X

some of the fundamental philosophical doctrines associated with
Jaina Darsana. Let us take first the doctrine of Sat or Reality.
The definition of Sat given in Jaina Metaphysics is that it is a '
permanent reality in the midst of change of appearance and dis-
appearance. Utpada vaya Dhrowya yuktam Sat. This concep-
tion of reality is peculiar to Jainism. The only parallel that we
can think of is the Hegelian conception of reality in Western
thought. The real existence is not merely the state of static and
permanent existence. An existing reality in order to maintain
its permanent and continued existence must necessarily undergo
change in the form of appearance and disappearance. This
may appear to be apparently a paradox. But when we appreciate
the significance of this description of reality, it may be found that
it is the most accurate description of reality of the actual state
of things. Everywhere we find growth and development and
this is manifest in the organic world. Whether we look to the
world of plants or of animals, the field of botany or biology,
this description of reality is clearly borne out. Let. us confine
ourselves to the life history of a plant. It begins itself in the form
of a seed. The seed which is planted in the soil must necessarily
break the shell and sprout out. That is the first step in its attempt
to grow. If the seed remains as a seed without this change there
will be no growth and no plant; the seed will be condemned as
a lifeless one. Hence it is necessary that it should change its
own form and assume a new form which is the necessary stepping
stone for the growth of the plant. This sprouting seed must
further undergo change and some portion of it must come out
seeking the sunlight and another portion of it must go down into
the earth in order to obtain nourishment from the soil. That por-
tion of the sprouting which goes down into the soil will undergo
enormous changes into the root system, all engaged in acquiring
nourishment for the mother plant. Similarly the portion that
shoots up into the air and sunlight will undergo enormous change,
of sprouting out in tendrills and leaves finally resulting in bran-
ches and stem of the plant all engaged in the task of procuring
nourishment with the help of sunlight, from among the chemicals
available in the atmosphere, such as carbondioxide. At every

cxxx SAMAYASARA

stage thus we find change, the old leaves being shed off and the
new sprouts coming in. This seems to be the general law of
Nature by which life maintains its identity and permanence be-
cause without this change life will cease to be life and organism
will die. What is true of a plant is equally true with the life his-
tory of an animal. The life history of a mammal or a man may
be of the same principle with similar process of growth starting
with a single cell organism with fecundated ouam in passing
through the multiplicity of cells constituting a mass undergoing
elaborate anatomical change within the uterus of the mother
till the time of the birth when it comes out as fully constituted
baby waiting to grow further in the outer environment. Here
also the same principle is maintained i.e., identity, in the midst of
change appearance and disappearance the old disappearing and
the new appearing in the organism. Every part of the physio-
logical system of the body of the child will thus undergo change
till the child grows into an adult and full-grown individual. It
is this Law of nature that is observed to be prevalent in the world
of reality. That is implied in the definition of reality given above.
The apparent paradox thus reveals the intrinsic nature of reality
and we find it illustrated everywhere in the world of nature. It
is this very same principle that is associated with the great-
German Philosopher Hegel, who spoke of the dialectical nature
of reality, dialectic implying thesis passing to its opposite, the
antithesis, and the both opposites being comprehended under the
general principle synthesis. What are apparent contradictions
are but two essential aspects of the same higher reality which
comprehends within itself two conflicting principles. The
general biological conception of life in the form of metabol-
ism may be taken to be a fit illustration of this Hegilian dialec-
tic, as well as the Jain conception of Reality, Sat. Life activity
or what is called Metabolism implies conflicting, process
of anabolism and catobolism which are the two necessary
aspects of life activity and the healthy balance between
these two conflicting activities is the general characteristic of
metabolism. In this ^ respect Jaina conception of reality is
different from the other Indian Darsanas, because the other

INTRODUCTION CXXXl

Darsanas some of them would emphasise permanency alone as
the nature of reality while some others would emphasise change
alone as the characteristic of reality. Vedantisfla .may be taken
to be an example of a philosophical system which emphasise
permanency as the characteristic of reality and dismisses change
as sheer illusion. Similarly Buddhistic Kshanikavada mo-
mentary change over emphasises change to the utter neglect
of the underlying permanency. The one sided emphasis either
of permanency or change is rejected by Jaina thinkers who con-
demn such systems' as Ekantavada, a system which clings to a
partial aspect of the reality. It neglects to note the other aspects
which are also necessarily present in the system of , reality.
After rejecting the non-Jaina systems as a group of Ekantavadins,
the Jaina thinkers call their own system as Anekantavada, a sys-
tem of philosophy which maintains that Reality has multifarious
aspects and that a complete comprehension of such a nature
must necessarily take into consideration all the different aspects
through which reality manifests. Emphasis on one particular
aspect of reality and building up the system of philosophy on that
alone would be similar to a fable of blind men attempting to des-
cribe the nature of an elephant. A clear and correct description
of the animal, elephant, would be accurate only when you take
into consideration all the descriptions which the blind men
make by their partial contact with the real animal. Hence
the Jaina Darasana is technically called Anekantavada as it
attempts to apprehend fully the whole of reality by taking into
consideration the different aspects through which this reality
manifest.

The Concept of DravjaThis conception of Sat or the ex-
isting reality that is a permanency in the midst of change
leads us to another philosophical concept associated with the
Jaina Darsana, the Concept of Dravya. The term Dravya is
generally applied to different classes of objects that constitute the
whole of reality. The term Dravya itself 'is derived from a root
which means the flow. Any object of reality which persists to
exist in the midst of continuous disappearance and appearance
may be described to be a flow of reality just like a stream of water.

CXXxii SAMAYASARA

This autonomic fludity of an object of reality is what is implied
by the technical term Dravya which is applied to any class of
objects constituting the Realty. This Dravya is defined thus :
Guna Paryayavat Daravyaha that which has characteristic qua-
lities and that which is undergoing constant modifications is
what is called Dravya. The general illustration of a dravya given
in textbooks is the substance, gold. This dravya gold- has
got its characteristic quality of yellowness, brilliance, malleability.,
etc., and it may be made into several ornaments. One ornament
of gold may be changed into another ornament if the owner so
desires. The changing form into which this substance, Gold,
shall be constituted is its mode. The substance, gold, out of
which" these ornaments are made is the Dravya and the charac-
teristic attributes of yellowness etc., constitute its Guna. Here
also the conception of Dravya is peculiar to the Jaina Darsana,
and to a very large extent differs from the conceptin of Dravya
found in the other Non-Jaina Darsanas. The substance and
qualities cannot be separated. Dravya and Guna are inseparable
and yet the substance is not the same as its attributes nor the attri-
butes same as the substance, though it is a fact it is the substance
that manifests this nature through its attributes . Substance without
attributes and attributes dissociated from the underlying substance
would all be meaningless abstractions. Guna cannot exist apart from
the Dravya nor the Dravya apart from the gunas. A real dravya
is that which manifests through its Gunas and real gunas are those
that have their roots in the underlying dravya. Gunas which
are not based upon the underlying Dravya, whose manifestations
they are, would be merely sensory illusions having no claim to the
status of reality. Hence in the world of reality there can be no
separate existence either of Dravya or Guna from each other.
It may be .clearly seen that according to Jaina Darsana, the sys-
tems which speak of a real existence without Gunas, Nirguna or of
Gunas existing separately from the substance till they are brought
together by a third entity called Samavaya, are erroneous philo-
sophical views not corroborated by facts of reality. As we shall
see ater on, according to this conception even Chetana or Soul
or Atma cannot separate its quality of Chetana or consciousness

INTRODUCTION CXXXlll

but some other philosophical systems do maintain that the
Chetana quality and Atamadravya are two different entities
occasionally brought together by extraneous circumstances.
These two doctrines as to the nature pertaining to reality Sat,
and Dravya lead us to the consideration of fundamental and
logical doctrine which is also pecular to Jainism.

Asti-Nasti Vada According to this logical doctrine every fact
of reality is capable of being described in two logical proposi-
tions one affirmative and the other negative. This paradoxical
logical doctrine of Asti-Nasti Vada has perplexed many non-
Jaina thinkers including even the great philosopher Sankara.
Apparently this conception will be meaningless. How could
the same fact be described by two contradictory logical propo-
sitions? How can we say that it is and at the same time it is not?
Because Asti-Nasti literally means the thing is and is not. If
we remember the two previous philosophical doctrines of Sat
and Dravya and if we remember that the ultimate reality is a
permanent and changing entity manifesting through con-
stant change of appearance and disappearance, then we can
understand that a fact of reality when looked at from the under-
lying permanent substance may be described to be unchanging
and permanent, where from the point of view of the modes which
appear and disappear, the thing maybe described to be non-perma-
nent and changing. This difference of aspect is called Naya tech-
nically by the Jaina thinkers. Describing a thing from the aspect
of the underlying substance or Dravya is called Dravyarthika-
naya whereas the description based upon the modifications or
changes is called Paryayarthika Naya. Thus the same fact of reality
may be apprehended and described from the Paryayarthikanaya
or from Dravyarthikanaya. From the point of view of the
former it may be called an ever changing fact whereas from the
latter point of view it may be said to be an unchanging permanent
entity. Hence these two apparently contradictory logical pro-
positions though applicable to the same fact of reality are pre-
dicated from two distinct aspects, one emphasising the underly-
ing substance, the other emphasising the changing modes. If
we recognise that the conflicting predications are logically pos-

CXXxiv SAMAYASARA

sible and fully significant since they -refer to two different aspects
of view, the logical doctrine of Asti-Nasti vada looses much of
its -mystery and apparent contradictory nature. This Asti-Nasti
Vada doctrine is further elaborated by Jaina Logicians. Take
the case of a piece of furniture, the chair or the table before us.
If we enquire into the nature of the material, the timber, the same
piece of furniture -admits of 'two different logical propositions,
one affirmative and the other negative.

If the chair is made of Rosewood 'then it is capable of
being described as furniture made of rosewood. Can we
describe the same chair as made of' teakwood ? Certainly Not.
We have to say emphatically that it is not made of teakwood.
The same piece of furniture therefore admits an affirmative pro-
position that it is made of rosewood, when you take into consi-
deration the actual timber out of which it is made and a negative
proposition that is it not made of teakwood when you take into
consideration some other timber alien to its own nature. Simi-
larly when we want to know whether a piece of furniture is in
the drawing room or in the verandah of your house, and if it
actually exists in the drawing room we have to say that is in the
drawing room and it is not in the verandah. It is according to
this doctrine of Asti-Nasti vada as elaborated by the Jaina logi-
' cians every fact of reality may be described according to four
different conditions. Dravya, Kshetra, Kala and Bhava. Nature
of the substance, the place where it is, the time when it exists,
and the characteristics intrinsically presented in it. Every object
from its own Dravya or substance admits of an affirmative predi-
cation and looked at from the paradravya, alien substance, admits
of a negative predication. The example of a chair given above
from swadravya rosewood admits of affirmative predication,
it is made of rosewood; and from the point of view of paradravya,
alien substance, negative predication. Similarly from swakshetra
it is said to be in the drawing room and from parakshetra it is
said it is not found in the Verandah. This principle of predications
may be extended to any object of reality. When we say an ani-
mal Cow, and one question arises what kind of animal it is, we
have to say affirmatively it is -a cow and negatively it is not a horse.

INTRODUCTION CXXXV

If the question is where is the cow -and if it is actually grazing in
the compound we have to answer the cow is in the compound and
it is not in the cattleshed. Affirmative predication from the swak-
shetra and negative predication from parakshetra where it is not.
Similarly historical proposition may be said to be true in its own
period, and not true in another historical period. Alexander's inva-
sion of India is an event which took place before the beginning of
the Christian era and therefore cannot be associated with the histo-
rical period of the Christian era. Hence we have to say that
the invasion took place in B.C. and not A.D. from the point of
view of kala. So this doctrine becomes an obvious statement -
according to common sense point of view and need not be con-
sidered to be an extremely intricate philosophical doctrine. ^ Yes
in spite of its obvious nature based upon commonsense point of
view it has been misunderstood by many non-Jaina thinkers and
even the great Sankara dismisses the doctrine as a prattlings of
a mad man. With this short account of philosophical background
of Jaina darasna, we may go to examine some of the important

categories in detail.

Jiva or SouI:-The term Jiva represents a living berng. It
denotes a spiritual entity. Its essential nature is Chetana or
thought. Jiva is defined by the Jaina thinkers as an entity which
lived in the past, which continues to live in the present and which
will certainly live in the future also. From this definition
it is clear that the term Jiva or soul is an entity which had no begin-
ning and which will have no end. It is beginningless and un-
ending continuous existence of a spiritual nature. This Jiva or
soul is mainly of two kinds-Samasara Jiva and Moksha Jiva.
The soul that is embodied, life in the concrete world of biolo-
gical kingdom associated with the karmic bondage is the Samsara
Jiva; the soul that is free from such karmic bondage and which
transcended the cycle of Samasara and which had attained its
nature of intrinsic purity as a result of liberation from karmic
bondage is Mokshd Jiva. This conception of Jiva may be said to
be the central doctrine of Jaina philosophy, all the other categories
being merely secondary and subsidiary to the central entity. The
Samasara Jiva itself is divided into four main classes, or Gathis

CXXXVi SAMAYASARA

as they are technically called * Chathur Gathis. These gathis are
Devagathi, Manushyagathi 5 Thiryakgathi, and Naraka gathi. The
first represents the class of devas living in what are called
Devalokas. The second term Manushyagathi refers to the
human being living in this world. The third term refers to
the sub-human creatures or lower animals of the zoologi-
cal and botanical kingdoms which are found with mankind in
this world. The fourth term refers to the beings in the hell
or the Naraka-Netherworld. The Devaloka or the upper world
and Narakaloka the world of hell are recognised in Jaina cosmology,
according to which the concrete world of living beings men and
. lower animals is called the Madhyama loka, the middle world.
All beings of these four different groups are called Samsara Jivas,
that is a Jiva which is subject to the cycle of birth and death, which
cycle is denoted by the term Samasara. All Samsarajivas are
embodied according to their individual spiritual status. Each
samsaric soul is born with a body and continues to live as
embodied soul subject to growth, old age, decay and death;
when it has to quit its body in search of another body it
acquires another body consistent with and determined by its
own karmic conditions. Throughout the series of births and
deaths thus associated with the appearance and disappearance
of the corresponding body the underlying Jiva or the soul
is a perpetual entity serving as a connecting thread of uni-
fying the various births and deaths associated with that
particular Jiva. This Samsara Jiva associated with its own
karmic bondage and its own corporeal existence is considered
to be uncreated and therefore beginningless. For the Jaina
metaphysician the question when did the soul get associated
with material body is a meaningless question, because they
say Samsara is anadhi. The cycle of births and deaths has
no beginning. Whatever may be the difference of opinion bet-
ween Jaina metaphysics and the other schools of Indian thought,
in this particular point all agree. All maintain that the Samsara
is Anadhi. Hence no school of Indian thought would allow
the question when did Samsara begin to be a sensible question.
While all the systems maintain that Samsara is beginningless-

INTRODUCTION CXXXVll

Anadhi, all of them do maintain that this series of Samsara will come
to an end. At the time of liberation of the soul from material
and karmic bondage it is said to attain Moksha or liberation.
In this respect also they are at one with the Jaina thinkers that the
Samsara Jiva is capable of liberating itself ultimately from the
samsaric cycle of births and deaths and of obtaining its
form of intrinsic purity when the soul is called Muktha Jiva
or Paramatma. Fundamentally therefore there is no distinc-
tion between the soul that lives in Samsara and the soul that
attains liberation or Moksha. The Jivatma of the embodied soul
in Samsara is identical with the would be Paramatma. The two
are one and the same. The doctrine that maintains that the
Jivatma and Parmatma are intrinsically identical is the funda-
mental Jaina doctrine of Advaitism, which is also the fundamental
doctrine of Advainsrn of Sankara of latter days. In fact Sankara
dismissed all the other systems which do not accept this doctrine
as erroneous ones to be discarded and emphasises this doctrine
of identity between the Jivatama and Paramatma as his own Sid-
dhanta. The nature of Jiva is Chetana or thought and is there-
fore quite different from all the other categories which are not so
characterised by Chetana or thought. The other Achetana
categories are "called Ajiva in Jaina metaphysics. This term
Ajiva includes Pudgala or matter, Akasa or space and two
other principles called Dharma and Adharma. Principles of
equilibrium and motion which are peculiar to Jaina

Physics.

The four categories which are grouped in the Ajiva class
are distinctly non-spiritual and hence incapable of consciousness
or thought. They are grouped under Achetana. All Ajiva
categories are called Achetana. It is only the Chetana entity,
Jiva, that is associated with the consciousness. This cons-
ciousness or thought which is the characteristic of Jiva may
manifest in three distinct psychological activities of cognition.
The process of knowing, emotion the process of feeling pleasure
or pains, and co-nation the process of activity culminating in
voluntary activity. All Jivas therefore are associated with these

CXXXVlii SAMAYASARA

three different forms of psychic activity of consciousness and are
technically called Chetana Paryayas-awareness of the environment,
hedonic reaction to the objects so cognised and the- characteris-
tic activity manifesting as a result of this feeling of pleasure or pain.
This Jiva is intrinsically the Knower, the Enjoyer and the Actor.
Every soul according to its own status in the course of evolution
is thus capable of being in its own way the 'knower, the enjoyer
and the actor Jnana, Bhokta and Karta. This process of know-
ing may be limited according to the biological conditions of the
individual being. Knowledge may be wider or narrower accord-
ing to the scale of evolution. The environment and knowledge
expected of a lower animal will be much narrower than that of
a human being and the environment and knowledge of a cul-
tured individual will be very insignificant when compared to
the knowledge of a person who by yoga or tapas acquired super-
sensual knowledge whose extensity would be very great. Thus the
growth of knowledge is conditioned by the spiritual growth of the
individual soul or Jiva. In the case of Moksha Jiva the knowledge
becomes infinite comprising within itself all the three worlds,
when he becomes the knower par-excellence who acquires the
nomenclature ofSarvagna, the Omniscient and whose extensity
is limitless in space and powers. This Paramatma is Jnani, par-
excellence. This Jaina conception of Jiva though fundamentally
identical with the concept of Jiva in other Indian systems of
thought, still differs from the other view in certain respects.
For example, Sankhya Purusha which corresponds with the Jiva
of the Jaina metaphysics is slightly different from the Jaina
concept of Jiva. The Sankhyas thought that Purusha is a Chetana
entity, but Purusha is the knower and the enjoyer, Jnatha and
Bhokta but he is not active. He is not a karta. All activities in
the concrete world according to Sankhya school is associated
with body, the material entity which is called Prakrit! in the Sankhya
school and which is called Pudgala in the Jaina school of thought.
Since all activities associated with non-thinking Prakritis in San-
khya system, the Chetana entity Purusha is not connected with any
kind of activity. Then why should he be responsible for the

INTRODUCTION CXXXlX

activity earned out by some other entity? He is really non-active
Akarta. The Jaina thinkers object to this Sankhya view. They
say that if the Pumsha is Akarta or non- active and merely a spec-
tator of an activity carried out by another agency there is no moral
justification in maintaining that he is the Bhokta or the enjoyer
of the fruits of such an activity. The fruits of activity are either
pleasurable or painful, and why should an entity which is not
responsible for the activity be destined to enjoy the result of pain
or pleasure. Similarly the other schools of thought such as
the Mimamsakas and the Viseshikas maintain that Jnana or
the knowing capacity gets associated with the soul which is
by nature intrinsically devoid of this guna or quality. The
knowing capacity or Jnana which is a distinct entity from the
soul is brought in association with the soul or Jivatma by
combination; then the soul becomes the knower. This doc-
trine also is rejected by the Jaina thinkers as most contradictory,
because it would reduce the Atma or the soul to a non-thinking
entity before it has the good fortune to be combined with Guna
or quality of knowledge or Jnana. The knowing capacity or
Jnana is intrinsic manifestation of the spiritual entity Chetana
dravya or Jiva. To imagine that the quality of guna can exist
separately from the Jiva or the Atma is according to Jaina meta-
physics quite impossible and meaningless, because according to
this' central doctrine of Jainism Guna and Dravya cannot be se-
parated and when so separated each becomes meaningless abstrac-
tions incapable of existence in reality. Hence the triple psy-
chic characteristics of knowing, feeling and action are considered
inalienable qualities of the Chetana entity, Atma or Jiva, and they
should not be considered to be of independent existence brought
together by combination or association. Each, quality may vary
inlntensityorin extensity. But all the three characteristics must
be present in any Jiva however high or low it be in the scale of devel-
opment. The process of Jnana being an intrinsic quality of the
Chetana entity or Atma introduces a peculiar attitude in the matter
of epistemology according to Jaina thinkers. The basic
principle of knowing process of the Jiva or the Atman, and the
variations in the knowing process of a particular Jiva are due

Cxi SAMAYASARA

to associated conditions. An ordinary living being has access
to the environmental objects through sense perception. Sense
perception is through the medium of sense organs of the body.
Since they are parts of the body, physical and physiological the
sensory organs are distinctly material in nature and thus distinct
from the nature of Jiva or the Atma. Sense perception there-
fore according to Jaina epistemology is the knowledge which
the Atman acquires of the environment through the intermediary
of material sense organs. Since it is though the intermediary
of physiological organs of sense, perceptual knowledge cannot
be considered to be immediate access of the soul to the environ-
ment objects. Hence sense perception becomes mediate and
not immediate. Direct contact of Jiva with the object is what
is called pratyaksha by the Jain* thinkers. Since the sense
perception is conditioned by physical sense organs, it is not imme-
diate. Sense perception becomes Paroksha, mediate knowledge,
according to Jaina epistemology. In this respect the terms
Pratyaksha and Paroksha are completely reversed in Jaina episte-
mology. What is directly in contact with the soul is pratyaksha
and what the soul acquires through intermediary agent is paroksha.
Hence the sense perception is a paroksha knowledge and not
pratyaksha as described by the other Indian systems. But Jaina
epistemology recognises two kinds of supersensory knowledge,
(i) awareness of objects in distant places and times and (2) contact
with thought present in other individual beings. The former is
called Avadhignana which may be translated as clairvoyant know-
ledge and the latter is called Manaparyaya Jnana which means
telepathy in the language of modern psychology. These two
features of supersensory knowledge, Avadhi and Mana paryaya-
jnana, clairvoyance and telepathy are recognised to be knowledge
of immediate type or pratyaksha since they do not depend
upon any intermediary of sensory organs. Of course, the real
pratyaksha knowledge is the supreme knowledge of Paramatma
when he gets rid of karmic bondage and when he attains
Kevalagnana the knowledge par excellence. This knowledge is
infinite in nature and unlimited by spatial and temporal condi-
tons. In this belief that the Jivatma is capable of becoming

INTRODUCTION Cxll

Paramatma or the Sarvagna, we find similarities and divulgence
between the various other Indian systems. The Mimamsakas
whose fundamental doctrine is that the Vedas are eternal and
apourusheya not revealed by any individual person, do not be-
lieve in any Sarvagna or Omniscient being. In this respect the
Mimamsaka system is wholly opposed to Jaina system of meta-
physics and also the Vedantic school of thought. The Mimam-
sakas who deny the reality of the Sarvagna also go to reject
the doctrine of a creator and the doctrine of creation Iswara
as the Shristikarta. In this respect the Mimamsakas entirely agree
with the Jaina and Sankhya systems in rejecting the creation theory.
The Sarvagna or Parmatma in Jaina system is not a Shristikarta
or the creator. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of creation may
be said to have been completely rejected by all the Indian systems
and not merely by the Jaina school of thought. No Indian sys-
tem, not even the Viseshikas and Nayayikas who speak of an Iswara
as the Shristikarta accept the doctrine of creation as bringing
into existence of non-existing entity. That form of crea-
tion is entirely foreign to Indian thought. This doctrine is
vehemently opposed and rejected by the Mimamsakas as most
ridiculous contradiction. All systems begin with the uncreated
Atmas or soul and the uncreated world of physical objects.
Transformation in these objects, conjunction and separation
between the living and the non-living in various forms are accept-
ed and described by the Indian thinkers as the primary entities
so combined or so undergoing transformations are all postulated
to be uncreated and indestructible having a permanent ex-
istence of their own. In this respect also the Jaina philosophy
agrees with the other Indian systems in maintaining that the
Jiva and Ajiva categories are permanent and uncreated and
indestructible.

SELF IN MODERN SCIENCE

Even the biological developments of lower organism may
be said to be a preparation for building up a vehicle for the self
to express itself. From the lowest mono-cellular organism and
ameaba right to man, the process of evolution is a process of

cx ]ji SAMAYASARA

building up the body enabling the self to express its nature and
characteristics fuller and fuller. Psychological development of
man illustrates the same point of view.

Further cultural development involving socio-political or-
ganisations and metaphysical evolution all point to the same end.
It is now a recognised fact that the character and behaviour of
living organisms are entirely distinct from that of the inorganic
things. Life's activity is characterised by an underlying purpose.
Purposive behaviour of organism marks the distinguishing charac-
teristic of the biological kingdom. No biologist nowadays has
faith in famous Belfast declaration by Professor Tyndali that matter
contains the promise and potency of life and consciousness. The
mechanical aspect of the physical realm is recognised to be differ-
ent from the teleological aspect of the kingdom of life. Even
the case of ameaba which consists of protoplasmic matter covered
by the cellular wall containing inside it a nucleus behaves charac-
teristically in a purposive manner. This mono-cellular organism
is able to recognise in a mysterious way the difference between
friend and foe. It is able to run away from a powerful enemy.
It is able to attack and defeat an enemy of modest intensity and
power. It is able to stretch out pseudo podia from the cell-wall
to capture food-stuff and assimilate it. Thus it has in its own
way the glimpse of sensitive awareness to help its behaviour.
It exhibits the main functions of life such as motion and loco-
motion, digestion and assimilation and even reproduction by
a process of gemmation. This acquatic mono-cellular organism
does not carry on with this mode of life and character for long.
Nature seems to be dissatisfied with this process of evolution.
Then begins the process of building up a colony of cells cling-
ing together with a sort of co-operative purpose of common
life. Thus arises the beginning of multi-cellular organism.
The mother cell separates into two cells which is brought about
by a process of gemmation. These clinging together resulting
in the constitution of the colony of cells, form the multi-cellular
' organism. This change naturally brings about a change in the
characteristics of the behaviour of the organism. The cells in
the outer periphery of the organism have the chance of coming

INTRODUCTION ' Cxliii

in contact with the environment whereas the cells inside the mass
have no such chance. This necessarily brings about a division of
labour in order to promote the common life of the colony of cells.
The outer cells are practically specialised to perform the function
of awareness of the environment and also the function of motion
and locomotion whereas the cells inside the mass specialise in the
function of digestion and assimilation. In order to facilitate
this 'functional differentiation the colony of cells provides a cen-
tral channel through which food is shoved in which is assimilated
by the inner cells and circulated to the cells in periphery also.
This central channel is a representative of the future digestive system
of the major organisms and also the circulatory systems. The
cells in the periphery get on specialised further into sensory motor
systems of the higher organism. The front opening of this colony
of cells represents the primitive mouth of the organism. It is this
side of the colony that approaches and catches foodstuff which
are shoved into the central channel for purpose of digestion
and assimilation. Hence the multiceliular organism' develops
tentacles at the frontal orifice for the purpose of capturing food-
stuff and shoving them in. Some cells at the frontal orifice
further specialise into different types of sensory awareness while
the ameaba had the privilege of contact awareness only, the multi-
cellular organism develops in addition the sense of taste and the
sense of smell, the former to distinguish food from the non-
edible object and the latter to recognise the approach of an object
whether it is friend or foe through scent. Thus the cells of the
periphery near the central orifice must further specialise another
functional structure some devoted to the awareness of taste and
others to smell. Thus form the beginnings of the sensory systems
in the organism. Even an organism of this type which is merely
a mass of cells with the central orifice with the tentacles near
the orifice is able. to express its characteristics in a significantly
purposive manner.

Professor Loeb conducted certain experiments to determine
the behaviour of such primitive organisms. He introduced pieces
of bread neat the mouth, the tentacles caught these pieces and
examined these and shoved them in. When the experiment was

Cxliv SAMAYASARA

repeated the tentacles were eagerly awaiting for small bits of bread
and the moment these pieces were introduced without further
examination they were pushed in. When this behaviour was
fully developed, he introduced pieces of card-board, the first
piece of cardboard was eagerly caught and shoved in. After
a little while this was brought out without being digested and
kicked away by the tentacles. Afterwards this primitive organism
was able to recognise the difference between the piece of bread'
and piece of cardboard. The latter when introduced would be
kicked away without ceremony a characteristic behaviour fully
illustrative of the purposive nature of life activity.

The next stage in the sensory development consists in the
appearance of the beginnings of eye which will be sensitive to
light. Certain other cells about the frontal orifice develop a
sensitiveness to light which is the primitive representative of
future-Eyeof the higher organism. The differentiation of cells
.thus responding to different sensory stimuli constitutes the ori-
gin of the different sense organs, which naturally must get
coordinated by interconnections if they are to subserve the p-ene-
ral purpose. Such interconnections of these sensory regions
from the primitive nervous system form the brain of the higher
organism.

Let us pursue the development of the sensory organism and
the other systems in the higher organisms. All this development
in the multicellular organism is associated with acquatic
organisms. When these animals become amphibians partly livincr
on earth and water, then there is the scope of further sensory
development of hearing. The latter evolution branches off in
two directions one towards the fowls of the air and the
other towards the beasts of the earth.

Confining ourselves to the career of the quadrupeds we
find a wonderful development of the nervous system and spe-
cially the brain. Examination of the brain of the lowest types
of quadruped, say the rabbit, we find that the whole mass
o the brain consists of the sensory centres connecting with
, he peripheral sensory organs, such as taste, smell, touch
s%ht and sound. Besides these central sensory organs Ind the

INTRODUCTION

brain, there are what are called motor regions of the body,
some controlling the movements of the hind legs, some
controlling the movements of the front legs and so on. When
we follow the development of this brain in the mammals,
we find the appearance of some brain regions which are not
characterised either by sensory functions or motor functions.
These areas of the brains were called silent areas, because the
physiologists were notable to determine their function accurately
by experiment. Later on it was discovered that these silent
areas perform a very important function of co-ordinating the
different elements of sensory awareness with appropriate mascular
reactions controlling the general behaviour of the animal and these
serve as the fundamental basis of the origin and development
of consciousness. This hypothesis is fully corroborated when
we watch the development of these silent areas in the brain surface
of the mammals.

When we come to the simian type of quadrupeds, we find
a critical and interesting turn in the brain development. Pro-
bably frightened by the pre-historic giants, certain quadrupeds
had to take up to arboreal life by climbing up the trees and living
there the major part of the time in order to preserve themselves,
from the danger of the enemies below. This necessarily resulted
in the liberation of the front legs which were converted into
hands capable of grasping at things with the flexible fingers and
so on. This liberation of the front leg led to immense possi-
bilities of. future developments found in man. Beginnings of
the human culture and civilisation may be traced to this cri-
tical turn in the evolution of life where the front legs changed into
hands and which agaiq. led to an erect posture of the animal stand-
ing on the hind legs alone, thus assuring in the advent of man
in the world. We now perceive the subordination of the sensory
areas of the brain and the major portion of the surface of the brain
assigned to motor functions to the functions of the association
of different centres. Thereafter we find that the so-called silent
centres otherwise called association centres of the brain becoming
the dominant area of the brain, and they are at the maximum in
the human, brain, thus indicating that they form the functional
basis of consciousness which is the fundamental characteristic

cx j v j[ SAMAYASARA

of man. Thus the process of building up the body for the pur-
pose of serving as a vehicle for the expression of consciousness,
which seems to be the guiding principle in the whole process
of evolution. This principle is generally recognised by modern
biologists who refute the inadequacy of Darwinian theory of
natural selection based upon mere mechanical environment.
Let us confine ourselves to human brain. Here you have
the centres representing the various sense organs of the periphery,
the motor centres controlling the various systems of the body
and besides these large tracks of association centres which cover
the major portion of the brain area. Modern ^ physiologists re-
cognise the importance of their association areas and they believe
that the same form the physiological basis of conscious activity.
But the psychological development and especially the study of
abnormal psychology brought to the forefront certain impor-
tant facts, which necessitate the modification of the theory postu-
lating that conscious activity is generally based upon physiologi-
cal functions of the different centres of the brain, sensory
and motor. Since these facts indicate that sometimes conscious-
ness functioning in a mysterious way completely transcends the
activity of the brain this result is obtained from two independent
sources. Mental disorders brought about by violent shock or acci-
dent are observed in cases where the medical men were not able
to detect any injury to the brain. A person falling from his dog-
cart, was found to be completely devoid of his past memory.
He was not even able to speak. His condition was just like that
of a baby incapable of uttering coherent words and incapable
of recognising familiar objects. In this case, the medical men
were not able to find any damage to the l?rain and they were in
a fix to account for this tragic wiping out of past memories.
The case was finally taken up by a psychologist. He began to
teach this patient a few words and made him understand few
objects in the environment. Thus he was equipped with a few
words to carry on conversation. Then he was subjected to hyp-
notic treatment and to the great surprise of the psychologist the
patient when in hypnotic sleep remembered all his past experience
vaguely as if in a dream. Feeling glad that the past memory

INTRODUCTION ' Cxlvil

is not altogether wiped off, the treatment was continued for some
time., the patient was given the post-hypnotic suggestion that
he would remember all the past experiences which he vaguely
recognised as dreams in the hypnotic trance. When the patient
woke up to normal consciousness from the hypnotic sleep, to
his great joy, he remembered the whole of his past experience
which was temporarily wiped out and became his former self
once again. Such cases were numerous during the last war,
when men in the front through shellshock suffered such mental
aberation. All such cases were treated by the psychologist and
restored to normal life to the joy of the patient.

It is clear that verdict of modern psychology is that the
human personality is distinct from the material body with it is
associated and that it survives even after death.

- SANKARA AND KUNDA KUNDA

Sankara's introduction to his Bashya is a philosophical master-
piece by itself. There he gives his own personal opinion with-
out being constrained to follow the text of the sutras. Hence
he freely expresses his views on life and things. Fifst he main-
tains that the Self and the non-Self are two entirely distinct entities.
He begins his introduction with the following words:

"It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and
the subject' whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou'
(the Non-Ego) and the 'Ego' and which are opposed to each other
as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All
the less can their respective attributes be identified. Hence it
follows that it is wrong to superimpose upon the subject whose
Self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of
the Ego the object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego
and the attributes of the object and vice versa to superimpose
the subject and the attributes of the subject on the object."

From this it is clear that these two distinct entities the Self
and the Non-Self, have no common nature and no common attri-
butes. One is Chetana and the other Achetana . The attributes
of the one cannot be superimposed upon the other. Such a
confusion is a distinct philosophical error and correct knowledge

Cxlviil SAMAYASARA

necessarily demands complete escape from such an error. Other-
wise it is not possible to realise the true nature of the Self which
is the ultimate object of all philosophical and religious discipline.
"In spite of this it is on the part of man a natural procedure which
has its cause in wrong knowledge not to distinguish the two
entities (object and subject) and their respective attributes, although
they are absolutely distinct, but to superimpose upon each the
characteristic nature and the attributes of the other, and thus
coupling the Real and Unreal, to make use of the expressions such
as That I am'. That is mine'."

The second point which he brings out in the introduction
is the distinction between the two points of view, Vyavahara
and Paramarthic, practical point of view and the absolute point
of view. The confusion of attributes referred to above is brought
about by Nescience or Avidya. The discriminating knowledge
of the true nature of the Self is therefore to be obtained by the
opposite Vidya or knowledge. He maintains that the concrete
life in this world is vitiated by Nescience and is real only from the
practical point of view., "The mutual superimposition of the
Self and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the presup-
position on which there base all practical distinction -those made
in ordinary life as well as those laid down by the Veda between
means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and all scriptural
texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and prohi-
-bition (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions) or with final
release." Thus he points out that in ordinary life, every indivi-
dual has to operate only through his body and sense without
which life itself would be impossible in the concrete world.
Even the cognitive process of knowledge depends upon sense
perception and intellectual activity which naturally presupposes
the organic body. Even when the individual is looked upon as
an agent carrying out the injunctions religious and ethical an or-
ganic body must be presupposed for carrying out all those injunc-
tions. His conduct as the social being in the world is therefore
inextricably mixed up with bodily behaviour, without which he
can neither discharge his duties as a social being not as a reli-
gious devotee. In this respect he is of common nature with other

INTRODUCTION

animals, who also behave in an fdentical manner in reacting
to the environment. In the presence of an enemy, the animal
tries to run away and escape and in the presence of a friendly
environment it feels happy. Thus this concrete world of natural
experience which is common to both men and animals though
philosophically supposed to be the result of Nescience, is to be
considered real and important from the practical point of view.
In this concrete world which is real in its own way, the social
distinctions based upon rank and birth hold good. That one is
a Brahmin and another is a Kshatriya, one is a master and another
is a servant, are all distinctions based upon the body and hold
good only in the empirical world.

The third point which he emphasises is that this empirical
world resulting from the non-distinction between the Self and
the Non-Self exists without beginning and without end. This
natural world which is without beginning and without end
is produced by the Nescience or wrong conception which is
the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoy ers
in the empirical world which is eternal and uncreated. The
individual self in the empirical world or Samsara is influenced "
by this wrong knowledge and identifies himself with external
objects.

"Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self,
if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as
long as his wife, children and so on are sound and entire or not.
Attributes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man
thinks of himself (his Self) as a stout, lean, fair as standing walking
or jumping, Attributes of the sens-organs, if he thinks, I am
mute or deaf or one eyed or blind. Attributes of the internal
organs when he considers himself subject to desire, intention,
doubt, determination, and so on."

Lastly he indicates the true nature of the Self which should
be discriminated from the non-Chetana bodily attributes as free
from all wants and raised above all social distinction as Brahmin
and Kshatriya and so on, and entirely transcended the empirical
samsaric existence to whom even vedic injunctions will cease
to be operative, because he is placed in a region from where he

C J SAMAYASARA

does not want to achieve anything more, because he is comple-
tely self-sufficient.

This introduction of Sankara may be taken to be an introduc-
tion to Sri Kunda Kunda's Samayasara also. The philosophi-
cal' work of Samayasara deals with all these points and practically
adopts identically the same attitude. Sri Kunda Kunda begins
his work with the distinction between the two points of view
Vyavaharic and Nischaya. Practical and real. He describes the
empirical world where the individual identifies himself with the
characteristics of the external objects as a result of the absence
of true knowledge. The course of conduct prescribed by prac-
tical ethics is said to have only a secondary value as a proba-
tion for the higher class. Bodily characteristics, instincts,
and emotions and the various psychic states of the individual
Self are all dismissed to be the result of the operation of the
erroneous identification of the Self or Paramatma. Thus without
changing the words, Sankara's intorduction may be considered
to be a fitting introduction to Sri Kunda Kunda's Samayasara.
We shall later on point out the various points of similarity between
the two, Sankara and Sri Kunda Kunda, which would constrain
the reader to accept the suggestion that Sankara was well acquaint-
ed with Kunda Kunda's philosophy either in the original or in
the Sanskrit commentary by Amritachandra.

SANKARA AND HIS POINTS OF VIEW

The distinction between. Vyavaharic and Paramarthic points
of view which Sankara makes throughout his commentary is
said to have been copied from the Buddhistic philosophy. A
writer in the Journal called "Achuta" referring to this says, that
Sankara must have copied this from the Buddhistic metaphysics
because the distinction is not found anywhere else. This writer
evidently is not acquainted with Jaina philosophy. If he were ac-
quainted with the Jaina philosophy, he would not have made such
a sweeping statement that the distinction is not found anywhere
else. In fact the doctrine of Naya or the points of view is peculiar
to Jaina metaphysics, which maintains that knowledge is to be
obtained from pramanas and nayas. Pramana-Nayai Adhigamaha

INTRODUCTION cli

is the fundamental Jaina doctrine of "knowledge. Following
this Jaina tradition Kunda Kunda starts his work Samayasara
by mentioning this distinction between Vyavaharic and Para-
marthic points of view in his study of the nature of the real Self
or Samayasara. He justifies the adoption of the vyavaharic
point of view even in the approach of a student towards the ulti-
mate reality of the Self, as a preparatory method of his adopting
the Nischaya or the Paramarthic point of view. .. According to
him all persons are not capable of understanding the real nature
of the ultimate Self. Therefore the information must be conveyed
according to the capacity of the student; just as it is necessary
to adopt as a means of communication the language with which
the student is acquainted so also it is necessary to adopt a method
of instruction which will be within the reach of the individual
student. When a guru teaches an individual not acquainted
with Sanskrit language through the medium of Sanskrit it
would not be intelligible to the person concerned and the instruc-
tor would defeat his purpose. Hence it is absolutely necessary
to speak to him in the language which is his mother tongue and
which may be some vernacular other than Sanskrit. Similarly
it is necessary to adopt vyavaharic point of view in communicat-
ing metaphysical truths to ordinary people. With this justi-
fication Sri Kunda Kunda examines every problem from these
two points of view, practical and real, the practical point of view
in dealing with problems of an empirical life and the real
point of view in dealing with supreme reality transcending limita-
tions of the empirical life. In this respect as was pointed above,
Sankara closely follows Kunda Kunda's methods, with which
obviously he was familiar when he began his Bashya.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SAMSARA

Both Sankara and Kunda Kunda adopt identically the same
attitude as to the nature of the individual self. Both maintain
that the individual soul is identical with the ultimate reality, the
Supreme Self. Sankara following the traditional language of
Jaina metaphysics calls this ultimate reality Paramataman, or
the Supreme Self. Even' according to Sankara the Brahman

SAMAYASARA

and Paramatma are synonymous and interchangeable. Both
the thinkers maintain that the individual self in the concrete
world is ultimately identical with this absolute reality or
Paramatma. The nature of the individual self in concrete ex-
perience is the result of limitations imposed upon the ultimate
reality, Paramatma. The limiting conditions are very often
spoken of as Upadhi, which is responsible for clouding
the true nature of the ultimate reality. Kunda Kunda compares
the ultimate reality with the shining sun in all his brilliance
and the individual self is compared to the sun hidden by a dense
layer of clouds which hides the sunshine. According to the varia-
tion in the density of the cloud, the rays of the sun will permeate
through the clouds and make the sun visible in varying intensity.
These variations in the appearance of the sun correspond to the
various stages of spiritual developments of the individual soul.
When the clouds completely get dispersed the sun begins to
shine in all his glory without any intervening interruption. Ex-
actly in a similar manner, Karmic upadhis of different density
obstruct the self-shining Supreme Atman where the Self will
shine in his pristine purity and glory when all the karmic upadhis
are destroyed and got rid of. The doctrine of identifying Jivatma
and Paramatma is common to both Sankara and Kunda Kunda.
In this connection it is worth pointing out that both Kunda Kunda
and Sankara in their commentaries used the word "Advaita"
the indication of the oneness of Jivatma and Paramatma, a term
which becomes the central doctrine of Sankra's philosophy. It
only means that the doctrine is common to both the Upani-
shadic thought and the Jaina thought. This individual self which
is merely the Paramatma limited by Upaclic conditions is
subject to transmigration, the cycle of births and deaths. This
career of births and deaths which is the peculiar property of the
individual self is a result of the ultimate self forgetting its own
nature and identify in itself with the external objects of the non-
Self^ This confusion between the nature of the Self and the non-
Self is pointed out as the ultimate cause of transmigratory existence
of the individual soul both in the Jaina [system as well as in the
Vedantic systems. The initial error or Adhyasa or Mithya is

INTRODUCTION dill

recognised to be the cause of Samsaric existence by both the
. thinkers. Both maintain that this samsaric .existence is without
beginning-Anadi. Moksha or Liberation consists in getting
rid of this transmigratory existence through the discriminating
knowledge of the self as distinct from the external objects.
The individual self in this transmigatory existence or Samsara
is determined by its own karmic activity at every stage. If
his conduct is y good he is destined to have happiness as the fruit
of karma, if otherwise misery. The variation in the individual
hedonic experience is thus attributed to the individual's own action
good or bad. Even here both the thinkers are at one. Sankara
in spite of his enthusiastic advocacy of unqualified monism con-
cedes this point that the individual souls are determined by their
respective karmas, good or bad, and that the ultimate Brahman
is not responsible for such individual conduct.

Answering to the objection that the creative Brahman must
be responsible for the inequalities among the individual souls,
Sankara writes:

"The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality
of . dispensation and cruelty 'because he' is bound by regards/
If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards,
produced this unequal creatioa, he would expose himself to blame;
but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards,
i.e., he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstances
of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit
of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord
is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked as analogous
to that of Parjanya, the Giver of tain. For as Parjanya is. the
common cause of the production of rice, barley and other plants,
while the difference between the various species is due to the vari-
ous potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord
is *the common cause of the creation of gods, men, etc., while
the difference between these classes of being are due to the differ-
ent merit belonging to the individual souls." In this passage
Sankara appears to drop out the Advaitic doctrine that the Brah-
man is the material cause or the Upadana Karana of the indivi-
dual souls. The individual souls are assumed to subsist with all

SAMAYASARA

their individual merits and demerits irrespective of the occurrence
of Pralaya and fresh creation. By bringing in the analogy of
Parjanya, he converts the first cause of Brahman to Nimitta Karta
like the potter making a pot out of clay. This attitude is in conflict
with the general advaitic attitude. In order to save the Brahman
from the responsibility of being the author of inequality existing
in the world, he has to assume the independent reality of the in-
dividual souls. So far Sankara entirely agrees with the Jaina
attitude represented by Kunda 'Kunda.

While maintaining that the confusion of the Self with the
Non-Self constitutes the initial mithya or the error, both the
thinkers part company in further elaborations of their systems.
It is certainly an error to identify the Self with the sense charac-
teristics which are peculiar to the physical body because the sense
qualities of colour, taste and smell have nothing to do with
the nature of the Self. Birth, old age, decay and death are all
characteristics alien to the conscious Self. Social and economic
distinction in the individual also pertain to the body and cannot
be transferred to the Self. In short the Self is a Chetana entity
and the non-Self is an Achetana entity, which is the object of sense
perception. Both Sankara and Kunda Kuncla therefore maintain,
one following the tradition of Vedantism and the other following
the tradition of Jainism, that it is mithya to speak of the body
as Self. Kunda Kunda stops with this statement and Sankara
goes beyond this. For the latter it is not only an error to
confuse Self with the body, the body itself becomes mithya or
illusion. Therefore Kunda Kunda has to call, Halt! It is only
the false identification that is error. The non-Self is not mithya
or illusion. This is the fundamental difference between the two
systems of metaphysics, Sankara's Advaitism and Sri Kunda
Kunda's Jaina metaphysics. Sankara seems to forget his own
statement in the introduction of the fundamental distinction
between the Self and the Non-Self when he comes to propound
his theory of unqualified monism, by denying the reality of exter-
nal world itself.

INTRODUCTION civ

NATURE AND THE EXTE'RNAL WORLD.

The reality of the external world is admitted by the Jaina
metaphysics as in the case of Sankhya philosophy. The Upa-
nishadic thought also maintains the reality of the external world
in spite of its pantheistic monism. The other commentators
of Vedanta Sutras, besides Sankara also maintain the reality of
the external world. Sankara himself while contradicting the
Buddhistic school of Vignana Vada accepts the doctrine of
the reality of the external world in refuting the Buddhistic
school. The Vignana Vada school of the Buddhistic philo-
sophy which maintains that the external reality is merely
a manifestation of consciousness is condemned by Sankara
by pointing out the difference between the purely imaginary
world of dream and the concrete world of sense perception.
There he maintains that the difference in the psychic ideas are intel-
ligible only on the supposition that the psychic images are direct
effects of a permanent object in reality. This faith in the reality
of the external world which he employs in refuting the Buddhis-
tic metaphysics, he drops out completely when he tries to
propound his own theory of Maya according to which the whole
of the external reality is converted into a dream world of unreality.
This particular doctrine of Sankara is incompatible with the
Jaina metaphysics.

The origin of the concrete world The popular view as
to the origin of the Concrete World that it is due to
the creative activity of an Ishwara is rejected by Jaina philo-
sophy. It is also rejected by Sankhya, Yoga and Mimamasa
systems of thought. Sankara also rejects this theory when he
criticises the Vaiseshika system and the Pasuptha system.
The concrete world from the creator ot an Ishwara as a result of
his creative Will is thus completely discarded by Sankara also. He
maintains that it is a result of the manifestation of the ultimate
reality, Brahman. In order to establish this doctrine that the
world is the result of the manifestation of the Brahman he ela-
borately discusses the Sankhya view of deriving cosmos from
Prakriti, the Achetana root cause of the concrete .world accord-
ing to the Sankhya school. Sankhyas and the Jainas staunchly

SAMAYASARA

maintain the difference between the Chetana Self and the Ache-
tana Non-self. Prakrit! of the Sankhyas exactly corresponds
to Pudgala or matter - of the Jains. Since this is contradictory
to the nature and attributes of the Self both the systems maintain
that it is impossible to obtain one from the other. Therefore
they regard both the Chetana and Achetana entities as not only
distinct and independent of each other, but both are utlimate re-
alities Existing permanently uncreated and indestructible. But
.Sankara in order to defend the Vedantic doctrine of the Brahman
has somehow to derive the Achetana entity also from the same
first cause, Brahman. Kunda Kunda clearly points out that
this is impossible. If the doctrine of the identity of the cause
and effect is accepted Sankara also does accept this doctrine
these two contradictory effects, the Achetana Non-Self and the
Chetana Self, cannot be produced by the same cause, the Brahman,
which is taken to be a Chetana entity according to the Upanishadic
thought. How can the Chetana Brahman produce Achetana
effect-matter, is the objection raised by the Sankhyas as well
as the Jainas. Sankara himself concedes to the fundamental differ-
ence between the two in his introduction when he speaks about
the Adhyasa which is the root cause of Samsara and yet since
he has to defend the Vedantic pantheism he seems to forget his
own doctrine and uses his- ingenuity to prove that it is possible
to derive Achetana non-Self from the Chetana Brahman, How
far he succeeds in his attempt is certainly an open question
to be decided by the readers of his commentary.

THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSATION

Kunda Kunda following the tradition of Jaina metaphysics
speaks of two different causes, Upaclana karana and Nimita karana,
material cause and instrumental cause. For example, clay is
the material out of which the jar is made. In this case the ma-
terial out of which the thing is made is the Upadana Karana. For
transforming the clay into the Jar you require the operating agent,
the potter, the potters, wheel on which the clay is moulded,
and the stick with which he turns the wheel and so on. All
these come under the Nimita karana or the instrumental cause.

INTRODUCTION clvii

Q

This distinction is considered very important in Jaina metaphy-
sics. The Upadana karana or the material cause must be identical
with its effect. There can be no difference in nature and attri-
butes between the material cause and its effect. From clay we
can only obtain a mud-pot. Out of gold you can only obtain
a golden ornament. Out of gold you cannot obtain a mud-pot
nor out* of clay can you obtain a golden ornament. The rela-
tion between. the material cause and its effect is exactly corres-
ponding to the modern conception of Causation, that wherever
the cause is present the effect would be present and wherever
the effect would be present the cause must have been present.
Again negatively, if the cause is absent the effect must also be
absent and conversely if the- effect is absent the cause must also
be absent. Following this doctrine of identity between the cause
and effect, Kunda Kunda maintains consistent with the Jaina
metaphysics, that the Chetana cause can only produce Chetana
effects, and that non-Chetana cause can only produce non-
Che tana effects. Accordingly he has to reject the Vedantic
doctrine of deriving both Chetana and non-Chetana effect from
the real cause of Brahman which cannot contain in himself, the
contradictory causal potencies to produce two contradictory
effects. Strangely the Vedantic doctrine which maintains the-
Brahman to be the ultimate cause of all reality also maintains the
non-difference in cause and effect.

Commenting on these sutras, Sankara writes, "For the follow-
ing reason also the effect is non-different from the cause, because
only when the cause exists the effect is observed to exist and not
when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay exists,
the jar is observed to exist. That it is not a general rule when
one thing exists, another also is observed to exist, appears for
instance, from the fact that a horse which is other or different
from a cow is not observed to exist only when a cow exists. Nor
is the jar observed to exist only when the potter exists. For
in that case the non-difference does not exist although the rela-
tion between the two is that of an operating cause and its effect."

Again he writes "Ordinary experience teaches us that those
who wish to produce certain effect such as curds, or earthern

SAMAYASARA

jars, or golden ornaments employ such as milk, clay and gold.
Those who wish to produce sour-milk do not employ clay, nor
do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But
according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-
existent (before its actual production) all this should be possible.
For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-
existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be pro-
duced from milk only and not from clay also and jar from clay
only and not from milk as well.

Again he writes, "As the ideas of cause and effect on the
one hand and of the qualities on the other are not separate ones,
as for instance the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that
the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance
and its qualities has to be admitted.

tfrom these quotations it is quite clear that Sankara's con-
ception of cause and effect is the same as Kunda Kunda's. The
former following the traditions of Vedantism and the latter the
tradition of Jaina metaphysics. Both maintain that the cause
and effect are identical and that particular cause can produce an
effect entirely identical in nature with the cause. They both main-
tain that the cause and effect are identical in nature. Hence they
both reject the view that the effect is non-existent in the cause and
occurs as a new thing just after the cause. And therefore they both
maintain that the effect is present in the cause though only in
the latent form. Clay is shaped into a jar and gold is transform-
ed into an ornament. The jar as such is not present in clay
already, nor is the ornament as such present in gold. Therefore
the effect is the result of causal manifestation. Thus according
to Jaina Metaphysics, the effect is identical with the cause and yet
the effect is slightly different from the cause. From the point of
view of the underlying substance the effect and cause are identical.
From the point of view of manifested form and change, the effect
is different from the cause. Thus cause and effect" may be said
to be identical in one sense and different from another point of
view. In the last quoted paragraph Sankara applies the same
doctrine of identity and difference also to the relation between
substance and its qualities. The substance and its qualities are

INTRODUCTION

inherently identical though they are different in another aspect.
This attitude of Sankara is identical with the Jaina attitude
as to the relation between Dravya and Guna, substance and
attributes. Both Sankara's Vedantism and Kunda Kunda's
metaphysics are at one in rejecting the Vaiseshika doctrine that
substance and qualities are two different distinct categories brought
together by a third category Samavaya which c'onjoins the two.
Rejecting this Vaiseshika view of the difference between subs-
tance and qualities it is maintained by both Sankara and Kunda
Kunda that they are identical in nature.

ONE AND THE, MANY

To speak of a thing as one or many is entirely dependent
upon the point of view you adopt. The same material clay may
be transformed into various clay vessels and the same material
substance gold may be transformed into various kinds of orna-
ments. If you emphasise the underlying substance the mud-pots
and jars will be identical in the same nature. They all belong to
one class and similarly ornaments may be said to be golden since
they belong to one class. But if you emphasise the ornaments
or the pots, they are many in number. Or take the case of a tree.
It may be spoken of as one or many. It is one when taken in its
complex as a whole and it will be many when you emphasise the
of number branches in it.

"We point out that one and the same thing may be the sub-
ject of several names and ideas if it is considered in its relations
to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one only
form the object of many different names and notions according
as he is considered in himself or, in his relations to other; thus
he is thought and spoken of as man, Brahmin, learned in the
Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son, grandson,
brother son-in-law etc., etc."

This last passage from Sankara completely coincides with the
Jaina point of view that any assertion about a thing would take
different forms according to the relations of the thing to other
things. A person is said to be father when he is taken in relation
to his son, as the son when the same is taken in relation

c { x SAMAYASARA

to his father. Therefore the question how can the same man
be father and son would entirely be meaningless and it will only
exhibit the ignorance of the logical theory of predication. The
same principle is extended by the Jaina metaphysics to other
relations, such as space, time, substance and modes. This obvi-
ous truth forms the basis of the Jaina logical doctrine of pre-
dication Astinasti Vada. That you can have two assertions about
a thing positive and negative according to the relation of the thing
to other tilings. Strangely this principle thus accepted by San-
kara is forgotten by him when he goes to criticise the Sutra re-
lating to Jainisrn, that two contradictory things cannot exist in the
same. This inconsistency is probably due to the fact that he was
only a commentator of an already existing work.

' Sankara commenting on the first sutra 'Adhatho Brahma
JignasaV Let us then enquire into the nature of the Brahman
or the Self. "Where is the reason why such an enquiry should be
taken up? says, Since there are various erroneous things as to the
nature of the self held by different schools of thought it is neces-
sary to clear up the errors and to establish the correct notion
of the self." He enumerates various schools lie considers .
to be erroneous as Bouddha, Sankhya, Yoga, Vniscshika and
Pasupatha etc., etc. It is strange that he does not mention the
Jaina account of Self as one of the erroneous views. Probably
the reason why he omits this is his own siddhanta is identical with

;the Jaina concept of self that the Jivatma and Parainatma are
identical. This exactly is Sankara's considered view. Hence
he cannot condemn this as one of the erroneous views for this
forms the foundation of Advaita, which forms the central, doctrine

of his commentary.

Sankara and Amritachandra : We mentioned above that
Sankara was acquainted with Sri Kuncla Kunda and Amrita-
chandra. We refer to this fact in connection with Sankara's
distinction between the Vyavaharic and Paramarthlk point
of view. We have here to mention the fact the doctrine of
Adhyasa is also peculiar to Sankara. Aclyasa is the tech-
nical term he used to denote the confusion between self
and non-self, a confusion due to Avidya or Ajnana. This term

INTRODUCTION

clxi

Adhyasa is not found in any of the philosophical writings prior
to "Sankara. Probably Sankara took a hint from Amritachandfa
who freely uses this concept in his commentary called Atmakhyati
on Sri Kunda Kunda's Samayasara. Probably Amritachandra and
Shankara must have lived in the same century, Amritachandra
being slightly older than Sankara. The language of Atmakhyati
is very similar to Sankara's Sareeraka Bashya. This suggestion
is made because Sankara himself speaks on one occasion that he
is influenced by one Dravida Acharya. Probably this refers
to Amritchandra the great Commentator on Samayasara.
The following quotations from Aitmakhyati will clearly bear out
our suggestion that Sankara and Amritachandra were of the same
age and that the former was acquainted with the writings of
.Amritachandra especially in his commentary Atmakhyati.

?' Ajnana or ignorance causes Adhyasa or confusion of the
intellect. On account of this, thirsty animals ran towards
mirage to quench their thirst thinking it is a lake full of

water.

Again the same Adhyasa or confusion caused by ignorance
frighten men is dusk at the sight of a rope and make them run
away from it thinking it is a snake.

Similarly on account of this confusion caused by ignorance
men falsely identify their pure and unruffled nature of the Soul
with the body and imagine that they are the author of the
various psychophysical activities caused by impure karmas, }ust
as the numerous waves in the ocean are caused by atmospheric
pressure while the ocean itself remains calm and unruffled. But
Jnana or knowledge produces discrimination between the self
and the non-self just like^the hamsa bird is able to separate
water from milk. Unruffled self firm in its pure nature is able to
understand that it is not the author of the various impure
psycho-physical changes caused by an alien agency."

ATMAKHYATI

SAMAYSARA

Prakrit Gathas

CHAPTER I.

1 1

Vandittu sawasiddhe dhuvamachalamanovamam gadim patte
Vochchhami samayapahudaminamo suyakevall bhaniyam. ( i )

1 1 ? 11

i. Bowing to all the Siddhas who have attained a state of exis-
tence, permanent, immutable, and incomparable, I will speak of
this Samaya Pahuda which has been uttered by the all-knowing
Masters of Scripture. Oh, Bhavyas, listen to this.

COMMENTARY

The author begins the work with the worship of the Siddhas.
The term Siddha implies the Supreme Self which has realised its
true nature. He uses the word Sawa Siddha all the Siddhas, pro-
bably to distinguish the Jaina conception of Moksha from the
non-Jaina conception. Jainism recognises plurality of selves not
merely in the world of Samsara but also in the liberated state or
Siddhahood which is a sort of divine republic of Perfect Souls,
where each Self retains its individual personality and does not
empty its contents into the tauldron of the Absolute as is main-
tained by some other systems of philosophy. It is but proper
that the work should begin with the worship of the Siddhas, since
the author is going to discuss the true nature of the Self in this
treatise. In the first line of the Gatha, he mentions the various
attributes of the Siddha, the Perfect SeE The attribute dhrwam
implies an unchanging permanency because, the Self, after

1 Other Reading

SAMAYSARA

achieving its true nature on the des traction of all karmic
shackles, is not subject to any further manifestation and hence
is characterised by unchanging permanency. The term achalam
implies the complete cessation of transmigratory existence.
The Self in the world of Samsara, determined by its own
karmic conditions, roams about in the empirical world, being
born in any one of the four gatis, or major organic classes
as determined by one's own karma. When karmas are completely
destroyed, when the Self achieves his true nature and becomes
a Siddha* this roaming about in the transmigratory world comes
to a full stop. This is what is implied by the attribute achala.
If the other reading, amala, is accepted then the attribute would
refer to complete absence of karmic impurity which is the sine'
qua non for achieving Siddhahood. The next attribute is anupama,
having no parallel or comparison. This characteristic naturally
follows as a corollary because the excellence of the Siddha-
hood far transcends the excellent things of the concrete world.
Hence Siddhahood cannot be indicated by comparison with
any concrete object of the empirical world, however great and
good it may be. After offering his obeisance to Siddha of
such characteristics, the author addresses the faithful ones, for
whose sake he composes the work called Samayapahucla.

The first part of the word Samaya means the Self, the knower,
the latter part of the word Pahuda is interpreted to mean the
essence or Sara. Further, he declares that the treatise which
he is going to compose is in conformity with what is taught
by the Sruta Kevalis, the omniscient masters of the scriptures.
The author mentions this fact not merely to defend his own
work as is consistent with the revealed Word of the Lord, but
also to, imply that what is not so based upon such divine reve-
lation is neither worthy of speaking about nor worthy of listening
to.

In the next gatha, the author takes up for discussion the
two kinds of Self, the Pure One which is termed as Sya-sanaya,
and the Impure One which is designated as Para-saaaja. The
latter refers to the empirical ego and the former to the pure
ego which transcends the empirical conditions.

CHAPTER I

cf ^FPT q^r^nf IRU

Jivo charittadamsanananatthido tarn hi sasamayam jane
Poggala kammuvadesatthiyam cha tarn jana parasamayam ( 2 )

2. Know ye that the Jiva which (in its intrinsic purity)
rests on Right Conduct, Faith and Knowledge is the real Self.
But that which is conditioned by karmic materials is other than
the real.

This gatha states the fundamental problem of philosophy
which is discussed by all the systems of thought, both in the
East and in the West The term Svasamaya, the Ego-in-itself
is the pure and ultimate reality which is considered to be the
ideal aimed at by all the Indian Darsanas and also by some of
the western schools of thought. This Ego-in-itself is charac-
terised by the three qualities of Darsana, Jnana, and Charitra
Belief, Knowledge and Conduct. These three attributes are
also associated with the ordinary human personality in the em-
pirical world. In the latter case the terms have quite intelligible
significance in as much as the activity of the ordinary human
personality manifests through his own body. The threefold
characteristics of Darsana- Jnana-Charitra are to be understood
in relation to the body. But in the case of the Ego-in-itself,
which is entirely free from up&dic conditions, the ordinary signi-
ficance associated with the terms will not hold good. Here
we have only to consider the nature of the Pure Self and hence
these terms must be interpreted consistent with the state of the
Self which is free and pure from upddic conditions. Charitra
cannot therefore mean the same thing as conduct associated with
an ordinary man. It must imply the pure and intrinsic activity
of the spiritual entity which goes by the name of Paramatma or
the Ego-in-itsdf. Similarly the other two characteristics must
imply the intrinsic vision and knowledge which are associated
with the Pure Self which has destroyed all the upddic conditions
constituted by karmic matter. After stating the characteristics of

SAMAYSARA

Sva-samaya the author indicates the nature of the empirical ego
by stating that it is in association with the very upddic conditions
of karmic matter which are absent in the case of the Pure Self.
The Self in association with the upddic conditions is not an entirely
different entity from the Pure Self which is designated as Sva-
samaya. If the two are identical in nature, the question naturally
arises, how does the Ego-in-itself which is pure in nature and
which is free from extraneous contamination of karmic material,
become degraded to an empirical ego entirely enmeshed in karmic
upddis. Here is a distinct deterioration in the nature of the
Self which may be termed as the Fall of Man. This Fall of Man,
as is already stated, is the central theme of religious philosophy
all over the world. The self in its pure nature is recognised to
be entirely free from karmic shackles and yet in the concrete
world he is found always in chains. He is by nature free and
yet he is everywhere found in chains. What is the explanation
of this great spiritual degradation? The Semetic religions, Judiasm
and Christianity, conveniently answer the question of the Fall
of Man by the hypothesis of the original sin. But the Indian
systems of thought do not adopt such a cheap and convenient
hypothesis. The explanation offered by the Jaina system of
metaphysics, places the association of the Self with extraneous
matter in the beginningless past. The empirical Self in Samsara
is assumed to be in association with up&dic conditions and it is
said to struggle to extricate itself from the shackles of karmic
conditions in its attempt to realise the ideal and goal the Liberat-
ed Self. The problem therefore for the Jaina metaphysician
is not the problem of the Fall of Man and the Lost Paradise. On
the other hand, it is the reverse of this. It is a grand pilgrim-
age to the spiritual goal, a noble excelsior towards the hilltop of
the Region of Peace and Purity towards which the whole creation
moves. This conception in some form or other is accepted by
the other Indian systems also. Sankara in the very beginning
of his Bhashya enumerates the various hypotheses as to the nature
of the Self which he rejects as incorrect and finally states his own
position which is the identification of Brahman or Atman, the
Ultimate Reality, with the empirical ego in- the concrete world.

CHAPTER. I

In describing the nature of the latter, empirical ego in Samsara,
he also speaks of Samsara being anddi without a beginning and
that the career of the empirical Self is also anddi without
a beginning. Why is the Self found in association with upddis
in its empirical form? Sankara distinctly mentions that the Self
builds a tabernacle of upddis by its own karmas. The building
up of the karmic upadis takes the form of its corporeal existence
where the Self, through its own body as its vehicle, is able to
enjoy the fruits of its own karma, good or bad, in the form of
happiness and misery.

This association of the Self with the extraneous material
upddis is thus explained to be the result of avidya or ignorance
which is present in the empirical self from time immemorial. The
attempt to get itself liberated from the bondage of upddis or karmic
shackles must begin with getting rid of the avidya. When once
this *avidya is got rid of, the karmas, good or bad, are got rid of
and the individual soul realises its own pure nature in the form of
Paramatma or Brahman, as it is generally designated by the Vedantic
writers. This career of the individual Self sketched by Sankara
is exactly parallel to the sketch given by Jaina metaphysics and
the theory is quite unaffected by the other Vedanta theory, that
the Brahman is the ultimate cause of things and persons. The
similarity is much more marked when we turn to the Mimamsa
conception of the Self. This is not encumbered with the Vedan-
tic hypothesis of Brahman as the original cause. It freely assumes
the Self to be eternal and uncreated. It postulates a plurality of
Selves each having its own individual career. This individual
Self is present in the beginningless Samsara in association with
karmic upddis which are material in nature. This association with
material upadis is determined by the Self's own conduct according
to Dharma or Adharma. Hence, liberation from the upadis, must
be obtained through discarding both Dharma and Adharma. Thus
the association of the Self with karmic upddis, its liberation from
the same, are both explained without bringing in the aid of any
extraneous causal agency. In fact both the Mimasakas and the
Vedantins stoutly repudiate the hypothesis of a creator or an
Iswara put forward by the Nyaya Vaiseshika systems in order to

6 SAMAYSARA

explain the association of the Self with material karmic upddu
resulting in the corporeal existence of the empirical self.

Our author therefore starts with the central theme of the
association of Self with karmic material., and his work is an ela-
borate explanation of the problems of why the individual Self is
found in karmic chains and how it can break the shackles and
assume its own true nature, pure and free. This is the aim of
Samayasara.

Eyattanichchhayagado samavo savvattha sundaro loge
Bandhakahaeyatte tena visamvadini hoyi

\

3. The Self which has realised its oneness (uncontamiriated
by alien conditions) is the beautiful ideal in the whole Universe.
To associate bondage with this unity is therefore self-contra-
dictory.

COMMENTARY

The author further emphasises the greatness and sublimity
of the Ego-in-itself or sva-samqya. This is said to be the sub-
lime and the beautiful in the whole world. The whole of the
organic world from the one-sensed organism right up to man
is viewed from this angle of vision. It is this sublime and beauti-
ful Ego-in-itself that constitutes the inner reality of every
organism. That being the ultimate goal, recognition of this
Ego-in-itself as the object to be aimed at is therefore the
most desirable thing. This ultimate ideal is so far removed
from the concrete world of the empirical reality that it would be
erroneous to associate upddic shackles with the sublime and beauti-
ful entity of the Ultimate Self. It is difficult to understand what
the author has exactly in his mind, when he says that it is errone-
ous to predicate bondage of this reality. Neither of the commen-
tators is of any help to us. When He says that it is erroneous to
associate bondage with Paramdtma the author must be thinking

CHAPTER I

about some rival theory which in his opinion makes that mistake.
To predicate a further 'career for the Paramatma leading to a fur-
ther manifestation would certainly be considered by our author as
an erroneous hypothesis. Probably he is thinking of the Upanisha-
dic system which not only presupposes that Atman or Brahman
is the original cause of the world but also postulates the perio-
dic evolution and involution in the life career of the ultimate
Brahman which our author evidently thinks reduces the Brahman
to a Samsaric entity and therefore amounts to predicating bondage
to the Paramatma Swarupa. It would probably be more plau-
sible to suggest that he was thinking of the popular deities of
the Puranic Hinduism. But such a suggestion would be an
anachronism, because Puranic Hinduism and Puranic deities
were not fully developed about the ist century B. C., which is
the date of our author. Internal evidence clearly shows that
he 'was fully acquainted with Upanishadic literature; hence our
suggestion that the author was having in his mind the Brah-
man's periodic career of manifestation and dissolution, an idea
prominently present in the Upanishadic thought. This Upani-
shadic Brahman, which is also designated as Paramatma, is the
same as our author's Sva-Samaya-the Ego-in-itself; but the Ve-
dantic Brahman or Paramitma is credited with periodic mani-
festation and dissolution, a characteristic entirely foreign to our
author's concept of Sva-Samaya. This is only offered as a suggestion
of a probable implication of the author's intention and we cannot
assert anything dogmatically about that.

Next, the author goes to show that of these two Egos, the
empirical 'Ego and the metempirical Ego, the former is easily
apprehended whereas the latter is very difficult to realise.

Sudaparichidanubhuda sawassa vi kamabhogabandhakaha
Eyattassuvalambho navari na^sulabho vibhattassa (4)

4. The proposition that all livfng beings, are characterised

SAMAYSARA

by desire for worldly things, enjoyment of the same and conse-
quential bondage has .been heard, observed and personally ex-
perienced by all. But the realisation of the unity of the Higher
Self which is free from all such empirical conditions, by our own
personal experience, is not easy of achievement.

COMMENTARY

Here the author frankly states in the beginning that it is ex-
tremely difficult to apprehend the nature of the metempirical
Self or the Ego-in-itself. He contrasts it with our knowledge
of the empirical Ego. The nature of the empirical Self can be
easily apprehended from the concrete world of living beings.
The behaviour of a living organism is a clear indication of its
nature. The instinct of self-preservation in an organism is
the main motive force of its behaviour. Every animal has to
seek its food from the environment to appease its hunger, to search
for water to quench its thirst, and to roam about in search of a
mate to satisfy its sex desire. This tendency to seek objects
from the environment, to acquire them and to enjoy them is a
common characteristic of the behaviour of all living beings from
the lowest to the highest. This knowledge we obtain from our
observation of other animals and by the study of books on natural
history describing the behaviour of animals in general The
information so gathered by observation and study is further
corroborated by our own personal experience since our own
behaviour as an organic being is no exception to the general law
of animal behaviour. The information thus obtained from different
sources gives us a fairly accurate knowledge of the nature of the
empirical Ego. But when we begin to talk about the metempi-
rical Ego we feel extremely helpless. Nqpe of the above sources
of information is available to us. The reality which we try to
apprehend has nothing in common with our empirical reality.
That is why the Upanishadic thinker frankly states that it can
be described only by negative attributes. We can only speak of
it as Neti Neti, not this, not this. That is exactly why Gautama
Buddha kept silent whenever he was asked by his disciples to give
some information about the Self or Atma. Again, that is exactly

CHAPTER I 9

the reason why the founder of Christianity always emphasised
that the Path leading to the Kingdom of God is extremely narrow
and steep. It is this very same truth that is communicated to
us by our author in this gdthd. Instead of taking refuge in a
cheap agnosticism that the Ultimate Reality is unknowable, he
merely states that it is extremely difficult to apprehend. Then he
promises that one who has the courage and conviction to plod
along the steep and narrow path can, however, reach the Summit,
the spiritual hilltop, and thus have a complete view of the sublime
reality, a privilege not available to the ordinary mortals roaming
about in the valley below,
cf

w w \\\\\

Tarn eyattavibhattam dayeham appano savihavena

Jadi dayejja pamanam chukkijja chhalam na ghettavvam ( 5 )

5. That Higher Unity differentiated from alien conditions,
I will try to reveal as far as I can. Accept it if it satisfies the
conditions of Truth or Pramanas. But if I fail in my description,
you may reject it.

COMMENTARY

It is a general belief among Indian thinkers that the metem-
pirical Self or the Ego-in-itself is to be approached only through
undergoing a special kind of spiritual discipline called yoga or
tapas. This discipline opens up a new door-way to approach
the Ultimate Reality which cannot be apprehended through ord-
inary sense perception. Such a super-sensuous faculty of appre-
hending the Inner Self is the privilege of those few who by the
practice of yoga successfully obtain it. Such a supersensuous
experience of metempirical Reality must have been obtained by
our author through the practice of the spiritual discipline or
yoga which is the necessary condition for such an acquisition.
Otherwise he would not make bold to promise that he would
reveal the nature of that Ultimate Reality the Metempirical Self.

I0 SAMAYSARA

But when he begins to translate this spiritual intention in terms
of ordinary vocabulary for the benefit of his readers, he is not
sure about the adequacy of language to express the complete
implication of his inner vision. Therefore he cautions the reader
to test the message offered to him according to the canons of
pramana or correct knowledge before accepting it. If it does
not stand the test, then it need not be accepted. That
would only prove the inadequacy of language to express accu-
rately the knowledge obtained by supersensuous experience.
The term pramana is to be interpreted in this context not in
the ordinary sense of sense-perception, inference, etc. As a
matter of fact, the Jaina thinkers, when they speak of pratyaksha,
do not mean sense-perception, which is the meaning given
to the term by the other Indian systems. Sense-perception or
pratyaksha according to the ordinary meaning is called paroksha
by the Jaina thinker because such knowledge is obtained through
an intermediate instrument of sense-organ and not directly by
the Self, It is the latter that is called prafyaksha y what is directly
present before the Self without the mediation of any external
instrumentality. It is such a pramdna, the supersensuous per-
ception of the Self, that ,the author must be thinking of when he
enjoins the reader to test his message before accepting it.

One other point we have to notice is this. Though he says
that he is going to follow the footsteps of the Masters of the scrip-
ture who went before him, and who themselves had the informa-
tion directly from the Omniscient Lord, the Sarvajna, still he
does not want to impose this on the reader on the authority of
the Revealed Word of the Lord. His frank advice to the reader
to submit this message to the touch-stone of pramana clearly
implies two things. He does not want to adopt the method
adopted by those thinkers whose systems of thought are based
upon the authority of the Vedas. These philosophers, whenever
they are confronted with intellectual difficulties incompatible
with the Vedic traditions, reject these; even though they are
ordinarily in conformity with the usual pramdnas. To them,
the pramana of the Veda is the most important and, before
that, the other pramdnas become inadequate and hence lose their

CHAPTER I II

value of authority. The attitude adopted by our author is en-
tirely different from the Vedic tradition. The other point to be
noticed here is the implication that such an inconvenient situation
will not arise here, that is the conflict between what is revealed
by the Divine Word and the value of the pram 'anas. The bold
suggestion that his information should be tested before acceptance
expresses his complete confidence that what is revealed by the
Sarvajna and what is also experienced by his own supersensuous
method will stand the severest test when critically examined
by the canons of Truth. He is sure that his message will certainly
pass through the ordeal of critical examination and he will not
need to take refuge in some kind of authority, superhuman and
unchallengeable. .Thus in short the author expresses the nature
of Truth as he understands it, and how it is different from Truth
resting upon the authority of the Vedas which is alleged to
be superhuman and therefore above criticism.

Next the author describes the nature of the Pure Self which
is free from the impure psychic states such as desire, etc.
srtfi? BTFqiTrft W Wrff

Navi hodi appamatto na pamatto janago du jo bhavo

Evam bhananti suddha nada jo so du so cheva ( 6 )

srrar q": ^ ^

6. That real being who is of the nature of the Knower, is
neither identical with Apramatta or Pramatta beings. His nature
as the Knower is unique and self-identical. Thus declare the
thinkers who adopt the pure (absolute) point of view.

COMMENTARY

The terms apramatfa and pramatta, (vigilant of. duties and
non-vigilent of duties) are used as representative terms to denote
the various shapes of spiritual development which are implied
by the technical term, gunasthdnas, which are gradations based
upon ethico-spiritual development. Human beings are classified
according to the principle of such a development and arranged

12 SAMAYSARA

according to various classes of ascending gradation beginning
with mthyadrishti upto ayogfkevali, from the one in whom right
faith is absent upto one who has attained spiritual perfection
through liberation from karmic upadhis. Apramatta, which
is the seventh stage in the gradation, stands for the eight upper
stages, whereas pramatta^ which is the sixth in the gradation,
represents the six lower stages. Thus the author emphasises
the fact that the characteristics brought about by the association
of the Self with upddhic conditions, the gunasthdna being
based upon such qualities must be understood to be entirely
alien to the nature of the Pure Self.

The author, who proposes to investigate the nature of the
True Self, thus starts with the thesis that his nature is distinct
from modes and characteristics resulting from its combination
with the upadhic material condition whose nature is entirely
distinct from that of the Ego-in-itself. The intellectual atmos-
phere about the time of our author was pregnant with certain
fundamental truths accepted by the .various systems of thought
then prevalent. There were thinkers paying allegiance to the
Upanishadic movement, there were the Bauddhas and the San-
khyas, besides the Jainas. There were also the materialistic
free thinkers about that time. All these different systems accept-
ed certain principles in common. All started with the concrete
world of experience as the point of departure for their investi-
gations. In this concrete world they recognised the proud distinc-
tion between the organic and the inorganic, the living and the
non-living, >W and ajiva. They also noticed the fundamental
difference between the behaviour of the living thing and that
of the non-living thing. The behaviour of a living organism
however rudimentary in development always indicates a purpo-
sive activity capable of spontaneous manifestation, whereas such
a purposive spontaneous activity is entirely absent in the inorganic
world. The physical object inert and incapable of spontaneous
movement will only move when hit by a moving object the
speed and direction of motion being determined by the original
impact. Besides the purposive behaviour of the living orga-
nism they possess also certain other characteristics whtch

CHAPTER I 13

ate altogether absent in the inorganic world. The charac-
teristics are birth and growth, decay and death. Every living
being must be born from living parentage, must have
development upto a certain stage and then decay and end in
death. These characteristics were carefully noticed by the
Indian thinkers who postulated a life principle which was
supposed to, be present in all organic bodies capable of pur-
posive activity. The behaviour of organic bodies as con-
trasted with other non-living physical bodies was thus explained
by the presence of this life principle which operated through
the living body which is also constituted by various inorganic
elements. Thus as far as the organic body' is concerned, they
recognised two distinct entities. The constitution of the organic
body is explained by the combination of various inorganic ele-
ments, and its purposive intelligent behaviour being credited to
the operative life-principle called atman or Soul. After recog-
nising the duality of the nature of organic beings, the various
systems of thought attempted to probe into the secrets of the
nature of this life-principle called atman or Soul. The mate-
rialist saved himself from the trouble of metaphysical investigation
by a summary disposal of the problem. For him there was no
entity called Atman which is postulated by others in order to
explain this purposive intelligent nature of animal behaviour.
The organic body is constituted by the inorganic elements and
there is* nothing more in it. Its behaviour is due to the peculiar
mode of combination of the inorganic elements, and the presence
of consciousness in man and some other higher animals is merely
a by-product resulting from the combination of the inorganic
elements constituting the organic body. The other systems
rightly rejected this view as erroneous because of its inadequacy
to explain satisfactorily the purposive and intelligent behaviour
of animals. Hence the other systems are at one in postulating
a separate entity besides the body which is constituted by in-
organic elements, in order to explain the purposive behaviour
of the organism. This entity which is so postulated is assumed
to be a cfotana, being of the nature of intelligence as contrasted
with inorganic bodies which are said to be achetana and non-

X4 SAMAYSARA

intelligent. Thus all the systems reduced the organic beings,
including man, to a combination of two distinct entities
chetana and achetana, intelligent and non-intelligent. Their
whole philosophical attempt is directed to a clear determination
of the nature of this intelligent principle which is supposed to
be present in all living beings. Again, all these systems, minus the
materialistic, agree in maintaining that this life-principle or atman
should not be identified with the body or any organ of the body
though it is the operative principle responsible for the activity
of the organic body as a whole or of the various organs, sensorial
and motor. Thus the philosophical investigation as to the
nature of the life principle of atman or Self, by a careful eli-
mination of all that pertains to the body as alien to its nature.
So far the systems agree in their ultimate aim as well as their
method of investigation though the conclusion reached is dif-
ferent in each case thus resulting in different philosophical systems.
Thus we see our author stating the nature of the Pure Self by
a process of elimination of all " those characteristics which result
from its association with inorganic material elements which
are designated technically upadhis.

The author goes to point out next, that even in the case
of the Self free from upddic conditions, certain diverse qualities
ordinarily associated with it such as Darsana, etc., when viewed
from the absolute point, can be differentiated only verbally and
not really.

W ^ftrf *T srarof 3TTWT tf^ft llvsll

o

Vavaharenuvadissadi nanissa charittadamsanam nanam

Navi nanam na charittam na damsanam janago suddho ( 7 )

7. Ftom the vyavabara point of view, conduct, belief
and knowledge are attributed (as different characteristics) of
the Knower, the Self. But from the real point of view there
is no (differentiation of ) knowledge, conduct and belief in Pure

SeE

CHAPTER I 15

COMMENTARY

Jaina metaphysics always emphasises the nature of reality
to be identity in difference and unity in the midst of multiplicity.
This characteristic which is assumed to be present in reality in
general is associated in a marked degree with the Self. The
Self in association with material upadic conditions is said to
be born in the world of samsdra with various organic bodies
in various places and various times. The various births asso-
ciated with a particular Self will be practically infinite in number
when the beginningless samsaric career is taken into considera-
tion. All these various forms are considered to be paryayfis or
modifications of the self-same unitary ego. The Self is one and
its modifications determined by upadic conditions are infinite
in number. It is in this sense that the saying that the atman
is one and the rishis call it many is interpreted by the Jaina meta-
physician. Another point which is generally noticed by Jaina
metaphysics is the relation between the substance and its quali-
ties. The complex nature of the substance with its qualities
also interpreted to be identity in difference. The qualities
cannot be considered as entirely distinct from the substance.
It is the same identical substance that expresses its nature through
qualities. No doubt the qualities may be spoken of as different
from one another and all from the underlying substance. Such
consideration of the quality in abstract is only verbal differentia-
tion. But really the qualities cannot exist independent of the
substance nor the substance independent of its qualities as
is maintained by the Vaiseshika school of thought. It is this
latter point that is emphasised in this gdthd. The self in its pure
nature, which is entirely free from upadic conditions, must be
considered as an indivisible unity in spite of the different attri-
butes associated with it ordinarily. The characteristics, Dar-
sana, Jnana, and Charitra are only verbal differentiations employed
to explain the complex nature of the unitary self. This point
that the qualities can only be differentiated verbally from
the substance is illustrated- by Jayasena in the following manner.
We may speak of fire that it burns, that it cooks or that it shines,
when we consider the various purposes for which it is employed.

I( $ SAMAYSARA

Burning, cooking and shining are spoken of as the various
properties of fire, because of its relation to other things, based
upon different purposes. In spite of the various descriptions
of its properties, fire is one and the same. Similarly the Self is
one indivisible identity and unity in spite of the various descrip-
tions of its nature in terms of Darsana, Jnana, and Charitra. The
same point is illustrated by Amritachandra in the following manner.
When an able teacher wants to inform his student about the nature
of an extremely complex reality possessing innumerable proper-
ties, he will proceed cautiously in choosing one property after
another in order to instruct the student accurately. Confronting
him with the whole complex reality at the same time will only
confound the student and the teacher's aim will be defeated. This
process of selecting one characteristic after another in order to
produce a clear understanding in the mind of the student of the
extremely complex nature of the reality which is the object of
study will not in any way really tamper with the identical unity
of that object. In the same way the self which is a complex reality
may for the purpose of instruction be described in different terms
but in spite of the variety of these descriptions it does not lose
its ultimate identity and unity. These two g&thds (6 and 7) may
be taken to be an implied refutation of the Upanishadic pantheism,
Buddhist Kshanikavada or momentariness of the Self, and the Vai-
sheshika theory of the .distinction between dravya and gtna, as
distinct categories.

1. Though the Jaina view recognises the identical unity
of the Self throughout its career of transmigratory existence, still
it does not reduce all the concrete personalities and organisms as
the modifications of one and the same atman as is maintained
by Upanishadic pantheism and later Vedantism.

2. The Kshanikavada of the Bauddhas is also rejected by
the Jaina metaphysics. The Bauddhas,, like the. western philoso-
pher Hume, rejected a permanent objective reality as well as the
permanent identity of the Self. This goes by the name of Ksh-
anikavada or momentariness which is also designated by
the term Anatmavada. While the Bauddhas do not accept
any individual identity of the Self besides and beyond the series

CHAPTER I 17

of psychic states, Jaina metaphysics emphasises that these series
of psychic states cannot be adequately explained without the pos-
tulate of a permanent atman.

3. We have indicated before, the Jaina conception of the
relation between dravya and its gunas and how this account
is different from the Vaisheshika one. Hence there is implicit
refutation of the Vaisheshika theory also.

If the real nature of the Self is obtained only by adopting
the pdramdrthika point of view, what is the use of adopting the
inferior vyavahara point which is able to give only a partial
and incomplete account of the ultimate reality. The answer
is given in the next gdthd.

\\6\\

Jaha navi sakkamanajjo anajjabhasam vina yu gaheyum
Taha vavaharena vina paramatthuvadesana masakkam ( 8 )

f^RT cT

f^RT

8. Just as a non-Aryan (foreigner) cannot be made to under-
stand anything except through the medium of his non-Aryan
language, so the knowledge of the Absolute cannot be communi-
cated to the ordinary people except through the vyavabtfra point

of view.

.
COMMENTARY

Here the author enunciates an important principle of educa-
tion which must be adopted by every teacher in instructing his
pupils. The teacher must take into consideration the under-
standing capacity of the pupil and he must adopt a method of
instruction suitable to the situation and present the matter of in-
struction so as to be easily understood by, the pupil. He illustrates
this by pointing out how it is absolutely necessary when talking
to a foreigner to converse with him only through his own foreign
language, in order to make him understand what he wishes to com-
municate to him. This is given as a justification for adopt-
ing the vyavahara point of view which is recognised to be diflfe-

1 8 ' SAMAYSARA

rent from and inferior to \hzpdramarthika point of view. This dis-
tinction between the Paramarthika Naya and the Vyavahara Naya,
the two intellectual methods of approach towards the comprehen-
sion of reality, is adopted by the Jaina metaphysicians as a very
important one. Our author adopts these two methods throughout
the work as the occasion demands. Since Jaina metaphysics
assumes the reality to be a complex entity it is bound to adopt
both these points of view. The ultimate reality must be subjected
to an intellectual analysis and the constituent elements so obtained
must be selected and emphasised according to the interest of the
student and also consistent with the purpose of the discussion. The
variations in the context and the intellectual aim will naturally
determine the nature of the descriptions adopted with refer-
ence to the reality studied. The method of selective description
to suit the purpose of the context is the method adopted
by the ordinary man who is engaged in his pursuit in life. Since
the method is determined by a purpose of practical interest,
the investigation will be relevant only to that purpose and
the conclusion obtained must be therefore partial since it is
not concerned with other aspects of the reality which are
left out as of no concern, being irrelevant to the purpose on
hand. This process of investigation, goes by the name of the
Vyavahara Naya or the practical point of view as contrasted
with the other method, Paramarthika Naya. The term Paramartha
refers to the ultimate and implies a philosophical attempt to probe
into the inner core of reality with the object of comprehending
the intrinsic nature of reality, whole and complete. It is also
called Nischaya Naya, real point of view, since it is not concerned
with the various aspects, partial and purposive, relevant only
to the practical man and not to the philosopher. This distinction
between the pdramrdrMka view and the vyavahara view is also
adopted by Sankara in his Bhdskya on the Vedanta Sutras, Since
Sankara came several centuries after Kujida Kunda, since he was
also of South India, probably he was acquainted with Kunda
Kunda's writings and adopted the method of distinction between
the practical and the real point of view as suitable to his own pur-
pose. Since our author has used the word anarya in the sense

CHAPTER I 19

of the foreigner it must be noted that there is no race-superiority
implied by the term as is ordinarily assumed. In Vedic literature
the term drya is used exclusively to denote the immigrant clan of
Aryans as contrasted with the people of the land who are des-
cribed with the sinister name of Dasas. This racial distinction
ultimately led to the Hindu social organisation of four varnas in
which the Dasas were assigned the fourth name or the Sudra
caste. The Jaina conception of social organisation is different
from this Hindu conception. Here the distinction is based more
upon profession and qualification than upon birth, as is clearly
evident from the Jaina tradition that such a social organisation
was originally established by Lord Rishabha. Commenting
upon the Sutra Aryd Mkcchhdscha 36. II of Tattvartha Sutra,
the commentators both Pujyapada and Akalanka speak of five
different classes of Aryas, Koshetra Aryas, Jati- Aryas, Karma Aryas,
Charitra Aryas, and Darsana Aryas. The first class includes all
those who live in the countries Kasi, Kosala, etc.; the second class
includes those who belong to the Ikshvaku clan; the third class
includes all those who are engaged in the six kinds of professions
such as defence, agriculture, trade, art, etc.; the fourth class refers
to all those persons who ennoble themselves by moral conduct and
spiritual discipline, and the fifth class to all those who adopt the
right faith as the basis of their religious discipline. In speaking
about the andryds or mlechhds they refer to two classes of mlecchas,
antaradvipaja, and karma-bhumija, those that are born in foreign conti-
nents and those that are born in Bharatakhanda, called Karmabhumi.
The Sakas, Yavanas, Sabaras, and Pulingas, etc. are andryas living
in the land. This description of Aryas and Anaryas is quite clear.
All the people of the land irrespective of their birth and profession
are included under the class drya. The Sudras engaged in agri-
culture, the blacksmith, the goldsmith and the sculptor are all
designated by the honorofic term of dryas. The illustration
given of non-Aryans, such as Sakas, and Yavanas clearly indicate
that the term is used to designate foreigners. It is in this sense
that our author uses the term in the above gafM, when he says
that when you talk to an andrya you must talk to him in his lang-
uage, that is in his andrya language, the foreigner's tongue.

SAMAYSARA

f|

Jo hi sudenabhigachchhayi appanaminam tu kevalam suddham
Tarn suyakevalimisino bhananti loyappa divayara (9)

^ cf

9. Whoever realises the absolute and pure nature of
this Self through the knowledge of the scripture, him, the
Rishis, the light of the world, call an all-knowing Master of
Scripture.

COMMENTARY

This gatha refers to Nischaya srutakevali as contrasted with
Vyavahara smtakevali referred to in the next gathd. This real
all-knowing Master of the Scripture, by the complete acqui-
sition of the scriptural knowledge, is able to realise the Self as
that which illuminates itself and the other and, hence, is of the
nature of knowledge or Jnana, an experience independently ob-
tained by the Kevala-jnanl, or the Sarvajna, through the instru-
ment of sukla-Dhyana, as the result ottapas. Since almost the
same result is obtained in these two cases, one through tapas
and the other through the knowledge of the scripture, the Sru-
takevali is designated as nischaya Srutakevali. The author describes
the Vyavahara Srutakevali in the next gdthd.

Jo suyananam sawam janayi suyakevali tamahu jina

Suyanana mada sawam jamha suyakevali tamha ( 10)

10. The Jinas call him a (Vyavahara) Srutakevali who
has full knowledge of the scripture; as all scriptural knowledge
ultimately leads to the knowledge of the Self, therefore the (knower
of the Self) is called Srutakevali.

CHAPTER I 21

COMMENTARY

The person who masters completely the scripture compris-
ing the twelve angas, is referred to as Vyavaharasruta kevali,
since he distinguishes himself by his study of the scripture, the
drayya sruta or the different works constituting the angas or
the agamas. Even with the complete study of the scripture
he has not reached that stage of realising the Atman as the Pure
Self, though he maj reach that stage ultimately. Hence he is
designated as Vyavaharasruta Kevali, as contrasted with the
other who, through the acquisition of bhdva sruta., is able to
realise the real Self for which reason he is designated as Nischaya-
sruta Kevali. The former has knowledge of all the reals^ for
which he is called Kevali and, since his knowledge of all the
reals is through the scriptures, he is called Sruta Kevali. And
since his knowledge is obtained through the description of the
reals given in the scripture, he is called Vyavaharasruta Kevali.
The latter, through his knowledge obtained through the scrip-
ture, is able to immediately realise the true nature of the Self
and the whole reality is called the Nischayasruta Kevali. These
two are contrasted with the Omniscient, par excellence, one
who obtains kevala-jnana, through tapas.

*spa>

Vavaharo abhudattho bhudattho desido du suddhanavo
Bhudatthamassido khalu sammaditti havadi jivo ( n )

II?'? II

ii. The practical stand point does not reveal the reals;
the pure point of view is said (to relate to) the real; verily, the soul
that takes refuge in the real is one of right vision.

COMMENTARY

The vyavahara point of view, since it is based upon practi-
cal interest, need not and does' not take into consideration
the reality as it is. Only that aspect of reality which is considered
useful by the practical view in the context is taken into consi-

22 SAMAYSARA

deration by the vjavahdra point of view. Both the commentators
explain this first through an illustration. An ordinary illiterate
person when he feels thirsty, he may freely drink muddy water if it
is immediately available to him. He wants water to quench his thirst
and does not wait to enquire whether it is pure or impure. But
in the case of an enlightened person the behaviour will be slightly
different. If he is thirsty and if he can't get pure water he would
try to purify the muddy water by the application of the cleaning
nut, thus separating the pure water from the muddy deposit before
using it. Exactly similar is the attitude of man towards the nature
of reality. The ordinary unenlightened person goaded on by prac-
tical interest may behave with the assumption that what is called
Self is that which is in . association with karmic impurities and
thus get on in life trying to obtain as much satisfaction as possible;
but an enlightened individual will not thus be satisfied. He will
try to distinguish between the Self as a pure entity and the various
impurities ordinarily associated with it. With this discrimina-
tive knowledge, he will try to guide his life as far as possible,
thus basing his whole conduct on the true knowledge of reality
as it is. It is the latter class of person that deserves to be called
Samyagdrshti or right believer.

Suddhosuddhadeso nadawo paramabhavadarisihimi
Vavaharadesido puna je du aparametthida bhave ( 12)

ferarr

12. The pure stand point which reveals the pure substance
should be adopted by (those whose object is to be) the seers of
the supreme state of the soul; but the practical one by those who
are satisfied with a lower status.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is emphasised that the point of view adopted depends
upon the object of the investigator. The commentators again
elucidates this point with an illustration. A person whose aim,

CHAPTER I

is to obtain pure gold without any impurities will go on melting
it a number of times till all the impurities completely disappear;
but In the case of a person who does not want gold of such purity
for making certain ornaments will not bother himself with such
repeated processes of purifying it in the fire. He may be satisfied
with two or three times of fire-purification since his aim is not
to obtain gold of the skteen-touch purity. Thus the object of
the person determines the process of purification in the matter
of gold. The analogy is applied in the context to the purifica-
tion of the Self. Whether he adopts the pure point of view or
the practical point of view depends upon the purpose in life adopt-
ed by the individual.

Here ends fte pithikd or Introduction.

The author then proceeds to describe the nine paddrtbds or
categories according to Jaina metaphysics.

\\\\\\

Bhudatthenathi gada jlvajiva ya punnapavarii cha
Asavasamvaranijjara bandho mokkho ya sammattam ( 13 )

=3* JWT?! ^ I

13. Right belief is constituted by a clear comprehension,
from the real point of view of the nature of the following cate-
gories: 'Jiva (soul), Ajiva (non-soul), Pmja (virtue), Papa
(vice), Asrava (inflow of karmas), Samvara (stoppage of karmas),
Nirjard (shedding of karmas), BanJha (bondage) and Moksha
(emancipation).

COMMENTARY

The nine padartbas or categories are important because of
their relevancy for understanding the life history of the soul.
Of these, the first twojfra and ajwa, the soul and the non-soul,
are fundamental categories and associated with each other from
beginningless time. The other seven categories, though they
are enumerated on a par with the first two, according to the doc-
trine of nava-paJJrtbas, must be recognised as resultant categories

Z4 SAMAY3ARA

due to the interaction of the first two. In spite of the subsidiary
nature of these seven categories, they are equally important as
the first two inasmuch as their knowledge is quite essential to the
process of self-development leading to the self-liberation which
is the last of these nine categories and which is also the o- O al
aimed at by spiritual development. Every one of these cate-
gories has a dual aspect. Externally it implies the material
operative condition constituting the karmic upddl. Internally
it also implies the psychic modification in the self caused
by the corresponding karmic upddi. Thus each one of these
seven categories has a two-fold nature, material and psychical,
which are designated respectively by the terms dravya and bhava.
Thus we have in each case, dravya ptmya t *aM bhdva punya,
dravya dsrava and bhdva asrava, etc. These various categories in the
life history of the soul are objects apprehended by right belief.
These various categories which are objects of right belief are iden-
tified by our author with right belief itself because there is really
no fundamental distinction between belief and objects of belief '
As has been pointed out above, these categories though consi-
dered as real entities because of their importance in the life career
of the soul, it must not be forgotten, are but the various aspects
resulting from the interaction of the fundamental reals, jwa and
ajtva. Recognition of this fact would naturally imply that it
is the same unitary Self that is present through these categories
whch are but the modifications of the same Self caused by the
operation of the non-self upddis. Thus it is possible to elim-
inate the modifications caused by external conditions since they
do not form part of the real nature of the Self. Thus after elim-
inating all those modifications alien to the nature of the Self caused
by external conditions, it is possible to contemplate upon the

IIT bl t T SeE Such a realisation of the Self ^

of t sJf th ^ SCtl k ^ge of the tme mt * ure
oftheSelf,_as distinct from the operating external conditions

and" 7 "^ ^ Cat0rieS

to tatus f

u a kn f

uc a_ knowledge of the true Self present throughout these
categones and yet transcending all these modifications is called

CHAPTER I 25

dtmakhydti, knowledge of the Self par excellence > a name intro-
duced by Anirtachandra in his commentary on this gdthd. This
term, dtmakhydti or Self-knowledge, -is also used by him to desig-
nate the whole of his commentary on Samajasara.

sft MHlfcf

Jo passadi appanam abMdhaputtham anannayam niyadam
Avisesamasamjuttam tarn suddhanayam viyanihi ( 14 )

*?: wrftr sn^TFf ar^^ps^RFRR? from; i

f^srnftftf u

14. He who perceives the Atman as not bound, not touched,
not other than itself; steady, without any difference and not-
combined, know ye him, as Sudha-ritya or the, pure point of view.

COMMENTARY

The person who has the pure point of view is himself called
the pure point of view according to this gdthd > as it is not al-
together incorrect to equate the person with his intellectual
attitude.

Not bound, not touched : though the Atman is associated with
matter, karmic and non-karmic, it is neither bound by that matter
nor contaminated by it. Really it retains its pristine purity just
as a lotus leaf in water remains untouched by it.

Karmic matter means the subtle particles of matter suitable
to constitute the subtle karmic body which continues to be in
association with the soul throughout its ttansmigratory existence
of births and deaths till the Self obtains liberation by the des-
truction of karma when the karmic body vanishes. Non-
karmic matter refers to the material molecules constituting the
organic body of each individual being, the body which appears
at birth and disintegrates after death.

Not other than itselj *: though the soul is subject to different
modifications in its roaming about in different gatis as a man or
a deva, etc., the soul throughout retains its identity just as clay
remains clay while it is shaped into different forms over the
potter's wheel.

2 6 SAMAYSARA

Steady : the soul in spite of its several psychic modifica-
tions remains steady in itself, unperturbed just as the sea which
remains steady in spite of the disturbance caused on its surface
by the waves.

Without any difference: the different qualities such as weight,
colour, and malleability do not in any way interfere with the
nature of gold. Similarly the possession of the psychic qualities
like knowledge, perception,, etc., does not in any way differentiate
the Atman. It remains undifferentiated in spite of the qualities.

Not combined: this quality refers to the impossibility of the
accidental emotional characteristics such as desire and aversion,
combining with the true nature of the soul. This implies that
the Self cannot be identified with the various emotions which
are accidental characteristics.*

\\\\\

Jo passadi , appanam abaddhaputtham anannamavisesam
Apklesasuttamajjham passadf jinasasaiiam savvam f (15)

15. He who perceives the Self as not bound, not touched,
not other than self, steady and without any difference, understands
the whole Jaina doctrine which is the kernal of the Scripture.

COMMENTARY

The author emphasises the fact that complete realisation
of the full Self is identical with the perception of the whole
reality, which is the topic discussed in the Jaina Scripture. Know-
ledge of the Knower is also the Knowledge of the Known.

Damsanananacharittani sevidawani sahuna nkhcham

Tani puna janatmmvi appanam cheva nichchhyado ( 16 )

CHAPTER I 27

1 6. Faith,, knowledge, and conduct should always be che-
rished by saints from the vyavahdra point of view. Know that,
in reality, these three are the Self.

COMMENTARY

Just as knowledge, belief, and conduct of a person called
Devadatta, cannot have separate and independent existence
apart from that person, so also knowledge, belief, and conduct
relating to the Pure Self cannot have any independent existence
apart from it and hence may be identified with its true nature.
The three jewels above referred to, when cherished as the ideal
to be aimed at, constitute ' yyavhdra* rafna-traya. But when
they are realised as identical with the Self, they constitute the
nischaya-ratna-trqya. Thus the nisckaya and vyavahdra
points of view in the case stand in the relation of sddhya and
sddhana, the ideal achieved and the method of achievement.

wnr sFfi% fwf THTPT ^f^rsw ^^ i

\\ \\3\\

Jaha nama kovi puriso rayanam janiuna saddahadi
To tarn anucharadi puno atthatthivo payattena

^TR" sfTfsfq" JWt <NM*

1 1

Evam hi jivaraya nadawo taha ya saddahedawo
Anucharidawo ya puno so cheva du mokkhakamena ( 18 )

<FT:

, vj

17 and 1 8. As a man knowing the king believes in him
and with the object of gain serves him with resourcefulness,
even so should the king, the sou], be known, believed in and
attended to with the object of emancipation.

COMMENTARY
The nature of ratna-traya is explained by a simile. Any

2 g SAMAYSARA

person who is desirous of obtaining presents from the king must
first of all find out who the king is through the royal paraphernalia
of the royal umbrella, chdmara, etc. Then he must have faith
in the benevolent nature of the king; then he must approach
him and serve him whole-heartedly in order to attain his end.
Similarly one who desires moksha or liberation should obtain
the knowledge of the true Self, should have faith in the possi-
bility of realisation and finally make an effort to reach the goal.
The approach towards the spiritual sovereign is compared to
the approach towards a temporal king.

Thus it is emphasised that right knowledge is the indis-
pensable condition of the attempt to successfully achieve libera-
tion or moksha.

Next, the author points out that the view which identifies
the Self with the body, etc. is the mark of ajnana or wrong know-
ledge.

cTR \\\\\\

Kamme nokammamhi ya ahamidi ahayam cha kamma-nokammam
Ja esa khalu buddhi appadibuddho havadi tava ( 19 )

II

19. Karmic matter and non-karmic body-matter constitute
the I and (conversely) I am identical with karmic matter and
non-karmic matter. So long as this belief persists in the Self, it is

said to be aprati-buddha, one lacking in discriminative knowledge.

COMMENTARY

This gdthd emphasises the fact that it is sheer ajnana or
ignorance to identify the Self with the various types of non-self.
Karma, here, refers to the subtle matter constituting the various
kinds of karma, such as jndndvaramya^ etc., and therefore implies
the various psychic states such as delusion, desire, etc. Non-karma
refers to the physical molecules constituting the organic body.
One who recognises that the Self is by nature entirely distinct
from the internal impure psychic states such as delusion, desire,

CHAPTER I

2 9

and the external body, is said to be prati-buddba or one with dis-
criminative knowledge. Therefore,one who believes that the
Atman is identical with the various impure psychic states caused
by the subtle karrnic matter or with the gross organic body is
called aprati-buddha, one devoid of discriminative knowledge.
Such an aprati-buddha, is called bahir-atman^ or one who identi-
fies himself with external objects.

Ahamedam edamaham ahamedassahi atthi mama edam

Annam jam paradawam sachittachittamissam va ( 20 )

STT u^ oil
ft-

Asi mama puvvamedam edassa ahampi asipuwamhi

Hosai puno mam edam edassa aham pi hassami ( 21 )

Edam ta asambhudam adaviyappam karedi sammiidho
Bhudattham jananto na karedi du tarn asammudho ( 22 )

20 to 22. "I am other substance, animate, inanimate, or mixed;
it is myself; I am its and it is mine; it was mine in past time and
I was its; even again it shall be mine and I shall be its." Such
erroneous notions about the Self (as identifying it with alien objects
such as body, etc. (only the deluded one) bahir-atman entertains.
But one who knows the real nature of the Self, non-deluded (an-
tar-dtman ) never entertains (such erroneous notions about the
Self).

- SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

These gdthas refer to the erroneous belief of identifying one-
self with one's own body as well as the environmental objects.
These alien objects such as wife and children, cattle and gold
and land constitute one's home and property. Wife and children
and cattle are designated as saebitta-paradraiya, living objects
in the environment. Gold ornaments, house and landed property
constitute a-ebitta-paradrayya, inanimate objects in the environ-
ment. Wife and children wearing ornaments and costly dress
would be miSra-paradravya, combined animate and inanimate objects
of the environment. There is a tendency in the householder
to identify himself with his wife and children and other proper-
ties. The identification may be as intimate as his relation to his
own body. Just as he is interested in maintaining his own body
free from injury or disease, so also he is interested in maintaining
his property and possession free from damage by promoting the
integrity and welfare of his relatives and property. Such an identi-
fication of one's self with the environmental objects is considered
as an impediment to the realisation of the true Self. Such an illusory
feeling of one-ness with the environmental objects, feeling elated
when they increase and grow, feeling dejected when they decrease
and decay, are all characteristics of self-delusion which must
be got rid of by one who pursues the path of self-realisation.

Such a self-delusion, may also be present in an ascetic. Though
he renounces his house and property, still he retains a few things
such zspichchavnA. kamandalu which constitute the insignia of an
ascetic. For him these constitute the environmental objects and he
shall not entertain the feeling -that they are his personal property,
lest he should be troubled by the characteristic emotions of joy in
possessing them and sorrow in getting them damaged or lost.
When the householder or the ascetic is enjoined not to identify
himself even with his own body it is much more important that
s he should be entirely uninfluenced by environmental objects
by the dear and near ones and by wealth and property.

CHAPTER I 31

Annanamohidamadl majjhaminam bhanadi poggalam dawam
Baddhamabaddham cha taha jivo bahubhavasanjutto ( 23 )

^ cf^TT

23. In the case of the soul that is characterised by various
emotions (such as desire, etc.), there are physical objects some
(of which are) intimately bound to it (like the body) and some
not so intimately bound (such as wealth). "These material objects
are mine" so declares one (the bahir-dtman} whose intellect is
deluded by wrong knowledge.

f%

Savvanhunanadittho jivo uvaogalakkhano nichcham

Kiha so poggaladavvlbhudo kirn bhanasi majjhaminam ( 24 )

24. The nature of the soul as seen by the Omniscient, is per-
manently associated with its quality called npayoga ^which com-
prises knowledge and perception, par excellence). How can
such a spiritual entity become a physical object? Then how can
you say, "this physical object is mine?"

Jadi so poggaladavvlbhudo jivattamagadam idaram

To sakka vuttum je majjha minam poggalam da warn ( 25 )

25. If the soul becomes matter and if the matter becomes
the soul then it is possible for you, Oh! bahir-atman, to say
"this physical object is mine."

COMMENTARY

(23 to 25) These gathds also deal with the illusion of identify-
ing the Self with the physical objects. The physical object may be

SAMAYSARA

intimately related to the soul as its own body or indirectly related to
the soul as one's own wealth and property. In any case, identi-
fying one's Self with these material objects is but a mark of the
lack of knowledge as to the real nature of things. But if you say
that the soul and the physical objects are not so very different in
nature. as to exclude all possible relations between the two, then
you have to remember that your view would be in conflict with the
Divine Word of the Sarvajna, or the Omniscient. According to
the pravachana, the soul is fundamentally different in nature from
Vudgala (matter). Its nature is characterised by perfect know-
ledge and perfect perception, whereas matter is non-living, ache-
tana, a characteristic which is contradictory to that of the soul.
With such an incompatability of naturq, how can they be reason-
ably identified with each other? If your predication, "This is mine"
is maintainable, it must be only on this condition, which is impos-
sible, viz., that the soul can be transmuted into matter and matter
into the soul. It is clear that the author addresses a deluded person,
(bahir-dtman) who is incapable of discriminating between soul
and matter, and points out to him the fundamental differences
between the* two. It is the clear* perception of this difference,
vivekajnana that forms the foundation of Right Faith.

Next the author states the possible defects which may be
pointed out against the view that the Self and the bqdy are abso-
lutely distinct from each other.

Jadi jivo na sarlram titthayarayeriya-santhudi cheva

Savva vi havadi michcha tena du ada havadi deho ( 26 )

26. If the soul is not the body then the hymns praising (the
bodily excellence, rupastava, ' of) the Tlrthankara or the Acharya
will all be false. Therefore the soul must indeed be the body.

COMMENTARY
The Tlrthankara as distinguished from Siddha has a body.

CHAPTER I 33

Siddha is described as asarfri, without a body, arupa> not per-
ceivable, and so on; whereas the Tirthankara or Arhat Para-
meshti has still a body even after attaining Omniscience or Kevala
Jfiana. It is with the help of this body that He is able to preach
the dharma (Truth) to the people, because His main fufiction is
dharma-prabhavana or proclaiming the Dharma. His wor-
shippers both human and divine praise His body in their adora-
tion. The adoration of an Arhat consists in the enunciation of
the marvellous characteristics of His body such as its beauty
and excellence, its freedom from natural impurities and defects,
and that it is the cynosure of attraction and grace, that it is the
fountain source of peace and harmony, that it is the physical
embodiment of the eternal values of Truth, Goodness and Beauty.
The term Acharya implies the master of a Sangha who in his
turn transmits the divine message to his disciples and through.
them to the whole world. It is not necessary to emphasise
the fact that in his case also adoration very often implies
praising the beauty of his body as the embodiment of a great
soul.

The bewildered and the doubting disciple naturally asks his
master: "If the soul is of supreme importance and if the body
being ache tana is without any spiritual grace and hence to be dis-
carded as worthless, how can we justify the various songs of
devotion of Arhanta and Acharya, songs which are but the praise
of their physical beauty and grace. If the songs in adoration are
valid, would it not be proper to infer that after all, the soul and
the body are not so fundamentally different?"

The author clears the doubt expressed above by explaining
the doctrine of nqya or points of view.

Vavaharanayo bhasadi jivo dehd ya havudi khalu ekko

Na du nichchhayassa jivo deho ya kadavi ekkattho ( 27 )

wra*

27. The Vyavabdra point of view indeed declares that body
3

34 SAMAYSARA

and soul ate one,-, but according to the nischaya point of view,
the soul and body are never identical.

COMMENTARY

Thus the devotional songs in praise of the bodily beauty of
the Lord are justified from the yyavahdra point of view, because
the beauty of the body is but the expression of the inner beauty of
the soul with which it is found in union. Though considered
as one from the vyavahdra point, because of their association, still
soul and body do not lose their intrinsic characteristics. They are
really distinct in nature. The soul has its intrinsic characteristic
of upajoga (darsana andjndna) which characteristic is not present in
matter. This fact clearly brings out their intrinsic difference.
The commentators explain this combination of different things
to constitute a unitary whole by a practical illustration. Gold
and silver, both being precious metals, may be used in combina-
tion for certain purposes such as ornament making, etc. Though
they go together to constitute the whole so manufactured, still
they do not lose their respective qualities. Gold is gold and^
silver is silver. One is yellow and the other is white. Hence the
two can never become one in nature really. In the same way,
soul and body, though found together in an embodied individual,
the unity must be taken to be true from the practical point of view
and not from the absolute point of view.

Inamannam jlvado deham poggalamayam thunittu muni
Mannadi hu santhudo vandido maye kevali bhayavam ( 28 )

W

28. By adoring the body which is different from the soul
and which is constituted of matter, the saint believes, "The Omni-
scient Lord is thus adored and worshipped by me."

COMMENTARY
His assumption is justified from the vyavahdra point of view,

CHAPTER I 35

because the praise of the body is but the praise of the personality.
But in reality, the bodily characteristics, however beautiful and
adorable, cannot be the genuine characteristics of && paramdtman*

w ^wrr ff
^ft g-=F5f ^f

Tarn nichchhaye na jujjadi na sariraguna havanti kevalino
Kevaliguno thunadi jo so tachcham kevalim thunadi -( 2 9)

t

29. That (body adoration is adoration of the paramdtman)
is not right from the mschaya point of view for the properties of
the body are not the properties of the Omniscient Lord. One
who worships the kevalin^ the Omniscient Lord, must do so by
adoring His genuine characteristics.
l M <fwH t'f^"r$ W 1%

Nayarammi vannide jaha na vi ranno vannana kada hodi
Dehagune thuwante na kevaliguna thuda honti ( 30 )

30. As the description of a city does not constitute the
description of its ruler, in the same way, the adoration of His
body is not the adoration of the attributes of the Omniscient
Lord.

COMMENTARY

The same point that adoring the body can by no means amount
to the adoration of the paramdtman is emphasised by the example
of a king and 'his capital.

Next the author describes the nature of adoration from the
real point of view.

113

Jo indiye jinatta nanasahavadhiyam munadi adam

Tarn kalu jidindiyam to bhananti je nichchhida sahu ( 31 )

j 6 SAMAYSARA

31. He who, subjugating the senses, realises that the self
is of the nature of real knowledge is verily called a conqueror of
the senses by the saints who know reality.

COMMENTARY

This is given as an illustration of the true worship of the
Jina through praising His qualities. Control of the senses implies
three things. Control of the sense organs or dravya-indriyas;
control of sense-perception which is bhava-indriya and, finally, the
control of the perceived environmental objects or mdriya-vishaya.
The sense-organs and sense perception, though serving as ins-
truments of knowledge to the soul, do only present the world
of environmental objects and thus divert the attention of the
soul to a world other than itself. Conquest of these senses there-
fore implies the acquisition of freedom from the influence of envi-
ronmental objects. When such an intellectual attitude is secured
through yoga or tapas, the attention thus liberated is directed inwards
leading to the contemplation of the Pure Self. Contemplation of
the Pure Self leads to becoming one with it. One who reaches"
this goal of self-realisation is known as Jina. This is the summum
bonum of life to be achieved according to the Jaina faith.

sft *ft| ^ fafriTir WTW^^f^f wfe

cf

Jo moham tu jinitta nanasahavadhiyam munadi adam

Taji damoham sahum paramatthaviyanaya vinti (32)

<r

3 2. The saints who know the nature of absolute reality, call him
Jita-moha or conqueror of delusion who, by subjugating the delusion,
realises that the self is intrinsically of the nature of knowledge.

COMMENTARY
This is given as an illustration of the second type of adoration

CHAPTER I 37

through the praise of quality. Conquest of delusion is the qua-
lity praised in this gdihd. The term moha implies the various gross
emotions such as anger, pride, deceitfulness, avarice, etc. These
emotions naturally create undesirable excitement in the conscious-
ness. These various emotional disturbances and the consciousness
which is so disturbed are all unwarrantedly identified with the
real Self. This identification of the higher Self with the empirical
consciousness characterised by baser emotions is certainly an evil
to be got rid of. One who is able to realise this higher Self as
distinct from the empirical Self and to concentrate upon one's
higher Self by the conquest of the baser emotions constituting
what is called moha or delusion., is called Jita-moha> the Conqueror
of Delusion.

*ft fw^

Jidamohassa du jayiya khino moho havijja sahussa

Tayiya du khinamoho bhannadi so nichchhayaviduhim (33)

sffaft *ftft ^t^Wt: I

113311

33. The Rishi who, after conquering moha or delusion,
further completely eradicates moha (the root cause of baser emo-
tions), is called by the Seers of Reality, the Destroyer of Delu-
sion.

COMMENTARY

This is the third example of worshipping the Lord by prais-
ing His qualities. Conquest of moha implies merely the suppres-
sion of the baser emotions and pushing aside the empirical cons-
ciousness from the focus of attention in order to obtain the un-
disturbed contemplation of the higher self. But in the case of
kshwamoha, the destruction of delusion, the baser emotions,
and the association of the empirical Self, are completely elimin-
ated leaving the higher Self as the unchallenged and undisturbed
sovereign of the spiritual realm.

1 TFf

trfpi DpFRT TTW II? VI I

SAMAYSARA

Nanam sawe bhave pachchakkhadi ya paretti naduna

Tamha pachchakkhanam nanam niyama munedawam ( 34 )

fTFT

34. The "discriminative knowledge of the Self leads to
discarding all alien dispositions, knowing them to be entirely
foreign to the nature of the Self; therefore in reality, this discri-
minative knowledge of the Self shall be known as pratydkbyana
or repulsion.

COMMENTARY

The alien characteristics of the empirical Self, since they
are foreign to the nature of the Self, get rejected by one who knows
the true nature of the Self. This knowledge of the true nature
of the Self in its isolation from all alien characteristics forms the
indispensable condition of self-purification by the process of dis-
carding all the foreign elements present in the Self. This process
known as pratyakhyana is the great renunciation or rejection of
foreign encumbrances. Since the discriminative knowledge of
the Self is the real and indispensible condition for pratyakhyana
which is the process of self-purification, such knowledge of Self
is called the pratydkhyana, renunciation itself, according to the
principle of justifiable identification of cause and effect.

TW 1%

Jaha nama kovi puriso paradavva minan ti janidum chayadi
Taha savve parabhave navuna vimuchchade nani (35)

WTf^T

35. As a person rejects a thing brought to him as his own,
when he realises through certain marks that it belongs to. some-
body else, so also, does the sage discard all alien dispositions,
as they are foreign to him.

COMMENTARY
The author explains this fact with a practical illustration which

CHAPTER I 39

is well brought out by the commentators. For example, a pet-
son may accept as his own a cloth brought by his washerman
which might really belong to somebody else. Due to the igno-
rance of the real fact, he may put on the cloth. But when the
real owner claims it as his own pointing to his proper washerman's
mark, the mistake may be recognised and the cloth may be given
up as not his own. Similarly a person due to ignorance may
call as his own the various emotional features of the empirical
Self. But when his attention is drawn to the error of such false
identification by his spiritual master, he certainly realises his mis-
take and is bound to discard the alien features as not his own.

urf^r TPT ^t 1% ^ffft ^^ ^sfrrr t^r

cf iftl^^Hii tl^tti f^STFRT f%1%

Natthi mama kovi moho bujjhadi uvaoga yev$ ahanekko

Tarn mohanimmamattam samayassa viyanaya vinti (36)

c

36. I am unique inasmuch as I am of the nature of upa-
yoga; hence no delusion whatsoever is related to me. He who
thinks like this, the knowers of the true Self call "one free from
delusion."

COMMENTARY

Nirmamatva : without any personal interest, emphasises the
former characteristic of nir-moMtva y freedom from delusion. This
gdthd reiterates the necessity for discarding all alien feautres
of the empirical consciousness. "These are not mine. I am
but the light that illuminates the inner Self as well as the outer
cosmos, being all-illuminating pure consciousness. I certainly
have no personal interest in tilings resulting from self-delusion."
One who thinks like that is said to be free from delusion.

c

Natthi mama dhammadi bajjhadi uvavoga yeva ahamekko

Tarn dhammanimmamattam samayassa viyanaya vinti (37)

SAMAYSARA

gf ^fMNcef WTFI

37. I am unique inasmuch as I am of the nature of upa-
yoga. Hence dharwa, etc., are not related to me. Hence, he
who thinks like this, the knowers of the true Self call, "one un-
related to dkarm, etc."

COMMENTARY

Previously the author has emphasised the fact that it* is er-
roneous to identify the true Self with the empirical Self charac-
terised by various emotions. Here he turns his attention to the
outer cosmos consisting of dharma, adharma, pudgala, dkasa,
Kdld) and other jjvas the principle of motion, the principle of
rest, matter, space, time, and other souls respectively. Hence he
wants to emphasise the fact that it is equally erroneous to identify
oneself with these objects of the external world. The consti-
tuent objects of the cosmos have their own intrinsic inalienable
nature and can by no means be derived from the nature of the
Self. No doubt the upayoga nature of the Self in its twin aspect
of knowledge and perception can completely comprehend the
cosmos so that the various objects of the external world, living
and non-living, may get immersed in the ocean of light that pro-
ceeds from the Perfect Knowledge of the Self. But this fact
of being comprehended by knowledge does not in any way inter-
fere with the intrinsic individual reality of the objects themselves
which are related to knowledge. As was already explained in
a previous gtha> the physical body and the Self have each an immut-
able and independent nature of their own, non-trans mutable one
into the other. This assertion relating to matter and soul is applied
to the whole of the cosmos consisting of the various objective
reals such as dharma, adharma, etc. Here we have to note one
important point that one's Self is not only distinct from the vari-
ous non-living objects of the environment but also from the vari-
ous personalities which are present in the outside world in the
human society and the various living organisms of the biologi-
cal kingdom. To talk of a mass consciousness or world-cons-

CHAPTER II 41

ciousness, offering only a subsidiary existence to the personali-
ties which are but chips of the particular adjectives of the Whole
would be incompatible with Jaina metaphysics.

Ahamekko khalu suddho damsanananamayio sadaruvi

Navi atthi majjha kimchivi annam paratpanumittatn pi ( 38 )

38. Absolutely pure, having the nature of perception and
knowledge, always non-corporeal, I am indeed unique. Hence
not even an atom of alien things whatsoever (whether living or
non-living) is related to me as mine,

COMMENTARY

Aham: the Self implies this : The soul from beginningless
eternity associated with ignorance and delusion forgets its true
nature, gets identified with "alien features and characteristics till
he is roused from slumber by a benevolent spiritual master who
repeatedly strives to wake him up to his true nature. Just as
a person who has lost his jewel feels a joy and surprise when it
is brought and placed in his hands, so also the jw^z wakes up as
a result of the master's effort to realise that his Self is tht/aram-
swara, that his nature is pure and unsullied by alien features,
shedding the pure light of pure consciousness all around.

Ekaha : the undivided unity implies that in spite of the
several psychic states, emotional, cognitive, and conative, expe-
rienced by the Self, it is an indivisible unity,

Sudba: pure. The Self, in spite of its gati, modification, such
as human and divine and in spite of the nine types of psycho-
physical modifications called nava-padarthas 9 *ft&rtt loses its intrinsic
pure nature and hence he is sudhdha.

Arupi: non-corporeal. Since the pure soul has no other
nature except upayoga, the pure knowledge and perception, and
since it transcends the sense-perception of vision, taste, touch,
etc., it is always non-corporeal. The Self having this nature

42 SAMAYSARA

and illuminating all things around through its light of knowledge
remains absolutely uninfluenced by alien psychic states and physi-
cal objects so that not even an 'iota of the alien things it can call its
own.

Thus ends, the jwa-paddrtha or category of Soul. The author
takes up next the ajiva-paddrtbas for discussion.

The Sanskrit commentators use the term ranga. Here ends
the first Scene, purva-rangahsamdptaha, thereby suggesting that
the whole work is a Cosmic Drama in which the chief hero is the
Self who appears on the stage in different characters and in
association with different actorscertainly a beautiful metaphor, in
depicting the career of the Atman.

CHAPTER II

AJ1VA OR NON-SOUL.

Thus after describing the category ofjfoa, the author takes
up now the category of ajm or non-soul for discussion. First
he states ^tpurvapaksha^ tteprima facie argument of those (bahirat-
mavadins)^ believe that there, is no soul besides and
beyond the various psychic activities characteristic of the empiri-
cal Self. r

Appanamayananta mudha du parappavadino kel

JIvam ajjhavasanan kammane cha taha paruventi ( 39 )

39- Some of those ignorant people who maintain that the
Self but the non-Self, not knowing the true nature of the

deILT ^ f Sdf ^ identiCal Wkh SUch P^ chic s ^es as
oesire, etc._ In the same way some others state that the Self is
identical with karmic matter.

CHAPTER II 43

Avare ajjhavasane sutiwamandanubhavayam jivam

Mannanti taha avare nokammam chavi jivotti ( 4 )

40. Others believe the psychic potency which determines
the intensity or mildness of conscious states to be the soul. Still
others identify the soul with non-karma matter which forms
the constituent elements of the various kinds of organic bodies.

Kammasudayam jivam avare kammanubhayamichchhanti
Tiwathanamandatatna gunehim jo so havadi jlvo va ( 41 )

^T^ i H-l

41. Some consider the manifestation of karma (resulting
in pleasure or pain) to be the Self; some others believe that what
determines the intensity or mildness of the edonic state (which
is the fruit of karma) is the Self.

Jlvo kammam uhayatn donnivi khalu key! jivamichchhanti
Avare samjogena du kammanam jivamichchhanti (42)

42. Some others state the Self to be jwa and karma taken
variously or together; still others consider the self to be the product
of the combination of the various karmas.

Evamviha bahuviha paramappanam vadanti dummeha

Te na du parappavadi nichchhayavadlhim niddittha " ( 43 )

fr

:

44 SAMAYSARA

43. Thus in many ways perverse-minded people identify
the Self with the non-Self; therefore, by believers in reality, they
are declared to be not paratmavddins (those who do not believe
in the identity of jwa and paramatman).

COMMENTARY

Discussing the nature of djiva-padartha or the non-living
substance the author introduces first that type of ajiva-paddrtha
or non-living substance which is intimately associated with jwa
or soul. This type of non-living substance which is associated ,
with life is of two kinds, karmic matter and matter called non-
karma which constitutes the various types of body associated
withy'/M other than the karmic body* Karmic matter constitutes
the karmic body and is inseparable from the soul throughout its
sdmsaric pilgrimage from one birth to another, till the soul
liberates itself in the pure state by breaking all shackles of karma.
Besides this karmic body which is extremely minute and imper-
ceptible, there are other types of organic bodies in association
with the jwa or Soul. Birth, growth,, decay, and death charac-
teristic of organic beings, man and animals, are all characteris-
tics of grosser bodies which form the physical associates of the
Self. The Self in association with these material vehicles, to
which it is bound has to undergo corresponding changes in its
conscious nature. These changes may manifest in three different
forms of experience : cognitive, pertaining to perception and
knowledge; conative ; pertaining to voluntary activity ; and affec-
tive, pertaining to the various affective states of emotions, plea-
sant and unpleasant. All these conscious characteristics of the
empirical Self are in reality unconnected with the real nature
of the Self. These characteristics of the empirical Self in the embo-
died form, are the result of the association of the Self with the
various material tabernacles in which it resides. Hence there
is the possibility of mistaking these characteristics to be the real
nature of the Self. These ' gdthds refer to the various errors of
identifying the Self with the various types of material bodies
and with the consequential changes in his consciousness due
to his association with such bodies.

CHAPTER II 45

?rf*Fn" f^ ^ sfoft 1% s^fa nwu

Ede sawe bhava poggaladawaparinama nippanna
Kevalijmehim bhaniya kiha te jivo tti uchchanti ( 44 )

I IVY II

44. It is said by Jina, the All-knowing, that the various
characteristics referred to above are all the result of the mani-
festation of karmic matter. How can they be then attributed
to the Pure Self?

COMMENTARY

This gSthd refutes the various erroneous positions stated in
the previous gdthds as believed by the various Ekantavadins.
No doubt it is true that the embodied Self is associated with attri-
butes such as desire, and aversion; so also gold, as found in nature
in the form of mineral ore, is found in association with various
mineral impurities. Similarly fire is usually found in association
with smoke. Nevertheless fire in itself is not smoke, nor gold
- is the same as the impure mineral ore. In the same way the Self
cannot be identified with the various psychic manifestations to
which it is subject because of its association with impurities. In
spite of the forms in which they are found in nature, gold in its
pure condition is distinct from the impure ore, and the pure
self is distinct and different from the embodied jiva. No
doubt the Self is found always in association with its body
throughout the cycle of births and deaths, but on that score it
cannot be identified with the body since the Self as distinct and
different from the body is realised in its pure form. No doubt
the karmic body may be an inevitable condition of the transmig-
ration of the Self in this samsaric cycle; nevertheless this non-
chetana material condition because of its invariable association
with the Self cannot be identified with it, as they are different in
nature and hence distinct from each other. In short, what is
found in association with a thing need not necessarily be identical
with its true nature. The realisation of the true Self will obviously

46 SAMAYSARA

expose the alien nature of the various attributes, physical and
psychical, with which it is associated in its impure state, an asso-
ciation which leads the uninstructed to erroneous conclusions.

<T"T?R2

Atthaviham pi ya kammam sawam poggalamayam jina vinti
Jassa phalam tarn buchchayi dukkham ti vipachchamanassa ( 45 )

45. The Jinas declare that all the eight kinds of kariaas are
material in nature; and also suffering which is the effect of karme
frution (is said) to be material.

COMMENTARY

According to Jaina metaphysics the various karmeu are in-
trinsically material though of subtle form. Since they are materi-
al in nature they are quite distinct ftomjiva whose characteris-
tic ^ is ebetana. The karmie matter which is achetana in nature
while operating, interferes with the pure consciousness of the jrva.
On account of this interference the various psychic states present
m the empirical Self are really the effect .of the operative cause
of the karmic matter. These psychic states constitute the suffer-
ing associated with samsara jtoa. These unpleasant psychic states
as they are the effects of karme matter, are considered to be materi-
al, since the cause and the effect are ultimately identical If these
psychic states, since they are produced by karmlc matter, are
also to be considered material in nature, what is the justification
for referring these states of consciousness as the attributes of the

The answer is given in the next gdthd.

Vayaharassa darisana muvadeso vannido jinavarehim

va ede sawe ajjhavasanadavo bhava / 4 g \

CHAPTER II 47

46. It is only from the yyavahdra point of view that these
various psychic states are declared by the Jinas to be of the
nature of the Self.

COMMENTARY

Though these mental states have nothing to do with the
real Self, the attention of the ordinary man must be drawn
to the fact that from the practical point of view, they are charac-
teristic of the empirical ego. The practical point of view is an
important method of instructing the unenlightened ordinary
man. Otherwise there will be an extremely disastrous effect on his
conduct. Waiving the practical point of view and presenting
only the absolute and real nature of the Self, may result in the per-
verse conduct of the ordinary man. Directing his attention to the
ultimate nature of the jiva, he may forget altogether the differ-
ence between the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom,
the difference between the sthdvarajiva and trasa jiva. Man has
to live on cereals and fruits, products of the vegetable kingdom.
Since the product of the vegetable kingdom is indispensable for
his life, the ordinary man may unwillingly adopt a similar attitude
to the animal kingdom and hence he may not care to appreciate
the importance of Ahimsa Dharma. If you can eat with impu-
nity the products of the vegetable kingdom, you may also eat
meat, the product of the animal kingdom. This undesirable
result in the conduct of the ordinary man is the result of not empha-
sising the yyavahara point of view and the intrinsic difference bet-
ween the vegetable and the animal kingdoms, though the ultimate
nature of jiva in both is the same. Similarly if the ultimate and real
nature of the Self is emphasised without describing the nature of the
empirical ego, the Self as a samsdrajwa^ it will create an undesir-
able attitude in the ordinary man's life. If the ultimate nature
of the Self is pure and unsullied, if it is identical with the liberated
Self or Moksha Jtva, then the ordinary man may argue, why
should I unnecessarily worry myself about moksha-marga, or
the path to Salvation, when my soul is already pure and
liberated in nature. Both ethics and religion would appear to
him superfluous and unnecessary. Presenting an ultimate ideal

48 SAMAYSARA

and prescribing a course of conduct for realising the same
would all be vain and useless, because the ideal is already there.
This perverse moral attitude is also to be avoided and this
could be achieved only by emphasising the 'vyavahara point.
The ordinary man must be made to realise that though he
has the element of divinity in him, still it is found in association
with impurity while he is in the concrete world of experience.
It is not enough to realise that his ultimate nature is pure.
He must also realise that this pure nature is cloudeH and
contaminated by karmas. This latter knowledge is possible
only when his attention is directed to the vyavahara point of view.
Only when he realises that he has fallen from a high stage, he
will make a genuine effort to regain his lost glory and eminence.
Hence is the need for and the importance of the vyavahara point
of view. Therefore it would be unwise to come to the hasty
conclusion that vyavahara naya and nischaya naya, the practical
point of view and the real point of -view, are mutually contradic-
tory and hence incompatible with each other.

*r i^ft

Rayahu niggado tti ya eso valasamudayassa adeso
Vavaharena du uchchayi tatthekko niggado raya (47)

TRT

47. At the sight of the military procession, one may exclaim:
"The king has started." This statement is made from the vyava-
hara point of view, because only one person is the king in the
whole procession.

% cc^F nr ^o \W6\\

Emeva ya vavaharo ajjhavasanadi annabhavanani

Jlvotti kado sutte tatthekko nichchhido jlvo ' ( 48 )

48. In the same way, from the vyavahara point of view,

CHAPTER II

49

the various psychic states such as desire, aversion, etc., may be
said to be the ego. But the real Self is none of these states but
remains as the unitary sub-stratum of which these are empirical
modifications.

COMMENTARY

Ordinary people, when they see the military procession
marching along, speak of the king going out. The military
procession may be -really very long, but really the whole of it is
not the king however important; he is only one person in the
whole procession. Similarly the series of psychic states and
modifications may be spoken of as the Self. The whole series
is not the Self. Really the Self is the underlying unitary existence
whose manifestation appears in the various conscious states from
which the Self is distinct and independent. The author employs
a popular example to illustrate the relation between the ever-
changing series of conscious states and the permanent unitary
'real self.

Arasamaruva magandham avvattam chedanaguna masaddam
Jana alingaggahanam jivama nidditthasamthanam ( 49 )

49. Know ye that the pure Self is without taste, colour,
without smell, imperceptible to touch, without sound, not an
object of anumdnatt inferential knowledge, without any definite
bodily shape, and is characterised by cbetdnd (consciousness).

COMMENTARY

Taste is a distinct quality of matter otpudgala. This attribute
is not feund anywhere else. Since the nature of the Pure Self
or suddhajiva is entirely distinct from that of matter, it is des-
cribed tasteless, in order to distinguish Self from matter. Simi-
larly colour is an intrinsic attribute of matter. It is not found as
an attribute of anything else. So the Pure Self which is distinct

SAMAYSARA

from achetana matter, is described as colourless. Again smell is
an attribute of physical objects and it cannot be associated with
anything else. The Self being distinct from matter is therefore
said to be smell-less. Similarly being perceptible to touch is
a characteristic of material objects and cannot be .attributed to
anything else. Since the nature of the Self is transcending sense-
perception it cannot be an object of contact sensation. Hence
it is described as beyond touch. In the same way, sound, since
it is the effect of concussion between material particles, is associat-
ed with matter alone and with nothing else. That which sounds
must be a material object as a non-material entity cannot produce
sound. Hence the Self also is soundless because it is non-mate-
rial in nature. Thus the Self is entirely beyond the scope
of sense perception. Can it be approached by inference or anumd-
na? No, because anumdna or inference entirely depends upon
what must necessarily be obtained by sense-perception. Percep-
tion of smoke may lead to the inference that there is fire. But
smoke must be obtained by sense-perception and then only
it is possible to infer that there is fire. An entity which
is quite beyond the scope of sense-perception cannot be ap-
proached by inferential knowledge either. Hence suddha-jiva is
said to be alinga-grdhana, not approached by inference. In the
organic world jwa is always found in association with its charac-
teristic body. These characteristic bodies are classifed accord-
ing to their various shapes which are called samsthdnas.
Since these shapes of the organic body are entirely deter-
mined by the physical structure, they are purely bodily qualities
and cannot be transferred to the Self associated with body.
Hence the Self is without definite shape or structure. In
short the pure Self whose intrinsic nature is chetand is entirely
different from the whole external world and hence the
characteristics of the external world cannot be predicated of the
Self. It is entirely devoid of the physical qualities of colour
taste, etc., it is also devoid of the characteristics of the other exter-
nal entities such as space, time, etc. Resting on its own intrinsic
nature, infinite knowledge, infinite vision, and infinite bliss, the
pure Self is not to be associated with the various varnasrama

CHAPTER II jx

distinctions such as Brahmana, Kashatriya, etc., since these distinc-
tions rest on the birth of the body. It is not only distinct from the
characteristics of the external world, it also remains distinct
from the various inner psychic qualities which are produced
by its association with achetana material environment. Neither the
characteristics of the material world nor the indirect effect of the
same can rightly be associated with the Pure Self.

wr wf% wr wf% *r ^i\ \

JIvassa nathi vanno navi gandho riavi raso navi ya phaso

Navi ruvam na sarlratn navi samthanam na samhanannam (50)

^rftr

IIHlt

50. In the (pure) soul there is no colour, no smell, no taste.,
no touch, no visible form, no body, no bodily shape, and no
skeletal structure.

JIvassa nathi rago navi doso neva vijjade moho

No pachchaya na kammam nokammatn chavi se natthi (51)

wf ^rftr t^t

51. In the (pure) soul there is neither desire nor aversion.
No delusion is found therein. There is no . karmic condition,
nor karmic matter, nor non-karmic matter in it.

trft

JIvassa natthi vaggo na vaggana neya phaddhaya kel

No ajjappatthana neva ya anubhayathana va (52)

52. In the (pure) soul there is no varga (atomic potency),
no vargand (molecules or group of atoms), no spardhaka (aggre-
gates of molecules). There is no ego-consciousness of different

r 2 SAMAYSARA

types and no (karmic] manifestations (resulting in pleasure-pain
experience).

^VrTWT *T

Jivassa natthi ke! jogatthana na bandhathana va
Neva ya udayatthana no maggana tthanaya kel ( 53 )

?rf% ^if^f^^^RTft" W ^^r^TRTft" ^"T I

\\\\\\

53. In the (pure) soul there is no activity of yoga (through
manas, vachana, kaya\ no (karmic bondage), no effective manifes-
tation of karma, and no variations according to method of in-
quiry into the nature of the soul (based upon the principle of
classification).

TT Wt ti

No thidi bandhatthana jlvassa na samldlesathana va

Neva visohitthana no sanjamaladdhithana va (54)

54. In the (pure) soul there is no stage of the duration of
bondage, or of emotional excitement or of self purification or
of the acquisition of self-control.

Neva ya jivatthana na gunatthana ya atthi jlvassa

Jena du ede sawe poggaladavvassa parinama (55)

Tf^T ^TT

q-f^j[]r[T:

55. The classification of the organic beings (according to
the principle of biological development) and the classification
of man (according to the principle of ethico-spiritual develop-
ment) are not applicable to the pure soul, since all the above-men-
tioned differences are the result of the manifestation of the material
conditions.

CHAPTER II - 53

COMMENTARY

Varna or colour, such as black, green, yellow, red and white,
are qualities of physical objects and physical objects alone, and
hence they cannot be predicated of jwa which is entirely
non-physical and spiritual in nature.

Gandha or smell is of two kinds. Pleasant odour and unplea-
sant odour. These are also characteristics of physical objects
and hence cannot be predicated of the soul.

Rasa or Taste, is as follows: Sweet, bitter, acid, pungent, and
astringent. These tastes are also associated with material things
and hence cannot be transferred to the soul because of the
intrinsic difference between the two.

Sparsa or contact sensation consists of smooth or rough, cold
hot, heavy or light, and hard or soft sensations. These different
contact sensations are all again associated with physical objects.
Hence these physical qualities cannot be predicated ofjiva or soul.
Sarira or body. The body associated with/7^ is of five different
kinds: auddrika sarira body given birth to by the mother; vai-
knajaka sarira, various bodily forms magical and hallucinatory
in nature assumed by a yogi because of his yogic powers ahdraka
sarira is the body drawn out of the physical body in the form of
plasma by the magic powers of the yogi with the object of carry-
ing out something which is beyond the reach of the physical body.
Taijasa sarira refers to the brilliant form of halo which shines
forth from the physical body under certain spiritual conditions.
Lastly, kdrmana sarira is the -body constituted by karmic matter,
which is extremely subtle and which is inseparable from the soul
throughout its samsaric career. Since all these different bodies
are constituted by matter either gross or subtle, these cannot
be identified with jwa or soul.

Samsthdna-tditts to the different shapes of the organic bodies.
These are samachatura sawsthana, body that is symmetrically devel-
oped; nyagrodha parimandala samsthana, body that is top-heavy like
the banyan-tree; swdti samsthana, body that is long and thin like a
sword, kubjasamsthdna, hunch-backed body, vdmana samsMna, dwar-
fish body, and hunda samsthana, an ugly mass of flesh. All these

54

SAMAYSARA

shapes of organic bodies are nothing but the different manifesta-
tions of matter in the organic world. Hence these physical forms
which are of material origin cannot be attributed to the soul.

Samhanana, the assemblage of bones of the skeletal structure.
This refers to six types of bony joints which pertain to vertibrate
animals. It is obvious that these varieties of bone-joints cannot
be applicable tojiva which is asarira by nature, a bodiless spiri-
tual entity.

Raga, the pleasant feeling of desire, and dvesha the unpleasant
experience of aversion, all these being products of karmic matter
cannot be attributed to the soul.

Moha or delusion, which clouds the knowing faculty and
prevents its apprehension of reality, is also an effect of karmic
matter and hence cannot be attributed to the soul.

The different kinds of pratyaya or karmic condition such as
mithydtwidst faith, avirati, absence of moral discipline, kasha-
ya soul-soiling gross emotions, and yoga, activity of thought,
speech and body, all being effects of matter either direct or in-
direct have no relation to the soul.

Karmas are of eight different kinds, such as jndnd-varamya,
darsand-varamya, etc. These are also mainly material in nature.
Hence these karmas cannot be spoken of as belonging to the
soul. Non-karma refers to the various physical molecules that
build up the three types of grosser bodies of fully developed biolo-
gical species. Since these body-building molecules are material
they have nothing to do with jwa or Soul.

Varga refers to the bundle of potencies incorporated in a single
indivisible atom which forms the basis of karmic matter.

Vargana refers to the type of karmic molecules constituted
by a number of vargas or karmic atoms.

Spardhaka refers to aggregates of varganas or karmic
molecules.

All these three refer to the development of karmic matter
from the subtle type to the grosser type. These types of karmic
matter cannot be predicated o jjva.-

Adydtmasthdna. On account of the ignorance of its true nature,
the ego may identify itself with the various objects and persons of

CHAPTER II

55

the external world. This false feeling of one-ness with exter-
nal things has nothing to do with the Pure Self since the confu-
sion is due to the interference of the physical objects. Simi-
larly anubhdgasthanas, the various types of pleasure-pain consci-
ousness resulting from the manifestation of corresponding karmas,
cannot be spoken of as belonging to the soul.

Yogasthdnas, the different grades of activity relating to
thought, speech, and body which form the condition for attract-
ing karmic molecules towards the soul are also mainly physical
in nature and hence cannot be spoken of as of the soul. Similarly
bandhasthdna, various kinds of karmic bondage and udayasthana,
fruit-yielding manifestation of karmas are also not of the
soul.

Marganasthdna, an inquiry into the nature of jwa y is based
upon the method of classification according to various principles
which are fourteen in number, such as gati, indriya, etc. These
different principles of classification are distinctly material, since
they pertain to the nature of the organic bodies, and hence
they are not of the soul.

Similarly the different classifications ofjzvas or jwasthdna^ and
the classification of man according to spiritual development or
gunasthana, are all ultimately traceable to the different manifesta-
tions of matter. The nature of the Pure Self must therefore be
understood to be entirely different from the above mentioned
various physical modes.

If the material characteristics, physical and psycho-physical,
are thus summarily disposed of either as qualities and modes of
matter or as psychical effects produced thereby, then how can
it be justified that thtjtva is described in the scripture in terms
of the very same attributes which are dismissed as being alien to
its nature. The answer to this apparent self-contradiction is
given in the next gdthd.

WRT

Vavaharena du ede jivassa havanti vannamadlya

gunathananta bhava na du <kei nichchayanayassa (56)

56 SAMAYSARA

56. These characteristics beginning from (Varna., colour)
and ending with Gunasthana or stages of spiritual development
are (predicated) of the soul from the Vyctvahara point of view;
but from the point of view of reality, not one of these can be pre-
dicated of the soul.

COMMENTARY

Vyavalam or the practical point of view is taken for empha-
sising \htjwa-paryaya or modifications of the soul. Emphasis
of patyaya or modification naturally implies diversion of attention
from drayya, the real substance. These jwa-paryayas or modi-
fications of the soul are the results of immemorial association of
the soul with matter. Just as cotton cloth puts on the colour of
the dyeing substance, so also thtjtva puts on the characteristics
of the associated matter. Since the empirical Self is so coloured
in ordinary life, it is described in those terms though in reality
it is alien to those characteristics.

The next gdiha explains why from the real point of view the
characteristics of colour, etc., cannot be predicated of the jiva.

edehiya sambandho jaheva khiro-dayam munedavoo

Naya hunt! tassa tani du uvavogagunadhigo jamha (57)

57. The association of these characteristics with soul must
be understood to be like the mixture of milk and water. They
are not certainly present in the soul since it is mainly characte-
rised by upayoga (cognitive activity of knowledge and perception.)

COMMENTARY

The relation of one thing to another may be In the form
either of a mixture or in the form of substance and its qualities.

CHAPTER II

57

Milk cum water is given as an example of mixture. Fire cum heat
is given as an example of substance and its quality. The different
things constituting the mixture can be separated from each other.
But the substance and its quality cannot be separated at any time.
Quality without substance and susbtance without quality will be
empty -abstractions incapable of independent existence. But a
mixture is not so, because the inter-mixing substances can be sepa-
rated when necessary. The predominating substance in the mix-
ture will give its colour to the mixture. Thus in the case of
milk and water which is compared' to the intermixture of soul
and its material upddis, the dominant,; substance being milk it is
still called milk, when diluted with water. Exactly similar is
the relation between jwa and its upddis. Though their inter-
mixture is from time immemorial, they can be separated from each
other, as when the jwa attains moksha or liberation. Since the
dominant factor in this mixture is jwa> the characteristics of the
mixture from colour onwards to stages of spiritual development
are considered as the attributes of the soul from the vyavabdra
point of view. From the real point of view, the soul must be
described in -terms of upayoga (cognitive activity of knowledge
and perception) which quality is inseparable from jwa. Even
when the jwa becomes perfect through self-realisation this
quality of upayoga will be inseparably present in it, in its complete
form as kcvala jndna and kevala darsana.

The reconciliation between the vyavahara point of view and
the real point of view is effected by bringing in a popular illustra-
tion.

TTW fir

Panthe mussantam jassiduna loga bhananti vavahari

Mussadi eso pantho naya pantho mussade koi (58)

58. Seeing some one robbed on a road, ordinary people
adopting the yyavahdra point of view, say "this road is robbed."
But really what is robbed is not the road.

5 8 SAMAYSARA

t *ncft I

Taha jive Kammanam nokammanam cha passidum vannam
Jivassa yesa vanno jinehi vavaharado vutto (59)

59. Similarly perceiving the colour which belongs to the
material entities of 'karma and non-Aarma, which are found in associa-
tion with jiva, the all-knowing Jina describes it from the vya-
vahara point of view 3 as the quality of the soul.

Evam gandharasaphasaruva deho samthanamayiya Je ya
Sawe vavaharassa ya nichchayadanhu vavadisanti ( 60 )

ircf

60. Thus are smell, taste, touch, figure, etc., predicated
(of the soul) from the yyavahara point of view by the All-knowing.

Why there is no intrinsic identity between jwa and
soul and colour, is explained next.

1 1 ^ ? 1 1

Tatthabhave jlvanam samsaratthanao honti vannadl
Samsarapamukkanam natthi du vannadavo kei ( 61 )

61. So long i&jivas have embodied existence in the world
of samsara, attributes of colour etc., are present in them. The
moment they liberate themselves from the samsaric bondage,
these characteristics such as colour, etc., have absolutely no rela-
tion to them.

COMMENTARY
This gdiha emphasises the fact that the relation between soul

CHAPTER II 59

and colour is one of mere association and not of identity. If
in spite of this, it is obstinately maintained that there is an intrin-
sic identity between jiva and varna it will lead to an erroneous
attitude as is indicated next.

% f| trt g^t wr % wr

1

jivo cheva hi ede savve bhava tti mannase jadi hi
Jivassajivassa ya natlhi viseso du de kol ( 62 )

^ ^?tsfqr

62. If you maintain that all these modes pertain to the soul
itself then according to you there would be no difference whatso-
ever between soul and non-soul.

COMMENTARY

Dravya and guna, substance and quality, have been described
to be inseparable from each other and intrinsically identical What
differentiates one substance from another is the difference of quali-
ties. Colour, taste, smell, etc. are the intrinsic qualities of matter,
just as cognitive qualities are the intrinsic qualities of jwa or
soul. If it is perversely maintained that the qualities of colour,
taste, etc., are also the qualities ofjiva, then there will be no funda-
mental difference between jiva and pudgala, a soul and matter. Since
the qualities are identical in both, the underlying substance will
become the same in nature, that is jiva having identical physical
qualities and hence becoming identical with matter will cease
to be an independent category as ^jlva or soul. The whole scheme
of things will then become all-devouring materialistic monism,

But if it is maintained that the identity between colour, taste,
etc., and y>"fe or soul is true only in the case of the samsara jwa
or empirical Self, even then it will lead to an erroneous position
which is pointed out next.

Wl .....

Aha samsaratthanam jivanam tujjha honti vannadi

Tamha samsarattha jiva ruvittamavanna ( 63 )

60 SAMAYSARA

63. If, as you maintain, the samsara-jtvas, the empirical egos,
are identical with the characteristics of colour, etc., then these
empirical souls will be endowed with physical forms.

Trft

Evam poggakdawam jivo taha lakkanena mudham.adl
Nivvanamuvaga do vi ya jlvattam poggalo patto ( 64 )

5^5":

64. If, according to thy philosophy, O Thou deluded one,

(soul gets physical form) then it is matter that assumes the form
ofjtva in samsdra and it is again the very same matter that figures
in nirvna, the state of liberation of the soul.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is maintained that even in tinesamsaric state, there
is no identity between the soul and the physical qualities of colour,
etc.

If there is no identity between jwa and the qualities of colour
etc., then how is it possible to describe jiva according to the different
stages of sense-development as ekendrija-jwa or one-sensed
organism, etc. The point is cleared up in the next two gdthds.

Ekkam cha donni tinniya chattari ya pamcha indiya jiva
Badara-pajjattidara payadio namakammassa ( 65 )

I

65. Living beings with one, two, three, four, and five senses,
gross and fully developed and their opposites (minute and undevel-
oped) are all determined by the nature of ndma karma or body-
building karma.

CHAPTER II 6 1

Edehrya nivvatta jivatthana du karanabhudahim

Payadihim poggalamaglKim tahim kaha bhannade jivo ( 66 )

sffa:

66. These classes of Jiving beings are the result of karmic
matter which constitute their operative cause. How can these
physical products be identified with soul?

COMMENTARY

In reality there is no fundamental difference between cause
and effect; for example, gold-leaf which is made of gold is of
the nature of gold and nothing else. Similarly the various jwa-
sthana or classes of living beings are the result of ndma karmas,
the physical conditions which determine the building up of the
body. Since the causal conditions are physical in nature, their
products must also be physical Hence they cannot be really
identified with the nature of the soul.

t^ET ^"^T^WT ^RT ^^T^" ^xTT
Pajjatta pajjatta je suhuma vadara ya je cheva
Dehassa jivasanna sutte vavaharado vutta

q^T^^rqpT^cfT t ^^i rr^TR^ ^

( 67 )

67. Completely developed, incompletely developed, minute
and gross; all these modifications pertaining only to the body are
given the appellation ofjiva in the scripture from the vjavahara
point of view. j

COMMENTARY

Paryapta and aparydpta are terms applied to organisms, fully
developed or incompletely developed. These attributes apply
to all organisms in general. Sukshma and badara, minute and gross,
are attributes applicable only to eksndriya jivas or one-sensed

62 SAMAYSARA

organisms. Stikshma ekendriya jivas are the microscopic orga-
nisms present in earth, water., air, etc. ftddara ekendriya jivas are
the plants and trees of the whole botanical world. These two
types of ekendriya jivas ztt also called sthavara jivas, living organism
incapable of locomotion or stationary beings. The types of orga-
nisms beginning with the two-sensed organisms are called trasa
jivas, organisms capable of locomotion. All these are various
terms describing the bodily differences and yet they are used as
names ofj&as. The commentators explain this practical point
of view with a popular illustration. Ordinarily, a vessel containing
ghee is called a ghee-pot. The pot is made of clay and it is
called a ghee-pot because it is used to keep ghee in it. The name
of the contained article is transferred to the container, the pot
of clay from the practical point of view in order to distinguish
it from a water jug or a milk jug. In the same practical way,
the various organic bodies get the name of the jtvas, which are
associated with them. This transfer of nomenclature of the
to the body is only from the vyavahdra point of view.
4|| <|

sffcrr

Mohanakammassudaya du vannida je ime gunatthana

Te kaha havanti jiva je nichchamache dana vutta ( 68 )

68. The stages of spiritual growth are stated to be due to the
(mohamya)^ deluding karmas which are permanently (acbetand)
non-intelligent. How can they be identified with soul?

COMMENTARY

The various stages of spiritual development called gunasthanas
are based upon the varying influence of mohamya karma which
manifests in two different ways. One method of its influence is
to interfere with the correct perception of reality on account of
which it is called darsana mohantya, deluding the right perception.
The other way of its influence is perverse conduct on account
of wHch it is called charitra vwhaniya. The various gunasthanas

CHAPTER III g*

which are the results of the varying operations of this mohamja
karma, must maintain the relation of cause and effect. As already
mentioned, cause and effect must be identical in nature. Wheat
when sown will produce wheat alone and not paddy. In the same
manner, the operative cause being material, the effect it produces
must also be material. Hence the gunasthdnas must be recognised
to be distinctly material in nature. Hence these cannot be taken
as attributes of the soul Neither the characteristics of the body
nor the emotions and feelings of inner consciousness of the
empirical Self can "really be attributes rtsudhajwa or Pure SeE

THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON AJIVA PADARTHA

The two previous chapters constitute the two different scenes
of the First Act of the great Cosmic Drama, in which the two
actors Jiva and Ajlva appear on the stage. The Ego, the living
and intelligent, and the non-Ego, non-living and non-intelligent,
first appear on the stage forgetting their self-identity, clasp each
other as infatuated lovers and behave as if they were identical
with each other. But after recognising their distinctness and
difference in nature, they become chastened from their delusion of
false identity and depart from the stage*

Thus ends the First Act of the Drama.

CHAPTER III

KARTA AND KARMA THE DOER AND THE DEED.

Dealing with the remaining seven padarthas such as (punya,
papa, etc.) virtue, vice, etc., the author wants to emphasise once
again that these seven padarthas are but the resultant secondary
padarthas of the interaction of the two primary padarthas, jiva
and ajtva, which are dealt with already. These two reappear
again on the stage in different forms as agent and his action,
karta and karma.

ijfgf fw^fcR 5T

3TFT f.flt ^Ttflfof 3gt sftcft.

SAMAYSARA

Java na vedi visesam param tu adasavana dohunampi
Annam tava du so kohadisu vattade jlv5 ( 69 )

t1%

69. As long as thejwa or soul does not recognise that the
entities, vtma and asravaSd and karmic inflow are abso-
lutely different from each other, so long will he remain devoid
of knowledge and will identify himself with baser emotions of
anger, etc.

.| |

Kohadisu vattantassa tassa kammassa sanchavo hodi
Jivassevam bandho bhanido kalu savvadaraslhim ( 70 )

5 PRTir:

=Fft

70. Thaty'J^/ which thus indulges in anger, etc., will only
have an increased inflow of karmas and finally end with karmic
bondage. Thus was it truly declared by the All-knowing.

COMMENTARY

Ignorance of the distinction of the true nature of the Self
and of the other alien entities is the root cause of the trouble.
The Self forgetting its pure nature imagines himself to- be other
than what he really is. He identifies himself with baser emo-
tional experiences such as, "I am angry." This vitiated state of
experience leads to the attraction and deposit of karmic molecules
in the Self. The Self behaves like a person bismeared with oil
all over the body walking through a cloud of du?t Dust parti-
cles get easily deposited all over the oily surface of his body. So
the Self, ignorant of his own nature, provides the necessary condi-
tion for attracting the karmic particles which, when accumulated,
permeate the whole nature of the soul thus clouding the intrin-
sic spiritual luminosity of the Self. This means karmic bondage.
This karmic bondage in its turn produces the samsaric cycle of
births and deaths, which is the inevitable career of the un-

CHAPTER III 65

enlightened Ego. Thus the unenlightened Ego imagines himself
to be the agent of all disturbances which take place in the inner
series of consciousness and outer scheme of things. Thus appears
the drama of the deluded Self in the form of karta and his karma,
agent and his action.

IIV99II

Jayiya imena jivena appano asavana ya taheva

Nadam hodi visesantaram tu tayiya na bandhS se (71)

71 As soon as the absolute difference between dtma and
asrava is appreciated by jwa y bondage ceases to be.

COMMENTARY

Just as the absence of discriminative knowledge is the root-
cause of bondage in samsara, the appearance of true knowledge
has the opposite result of dissolution of bondage and disappear-
ance of samsara.

Naduna asavartam asuchittam cha vivarlyabhavam cha
Dukkassa karanam ti ya tado niyattim kunadi jiv5. (72)

cfcft

72 Knowing that the JJT^^ are impure, of contrary nature
to Self, and the cause of misery, the soul abstains from them.

COMMENTARY

Just as water gets muddy through association with clay,
the asravas, because of association with impurities, are impure.
But the Bhagavan Atma, because of his eternal association
with the absolutely clear nature of chit or intelligence, is perfectly
pure. Asravas being physical modes are non-intelligent and
hence of contrary nature. But the Lord Atma is eternally of

66 SAMAYSARA

the nature of knowledge and hence uncontaminated by an
alien characteristic. Asravas, because they always are productive
of. unpleasant experience, cause misery. But Bhagavan Atma,
in his state of eternal bliss, cannot be the causal agent of any
thing else and much less be the cause of misery. Hence
dsrava is impure, achetana and the cause of misery, whereas the dtma,
is always, pure, chetana and the cause of eternal bliss. Their
natures thus being fundamentally different, the jwa that possesses
the discriminative knowledge naturally abstains from the dsravas,
such as anger, etc. The discriminative knowledge thus leading
to abstention from the impure dsravas is emphasised here, for
otherwise, the Jaina point of view would be indistinguishable
from that of the Sankhyas. According to the Sankhyas, inveka-
jnana, the discriminative knowledge, constitutes the summum
bonum of life. But according to the Jaina thought right knowledge
must necessarily lead to right conduct and only then it will
lead to moksha or Liberation.

Ahatnekko kalu suddho ya nimmamo nanadamsana samaggo
Tamhi tido tachchitto sawe, yede kayam nemi (73)

73. I am really one, pure, without the sense of ownership
or "mine-ness" and full of complete knowledge and perception.
Firmly resting in the true consciousness of such a Self, I shall
lead all these dsravas such as anger, etc., to destruction.

COMMENTARY

The Pure Self provided with discriminative knowledge rest-
ing on its own innate perfection of consciousness is able to destroy
all those dsravas, alien psycho-physical characteristics with which
he identified himself in the empirical state. Next it is stated that
the dsravas which are intrinsically undesirable and are the products
of evil should be abstained from.

CHAPTER III 67

Jlvanibaddha yede aduva anichcha taha asara naya

Dukka dukkaphaltti ya naduna ruyattade tehim (74)

^ 5TR3T

74. Knowing them, bound as they are to the soul, to be
impermanent., evanescent, unprotected and misery in their nature
and also to be misery as their fruit in future (the Self) abstains
from them. m

COMMENTARY

The realisation of the Self and the disappearance of the dsra-
vas are interdependent and simultaneous. The moment the Self
realises its true nature, the cloud of dsarvas gets dispersed. The
moment this cloud of asravas gets dispersed, the Self shines in all
its glory. Thus both are causally inter-dependent and the events
occur simultaneously.

Adruva means impermanent and extremely momentary like a
Hash of lightening. The asravas may appear at one moment and
disappear at the next. This characteristic is indicated by the
word ddruva, non-persisting.

The term anitya implies the quality of vanishing like tem-
perature in a fever patient which may vary and finally disappear
altogether. As against these attributes of asravas, the wddba
jiva or the Pure Self is drum constant and permanent, and nitya,
unchanging and eternal. Similarly the asravas, since they are
produced in the soul by alien conditions, are really asarana or
unprotected, since they are dependent upon something other
than themselves. Not so is the suddha jwa or Pure Self, since
it is self conditioned and hence undisturbed by anything else. The
asravas such as desire and hatred, constitute the misery in life.
They are not only misery by nature, they carry with them the
misery-producing potency through their association with sam-
sdric jwa which has to experience the same misery even in its
future births. But the 'suddha jwa, the Pure Self, not only

68 SAMAYSARA

shines with its intrinsic brilliance of knowledge but also rests in
its own inalienable state of eternal bliss. Certainly the Self who
knows his greatness and glory will never think of identifying
himself with the impure and misery-producing asravas.

*ft

Kammassa ya parinamam nokammassaya taheva parinamam
Na karedi yeda mada jo janayi so havadi nani (75)

ft

75. The Self does not produce any modifications in karmic
matter nor is the non-karmic matter. He who realises this is the
real knower.

COMMENTARY

Cause or kdrana is mainly of two kinds: updddna karana,
substantive cause, and nimitta kdrana, external causal agency.
Thus in the making of a pot, clay is the updddna kdrana and the
potter is the nimitta kdrana. In the same manner modification
in karma and modifications^ in non-karma have both, as their upd-
ddna Parana, causal substance, the material particles. These
modifications are built by material particles like the pot which
is made of clay. This gdtha therefore emphasises the fact that
the various modifications of the karmic and n&n-karmic matter,
cannot be explained as the result of the causal agency, of dtma,
which by its chetana nature cannot be the updddna kdrana of the
ache f ana material modifications.

Next the author points out that though the dtma perceives
matter, it does not become identical with the object.

tiTfe qfwrfe q" f$T"|ff^ ^qTj3ff% TJJ T^o^q^Tqr \
WFft" STFRTt 1% f qVw 5 !^ STW^r f%f llvs^ll

Navi parinamadi na ginhadi vuppajjadi na paradawa pajjaye
Nani jananto vi hu paggala kammam aneya viham (76)

srrftr qr<i*iRr ^ ^riw^q^rt ^ T^o^rqirfq- i

CHAPTER III 69

76. Material karmas ate of various kinds. While in the
process of knowing these, the knower neither manifests in, nor
identifies with, nor causes the appearance of modifications of
alien substance.

COMMENTARY

The karmic modifications which are of various kinds are

really the result of the manifestations of karmic matter. Atma

or Self because of its chetana nature cannot in any way be res-

ponsible for the karmic modifications. These cannot be described

as the result of manifestations of the Self. Nor can they be iden-

tified with Self; nor their appearances be taken to be the result

of this causal agency of the dtma. In short the self cannot be the

causal agent or karta of the various karmas. Thus the author

emphasises that the relation between the knower and the object

known is quite analogous to the relation between the light and

the object illuminated. That is, the knower in the process of

knowing the object does not transform himself into the nature of

the object known. This refutes the idealistic theory of knowledge

which maintains that the process of knowing creates the object

known.

fa Vnrfrrnf-

.

Navi parinamadi na ginhadi vuppajjadi na paradawa pajjaye
Nani jananto vihu sahaparhamam aneye viham * (77)

^

77.- Modifications in the Self (as the result of karmic influ-
ence) are of various kinds. While in the process of knowing
these the knower neither manifests in, nor identifies with, nor
causes the appearance of modifications of alien substance.

COMMENTARY

The changes appearing in the consciousness of the empirical
Self though different from the karmic materials, are really produc-
ed by the karmic influences, though indirectly. Hence the Pure

7 SAMAYSARA

Self cannot consider these psychical modes to be the direct mani-

festations of his own nature. They must be traced to alien influ-

ence and hence cannot be identified with the nature of the Pure

Self, though he is aware of them as objects of knowledge.

qfwrfe

;

Navi parinamadi na ginhadi vuppajjadi na paradavva pajjaye
Nani jananto vi hu poggala kammaphalamanantam ( 7 g)

78. The (pleasant and the unpleasant) fruits of karme
materials are really infinite. While in the process of knowin*
these, the knower neither manifests in, nor is identified with &
nor causes the appearance of these modifications of alien subs-
tance.

COMMENTARY

Pleasant and unpleasant experiences of the empirical Self are
really the fruits of karmie influence which is material in nature
Thus realising the true origin of the fruits of karma, the Pure
Self cannot call these his own. Nor can he identify himself with
these. Here also it is emphasised that the knower is in no way
causally related to the objects known.

Thus after rejecting the doctrine from the real standpoint
that the dtma or the Self is the causal agent in relation to modifi-
cation of alien things as well as of the various impure psychic
states, the author goes to establish a similar relation with reference
to the matter that it also cannot stand as causal agent in relation
to modification in the chetana entity, Self.

wfr qftunrft *T %fr w*sfc ^ VT&SWS^ \
<ffrr5535f fq- ^ 7fTw?rfe *nrf| ?ntft 111^11

Navi parinamadlna ginhadi vuppajjadi na paradavva pajjaye
Poggaladawam pi taha parinamadi sayehim bhavehime (79)

Trft Tfwrf^r * ^TitTc^r JT qr i&mft ,

CHAPTER III 7 1

79. In the same way, matter also manifests in characteristic
material modifications. In reality it neither manifests in, nor_
is identical with, nor causes the appearance of modifications in
(/iva') which substance is of alien nature.

COMMENTARY

Just as the Self cannot be related to physical modifications as
the updddna kdrana or substantial cause, so also matter cannot be
related to psychical changes as their updddna kdrana. Neither
jiva is the karta of karmas, nor matter is the karta of changes in
the jiva. Thus there can be no identity between Self and matter,
chetana dravya and achetana* dravya.

Next it is pointed out that though Self and matter cannot be
related to each other as material cause, still both may be related
to each other as instrumental cause.

\\6o\\

JIvaparinama hedum kammattam poggala parinamanti
Poggalakamma nimittam taheva jivo vi parinamadi (80)

80 As conditioned by the modifications ofjfra, the mate-
rial particles get modified into karmas. Similarly, conditioned by
the karmlc materials, jiva also undergoes modifications.

Navi kuwadi kammagune jivo kammam taheva jivagune
Annonnanimittena du parinamam jana douhampi

' '

8I >* does not produce changes in the qualities of karma
nor do'es Zanna similarly in the qualities of jiva. The moMca-
tions of those two, know ye, are the result of one conditioning
the other as mmltta karana or instrumental cause.

72 SAMAYSARA

3TRT

Edena karanena du katta ada sayena bhavena

Poggala kamma kadanam na du katta savvabhavanam (82)

82. For this very reason the Self is the substantial cause of
his own modifications (both pure and impure); but is not
the substantial cause of any of the modifications of karmic
matter.

COMMENTARY

As the modifications of jwa operate as the instrumental
cause, material particles get modified as karmic molecules.
Similarly when the material particles operate as instrumental cause,
jiva undergoes modifications. Thus the modifications of
jwa and the modifications of matter indirectly condition each
other. The relation between the two groups cannot be inter-
preted as a sort of causal identity that holds good between
an immanent cause and its corresponding effect. Hence the
relation between the two groups of modifications is not one
of karta and karma, agent and action, for instrumental cause
is quite different from substantive cause. Just as clay is the cause
of a pot and cannot be the cause of a cloth, so jwa is the causal
agent of all his modifications and matter is the causal agent of
all its modifications.

Next it is pointed out that from the real point of view the
Self is the karta (agent) producing its own modifications and
bhokta (enjoyer) of its own states.

^^ f| ^rf^- |

t^fe jwt cf %r STFT STTTT | STXTTW n<^n

Nichchayanayassa evam ada appanameva hi karedi
Vedayadi puno tarn cheva jana atta du attanam (83)

ft^H^^^ k i^Trnw^ f| 3rd% \

CHAPTER III

73

83. Thus from the real point of view the Self produces
only his own Self. Again, know ye, that the Self enjoys his
own Self..

COMMENTARY

When wind blows over the surface of water in a sea, it will
produce waves on its surface, waves constituted by the rise and
fall of water on the surface. These waves on the surface of water,
though caused by the blow of wind are really modifications of
the water surface and certainly are not of the air which produces
it. Air is only the nimitta kdrana of the waves, while water is
the updddna kdrana. Hence it is the ocean surface that undergoes
modifications in the form of waves though indirectly determin-
ed by the blow of wind. Similarly karmic matter may operate
as the instrumental cause and produce modifications in the Self.
These modifications, though indirectly conditioned by karmic
materials, are really the result of the manifestation of the Self
either pure or empirical. The empirical Self as an embodied
entity in the world of samsdra may undergo modifications of
experience, pleasant or unpleasant, accordingly as the karmic
conditions are good or bad. Since experience-changes are con-
fined to the nature of consciousness, though indirectly determin-
ed by karmic materials, they are really the result of the mani-
festations of the Self. In other words, the Self is the agent who
produces all these changes in his own nature. Even when the
determining karmic materials completely disappear leaving the
Self free to realise his true glory and brilliance, it is the Self
alone again that is the causal antecedent of the liberated Self.
The consequential experience of pleasure-pain in the empirical
state and his eternal bliss in the liberated state It e also the mani-
festations of the Self. Thus it is the Self that makes his own nature
whether empirical or pure, as an agent or karta and it is again
his own self either empirical or pure that is enjoyed by the Self
as bhoktd or enjoyer.

Next from the yyavahdra point of view the Self is described
as karta and ithoktd.

74 SAMAYSARA

Vavaharassa du ada poggala kammam karedi aneyaviham
Tarn cheva ya vedayade poggala kammam aneyaviham (84)

84. But from the vyavahdra point of view, the Self produces
various types of karmic modifications in matter. Similarly
the various fruits of karmic ' materials, the Self enjoys.

COMMENTARY

Though the pot is really made of clay, in ordinary parlance
. it is made by the potter and is used for the purpose of bringing
water. Thus the potter figures as the agent in making the pot
and enjoyer by making use of it for different purposes. Similar-
ly from the vyavahdra point of view, the Self is the agent who
produces the various modifications of karmas out of the avail-
able material atoms. Having produced the karmic modifica-
tion in the matter, the hedonic consequences of these karmic
materials are enjoyed by the Self as bhokta. Thus the rela-
tionship to karmic materials of Karta and Bhokta, the
Agent and the Enjoyer, which was denied of the Self from
the real point of view, is reasserted from the vyavahdra point of
view.

Next the author refutes dvikriyavada, the doctrine that the
same cause can produce two distinct effects.

Jadi poggala^ kammaminam kuwadi tarn cheva vedayadi ada
Do kiriyavaditam pasajadi so jinavamadam (85)

^85. If the stma or Self produces these karmic materials (ope-
rating as updfana karta or substantive cause) and enjoys the con-
sequences thereof in the same manner, /it will lead to the doctrine

CHAPTER III

75

of a 'single cause producing two different effects, which will be
in conflict with the Jaina faith.

COMMENTARY

If what is taken to be true from the vyavahdra point of view,
that the dtma is the agent and enjoyer of his own karmas, is also
taken to be true from the absolute point of view, it will lead to
a metaphysical error, dtma is a chetana dravya or thinking
substance, karma-pudgala> karmic materials, are as chetana dravya,
non-thinking substance. The Jaina faith is distinctly a dualistic one.
nva and pudgala, thinking thing and non-thinking thing,
are entirely distinct from each other, intransmutable one to
the other and completely self-subsistent. If the Self, as an agent,
is capable of producing modification not only in himself but also
in karmic materials, operating identically in the same manner
as upadana karta, then this causal agent must be credited with
a potency to produce entirely two different effects and this
doctrine of causation is what is called dvikriyadvada the doctrine
which is rejected by the Jaina philosophy. According to Jaina
metaphysics, two distinct and conflicting effects cannot be pro-
duced by identically the same cause nor, conversely, can the identi-
cally same effect be produced by two entirely distinct causes. The
attempts to derive both chetana and achetana entities from the
same cause would result in making the original cause in itself
to be either chetana or achetana. If it is identified with the ache-
tana effect, the chetana Self will cease to be. If it is identified with
the chetana entity, then matter achetana will cease to be. In either
case it would be a metaphysical error. The Vedanta doctrine
which tries to derive both the Self and the external objects from
the same source of chetana dravya, Kimm or Brahman, must
end in mdyavdda, which condemns objective reality as unreal and
illusory.

Conversely the attempt to derive the Self from the operation of
the achetana matter as the Charvakas do, must enthrone the physi-
cal world in the sovereignty of reality and dismiss the dtma.,

chetana dravya, as ficticious and unreal Neither of the conclu-

. H""

sions is acceptable to the Jainas.

SAMAYSARA

The same doctrine of dvikriyavada is again condemned

with reasons.

Jamhadu attabhavam poggalabhavam eha dovi kuwanti
Tena du michchaditlhi dokiriyavadino hoti

cr foBn^ft fefw^rf^ft

86. Because they make the modifications of Self as well
as modifications of matter to be effects of the same identical atma
or the Self (operating as upddana cause) the believers in that doc-
trine of causation (which derives the conflicting effects from the
same source), are said to be of erroneous faith.

Next the author describes the two-fold nature of karma.
i. Dravja-karma of which material karmic particles form the
upadana cause. 2. Shava karma of which Self is the upadana

/"OTTO /a *

cause.

frr^xf jw ffrf sfrcnrsfcf c% sruurpf t

sffrTfe *M %> ;%^T \TS ^TRI i^vsll
Michchattam puna duviham jivamajivam taheva annanam
Aviradi gogo moho kohadiya ime bhava " (

ftzWH T^f^ ^S^^t^TWR I

( 8y )

87 Erroneous faith is of two kinds. One pertaining to
jwa or Soul and the other pertaining to ajiva or non-soul. Simi-
larly the following modes are also of two kinds. Nescience
non-discipline, yoga (of thought, word and deed) delusion, anger,'

COMMENTARY
The doctrine of karma according to Jaina philosophy im-

^^TS SPeCtS ' ^ VatiOUS mo ^ations of larmic
materials cloud the nature of the soul by getting entangled
with it Consequently upon this harm* entanglement, the soul
gets vitiated and thu^nanifests itself in variout impure psychic

CHAPTER III 77

modes corresponding to the karmic materials. The karmic materi-
als are called drayya karmas and the consequent psychic changes,
bhdva karmas. Since the karmas are constituted by material
particles, they are ajwa and achetana, non-living and non-
thinking. Since the bhdva karmas are modifications in the con-
sciousness of the Self, they pertain to jiva and chetana, and hence
living and thinking. This distinction between drayya and bhdva
is considered very important and it is applied to the various forms
of experiences narrated in this gdthd. Thus mithyatva, which
means erroneous belief, not merely implies the psychic activity
which results in erroneous thought but also the physical karmic
conditions of a particular type capable of producing erroneous
belief in consciousness. This two-fold nature is present in other
modes also. Thus we have drayya ajndna and bhdva ajndna,
the former referring to the karmic materials of a particular kind
capable of interfering with the process of right cognition, and
the latter the consequential effect produced in the consciousness.
This distinction of drayya karma and bhdva karma is to be applied
similarly in the other cases also.

This two-fold nature of karma should not be confounded
with the doctrine of dvikriydvdda which has been rejected though
there is an apparent similarity between the two. karma in the
forms of drayya karma and bhdva "karma, the material and psychical
respectively, may be erroneously assumed to be two different effects
of the same causal substance, karma. But in reality there is no
such common substance called karma capable of producing the
two kinds of karmic effect. As a matter of fact drayya karma has
matter as its updddna cause, and bhava karma has the Self as the
updddna cause. Hence the two karmas have two different causes.
Hence this doctrine of karma is distinct homthtdvikrijdvdda.

In relation to the duality of karma the author explains next
what is related to jwa and what is related to ajiva.

\\66\\

Poggalakammam michcham jogo aviradi annanamajjivam
Uvavogo annanam aviradi michcha mcha jivo du (88)

7 8 SAMAYSARA

^ ll^ll

3. Being of the nature of karmic matter, erroneous faith
yoga (of thought, word and 'deed), non-discipline, and nescience'
pertain to ^z non-soul. Being of the nature of Self (upajogd)
nescience, non-discipline, erroneous faith, pertain to soul.

COMMENTARY

Because of this two-fold aspect of the karmas, each must be
called by different names, jiva-mithydtva when the bhava aspect is
emphasised, and the ajiva-mithyatva when the dravja aspect is
emphasised. Similarly such different names are to be applied to
the rest of the modes from the different aspects.
STWTf Tf^TPTT

q-

Uvavogassa anal parinama tinnimoha juttassa
Michchattam annanam aviradi bhavo ya nadavoo (89)

89. The Self of the nature of upajoga (pure thought and
perception) associated with delusion from beginningless eternity
undergoes three different kinds of (corrupt) modifications. Let it
be understood that these three are wrong faith, wrong know-
ledge, and wrong conduct.

strsr

COMMENTARY

flawless

?=. -ittSf 5:
-- -"""

CHAPTER III 79

On account of this association, the nature of the Self is corrupted
and this corrupt nature appears in three forms, wrong faith, wrong
knowledge, and wrong conduct. This must go on so long as the
association of the alien matter persists; when the tie to the alien
characteristics is broken, when the corrupt modifications disappear,
the Self will regain its flawless nature and shine in its pristine
purity ancLglory.

q* S^Tsftft fcri%fr

Edesu ya vuvavogo tiviho suddho niranjano bhavo

Jam so karedi bhavam vuvogo tassa so katta (90)

90. The Self of the nature of upayoga, in himself, pure and
flawless, when influenced by these three different forms of karmic
materials, operating as nimitta cause, undergoes correspondingly
three different impure modifications for which the Self in impure
form figures as upadana (or substantive cause).

COMMENTARY

The Self as influenced by foreign karmic materials has corres-
ponding psychic modifications, for which he maintains the
relationship of agent or karta. The relationship of karta and
karma, thus holds good between the empirical Self and the impure
experience associated with it. Thus once again the author em-
phasises that the three-fold corrupt modifications, though
started by the operation ' of karmic materials as nimitta karana,
are, still due to the empirical Self as updddna kdrana.

wnrrer wr *ft ft fe
5rfi=|

Jam kunadi bhavamada katta so hodi tassa bhavassa
Kammattam parinamade tamhi sayam poggalam dawain (91)

r \\\\\\

91. Whatever impure modifications the Self engenders

8o SAMAYSARA

(by relinquishing his own pure nature) to those modifications he
becomes the karta or the agent. These impure psychic modifica-
tions operating as instrumental cause, matter assumes of its own
accord the corresponding karmic modifications.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is emphasised that dtma or Self is only an instru-
mental cause, nimitta kdrana and not substantive cause, updddna
kdrana, of the various material karmas.

ftpT q

Paramappanam kurvadi appanam piya param karanto so
Annanamavo jivo kammanam karago hodi (92)

92. That ignorant Self which makes non-self, Self, and the
Self non-self, becomes karta or causal agent of those various
karmas.

COMMENTARY

The Self ignorant of his true nature is incapable of different-
iating himself from the external objects. He readily assumes
the qualities of the external objects and equally transfers his own
attributes to the external objects. On account of this transposi-
tion of attributes or adhyasa,tlc& Self puts on the qualities which
really belong to matter. For example the temperature variation of
the environment of being hot and cold is transferred to himself by
an ordinary man who will say I am hot or I am cold. Similarly the
feelings of affection and hatred are attributes relating to karmic
matter and yet the ignorant ego will feel identical with these attri-
butes and say, "I desire," "I hate," I am angry, etc." Thus vitiat-
ed by ignorance the Self figures as the karta of the agent in rela-
tion to the various alien characteristics,

ft" q- q

CHAPTER III 8 1

Paramappanama kuvvi appanam piya patam akuwanto

So nanamavo jivo kammanamakarago hodi (93)

93. That knowing Self which does not make non-self, Self
and the Self, non-self, does not become the karta or causal agent
of those various karmas.

COMMENTARY

This gathd emphasises the importance of discriminative
knowledge. Realisation of the true characteristics of the Self
as different from those of non-self, results from the disappearance
of qjndna. That is identical with samyak jndna or Right know-
ledge, and this samyak jndna or Right knowledge leads to
moksha or liberation of the Self. In short ajndna, is said
to be the cause of bondage, and samyak jndna, the cause of
moksha.

Tiviho , yesovavogo appaviyappam karedi kodhoham
Katta tassuvavogassa hodi so attabhavassa (94)

94. Thus the Self whose nature is upayoga^ manifests (as
conditioned by corresponding karmic pratyayd^) in three different
impure forms (of wrong faith, wrong knowledge, and wrong
conduct) produces false identity (of Self with impure emotions)
such as C I am angry'. He becomes the updddna karta or the
causal agency for those impure experiences of that empirical ego.

COMMENTARY

This statement is equally applicable to the other grosser
emotions, as pride, delusion, etc.

82 SAMAYSARA

Tiviho yesovavogo appaviyappam karedi dhammadi
Katta Tassuvavogassa hodi so attabhavassa

^ ^nffar

95. Thus the Self whose nature is upayoga, manifests (as
conditioned by corresponding karmic pratyayds) in three different
impure -froms (of wrong faith, wrong knowledge, and wrong
conduct) produces false identity (of Self with "external objects)
such as 'I am dharmastikaya (principle of motion).' He becomes
the updddna karta or the causal agency for those impure experi-
ences of that empirical ego.

COMMENTARY

The Self, on account of ignorance, imagines himself to be
identical with alien characteristics which may be of two kinds,
i. internal relating to empirical consciousness, 2. external
relating to the objective world. The Self, forgetting his pure
nature may identify himself with either of these groups. The
previous gdtha describes the false identity of the Self with the
inner impure and other psychic states relating to the empirical
consciousness. This gdthd refers to the relation of the Self to the
external world of things and persons. The external world accord-
ing to Jaina metaphysics consists of other jwas, pudgala, dharma,
adharma, dkdsa, and kdla. Jiva and pudgala, Soul and Matter,
being the chief actors in the drama, their various alliances have
been already dealt with in their different aspects. Hence the
author uses the word dharmddi, dharma, etc., merely to indi-
cate the objective world as distinguished from the subject or the
ego. A glance at the Upanishadic literature will provide a suffi-
ciently large number of illustrations of identifying the Self erro-
neously with the external objects and persons. There the Atman
and the Brahman are used synonymously and this Atman or
Brahman is identified with dkdsa or space, kdla or time.
Sometimes it may be identified with the Sun and the Moon and
the rest of the bhatas such as Earth, Air, Fire and Water. Such
false identifications 'of Atman with non-Atman was prevalent

CHAPTER III

and in abundance in the Upanishadic period. Evidently the
author is thinking of such metaphysical doctrines when he speaks
of the Self identifying with dharmadi. Sankara who appears
in the field several centuries later adopts exactly a similar atti-
tude and condemns such identification as examples of adhyasa*
or erroneous transposition of attributes.

One other point we have to note here which is of episte-
mological interest is the relation of the Knower to the object of
knowledge. According to Jaina theory, though the object known
is related to the Knower, still it is entirely independent and self-
subsistent. Its nature can by no means be interfered with. The
idealistic systems both in India and Europe maintain that the
object of knowledge is not only known by the agent, but is also
constructed by the knowing agent in the act of knowing. Thus
the object of knowledge is practically derived from the creative
activity of the knowing agent. The knowing Self or ego is thus
credited with the capacity of producing the external world out
of itself in the process of knowing. Such an idealistic monism
is incompatible with Jaina metaphysics. Probably the author
was thinking of this erroneous metaphysical doctrine when he
condemned the false identity of the Self with the external objects.

Evam parani davvani appayam kunadi mandabuddhivo
Appanam kaviyaparam karedi annanabhavena (96)

qTrf*T Seqjfw STT^RW ^TCf?r ^fe^T if

1 1

96. Thus a person of dull intellect * (bahiratmari) takes alien
things to be Self and through sheer ignorance takes the Self also
to be alien things.

*The term Adhyasa is first used by Amritachandra the
Comentatbr of Samayasara. This term is not found in the upa-
nished but is adopted by Sankara in his Bashya.

f 3T IT ^TT ^ cf ffeoRT ^TfW ^T^fcf

84 SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

The Self out of ignorance, not realising its own pare nature
may identify itself either with the impure emotions and ideas
of inner consciousness or with the external objects of knowledge.
In both these cases the ignorant Self figures as the agent. It
may either imagine that anger, love, fear, etc., are its own attri-
butes or that the external things such as dharma, etc. are of its
own nature. The commentators explain both these erroneous
beliefs through illustrations. A possessed person identifies him-
self with the spirit possessing him and behaves exactly as if that
spirit is acting. He is able to carry out certain extraordinary
deeds such as carrying a heavy stone or a heavy log of timber
through the influence of the spirit and yet he thinks that he per-
forms all these deeds. Anger, fear, affection, etc. are all emo-
tions due to alien influence and yet an ignorant person takes these
to be his own just as- a possessed individual imagines himself
to be the agent of the extraordinary feats of strength exhibited
by him. Secondly a person concentrating his attention upon
an object of thought very intensely may end in identifying him-
self with that object. On account of the intensity of concen-
tration on the object, he may forget to notice the difference bet-
ween the Self attending to and the object attended to. He may
cry in illusory joy, <I am that object'. <I am Mahamahisha; the
great and powerful animal (Buffalo) 1 am Garuda, the king of
Birds; I am Kamadeva, the god of Love; I am Agni, the fire
(evidently taken from Vedic mantras)' . This false identification
of the Knower and the object known as the result of intense con-
centration is given as an illustration for the ignorant identifi-
cation of the Self with the external categories such as space, time,
dharma, adharma, etc. Both these notions of identity are condemned
as erroneous, since they are alien to the pure nature of
theSeE ,

3TKT

Edena du so katta ada nichchayaviduhim parikahido-
Evam kalu jo janadi so munchadi sawa kattittam (97)

CHAPTER III

85

97,,. The Self on account of ignorance, figures as the agent
of the various karmas. Thus it is declared by the knowers of
reality. Whoever realises this truth gives up all causal agency
(relating to alien things.)

COMMENTARY

This gdiha emphasises that it is ignorance which is the cause
of making the Self -karta, an agent causing all alien characteris-
tics and, conversely, it is knowledge that leads to complete seve-
rance of the Self from alien activities and attributes.

. Thus from the real point of view after denying that the Self
is the karta of alien states, the author next asserts that it can be
so from the yyavahdra point of view.

\\\6\\

Vavaharena du ada karedi ghadapadarahadid avvani
Karaiianiya kammani ya no kammaniha viviharani (98)

98. From the vyavahdra point of view, the Self constructs
external objects such as a pot, a cloth, and a chariot. In the same
manner he builds within himself the various types of sense-organs,
karmic materials and (body-building) T>&-karmic materials.

COMMENTARY

The Self in reality neither constructs any external objects
nor produces internal modifications. The belief that he does
so is associated with the ordinary man who thinks so from the

hdra point of view.

w

Jadi so paradawant ya karijja niyamena tamnaa vo-,hojja
Jamha na tammavo teaa so na tcsim havadi katta (99)

86 SAMAYSARA

99. If the Self were in reality the producer (as tjpdddna
karta or substantive cause) of those alien substances, then he
must be of the same nature; as it is not so, he cannot be their
author.

COMMENTARY

]lva and pudgala, Self and matter are two distinct subs-
tances, so different in nature that one cannot be derived from the
other as a result of manifestations. If the karmic matter could
be obtained as a result of the manifestations of jiva, then there
must be complete identity between the evolving entity and the
evolved product. Since it is not so in this case, the relation of
causal manifestations cannot be predicated between Jwa and
pudgda. Thus it is denied that the Self can be the updddna karta
or substantive cause of material things.

In the next gdthd it is pointed out that he cannot be even
the immediate instrumental cause of material things.

w

Jivo na karedi ghadam neva sesage davve

Joguvavoga uppadaga ya so tesim havadi katta (100)

||?oo||

ioo. The Self (even as an instrumental cause or wmitta
karta) does not directly make a pot, nor cloth, nor other things;
they are produced by yoga and upajoga (operating as nimitta
karta or instrumental cause) of which he is the cause.

COMMENTARY

The termj^ is used to denote bodily activity and upayoga
mental activity. In a former gdthd the Self was described as
the maker of a pot, cloth, etc. from the vyavahdra point of
Even this position is rejected here. The Self has no direct

view.

CHAPTER III 87

relation to the pot or the cloth. The potter or the weaver or
the carpenter must use his hands for making a pot, a cloth, or
a chariot and must make use of his mind for constructing designs
before executing them. Thus the external objects are the direct
result of the bodily and mental activity of the maker. Hence
what makes the pot or the cloth is not the spiritual entity, the
Self. The Self is directly related to the bodily and mental activi-
ties, yoga and upqyoga, which in their turn are able to make
external objects operating as nimitta karta, instrumental cause.
Thus it is pointed out that the Self cannot even be the nimitta
karta of external objects except through the instrumentality of his
own body and mind.

WFJT \\\*\\\
Je poggaladawanam parinama honti nana avarana
Na karedi tani ada jo janadi so havadi nani (101)

1 01. Those material modifications which become jndna
varana, knowledge-obscuring karma, the Self does not make.
He who knows this is the Knower.

COMMENTARY

]ndnavarana y the knowledge-obscuring karma., is here
taken as a type of karma. What is true of this karma, must
be taken as true in the case of the remaining harm as also.
What is asserted here is that the knowledge-obscuring karma,
jndnavarana karma, is but the modification of the material parti-
cles which are suitable to build up the structure of karma. Such
particles of matter are called karma-prayogya-pudgala-paramanus
the primary atoms fit to make the karmc particles. Thus the
various karmas are but the modifications of matter of which the
Self, the Knower, cannot in any way be the substantive cause. For
example milk may get transformed into curd, butters etc. The person
who supervises the dairy operations is only the spectator of the
various modifications of milk. Similarly the Self is only a spectator

SAMAYSARA

of the various processes by which the material particles get trans-
formed into karmic particles. One who knows these material
changes and the nature of the pure Self, who is only a spectator
of these changes is the real Jnani, the Knower par excellence.

STRT $

< TOT ft =F*T flt TOT

Jam bhavam suhamasuham karedi ada sa tassa kalu katta
Tarn tassa hodi kammam so tassa du vedago appa (i 02 )

*r TOT

.sr TOT cf

102. Of whatever psychic disposition, good or bad, the
Self is produced he is certainly the (substantive) cause. That dis-
position becomes his karma or action and the Self enjoys the fruits

thereof.

COMMENTARY

Psychic disposition or bhava is of three kinds, subha bhava
asttbka bhdva, and suddha bhava, good disposition, bad dis-
position, and pure disposition beyond' good and evil. The first
two are the characteristics of the empirical Self which is subject
to karme bondage, and the third refers to the Self in his pristine
purity. Subha bhava is associated with virtuous conduct ,or
pttnya, and aatbha bhava is associated with evil or pdp a
The former may lead to happiness and the latter to misery'
The third being beyond good and evil, transcends the worldly
pleasure or pain and implies eternal bliss, characteristic of the
transcendental Self. The psychic disposition both good and
evil are modifications in. the empirical Self, according to its
ethical nature. Whether the Self be good or bad, it can only
manifest in corresponding psychic dispositions and have nothing
to do with karate material modifications.

The author next explains the reasons why the Self cannot
be the causal agent producing modifications in alien things.

CHAPTER HI g C)

Jo jamhi guno davve so annamhi du na sankamadi dauve
So annamasankatto kaha tarn parinamaye da warn (103)
5ft ^FR Wt

1 1 ? o 3 1 1

103. Whatever be the essential quality of a particular subs-
tance it cannot be transported to another substance of a
different nature. Thus being non-transportable, how can the qua-
lity of one substance manifest as the quality of another substance ?

COMMENTARY

Jaina metaphysics recognises various drayyas or substances
each with its own proper gunas or qualities. Thus ''jwa, the Self.
has its peculiar quality of chetana, and pudgala or matter Its own
quality achetana. The former is conscious and the latter is non-
conscious. Similarly with the other drayyas. Since the quality
of a substance is the result of the manifestations of the
intrinsic nature of that substance neither the quality nor the
substance can be separated from each other. Since the drayya
and its guna are so inseparably united the guna of one drayya
cannot be transferred to another drayya. Thus the gunas are
non-transferrable, and the dravjas are non-transmutable. Thus
the chetana drayya^ the Self, cannot manifest as achetana drayya
or matter. Conversely matter cannot manifest as Self.

cf ^^"W^cft ^f^ ^ cT^9T ^ft" ^"rTT II

Davva gunassa ya ada na kunadi poggalamayamhi kammamhi
Tarn ubhayamakuvvanto tamhi kaham tassa so katta (104)

ll?oY||

104. The Self does not influence the substance or the attri-
butes 1 of karma which are of material nature. Thus being in-
capable of influencing these two (aspects) of karmas, how can
he be their upaddna karta (substantive causal agent).

COMMENTARY
The clay out of which a pot is made has its distinct quality.

90 SAMAYSARA

The potter in making the pot, makes use of this substance with
its own quality. In making the pot, he cannot be said to manifest
in the form of pot . He is not the karta in that sense, though he
makes the pot. He being a conscious spiritual entity, can in no
way become achetana material pot. Similarly the Self, being a
chetana entity cannot manifest into karmic forms of material
nature. He is not the karta nor the causal agent producing
those karmas. This indirectly refutes the metaphysical doctrine
which derives the whole of the physical universe, as a manifesta-
tion of Paramatma or Brahman, who is by nature a pure
chetana dravya.

II? o^U

Jivamhi hedubhude bandhassa ya passiduna parinamam
Jivena kadam kammam bhannadi vuvayaramattena (105)

f^ SR 1 W ^TWTWtw II? o^H

105. When it is perceived that while the Self remains as
the ground, the modification of karmic bondage appears (as
consequence), it is figuratively said that the karmas are produced
by the Self.

COMMENTARY

The presence of the Self is merely a nimitta condition which
produces in the karmic materials the various modifications of
karma such as jnanavaramya, darsanavaraniya, etc. Noticing
this relation, the popular mind describes by a figure of speech
that the Self is the karta or the agent of those karmic modifi-
cations. The commentators give an illustration. The presence of
the sun in a particular position with reference to clouds may result
in the formation of rainbow. This rainbow is associated with
the clouds, though its appearance is consequent upon the sun
remaining in a particular position. Similarly the presence of
the Self results in modification of several karmas out of 'karmic
materials present therein. In both the cases the causal agency is
only figuratively true.

CHAPTER III 91

The author emphasises the same point by citing a popular
illustration.

II? o^l |

Jodehim kade juddhe rayena kadanti jampade logo
Taha vavaharena kadam nanavaranadi jivena (106)

1 1 ? o 1 1

106. When a war is waged by warriors, ordinary people
say that the king is engaged in war, from the practical point of
view. Similarly jndnavaramya, etc., is said to be produced by the
jiva. or Self.

COMMENTARY

Karmas like jnanavaraniya are the result of the operations
of karmic materials. The Self or dtma is not directly responsible
for these operations and yet he is spoken of as the causal agent
producing these karmas. This statement is purely from the prac-
tical standpoint, and hence it should not be taken to be true from
the absolute point of view. The practical point of view is ex-
plained by a simile which is obvious.

Uppadedi karediya bandhadi parinamayadi ginhadi ya

Ada poggaladavvam vavaharanayasya vattawam (107)

107. It is stated from the practical point of view that the
Self produces, shapes, binds, causes to modify, and assimilates
(karmic) matter.

COMMENTARY

Utpadayati implies the different formations of the different
types of karmic matter out of the material particles suitable to
such formations.

SAMAYSARA

Kareti implies the shaping of these types in different intensity.

Bandbnati implies determining the duration of bondage and
their capacity to produce pleasure-pain experience.

Parindmayeti implies modifications in their nature on account
of which they may appear and produce effects or get withered
after having produced the results.

Grihnati implies the process of attraction through which the
karmic materials are assimilated so as to fill the whole of the Self.
The Self himself being pure is not responsible for any of these
operations and yet he is credited with these activities only from
the practical point of view.

TFTT

||9 /;il

"O *O \ ^** ' '

Jaha raya vavahara desagunuppadagotti alavido
Taha jivo vavahara davvagunuppada ago bhanido (io8)

TRT

1 1 ^ ^i i

108. As a king is said to be, from the practical point of view,
the producer of vice or virtue (in his subjects), so also from the
practical point of view, the Self is said to be the producer of kar-
mic materials and their properties.

COMMENTARY

Puaya or papa, virtue or vice, are considered to be different
material modifications of karmic matter. Though they correspond
to the normal characteristics of the individual still they cannot
be considered to be produced by the Self, since the Self being a
chetana entity cannot produce aehetana karmic material forms.
If he is spoken of as a causal agent it is only metaphorically true.

\\\*\\\

Samannapachya khalu chavuro bhannanti bandhakattaro
Michchattam aviramanam kasayajoga ya boddhawa (109)

CHAPTER III 95

109. The general karmic conditions, pratyqycis 9 are primarily
four in number. They are said to be the immediate agents bringing
about karmic bondage. These must be understood to be wrong
belief, non-discipline, gross emotions, mdyoga or psycho-physical
structure, conditioning the activity of thought, word, and deed.

I?? o||

Tesim punovi ya imo bhanido bhedo do terasaviyappo
Michchaditthiadi Java sajogissa charamantam (no)

f*^iqre^^^ H??H

no. Of these pratayas, thirteen further subdivisions of
secondary conditions (based upon dsravas) are mentioned, which
are the various gunasthdnas (stages of spiritual development)
beginning from miihyadnshti or wrong believer, and ending with
sayogikevali (the perfect being still with joga or psychophysical
structure) conditioning the activity of thought, word, and deed.

u n ?n

Yede achedana kalu poggalakammudaya sambhava jamha
Te jadi karanti kammam navi tesim vedago ada (in)

n n ?u

in. These stages (brought about by uttara pratyayas or
subsidiary conditions) are really .acbatana, non-conscious, because
they are brought about by the manifestation of material karmas\
if really they are the immediate causal conditions producing
tht'&arwas, then the Self cannot enjoy their fruits.

II

Gunsannida du yede kammam kuwanti pachchaya Jamha
Tamha'jivo akatta guna ya kowanti kammani (112)

ffor ^r^TT ^^ra; i.

94 SAMAYSARA

112. Because these conditions called gunasthdnas produce
karmas, therefore the Self is not their author. Only the condi-
tions called gupasthdnas produce the karmas.

COMMENTARY

The conditions which bring about bondage are of two kinds:
mulapratyaya or primary conditions, and uttarapratyayd or secon-
dary conditions. The former is of four sorts and the latter of
thirteen as enumerated above. The pratyayds or conditions are
material in nature, and hence achetana, non-conscious. They
are mainly responsible for the various karmic modifications. Hence
they constitute the karta of the various karmas, and not the Self.
Thus the Self, being in noway the causal agent of the karmas,
cannot be spoken of as the bhokta or the enjoyer of the fruits
thereof. Thus these pratyayas are said to be the immediate cause of
the karmic modifications. Though the pure Self is not in any way
responsible for these karmic modifications,, the impure Self in
samara may be said to be the remote causal agent of these kar-
mas, Thus from the absolute point of view, the pure Self is
neither karta nor bhokta, neither the actor nor the enjoyer, where-
as the impure empirical Self is both karta and bhokta, doer and
the enjoyer. Thus the Sankhya conception ^ purmha, that he
is only the enjoyer and not the doer of karmas, is rejected here.
He who enjoys the * karmas must also be its agent. If he is not
the one, he cannot be the other. In his pure nature, the Self has
neither aspects but in his impure form he has both the aspects.

Next the author states thatyf^ %&& pratyayds, the Self and
karmic conditions are not absolutely identical.

1 1 \ \ 3 1 1

no

(113)

\\\\\\\

113. If anger is non-different from the Self, just as upayoga,
then-it must result in the identity of the Self with the non-seE

n^lw ^T ^^T^roTxT Tl^T 1 1 \ \ 3 1 1

Jaha jivassa anannuvavogo koho vi taha jadi anno
Jivassajivassa ya* yevamanannatta bhavannam

W sfaw^R- sqqfa: ^Wtsfq- g*TT ^^Fq":

CHAPTER III 95

*fr % | fwret
start qr^uiW+Hiqw i i

Eva miha jodu jivo so cheva du niyamado taha jivo
Ayameyatte doso pachchayano kamma kammanam (114)

114. If the pratyayas or the /kznw conditions, karmas
(karmic modifications) and non-karmas (body building material
particles) are identified with the Self (in an unqualified form) it
will lead to the erroneous conclusion that whatever is Self is in
reality non-seE

sproft ^tft STWJRSftTFFft ^fe ^ I

\\l\\\\

Aha puna anno koho annuva vogappago havadi cheda
Jahakoho taha pachchaya kammam no kammamavi annam(ii5)

115. And if (you agree that) anger is one thing and the
conscious Self is entirely a different one, then like anger, the
pratyayds (or conditions), karmas (karmic modifications), and
non-karmas (body-building material particles) must also be admit-
ted to be different (from the conscious Self).

COMMENTARY

The intrinsic attribute of the Self is upayoga, cognitive acti-
vity This intrinsic quality is therefore inseparable from the
dtma or the Self. But this Self loses its nature when it is in asso-
ciation with the achetana matter in samara. As a result of
this combination, several psycho-physical modifications appear.
Anger is one such modification. Since it is the result of asso-
ciation with matter, it is said to retain the attributes of its ori-
gin of being non-conscious. This non-conscious experience
of the emotion of anger must be entirely distinct from the pure
Self characterised by upayoga. Without noticing this funda-
mental difference, if anger or krodha is elevated to the privileged

SAMAYSARA

position of upayoga and is considered as an intrinsic attribute
of the Self, then the Self will be endowed with an achetana
attribute and fundamental distinction between jiva and ajwa
will vanish and with ihztjwa itself will disappear. In order to
avoid such an inconvenient conclusion of denying the existence
of the Self altogether if you hold that krodha or anger is entirely
distinct tomjwa> then you must consistently maintain a similar
attitude with regard "to the other material modifications such as
pratyay&s, karmas and non-karmas, since there is no difference in
nature between these and krodha. If krodha and pratyaya are
absolutely different from the Self then there could be no pos-
sibility of association of the Self with upadhis. Therefore the
author emphasises here that the karmic upadhis and the impure
psychic states generated thereby are only partially different from
the Self (and not absolutely).

Next the author points out what absurdity would result
from maintaining that pratyajds, etc. are absolutely different from
jwa.

-g UT

irtf? ii

Jive na sayam badham na sayam parinamadi kammabhavena
Jadi poggaladawaminam apparinami tada hodi (116)

1 16. If matter, in the form of karmas, is not of its own accofd
bound with the Self, nor of itself evolves into modes of karma,
then it becomes immutable.

Kamma yiya vagganasu ya aparinama ntisu kammabhavena
Samsarasse abhavo pasajjade sankhasamavo va (117)

If the primary karmic molecules do not transform
themselves into various karmic modes (associated with jwa)

CHAPTER III 97

then it will lead to the non-existence of samsara as in the case
of the Sankhya system,

Jivo parinamayade poggaladawani kammabhavena

Tarn saya maparinamantam kahamnu parinamayadi cheda(ii$)

1 1 8. If you maintain that it is the Self that transforms the
primary karmic molecules into various karmic modes, then how
is it possible for the Self who Is a chetana entity to cause
transformation in a thing which is by nature non-transformable.

Aha sayameva hi partnamadi kammabhavena poggalam dav-

vam

Jive parinamayade kammam kammatta midi michcha (119)

s* ; " ^R" WR^T ?^T^c^^FT !

119. Then it follows that matter of its own accord trans-
forms itself into various modes of karmas. Hence it is false to
maintain that jiva causes this transformation into karmic modes.

JS[iyama kammaparinadam kammam chi ya hodi poggalam

davvam

Taha tam nanavaranal parinadam munatu tachcheva (120)

120. The primary karmic molecules which undergo trans-
formation as various karmic modes are in reality material in nature.
Know ye, then that the karmic modifications such z$ jnanavara-
mja, knowledge-obscuring karmas, 'etc. are also of similar
nature.

g SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

Samara ot concrete life implies embodied nature of the Self.
This embodied existence of the empirical Self is primarily due
to the association with karmic matter. This association with
karmic matter is present through the career of the empirical Self.
This karmic material which is associated with the Self through-
out its samsaric life is made up of minute material particles. These
minute material particles must constitute various types of
material aggregates or types of karma. These various types
or modes of karma get inextricably bound with the nature
of the Self and this intimate association of Self with
matter is called karmic bondage. These two processes of
forming karmic aggregates from primary karmic . molecules,
and these aggregates binding themselves with the Self, are en-
tirely the result of the manifestation of karmic toolecules. If
this tendency of matter to manifest itself into karmic modes is
denied then there will be no 'karmas. When there are no kar-
mas there is no karmic bondage and when there is no karmic
bondage, the Self must remain pure and unsullied as in the case
of the purusha in the Sankhya philosophy. If the Self remains
perfectly pure in himself, -there is no chance for his embodied
existence and no scope for samara. This is absurd as it is con-
trary to our experience. If in order to avoid this inconvenient
conclusion, it is maintained that the Self by his own intrinsic poten-
cy, produces the transformation of karma types from primary
material molecules and ties himself to these types of his own
accord, then this leads to an equally impossible position. Matter
itself being incapable of transformation cannot be forcibly made
to undergo transformation by any alien influence. Hence it must
be maintained that matter by nature is capable of transformation
and it is this process of transformation which matter under-
goes that results in the formation of various types of karmas such
i&jnandvaranJya.

Thus in order to refute the Sankhya point of view, the ten-
dency to manifest is predicated of matter. Similarly the same
attribute is said to be true of the Self in the following gathas.

CHAPTER II 99

W 33RT ^T ^T ^T

Na sayambaddho kamme nasayam parinamadi kohamadihim
Jadi esa tujjha jivo apparinaml tada hodi (121)

121.

. If according to your view the Self by himself is not
bound by karmas and does not have emotional modifications ^ such
as anger, etc., then he must by nature remain non-manifesting.

The' next gdtha says what is wrong if the Self remains incap-
able of manifestation.

wr

Aparinamamtamhi sayam jive kohadi ehi bhavehim
Samsarassa abhavo pasajjade sankhasamavo va ^ (122)

122. If the Self does not of his own accord undergo emo-
tional modifications such as anger, then empirical life or samara
will cease to be. This would result in the Sankhya view.

123)

: u

j2 3 If you maintain that It is harmic matter, by its own
potency,' that causes in the Self emotional modifications such as
anger, then how is it possible for matter to produce any modifi-
cation in the Self which is by nature incapable ofmanifestation.

qfwrfe ^wm ^r z *<& i

\\w\\

Aha sayamappa parinamadi koha bhavena esa de buddhi
Koho parinamayade jivam koha tta midi michcha (124)

ICO SAMAYSARA

1 24. If it is your belief that the Self, without any extraneous
influence, undergoes emotional modifications such as anger, then
Oh disciple ! your statement, "karmic matter of anger produces
in the Self the emotion of anger," becomes false.

^TRT ^t^Wrft f=T"fe ^tfl" 11

kohuva jutto koho manuvajutto ya manamevada
Mavovajutto maya lohuva jutto havadi loho ( I2 5)

1 1

125. The Self in association with karmic material conditions
of anger, has the emotion of anger; of pride, has the emotion of
pride; of deceipt, has the emotion of deceipt; of greed, has the
emotion of greed.

COMMENTARY

The argument employed in the case of matter that it is capable
of modification is repeated in the case of jwa. If the Self is by
himself incapable of karmic bondage and is incapable of emotional
modification of anger, he must remain pure and unchanging like
the Sankhya purusha. Hence there is no scope for samara.
In order to avoid this, conclusion, if matter is credited with poten-
cy to cause emotional modifications in the ^elf, then this problejn
will remain unanswered. How can matter in any way produce
changes in an alien entity, the Self, which is taken to be unchange-
able in nature. Hence it must be accepted that the Self is capable
of undergoing emotional modifications when influenced by kar-
mic materials operating as nimitta condition.

^ft

WTWWt* 3tbu|:|uprgft ^unfrittl II

Jam kunadi bhavamada katta so hodi tassa bhavassa
Nanissa du nanamavo annanamayo ananissa (126)

CHAPTER III 1 01

1 1

126. Into whatever, mode the Self manifests himself, he is
the upaddna karta substantial agent of that mode. If the mani-
festing agent is the Self with the right knowledge, then the corres-
ponding mode will also be of the same nature, i.e., right know-
ledge. If the manifesting Self is of wrong knowledge, the
corresponding mode in this case will be wrong knowledge.

COMMENTARY

If the Self is incapable of manifestation, then it is not possible
to speak of psychic modifications either pure or impure.

M

Annanamavo bhavo ananino kunadi tena kammani
Nanamavo nanissa du na kunadi tamha du kammani (127)

^TffcT

127. The Self ignorant of his true nature, manifests in the
form of wrong knowledge and through this wrong knowledge,
he makes karmas. But the Self aware of his true nature has the
manifestation of right knowledge and because of this right know-
ledge he does not make any karmas.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is made evident that the Self, who is ignorant of his
true nature, identifies himself with alien objects and characteris-
tics Because of this erroneous identification or adhyasa, he
develops various impure dispositions which finally end' in karnnc
bondage But the Self with right knowledge realises his nature
to be entirely distinct from alien things and attributes and hence
never has any impure psychic experience. Thus remaining pure
in himself, karmas do not approach him and hence no karmu
bondage for him. He remains pure and perfect untouched by
*** In short, wrong knowledge makes the Self wander in
.samara whereas right* knowledge leads to mokska. .

102 SAMAYSARA

Nanamaya bhavavo nanamavo cheva jayade bhavo
Jamha tamha nanissa sawe bhava du nanamaya

1 1

128. If right knowledge alone can produce the mode or
disposition of right knowledge, then it follows that every manifes-
tation of the Self knowing his true nature must be of the nature
of right knowledge.

SfHFWTT

Annanamaya bhava annano cheva jayade bhavo

Jamha Tamha sawe bhava annanamaya ananissa (129)

129. If wrong knowledge alone can produce the mode or
disposition of wrong knowledge, then it follows that every mani-
festation of the Self ignorant of his true nature, must be of the
nature of wrong knowledge.

The same point is emphasised through an illustration.

Kanaya maya bhavado jayante kundaladayo bhava
Ayamayiya bhavado jaha jayante du kadayadi (130)

1 1 \\ o 1 1

^TRT cTfT ff 1% 1 1 \ ^\ 1 1

Annanamaya bhavo annanino bahuviha bi jayante
Nanissa du nanamaya sawe bhava taha honti (131)

n ? 3 ?u

CHAPTER III liD 3

1 30 and 1 5 1 : From gold only golden ornaments like ear-rings
etc., can be produced and from iron only iron chains etc., can be
produced. In the same manner, all modifications of the know-
ing Self, must be of the nature of right knowledge, whereas the
various modifications of the Self ignorant of his true nature would
be of the nature of wrong knowledge.

The various modifications of the impure Self are described

next.

II

Ananassa saudayo jam jivanam atachchauvaladdhi
Mkhchattassa du udayo jam jivassa asaddahanattam (i 3 2)

Jo du kabusouvavogo jivanam so kasavudavo
Udavo Asanjamassa du jam jivanam haveyi aviramanam (i 3 3)

U

Tarn jana jogavudayam jo jivanam tu chittauuchchaho
Sohanamasohanam va kayavvo viradibhavo va (i34)

Jft ^WHt % TOfcSTf: I

frd^rrat ^r u?

Edesu hedubhudesu kammaiya vagganagayam jantu
Parinamade attaviham Nanavaranadi bhavehim

104 SAMAYSARA

f ftfe t .

Tarn kalu jivanibaddham kammaiya vagganagayam jayiya
Tayiya du hodi hedu jivo parinama bhavanam ( I 36)

132 to 136. Know ye, that if there is in the Self knowledge
of things that are not real, it is due to the operatidn of nescience
(karmic materials interfering with right knowledge); absence
of belief in the reals is due to the operation of mithydtva karma;
impure cognitive activity in the Self is due to the rise of kashaja
(soul-soiling karmas\ non-discipline in the Self is due to the rise
of conduct perverting karma; the tendency to act through
thought, word; and deed is due to the rise of yoga (or the psycho-
physical structure). Know ye, that everything that ought to be
done is good and everything that ought to be discarded is bad.
Thus conditioned by the primary karmic materials, are produced
the eight types of karmic psychic dispositions such as jnana-
varantya (knowledge-obscuring). And thus when the eight types
of karmic materials bound to the Self begin to operate, there
arise in the Self corresponding psychic dispositions of which the
Self is the causal agent,

COMMENTARY

Thus it is emphasised once again that the various psychic
modifications in the Self are caused by nescience and that
these impure modifications can be got rid of only by true
knowledge.

Next it is said from the real point of view that the various
manifestations of the Self are entirely different from those of mate-
rial karmas.

sftTO | ^^ q- ^ qrftTOT f fffr TFTRt 1
Ctcf sfrcft ^TCTf ^ $fa ^TTfeTR^^ ll^vsll

Jivassa du kammena ya sahaparinama hu honti ragadi
Evam jivo Kammam cha dovi ragadimavanna (137)

CHAPTER III 105

Ekassa du parinamo jayadi jivassa ragamadihim

Ta kammodaya hedu hi vina jivassa parinamo (138)

137 and 138. If attachment and other emotions are really
produced by the Self and the karmas co-operating together as
updddna causal conditions, then both the Self and the karmic
matter will be able to appear in the form of the psychic mode of
attachment. If the Self manifesting by himself is capable of
producing attachment and' other psychic modifications, then it
must follow that even the pure Self without the influence of kar-
mic materials must be able to manifest into impure forms of psy-
chic modes such as attachment.

COMMENTARY

In the first case when both jiva and karma co-operate to
produce the psychic mode of attachment, both operating as upd-
ddna kdrana, then according to the principle of the identity of
cause and effect, even karmic' matter which cooperates with
jiva must be assumed to be psychical in nature, because the result
produced, attachment, is psychical. Thus matter will become
a chetana entity which is untrue. If in order to get over^this
difficulty, the Self is assumed to produce the psychic modifica-
tions of an impure nature without any alien influence, then this
tendency must be present even in the pure Self. That is, since
the nature of the Self contains in a latent form the tendency to
produce impure psychic modifications, there can be no such thing
called pure Self. This means complete denial of the possibi-
lity of moksha.

h+-+lTt+i

SAMAYSARA

Jayi jivena sahachchiya poggaladavassa kammaparinamo
Evam poggala jiva hu do vi kammattamavanna (139)

srf^ >sfttT *n[ ^ ^T553o3^r ^nfqrfcnw. i

Iwr 3>wnRr qfwnft

Ekkassa du parinamo poggaladawassa kanimabhavena
Ta jivabhava heduliim vina kammassa parinamo (140)

159 and 140. If dravya karmic modes are really produced
by matter in co-operation with jtva, as updddna condition., then
matter and Self will both become dravya karmas (matter). If
matter manifesting by itself is capable of producing karmic
modes without the influence of the self, then all matter as such
must be able to manifest as karmic modes.

COMMENTARY

Here in the first caseyftw (one of the co-operating causes)
will become achetana dravya^ because the effect (dravya karma) is
achetana. In the second case all matter as such must be capable of
manifesting as karmic modes. Both the conclusions are impossible.

Jive kammam baddham puttham chedi vavaharanayabhanidam
Suddhanayassa du jive avaddhaputtham havai kammam (141)

141. From the yy'avahdra point of view, it is said that kar-
bind and are in contact with the Self; but from the pure (ab-
solute) point of view, karmas neither bind nor are in contact
with the Self. Thus from the different points of view the Self
is said to be either bound or free according as it is associated
with npddhis or free from them,

CHAPTER III I0 7

After stating that bondage and freedom are predicated of
the Self according to different points of view the author next
points out that samayasdra, or Ego-in-itself, is beyond the view
points.

Kammam baddhamabaddham jive edam to jana nayapakkham
Pakkhatikkanto puna bhannadi jo so samayasaro (142)

142. That the Self is bound with karmas and that it is not
bound with karmas are statements made from different points

of view.

But the essence of the Self transcends these aspects. So it

is said.

Next the author describes the nature of the transcendental Self.

^fjffr w^ ?rfrK srm Tj reft 1 *+i*n( i
TJT i wrw ffrffe f%^r U^H^MR^^ uwii

Donhavi nayana bhanidam janai navarim to samayapadivaddho
Na dunayapak^amginhadikimchivinayapakkhaparihino (143)

S^ftrft 1 ^FTt^Tcf 5TFTT% ^^ ^ ^*iMMPaq: I

^ <r ^FT^f ifr^r f^ 3 ^^ ^Rq-^rf^r: u t^u

u

143. It is the Self whose attention is inwardly directed on
himself that really knows the two natures, pure and impure, which
are described by the two points of view (real and practical).
But the transcendental Self who is beyond these points of view
does not apprehend them.

COMMENTARY

Jaina metaphysics recognises three kinds of telt-bahirdma
antaratma, and ^7^-the outer Self, the inner Setf and

antaratma, an - ,

the transcendental Self respectively. The first kind of Self on
account of ignorance identifies himself with the body and other
external objects: certainly an attitude which ought to be dis-
carded- the second kind certainly recognises that his nature is

108 SAMAYSARA

quite different from matetial objects , including the body. This
discriminative knowledge leads to the further investigation of
the nature of the Self. Research into the nature of any reality,
according to Jaina philosophy., is undertaken from different nay as
or points of view. Thus the study of the true nature of the Self
is undertaken by the antardtman, the inner Self whose attention
is concentrated upon his own nature. The nature of the Self
so investigated appears either in bondage or free from bondage.
Both these descriptions are from the relative points of view of
antardtman whose sole aim is to discover, the nature of the Self
through srutajnana or scriptural knowledge. In the third case
these two relational aspects have no relevancy, paramdtma swarupa
refers to" the Perfect Self, which state is the result of self-realisation
through tapas otjoga. Naturally therefore this absolute transcen-
dental Self is quite beyond the relational aspects and represents
the highest nature of reality which ought to be the goal of all

%

3ft ^

Samniaddamsanananam eso lahaditti rjavari vavadesam
Savvanayapakldiarahido bhanido jo so samayasaro (144)

144. That the Self is really characterised by Right Percep-
tion and Right knowledge is an assertion (made by those who
adopt the different points of view) and what transcends all points
of view is said to be samayasara.

COMMENTARY

The term samayasdra means the essential nature of the Self.
This Absolute Ultimate Unity is transcendental in nature. Hence
the various appellation based upon different points of view really
have no relevancy in that state.

The two characters, jfva and qjiva, which appeared, on the
stage as 'Karta and Karma, each realising its true nature exit from
the stage.

Thus ends the Second Act.

CHAPTER IV 109

CHAPTER IV

PUNYA AND PAPA VIRTUE AND VICE.
The single actor Karma enters the stage putting on the garb
of two different characters,, Punya and Papa, Virtue and Vice.

t ftf?

Kammamasuham kusilani Suhakammam chavi janayisusilam
Kaha tarn hodi susilam jam samsaram pavesedi (145)

145. Know ye, that the karma leading to wrong conduct
is bad and that leading to right conduct is good. How can that
be right conduct which pushes jiva into samsdra (cycle of births
and deaths).

COMMENTARY

The distinction of karma into good and bad is based upon
practical morality. What is good may lead one to the plea-
sures of swarga and what is evil may lead one to the miseries
of Hell. Even the life of a deva in Swarga, is only a life in samsdra.
Swarga or naraka is merely a branch of samsdra, the cycle of
births and deaths. The ultimate ideal set up transcends both
good and evil and is beyond samsdra. Hence whatever leads
to -samsdra is undesirable from this ultimate point of view. Hence
the interrogation, "How can that be right conduct which pushes
jiva into samsdra ?".

Next the same point is elucidated by an example.

Sovanniyampi niyalam vandhadi kalayasam cha jaha purisam
Vandadievamjivamsubhamasubhamvakadamkammam (146)

r f

146. A shackle made of gold is as good as one made of iron

IIO SAMAYSARA

for the purposl of chaining a man. Similarly karma whether
good or bad equally binds the jiva.

COMMENTARY

The distinction between good karma and bad karma is mean-
ingless since the effect in both is identically the same.

Tahmadu kusilahiya rayam makahi mava samsaggam
Sahinohi vinaso kusila samsaggarayena (147)

: TFT

147. Therefore do not have attachment for or association
with undesirable karmas whether good or bad; by such attach-
ment for or association with undesirable karmas the destruction
will be inevitable.

COMMENTARY

Both the karmas are to be avoided as they lead to the same
undesirable result.

The author emphasises the same point through an analogy.

Jahanama kovi puriso kuchchiya silam janam viyanitta
Vajjedi tena samayam samsaggam rayakaranam cha (148)

Emeva Kamma payadi silasahavam cha kuchchidam nadum
Vajjanti pariharanti ya tarn samsaggam sahavarada (149)

148 and 149. As a person knowing certain people to be of

CHAPTER IV III

bad character gives up association with and attachment for them,
even so, those desiring to realise the Pure Self and knowing the
nature and character of karmic prakritis to be evil, prevent the
approach of karmic particles (samvara) and root out the already
existing ones, (mrjara).

COMMENTARY

The Commentator, Amritachandra, gives an additional illus-
tration. A clever wild male elephant, sees a decoy-female elephant
with pleasant looks or otherwise approaching him with flattering
gestures with the object of chaining him. Learning her evil
purpose, he does not evince any affection towards her nor does
he associate with her. In the same manner an enlightened Self,
knowing that the approach of karmas^ whether pleasant or un-
pleasant, is for the purpose of binding him, avoids them and gives
up any association with them.

That the two karmas should be rejected is further empha-
sised on the authority of dgama or Scripture.

Ratto bandhadi kammam munchadi jivo viragasampanno
Eso jinovadeso tahma kammesu marajja ( X 5)

150. The self with attachment gets bound by karwas but
the one with detachment remains free from karmas. So has
the Jina declared. Therefore do not evince attraction towards
karmas.

COMMENTARY

Thus attachment and detachment are shown to be the causes
of bondage and liberation respectively.

\\\\\\\

Paramatto kalu samavo suddho jo Kevali muni nanl
Tahmitida sahave munino pavanti niwanam (151)

112 SAMAYSARA

^

*pRT:

151. Verily, the supreme .teal, the Self, the Pure, the Omni-
scient, the Seer, and the Knower (all mean the paramdtmd). Thus
with the contemplation fixed on the Pure Self, the Rishis attain
Nirvana. ;

COMMENTARY

Paramatma is described in the following terms for the corres-
ponding reasons. He is said to be paramartha because he is the
highest reality; he is samqya as he is the Self manifesting in pure
qualities and modes; he is suddha the pure, as he is free from
karmas both material and psychical; he is kevali because his nature
of omniscience is unaided by any extraneous means such as sense-
perception; he is muni because of the intuitive perception of rea-
lity; and he hjnani because he is of the nature of jndna or know-
ledge. Though these are different names, they all refer to the
same reality.

1 1

Paramattimmiya atido jo kunadi tavam vadam cha dharayadi
Tarn sawam balatavam balavadam vinti savvahunu (152)

152. If one performs (tapas) austerities or observes (vra-
tas}. vows without fixed contemplation on the Supreme Self,
the all-knowing call all that (bdlatapd) childish austerity and (bdla-
watd) childish vow.

COMMENTARY

jndna is the ultimate cause of moksha or Liberation. What-
ever is done without the background of right knowledge will
not achieve its ends. Imitation is a characteristic of the child.
Whatever is done through imitation is certainly lacking in the
inner background of knowledge. Hence imitative behaviour

CHAPTER IV IX 3

in the child cannot have the same effect as in the case of an adult
individual. Such an imitative behaviour may be an amusing
play and cannot have any real significance. Similarly the perfor-
mance of tapas and observance ot-vratas without the necessary
background of correct knowledge will be merely imitative be-
haviour on the part of an ignorant person; hence would not pro-
duce the desired goal or ideal. In order to expose the futility
of imitative behaviour without the background of correct know-
ledge, the author calls them balatapas and balavratas.

cr?rr ^

Vadaniyamani dharanta silani taha tavam cha kuvvanta
Paramatta vahira jena tena te honti annani (153)

f: sfterfr "

153. Those who are outside the presence of paramartha. or
Supreme Self even though they observe vows, restraints, and rules
of conduct and practice austerities are devoid of right knowledge.

COMMENTARY

True knowledge is the condition for moksha or Liberation.
When that is absent, mere external activities such as strict obser-
vance of rules of conduct and performance of severe austerities
will be of no avail. They by themselves cannot lead to Nirvana.
Absence of true knowledge will certainly lead to^rmc bondage.

tf fa*flHsiii awkir ti

Paramattavahira ]e te annaneria punnamichchanti
Samsaragamana hedum vimokkha hedum ayananta (154)

154 Those who are outside the presence of paramartha
or Supreme Self, through their ignorance-not knowing that

114 SAMAYSARA

virtue leads to samara, desire the same with the belief that it
lead to moksha.

COMMENTARY

Those who observe all the rulei of conduct imagining that
they are walking the path which leads to moksha are entirely mis-
taken. Even good conduct leads to karmic bondage. An igno-
rant person who is not aware of this truth and who boastingly
exclaims, "I have kept up all the commandments, what more shall
I do to enter into kingdom of God", will soon be disillusioned.

Thus ends the Chapter on Punya.

Next the author takes up the discussion of papa or Vice.
He indirectly implies that Vice is the cau.se of samara by stating
the opposite moksha and its cause.

Jivadi saddahanam sammattam tesimadigamo nanam
- Ragadi pariharanam charanam eso du mokkhapaho (155)

155. Belief in the paddrthas such as soul; etc., is right faith,
and knowing their true nature is right knowledge; then rooting
out attachment, etc., is right conduct These together consti-
tute the path to moksha.

COMMENTARY

These, are the well-known three jewels or the ratnatraja
which constitute \htmokshamarga, according to Jainism. ILat/iatra-
ya or the three jewels are considered from two points of view,
vyavahara and nischaya. Vyavahara ratnatraja gradually leads to
moksha, and nischaya ratnatraya directly leads to moksha.

Of these two the Rishi must choose the direct and the imme-
diate path to moksha, that is real or higher ratnatraja. But
the other one which operates gradually in, producing the fruit
ought to be accepted by the ordinary mortals.

CHAPTER IV *

Mottuna nichchayattam vavahare na vidusa pavatthanti
Paramattamassi danam du jadina kammakkhavo viliivo (156)

156. Since it is declared that destruction of karmas is possi-
ble only to those jatis who adopt the absolute point of view,
the wise ones will not walkthrough (vyavaharamarga) the practical
path leaving aside the (nischya marga) absolute one.

COMMENTARY

When there are two courses of action open to a person, the
superior and the inferior, the wise will always choose the supe-

rior one.

Next it is pointed out how this path to salvation is obstructed
by the operation of evil karmic conditions such as mithyatva
or wrong belief, etc.

Vatthassa sedabhavo jaha nasedi malavimelanachchanno
Michchattamalochchannamtahasammattamkhu nadawam (157)

"TFT 'ftfe tj n^ \\v\t\\

Vatthassa sedabhavo jaha nasedi malavimelanachchanno
Annanamalochchannam taha nanam hodi nadawam (i 5 8)

\\
WTtfe

*l ti

I]E 6 SAMAYSARA

Vatthassa sedabhavo jaha nasedi malavimelanachchanno
Taha du kasayachchannam charittam hodi nadavvam (159)

157, 158 and 159. As the whiteness of cloth is destroyed
by its being covered with dirt, so let it be known that right faith
is blurred by wrong belief. As the whiteness of cloth is destro-
yed by its being covered with dirt, so let it be known that right
knowledge is destroyed, when clouded by nescience. As the
whiteness of cloth is destroyed by its being covered with dirt,
so let it be known that right conduct becomes perverted when
vitiated by soul-soiling passions.

COMMENTARY

Faith, knowledge and conduct, so long as they are true consti-
tute the path to moksha. But when they are perverted by the
influence of corresponding karmic materials, they get deflected
from the right path dragging the Self to samara. Thus the pure
manifestations of the Self get destroyed by the influence of karmas
just as a white cloth gets soiled by impurities.

tl oc *<U ^^ 1 1 \\ o 1 1

So sawananadarisi kammarayena niyena ochchanno
Samsarasamavanno navi janadi sawado savvam (160)

1 60. The Self who is by nature all-knowing and all-per-
ceiving when soiled by his own karmas is dragged on towards
samsdra the cycle of births and deaths, and becomes incapable
of knowing all things completely,

ftr^sraf

u

Sammattapadinibaddham michchattam jinavarehi parikahi-

yam

Tassodavena iivo michchaditthitti. nadawo

CHAPTER IV TI 7

ftfe

Nanassapadinibaddham annanam jinavarehi parikahiyam
Tassodayena jivo annani hodi nadavvo (162)

STSTfTrft

Charittapadinibaddham kasayam jinavarehi parikahiyam
Tassodayena jivo acharitto hodi nadawo (163)

161, 162, and 163. It is declared by Jina that mithjdtva
karma is adverse to Right Belief; when that begins to operate,
the Self becomes a wrong believer; so let it be known. It is dec-
lared by Jina that nescience is adverse to Right Knowledge; when
that begins to operate; the Self becomes ajndni (one devoid of
knowledge); so let it be known. It is declared by Jina that kash
aya (soul-soiling gross emotions) is adverse to Right Conduct;
when this begins to operate, the Self becomes acharttra (devoid
of Right Conduct); so let it be known.

COMMENTARY

Just as a colourless crystal puts on 'the colour of the asso-
ciated object, so the pure Self undergoes various impure modi-
fications as determined by the various karmas. Thus from all
points of view, all karmas are to be destroyed.

Thus ends the chapter on papa padartha, the category of

Vice.

Thus karma which acted the role of two characters, Pvya
and papa, Virtue and Vice, exits from the stage,

Il8 SAMAYSARA

CHAPTER V

ASRAVA OR INFLOW OF KARMA.
Then Asrava enters the stage.

Michchattam aviramanam kasaya jogaya sanna sannadu
Bahuvihabheya jive tasseva anannaparinama (164)

1 64. Karmas in the empirical Self, such as wrong belief,
non-discipline, soul-soiling gross emotion, and psycho-physical
structure, with their various sub-species are mainly of two classes,
material (acketana). and psychical (chetana), (dravya karma and
bhdva karma). The psychical karmic modifications are insepar-
able from the Self.

fff^"

Nanavaranadiyassa te du kammassa' karanam honti
Tesimpi hodi jivo ragadosadibhavakaro

sffa:

165. Those impure psychic modifications cause the mate-
rial karmas such jndndvaranlya (knowledge-obscuring), etc. To
them (those psychic karmic modifications) the empirical Self with
the characteristics of attachment and aversion is the cause.

COMMENTARY

The inflow of karma is of two kinds, material and psychical
(dravydsrava and -'bhdvasrava) corresponding to the two kinds of
karmas, material and psychical. These two mutually determine
each other in the form of nimitta kdrana, instrumental cause. The
various psychic modifications of impure nature cause the inflow
of material karmas towards the Self, This is dratydsrava. When
the material karmas., so flowing in, influence the Self they give
rise to fresh emotional modifications which constitute the bhdvd-

CHAPTER V IJ 9

srava. To these psychic modifications of bhavasrava, the Self
is the upaddna kdrana, substantial cause.

Next it is pointed out that in the case of the Right Believer,
there is neither asrava, the inflow of karma, nor the consequen-
tial karmic bondage (bandha).

*ft 3 SRSFcft \\\\\\\

Natthi du asavabandhi sammadittissa asavaniroho

Saiite puwanibaddhe janadi so te abandhato (166)

IHlid ^ ^FT^T^ II

1 66. To the Right Believer, since he blocks the inflow of
karmas, there is neither the incoming of karmas nor the conse-
quential bondage thereby. Thus remaining free from new kar-
mic bondage, he understands the previously bound karmas (to
be different from the Self).

COMMENTARY

Thus it is pointed out that the right believer is capable of
preventing the inflow of karmas.

Next it is pointed out that desire, aversion, and
delusion constitute the main cause of asrava, the inflow of
karmas.

Bhavo i-agadi judo jivena kado du bandhago hodi
Ragadivippamukkho abandago janago navari (167)

167 The psychic states associated with desire, etc., which
are the modifications of>* constitute the cause of bondage; but
when completely free from desire, etc., the psychic state is of the

120 SAMAYSARA

nature of pure knowledge which indeed is the cause of the destruc-
tion of karmas.

COMMENTARY

The emotional states such as attachment, aversions and delu-
sion completely disfigure the nature of the Self and thus he be-
comes associated with nescience. In this impure state, the Self
attracts karmic particles which get bound with the Self just as a
magnet attracts iron needles to itself. When those emotional
states are absent, the Self undisturbed in his nature does not
attract karmic particles. Hence there is no chance of bondage
in his cause. Thus knowledge secures freedom from bondage
and the absence of it inevitably brings about bondage.

Pakke phalammi padide jaha na phalam banjjhade puno vinte
Jlvassa kammabhave padide na punodayamuveyi (168)

1 68. As a ripe fruit fallen (from a tree) cannot be attached
again to the stalk, so when the psychic karmic modifications in the
Self drop off, they can no more bind the Self again nor operate.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is emphasised that to the Self, with right knowledge,
there is no bhdvdsrava (inflow of psychic karmas}.

Next it is stated that to the knowing Self there is no dravya-
ava or material karmic inflow either.

Pudavipinda samana puvvanibaddha du pachchaya tassa
Kammasarlrena du te baddha savvevi nanissa (169)

?rrf^r:

169. In the Self with right, knowledge, the old karmas

CHAPTER V

remain incorporated only with the karmle body, like a clod of
earth without any effect on the Self. __

COMMENTARY

The previous karmle bondage was caused by nescience,
absence of correct knowledge in the Self. Presence of nescience
produces impure psychic states which facilitate the inflow of
karmic materials. Thus in this case there are both the bhavds-
rava and dravyasrava. But when nescience disappears the Self
regains his true nature of pure knowledge, and the impure psy-
chic states have no chance to occur; when these do not occur
there is no chance for fresh karmic materials to flow in. Thus
the Self is left with only the previous karmic materials which
got in when favourable psychic states were present. Hence they
remain only part and parcel of the kdrmana sarira, absolutely
incapable of producing any corresponding impure psychic state.
Thus in the case of the knowing Self, the Self with pure know-
ledge, both the asravas, psychic and material, are absent.

srwfcr sNt

Chauviha aneyabheyam vandhante nanadamsanagune him
Samaye samaye jahma tena avandhutti nani du (170)

* irf%' sFF^npiTO-nt i

WFTt ll^oll

170 The four primaty karmic conditions, with their multi-
farious subdivisions bind the soul every moment as determined
by suitable impure qualities of knowledge and perception.
Hence the Self with right knowledge is not bound by them.

sn^r | ^

srwrxf wFnpft ^r \ r ivft ^Kt \\w\\

Tamha du <jagannado nanagunado punovi parinamadi
Annattam nanaguno tena du so bandago banido (171)

TrT ^r^r 5rFnrm^ 3^ Tf^rw i

I7 i

When the 3 Self's cognitive quality is at its lowest stage

122 SAMAYSARA

It is liable to alternative alien modifications whether good or bad.

Therefore in either case the Self is called the binder of karmas.

<i-

COMMENTARY

Knowledge is the essential quality of the Self. So long as
this quality is strong and intense, the Self is unassailable by ex-
ternal influences, but when this quality is at its weakest point,
the Self becomes easily influenced by alien conditions. In that
case the Self will get modified from its own intrinsic nature according
to the nature of the influence, good or bad. In either case the
result will be bondage, though it is emphasised that both subhabhdva
and asubha-bhdva respectively lead to puny a %&& papa which both lead
to dsrava and bandha. But suddha-bhdva alone avoids dsrava and bandha.

sf

Damsananana charittam jam parinamade jahannbhavena
Nani tena du vajjhadi poggala kammena vivihena (172)

172. When the manifestation of Right Belief, Right Know-
ledge, and Right Conduct is at its lowest, the Self, the Knower,
is bound by various types of (good) karmic materials.

COMMENTARY

The Self here is in possession of ratnatraya, the three jewels.
Since the three jewels are in a very low degree of efficiency, bond-
age is predicated of the- Self and yet the karmas that will bind him
are only the punya karmas, karmic materials of the good type cap-
able of producing happiness. "

Savve puvva nibaddha du pachchaya santi sammadittissa
Uvavogappavogam bandhante kammabhavei?,a (173)

CHAPTER V

Santidu niruva bhojja bala itthi jaheva purusassa
Bandhadi .te uvabhojje taruni itthi jaha Ixfarassa (174)

s^nftenfr ^rwt ^ft ^T^TT T^T n

173 and 174. Just as to a person, his child-wife is unfit for
enjoyment, but when having become mature, she is fit for enjoy-
ment and attracts his attention, so also in the .case of a right believer:
all the previously bound karmlc conditions, though present,
begin to operate only when they become mature and then they
produce corresponding psychic states through which they bind
the Self.

Hoduna niruva bhojja taha vandhadi jaha havanti uvabhojja
Sattatthaviha bhuda nanavara nadibhavehim (175)

?T2TT

175. In the case of "the right believer, the previously bound
karmas such as jnandvaranlya, remain inetTective so long as they
are latent, but when they become efficient and operative, through
the instrumentality of psychic states such as attachment, they bind
the Self in seven ways, (exclusive of age-,i) or in eight ways.

Edena karanena du sammaditthi abandhago bhanido
Asavabhavabhave na pachchaya bandhaga bharnda (176)

I7 6 In the case of the right believer the karmie inflow of
the opposite psychic state is absent. (When this is absent) the.
remaining tin* conditions, (since they are incapable of produc-
ing bondage leading to samstra) are declared to be non-binders.

124 SAMAYSARA

On account of these reasons, the right believer is said to be non-
binder.

COMMENTARY

As a general principle it is maintained that the material karmic
conditions, even though present about the Self, are incapable of
binding him, unless there is facilitating opportunity, which oppor-
tunity is provided by the appearance of psychic states such as
attachment. Thus it is the psychic state that is the sine quo non
of karmic bondage. In the case of the right believer this necessary
condition is absent; when this is absent even the previously bound
karmaSy become ineffective. When these karmic conditions
become ineffective and when there is no chane of fresh inflow
of karmic particles, the Self may very well be declared to
be without bondage. (In the case of mtaraga samyakdrishti]
since he is absolutely free from karmic states of attachment, etc.,
he is necessarily called unbound but in the case of saraga-samyak-
drisM, since the impure psychic conditions have not been comple-
tely rooted out, the name is still applicable in a figurative
sense.

^teft

1 1 \ \B\B\ I

Rago doso moho ya asavanatthi sammaditthissa

Tahma asavabhavena vina hedu na pachchaya honti (177)

177. In the case of the right believer of the higher or (vita-
rdga) type there is no inflow of psychic states relating to desire,
aversion, and delusion. Hence apart from the psychic karmic
inflow, the material karmic conditions cannot produce
bondage.

TFTKt ^f

Hedu chaduviyappo attaviyappassa karanam hodi
Tesim piya ragadi tesimabhavena vajjhanti (178)

CHAPTER IV 12 J

<T 3^F II

178. The four primary karmic conditions are said to be
the cause of eight karmas such as jnanavaraniya. To these karmic
conditions the psychic states such as desire, etc. form the cause.
When these psychic states are absent, the karmic material condi-
tions cannot bind the Self.

Jaha purisenaharo gahido parinamadi so anajaviham
Mamsavasaruhiradi bhave udaraggisanjjutto (179)

^TRFT,

Taha nanissa du puvvam je baddha pachchaya bahuviyappam
Vajjhante kammam te nayaparihina du te jlva (180)

179 and 180. Just as food eaten by a person in association
with gastric heat (digestive and assimilative function) is trans-
formed into various kinds such as flesh, fat, blood, etc, so also
in the case of the Self, the previously bound karmic conditions
(though of uniform material type in the beginning) get transformed
into various karmic modifications at the time of bondage.
This is true in'the case of Self devoid of the pure point of
view.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is pointed out that the giving up of the pure point of
view or suddhanaya causes asrava or karmc inflow, whereas
the adoption of it causes nir-asrava, the cessation of the inflow.
Thus ends the chapter on asrava.
Thus asrava quits the stage.

126 SAMAYSARA

CHAPTER VI

SAMVARA-BLOCKING THE INFLOW
Now Samvara enters the stage.

While describing the nature of samvara padarth, the author
first praises its ultimate condition, discriminative know-
ledge.

f| ^3ft*r wf^r ^ ^tft 1 1 \ 6 \ \ \

Uvavoge uvavogo kohadisu natthi kovi uvayogo
Kohe kohochevahi uvavoge natthi kalu koho (181)

1 1

1 8 1. The pure cognitive attributes of perception and know-
ledge rest upon upayoga or the intrinsic nature of the pure Self.
The impure emotions such as anger have no relation whatsoever
with upayoga. Anger subsists on anger itself. Certainly there
is no anger in the pure cognitive attributes of perception and
knowledge.

COMMENTARY

What is predicated of anger must be taken to be equally true
in the case of other emotions such as pride, etc.

Next the author deals with other facts which are also distinct
from upayoga or the nature of the pure Self.

Attaviyappe kamme nokamme chavi natthi uvavogo
Uvavogahamiya kammam nokammam chavi no atthi (182)

182,' There is no upayoga either in the eight types of kar-
mas or in the nokarma material particles (which go to build up
the various kinds of bodies). Conversely there are neither kar-
mas nor nokarmas mapayoia.

CHAPTER IV 127

WPf 3RpiT f ftfe

Edam tu avivarldam nanam jiyadu hodi jivassa

Tayiya na kimchi kuwadi bhavam uvavogasuddhappa (183)

183. When this discriminative knowledge, free from error,
arises in the Self, then the nature of the Self manifests in the form
of pure upayoga and he does not cause any kind of impure psy-
chic states.

COMMENTARY

Two things which are spatially distinct and which have no
relation to a common cause cannot maintain the relation of sub-
stance and substratum. Substance and substratum will be appli-
cable to a particular manifestation and the intrinsic nature which
so manifests. Thus knowing activity is related to knowledge in
the form of substance and substratum, an entity and its manifes-
tation. An entity and its manifestation are inseparably united
with each other and there is intrinsic identity between the two.
So viewed, the pure cognitive activity or upayoga, since it is based
on the intrinsic nature of the Self, is inalienably identical with
it. Various impure emotional states have no such intrinsic re-
lation to the nature of the Self, because they are accidental states
of the Self and as such can disappear without in any way affect-
ing the nature of the Self. Essential attributes are based upon
the real nature of a thing whereas the accidental attributes are
not so based. It is this truth that is emphasised in the above
gdthds. Cognitive attributes of perception and knowledge tech-
nically caH&A-upayoga are the essential attributes of the Self, where-
as anger, pride, etc., are only accidental attributes. That is why
it is said that upayoga is in the self and conversely Self is in
upayoga and, negatively, anger, etc., are not in the Self nor
is the Self in anger, etc. So also karmas and nokarmas being acci-
dental adjuncts to the Self have no basis in the nature of the Self.
This recognition of the Self to be distinct from the various acci-

128 SAMAYSARA

dental attributes, psychical and physical, enables it to shut out
the impure psychical states of desire, aversion, and delusion.
When these are shut out there is no inflow of karmas and that is
just samvara*

Next it is explained how the Self, even though associated
with impure karmas, is through discriminative knowledge, able
to recognise his pure nature.

j4 ft" ^T^nrR w cf

Jaha kanayamaggitaviyampi kanayabhavam na tarn

parichchayadi

Taha kammodaya tavido na chayadi nani du nanittam (184)

rT cf Tf</:^% I
| 1T1%^T 1 1 $ <V| I

184. Just as gold, however much it is heated, never loses
its intrinsic nature, so also the right knowing Self, however much
it is burnt by the associated karmas, does not lose his intrinsic
nature of pure knowledge.

Evam janadi nani annani munadi ragamevadam
Annanatamochchanno adasahavam ayananto (185)

1 1

185. Thus the Self with discriminative knowledge knows
his true nature. But one lacking in this knowledge, blinded by
his own nescience unable to perceive his true nature, thinks
that the nature of the Self is identical with the impure psychic
states such as attachment.

Next it is pointed out how this apprehension of the pure
nature is itself samara.

Suddham tu viyanan,to suddhan chevappayam lahadi jivo
Jananto du asuddham asuddhamevappayam lahadi (186)

CHAPTER VI 129

1 8 6. The Self with the discriminative knowledge, by contem-
plating upon the pure Self, becomes himself pure. But the Self
which contemplates upon the impure nature of the Self becomes
himself impure.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is pointed out that the nature of the contemplating
Self is determined by the nature of the contemplated ideal. Hence
apprehension of the pure nature of the Self means samtara.

Next the method of apprehending in the pure Self is described*

Appanarn appano rumbhiduna dosu punnapavajodesu
Damsananahmitido ichchavirodoya annahmi (187)

\\166\\

Jo sawasangamukko jhayadi appanamappano appa
Navi kammam nokammam cheda chintedi yeyattam (1

Appanam jhayanto damsananana mavo anannamayo
Lahadi achirena appanameva so kammanimmukkam (189)

187,188, and 189. Who so restrains, through his own effort,
the Self that is immersed in the activity,, whether good or bad,
of joga (thought, word, and deed), rests on pure perception and

130 SAMAYSARA

knowledge, has no desire whatsoever for alien objects and
is free from all attachments, that Self contemplates on his
own unity. Such a Self never thinks that karmas are of the nature
of the Self, nor the nokarmas. Such a right knowing Self, of
the nature of perception and knowledge entirely different from
alien nature, contemplates upon his pure Self and very soon
becomes identical with that Pure Self who is free from all
karmas.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is pointed out that discriminative knowledge will
ultimately lead to the attainment of the pure Self by destroying
all the impure karmic shackles.

Tesim hedu bhanida ajjhavasanani sawadarasihim
Michchattam annanam aviradibhavoya jogoya (190)

frlWT

f^rr ^rqf^ ^^^ j% prjf^ \\\\\\\

Hedu abhave niyama jayadi nanissa asavaniroho

Asava bhavena vina jayadi kammassa vi nkoho (191)

f^rr

f fir

Kannassabhavena ya nokammanam pi jayadi niroho

No karnmanirohena ya samsaranirohanam hoyi (192)

190, 191 and 192. It is declared by the Omniscient that the
psychic states corresponding to wrong belief, wrong knowledge,
non-discipline, and psycho-physical activity are the causes of karma

CHAPTER VII 131

such v&jfidndvaramya. On account of the psychic states relating
to pure perception, etc., the karmic conditions are absent. This
absence of conditions in one who has discriminative knowledge
causes the blocking up of psychic inflow {bhamsrava}. If the
psychic inflow is blocked up, the blocking of the karmic inflow
(dravydsravd) necessarily follows. When there is no inflow
of material karmas^ the inflow of no karmic materials is also stopped.
When there is no inflow of nokarmic body-building materials
the process of body-building will completely disappear which
means the cessation of samsara.

COMMENTARY

So long as the root cause, identification of the Self with karmas
persists, psychic activity to wrong belief, wrong knowledge,
wrong conduct, and .yoga persists. These form the cause of the
bhdvdsrava relating to desire, averson, and delusion, bhdvdsrava
forms the cause of dravydsrava or material karmas Material
karamas in their turn form the cause of body-building nonkarmas.
Nokarma is the cause otsamsdra. This is the causal sequence.
But when discriminative knowledge appears, the Self recognises
its own pure chetana nature. This knowledge leads to the absence
of psychic activity relating to wrong belief, wrong knowledge
etc. Absence of such psychic activities leads to the disappearance
of bhavasrava. When that is absent karma naturally disappears.
Disappearance of karmas means cessation of samsdra. This
is the order of samvara.

Thus ends the Chapter on samvara.
Thus Samvara quits the stage.

CHAPTER VII

(Nirjara Shedding of Karmas.)
Then Nirjara appears on the stage.

13 2 SAMAYSARA

Uvabhogaindiyeha davvanamachedananamidatanam

Jam kunadi sammaditthi tarn sawam nijjaranimittam (193)

1 1

193. Whatever affective experiences the right believer (with
a neutral attitude) has in relation to sense-perceived objects,
conscious and nonconscious, they only lead to the shedding of
karmas or nirjara.

COMMENTARY

Ordinarily the enjoyment of sense-perceived objects whether
animate or inanimate is said to be the cause of karmic bondage.
But in the case of a right believer, this is supposed to lead to
the very opposite result of nirjara or wearing down of karmas.
.What is the meaning of this paradox? Enjoyment of sense-per-
ceived objects in the case of the right believer is quite different
from the experience present in the wrong believer. The latter,
because of the lack of discriminative knowledge, identifies him-
self with the external objects and indulges in the enjoyment of
those objects carried away by the full force of desire, aversion
and delusion. In this case the enjoyment brings about dsrava
which leads to fresh bondage of karmas. But in the case of the
right believer who is equipped with discriminative knowledge
and who is thus able to adopt a detached view of things external,
these conditions of karmic bondage are. altogether absent. No
doubt he has relations with useful and enjoyable objects of the
external world such as his wife, children, wealth and property. To-
wards these he adopts a neutral attitude. Because of this neutral
attitude, he is unaffected either by their increase or decrease. Hence
there is no chance for the incoming of new karmas. The
experiences he has therefore all relate to the previous karmas which
are present in him already. When they begin to operate they
produce corresponding psychic experiences in the right believer
who, in spite of his neutral attitude, must necessarily experience
the fruits of his previous karmas. Thus the previously acquired
karmas after producing their inevitable result exhaust them-
selves and cease to be. This is nirjara or wearing down of karmas.

CHAPTER VII 153

After describing the wearing down of material karmas the
author next describes the consequential bhdva nirjara, the corres-
ponding psychic result.

Dawe uvabhujjante niyama jayadi suham va dukkham va
Tarn suha dukkhamudinnam vedadi aha nijjaram jadi (194)

c

194. Useful and enjoyable objects of the perceptual world
when they are enjoyed by the right believer, inevitably produce
pleasure or pain as determined by good or bad karma. Since
these pleasant or painful feelings are indifferently experienced
by the right believer, they wear themselves down and this is
nirjara.

Next the power of knowledge is extolled.

n" *r

Jahavisamuva bhujjanta vijja purisa na maranamuvayanti
Poggalakammassudayamtahabhunjadinevavajjhade nani (195)

195. Just as a person who is an expert in anti-poison lore,
even though he takes poison, does not meet with death, even
so when the karmic materials become mature and produce their
inevitable results of 'pain and pleasure, the knowing Self with
a neutral attitude experiences these but remains unbound.

COMMENTARY

The very conditions which lead the unenlightened towards
bondage are counteracted by the power of knowledge become
defunct and disappear, in the case of the enlightened one.

134 SAMAYSARA

Jaha majjam pivamano aradibhave na majjadi na puriso
Dawova bhoge arado nanivi na vajjadi taheva

?r

?r

196. Just as a person who takes wine (as medicine) without
any special longing for it, does not get intoxicated, so also the
enlightened Self, while he enjoys external objects without any
special longing towards them, does not get bound.

COMMENTARY

Thus is explained the extraordinary potency of the attitude
of non-attachment in keeping the enlightened Self free from kar-
ate bondage, even while he enjoys the objects of the external
world.

wft

rar TR^W^T *r>

Sevantovi na sevayi aseva manovi sevago kovi
Pagarana chetta kassavi nayapayara notti so hodi (i 97 )
-

197- While one actually enjoys, does not really enjoy; where-
as another while not enjoying does really enjoy. Just as one who
plays a part does not really become that character.

COMMENTARY

An actor on a stage may represent a particular character In
a drama which may be either tragic or comic. The actor may
very successfully play his part without actually suffering any emo-
tional experience corresponding to the part. But a man in the
audience who is merely a spectator may experience all the emo-
tions because he identifies himself mentally with the character
in the former case such emotional experience is absent in spite
of perfect dramatic action because the actor maintains complete
isolation mentally from the dramatic situation. Isolation is the
cause of the absence of emotion even while external action is present

CHAPTER VII 155

Whereas in the latter case even though there Is no action, there

is emotional experience corresponding to the situation because

of the mental identification with the situation. Exactly similar

is the case with a person who enjoys the objects of the external

world. The determining factor here also is the mental attitude

and not actiog. A person may make use of external objects

as a matter of duty without having corresponding emotional fer-

vour. Here action is present and not the corresponding emotion.

But in the case of another person who is incapable of having the

attitude of mental isolation and who has a hankering after

external objects, may have all the characteristic emotions even

though he does not actually enjoy them either because of lack

of opportunity or of external restraint. Thus it is true that one

who enjoys may not really enjoy, whereas another who does not

enjoy may really enjoy according to the mental attitude of each.

W ^ PFT SfWFt II

Udayavivago viviho kammanam vannido jinavarehim

Na du te majjha sahava janaga bhavo du ahamekko (198)

q- g; *nr

198. It has been declared by the great Jinas that the rise
and fruition of karmas^ are of various kinds. But they are not
(related to) my pure nature. I am certainly the (non-varying)
one, the Knower by nature.

cTRT

Puggalakammam tago tassa vivagodavo havadi eso

Na du esa majjha bhavo janagabhavo hu ahamikko (199)

199. Desire is karmic matter (previously bound). When
this manifests after maturity there is the emotion of desire. This
psychic state is not of my nature. Certainly, I am the unruffled
one, the Knower;

SAMAYSARA
COMMENTARY

This statement about desire must be taken to be true in the
case of other emotions such as aversion, delusion, anger, pride
deceit, greed, etc.

Evam sammaitthi appanam munadi janagasahavam
Udayam kamma vivagam cha muadi tachcham viyanan to (200)

200. Thus the right believer having a clear knowledge of
reality apprehends his own Self to be of the nature as theKnower
and rejects emotional states because they are the result of the
manifestation of karmic matter.

COMMENTARY

A clear understanding of the nature of reality thus enables
one to accept what ought to be accepted and to reject what ou*ht
to be rejected. to

Paramanumitliyam vi hu ragadinam tu vijjade jassa
Navi so janadi appa nayam tu sawagamadharovi (201)

TFTT^Tt

201. Verily one in whom attachment, etc., even to the
extent of an atom, is present, cannot know the Self even if one be
a master of all scriptures.

Appana mayanantho anappayam cheva so ayananto
Kaha hodi sammaditlhi jivajive uyananto ' ' ( 202 )

3TTRWT

CHAPTER VII I?7

202. He who does not know the real Self cannot know the
non-Self. Thus being devoid of the knowledge of jwa and
aitvet, Soul and non-soul, how can he be one of right faith?

TftxFT

Adamhi dawabhave athire mottuna ginha tava niyadam
Thirameka mirnam bhayam uvalam bhatam sahavena (203)

203. Giving up the impermanent physical and psychical
states in the Self (which are due to dravja karmas and Uidra
karmas respectively) makes one grasp this state resulting from the
realisation of the true nature of the Self which is eternal, unchang-
ing, and indivisible .unity.

COMMENTARY

In the experience of the empirical ego, there are several
psycho-physical states, brought about by the erroneous apprehen-
sion of the reals. These states are indeterminate, varying,
momentary and erroneous in nature. Hence these do not repre-
sent the true nature of the Self. Therefore they must be discarded.
But that psychical state resting upon the nature of the trans-
cendental ego is characterised by qualities contrary to the above.
This is determinate, permanent, one and free from error. Hence
this is the 'ideal to be sought after.

=* cf flft l^F^ T5 1

Abhini sudo himana kevalam chatam hodi ekkameva padam
So eso paramatlho jam lahidum niwudim jadi ^ (204)

^ irisr TW^h ^ 53Bcrr f^f?r 3-rrfo iRovu

204. Knowledge through, sense-perception, knowledge
from scriptures, 'knowledge from clairvoyance, knowledge from

X 3 8 SAMAYSARA

telepathy, and supreme knowledge of reality all these refer to
one and the same state. That is the absolute. Realisation of
that absolute is moksha.

COMMENTARY

Atma, the Self is the absolute. That itself is jndnd or know-
ledge. The Self is one prime category. Hence knowledge is there-
fore the same as that absolute. Hence it is the means of Nirvana or
moksha. Various kinds of knowledge, such as mati-jndnd, smta
jndnd, etc. do not in any way differentiate this unitary state of
knowledge. These various kinds of knowledge refer only to this
unitary state of knowledge. When the sun is hidden by clouds
its light is not seen and when the clouds gradually disperse, the
sunlight gradually reappears in varying degrees till it regains its
foil luminosity when all the clouds completely disappear. So
also the Self in the form of knowledge, remains hidden shrouded
by the layer of karmas. When the karma cloud gradually a ets
dispersed, then the Self-knowledge begins to shine in varying
brilliancy. This variation in knowledge which is due to the
variation in the density of the karmic cloud does not in any way
imply any differentiation in the nature of the underlying Self.
That remains the same one, non-varying and permanent. That
remains without any differentiation. It is identical with supreme
knowledge, men that knowledge is obtained, it is Self-realisa-
tion. Then nescience gets destroyed, then the Self is obtained-
all that pertains to non-Self disappears; no more desire, hatred or
delusipn; no more inflow of fresh karmas- no more karmic bond-
age; the previously bound karmas automatically wear out- thus
when all karmas completely disappear, that state itself is Loksha
Hence it follows that the absolute is equal to the Self which is
equal to pure knowledge, and attaining this ought to be the aim
of life since that is the door-way to moksha.

Nanag unena vihina edam tu padam vahuvi na lahante
Tarn ginha supadamedam jadi ichchasi kammaparimokkam (205)

CHAPTER VII 139

205. Those who are devoid of this attribute of knowledge
even though their efforts be several, do not attain this state. If
you desire complete liberation from bondage,* you must contem-
plate upon this pure state of knowledge.

COMMENTARY

What is contemplated is the ideal. One who contemplates
is the person who desires the ideal. By constant contemplation
of the ideal, a person aiming at the goal conies nearer and nearer
to it till he finds himself identified with that very ideal. This
psychic effort of aiming at the ideal through the act of contem-
plation is here pointed out as the necessary means of realising the
true nature of the Self. Further it is implied that the nature of
the ideal contemplated upon is of great importance. The popu-
lar view that one who contemplates with devotion upon an ideal
whose nature may be anything is really contemplating upon the
supreme paramdtma, is incompatible with the Jaina Siddhanta.

^

Edamhi rado nichcham santutto hohi nichchamedamhi
Edena hohi titto to hohadi tuha uttamam sokkham, (206)

Tcft

206. 'oh! Good Soul (Turning away from the sense
pleasures and feing your attention always on the pure nature of
the Self) always be in love with it and hence be happy and satis-
fied, for surely that will lead you to the future everlasting supreme
bliss of moksha*

Konama bhanijja vuho paradawam mamamidam havodi

dawam , N

Appanatnappano pariggaham tu niyadam viyananto (207)

140 SAMAYSARA

f^fFFT ll

207. How can the wise man who realises that the Self alone
is the property of the Self, really maintain these alien objects, such
as his body, as genuinely his own property ?

COMMENTARY

Even an ignoramus cannot make the mistake of identifying
his self with the external objects. Thus it is quite obvious that a
wise man. can never make such a mistake. He will always be
able to discern the difference between his Self and non-Self.

cr

Majjham pariggaho jayi tado ahamajivadam tu gachchejja
Nadeva ahan jamha tamha na pariggaho majjham (208)

208. External things owned by me, if they are absolutely of
my nature, then I must become non-living (like them). Be-
cause I am a Knowing Self, therefore the objects possessed by
me are not of my nature.

=rr r err

Chchijjadu va bhijjadu va nijjaduva ahava jadu vippalayam
Jahuha tamha gachchadu tahavi na pariggaho majjha (209)

._ 2o 9 . 'It may be cut, it may be split, it may be dragged or
it may be destroyed, whatever manner of deformity it under-
goes even then it (the body or any other external object) does
not concern me as it is not really mine.

COMMENTARY

The various ways of maiming the body or other external

CHAPTER VII

objects and the consequent suffering will not affect the Self which
has realised its true nature to be distinct from that of the alien
objects.

st fffe IR^H

Apariggaho anichcho bhanido naniya nichchade dhammam
Apariggaho du dhammassa janago tena so hodi (210)

IR. ?o|l

210. Non-possession is said to be non-attachment. For
that reason the knower does not desire even merit. Thus being
free from attachment towards merit, he thereby becomes merely
the Knower (of merit).

COMMENTARY

Dharma or virtuous conduct is the same as what puny a is.
Punya also is considered to be a form of karma in spite^of the
fact that it is able to produce pleasurable results. Hence it must
also be avoided by one who is bent upon realising the Pure Self.
The Pure Self is of the form of suddhopoyoga. This is its real
nature, whereas puaya or Dharma is said to be the sabharttpa-
yoga. Since the latter is different from the real nature of ^the
Self, it ought to be discarded by the knower, even though it is
ordinarily a desirable course of conduct.

tft

Apariggaho anichcho bhanido naniya nichchadi^ adhanamam
Apariggaho adhammassa janago tena so hodi ^ (211)

2ii Non-possession is said to be non-attachment. For
that reason the knower does not desire de-merit. Thus being
free from attachment towards demerit, he thereby becomes
merely the knower (of demerit).

142. SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

Possession and attachment ate identical. Where there is
no desire, there is no possession. Desire is r the psychic state
born of nescience. This psychic state of the nature t r of nescience
therefore cannot happen in the knower. The knower must
therefore have the psychic state of true knowledge. Hence he
cannot have desire which is of the nature of nescience. Therefore
he does not even desire that which is of the nature of nescience.
Therefore he does* not even desire merit or demerit, good or evil.
Hence in the case of the knower there is no relation of possession
of merit or demerit, dharma or adharma, since real nature is beyond
good and evil. What is asserted of adharma (demerit) is equally
true of raga (desire), dvesha (aversion) krodha (anger), etc.

Apariggaho anichcho bhanido nani ya ruchchhade asanam
Apariggaho du asanassa janago tena so hodi (

irft~

212. Non-possession is said to be non-attachment. For
that reason the Knower does not desire food. Thus being free
from attachment for food, he thereby becomes merely the Know-
er (of food).

jfq^f qrr^f ^ ftr^st
| TPR^T

Apariggaho anichcho bhanido panam cha nichchade pani
du panassa janago tena so hodi (213)

arf^st

213. Non-possession is said to be non-attachment. For
that reason the Knower does not desire drink. Thus being free
from attachment for drink, he thereby becomes merely the
knower (of drink).

CHAPTER VII 143

Evamadu edu vivihe sawe bhaveya nichchade nani
Janagabhavo niyado niralambodu sawatta (214)

^TRR

214. The Knower has no hfflkering after all these various
psychic states (such as desire and appetite for external objects).
Since he is really of the nature of the Knower he remains every-
where independent (of alien influences).

WFlt

Uppannodayabhoge vivogabuddhiye tassa so nichcham
Kankhamanagadassaya udayassa na kuuvade nani (215)

215. Thus the Knower having always an attitude of renun-
ciation towards the enjoyable environmental objects arising from
the operation of karmas, he exhibits neither a desire for the present
changes nor a longing for the future ones.

cf ^T^ 1 WFlt ^^r^ W ^^? Wfe \\\\\\\
Jo vedadi vedijjadi samaye samaye vinassade uhayam
Tarn janago du nani ubhayamavi na kankhayi kayavi (216)

216. IPsychic activities corresponding to what feels and
what is felt, both get destroyed every moment. One who knows
this is the Knower. Never does he long for these.

COMMENTARY

The series of conscious states consist of rapidly moving
sensation, perception and idea. These elements form parts of the
cognitive aspect of consciousness. Besides this cognitive aspect

144 . SAMAYSARA

of series of consciousness, there is als o the hedonic aspect asso-
ciated with each item of the series. A sensation or a perception
besides giving information about an external object, may also
produce pleasurable or painful feeling. This pleasure-pain aspect
is present in association with each item of the series. This again
has two aspects, subjective and objective, the former indicated by
the direction of attention, the latter indicated by the perception
and idea attended to. These are technically called vedaka and
vedya bhavds. If the pleasure-pain aspect is negative, it produces
an automatic reaction whether in man or in animals to turn away
from the painful perception and idea. But if the hedonic aspect
is positive and pleasurable it produces a contrary reaction in the
individual. The individual strives to get at it and possess it'
because it is pleasurable. This behaviour which man, has in
common with lower animals, as the manifestation of the instinct-
of self-preservation, is not present in the case of an enlightened
individual. He recognises the momentariness of these series rapidly
passing in front of the real Self whose nature is entirely distinct
from the characteristics of the passing series of conscious states.
Resting upon this permanent reality, he is able to realise that even
the pleasurable elements of consciousness are entirely ephemeral
and fleeting in nature and hence incapable of producing any real
satisfaction. Further he realises that there is no fundamental
difference between the pleasurable and painful hedonic aspects
of consciousness, since both are due to karmic upddhic condi-
tions entirely alien to the nature of the Self. Hence his behaviour
is different. He does not run after the pleasurable elements of cons-
ciousness, nor does he desire to possess them. The ordinary beha-
viour of avioding the painful and pursuing the pleasurable is trans-
formed in his case to an attitude of neutrality in which he remains
nierely a spectator of the panorama without in any way being
affected by the hedonic elements even when they are pleasurable.

Bandhuvabhoganimittam ajjhavasanodayesu nanissa
Samsara dehavisayesu neva uppajjade rago (217)

CHAPTER VII 145

TFT I R ? \s 1 1

217. The psychic states conditioned by samara lead to bon-
dage while the psychic states conditioned by the body lead to enjoy-
ment. Hence in the true knower, no desire for these is produced.

COMMENTARY

Psycfcdc states are of two kinds, one pertaining to samsdra
that is the empirical world of things and persons, and the other
pertaining to one's own body. The former results in bond-
age since it is conditioned by the emotions like desire, aversion
and delusion. The latter leads to enjoyment either pleasurable
or painful. The knowing Self is therefore without any attach-
ment to any of these.

trff

Nani ragappa jaho sawadawesu kammamajjhagado

No lippadi karnmarayena du kaddam amajjhe jaha kanayam

'

WFTl"

^TfT f \\\\\\\

Annani puna ratio savvadauvesu kammamajjhgado
Lippadi kammarayena du kaddamamajjhe jaha loham (219)

218 and 219. Just as gold in the midst of mire remains
uncontaminated because of its non-adhesive property, so also the
enlightened one, because of his complete non-attachment to the
environment remains unaffected even when immersed in a cloud
of karmas; whereas the unenlightened one because of his attach-
ment to external objects gets affected when in the midst of kar-
mas, just as a piece of iron gets contaminated when dipped in
mire because of its adhesive property.

146 SAMAYSARA

f^T

W f^T

Bhunjjatassavi vivihe sachittachittamissaye dawe

Sankassa sedabhavo navi sakkadi kinhago kayum (220)

1 1 ^ ^ o 1 1

| fsH%f
f^" WFT W f^"

Taha nanissa du vivihe sachittacbdtta missiye davve

Bhunjja tassavi nanam na sakkamannanadam riedum (221)

220 and 221. The conch-fish may eat and assimilate various
things, animate, inanimate., and mixed, and yet the white colour
of its shell cannot be changed into black by the things assimilated.
In the same way the enlightened Knower may enjoy various ob-
jects, animate, inanimate, and mixed, and yet his nature of know-
ledge cannot be converted into nescience by the tilings so
enjoyed.

Jaiya sa eva sankho sedasahavam sayam pajahiduna
Gachchejja kinhabhavam talya sukkattanam pajahe (222)

Taha nani viyu jayiya nanasahavattayam pajahiduna
Annanena parinado tayiya annana dam gachche (223)

222 and 223. The very same conch-fish (irrespective of the
fact whether it eats other things or not) may intrinsically undergo

CHAPTER VII 147

a change of colour, when the white-shell will be changed into
black one. Similarly the enlightened Knower (who remained
uninfluenced by the things enjoyed) may undergo deterioration in
himself by whichjie may lose his nature of knowledge and assume
one of nescience.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is clear that whether the Self retains its true form as
the knower or deteriorates into its opposite is entirely determined
by itself.

Next the author explains through an illustration taken from
ordinary life the difference between the operation of the karma
in the case of the wrong believer and that in the case of the right
believer.

r tftfa tft THTT

Puriso jaha kovi iha vittinimittam tu seva ye rayam

To sovi deyi raya vivihe bhoge suhuppaye (224)

eft iftfa

Emeva jivapuriso kammarayam sevaye suhanimittani

To sovi dehi kammovivihe bhoye suhuppaye (225)

^ft f^R <rfoft

\o

^ft T t

Jaha puna so chiya puriso vittinimittam na sevaye rayam
To sq na deyi *aya vivihe bhoye suhuppaye^

TRT

T f^Txf T

eft ^ft ir

148 SAMAYSARA

4 Emeva sammaditlhi visayattam sevaye na kammarayam
To so na deyi kammam vivihe bhoye suhuppaye

^ft^TFT

224 to. 227. Just as whenever a person in this world, with
the object of gaining his livelihood, serves his king and
the king gives him by way of remuneration various pleasure-
producing objects, so also the Self, in the form of an unenlightened
personality with the object of securing pleasures, devotes himself
in the service of karmas and the karma-raja accordingly offers him
pleasure-producing things. Whenever that very person does
not serve the king for his livelihood, the king does not give him
various pleasure-producing object by way of remuneration. Simi-
larly the right-believer, for the sake of sense-pleasures does not
devote himself to the service otkarmas and, consequently, the
karma does not yield various objects as a source of enjoyment,

COMMENTARY

Thus it is clear that in the case of the right-believer the karma
is incapable of producing any effect.

While proceeding to describe the nature of right belief and
its constituent elements, the author first states in general nis-
shankha or doubtlessness.

Sammaditlhi jlva nissanka honti njbbhaya tena
Sattabhayavippamukkl, jamha tamha du nissanka (228)

228. Souls with right belief are free from doubt and there-
fore they are free from fear. Because they are free from seven
kinds of fear, they are free from doubt.

COMMENTARY
The sevenfears are (i) fear relating to this life, (2) fear relating

CHAPTER VII

149

to future life, (3) fear of being without protection, (4) fear
of the disclosure of what is kept in secret (j) fear of pain, (6) feat
of accident and (7) fear of death.

The author further explains the characteristics of nissan-
kha or doubtlessness (one of the constituents of right belief).

Jo chattarivi paye chchindadi te kammamoha vadhakare
So nissanko cheda sammadithi mune yawo (229)

fqr TITFT fe^rf^r ?TR 3^^ i

229. He who cuts the four feet (wrong-belief, non-discipline,
soul-soiling grose emotions, and psycho-physical activity) of what
produces karma., delusion, and suffering is the non-doubting
right beliver.

COMMENTARY

Hence the Self which is non-doubting is free from bondage
resulting from doubt. He has only to shed the karmas previously
acquired.

Next tl^e quality of nish-kdnksha or desirelessness is described.

1 1 \ 3 o 1 1

Jo du na karedi kankham kammaphale su taha saVvadhammesu
So nikkankkho cheda sammaditthi mune yawo ^ (230)

cf^T

230. He who evinces no desire for pleasures resulting from
karmas or for all qualities of things must be understood to be a
desire-free right believer.

COMMENTARY
The Self which is free from desire is ipso facto free from

150 SAMAYSARA

desire produced by bondage. He has only to do nirjara^ the
shedding of the karmas previously acquired.

Next the characteristic of nirvichikitsa is mentioned.

Jo na karedi juguchcham cheda savvesimeva dhammanam
So kalu nivvidigichcho sammaditthi mune yavvo (231)

231. He who does not exhibit any abhorrence or disgust
towards all the (obnoxious) qualities of things, is said to be the
right believer without any abhorrence.

COMMENTARY

The characteristics in one's own body or in the environment
which produce disgust or abhorrence in an ordinary man are
without any influence in the case of the right believer who is
aware of the nature of the things in themselves . This attitude
of absolute indifference even in the midst of disgusting things
is what is known as the quality of nirvichikitsa.. This attitude
of indifference does not produce any feeling of disgust or abhor-
rence. His attention is not diverted to the unpleasant situation
in the environment. His attention is therefore fixed on the
true nature of the Self. Hence there is no karmic bondage
resulting from the emotions of disgust or abhorrence. He
has only to achieve riirjara or the shedding of the past.
karmas.

Next the author describes the quality of non-delusion (amfida
drishtitvam\

Jo havayi asammudo cheda sadditthi sawa bhavesu

So kalu amudaditfhi sammaditlhi mune yawo (232)

CHAPTER VII

232. He who is completely devoid of delusion as to the
nature of things is certainly understood to be the non-deluded
right-believer.

COMMENTARY

In this case also freedom from delusion as to the nature of
things prevents the appearance of karmas arising from delusion.
Hence the right believer has only nirjara to achieve.

Next the author describes upagtihana or the charitable con-
cealment of defects in others.

Jo siddhabhatti jutto uvaguhanago du sawadhammanam
So uvaguhana kari sammaditlhi mune yawo (233)

233. He who is filled with devotion to Siddha and who
forbears' in every way all kinds of defects in others is considered
to be the right-believer endowed with the quality of forbearance.

COMMENTARY

The important word in this gatha is upagihana which means
the attitude of forbearance and charity through which the defects
of helpless persons such as children and invalids are overlooked
and concealed. This is the usual meaning given by the various
Jaina writers for that word ^aguhana. That is also the defini-
tion aiven by Samantabhadra in his Ratnakarandaka Sravakachara
(i i,? where he explains the constituent element of upagfihana
Prabhachandra's commentary on the same verse maintains the
same point of view. "Children because of ignorance and inva-
lids because of their incapacity, may go wrong in their course
of conduct prescribed for them by the religion. When they
commit mistakes in that way those defects must not be made

SAMATSARA

much of, but must be over-looked and concealed, and that is
upaguhana"

One of the commentators on Samayasara, Amritachandra
evidently had before him the word upabrmhana and not
upagiihana. The word upabrimhana means growing or in
creasing. With this reading evidently he explains the term a<
one who increases the powers of the Self, or dtma-sakti and that
a right-believer is called one who has the soul-power in fullness
Hence in his case there is no karmic bandha produced by lack of
soulpower or the weakness of Self. This same word up^hana
is included both by Pujyapada and Akalanka when they enumerate
the eight constituent elements or ashtangas of right belief. In
commenting upon the Sutra 24 of Chapter VI of Tattvarthasutra
Uttama kshamadi bhavamaya atmano dharma pari-vriddhi'
karanam upa-brimhanam", increasing the true characteristics
of the Self through the attitude of supreme forbearance etc
means upabrimhanam or increase in soul power. Jayasena'
the other commentator on Samayasara, evidently tries to com-
bine the meaning of both the words upabrmhana and u P a-
guhana. Mithyatva-ragadhi-vibhava-dharmanam upa-cmhaka
prachchadaka vinasakaha." Thus he takes the word upagvhana
to mean or destruction and what must be destroyed are
the impure psychic states produced by wrong belief, attachment
to sense-pleasures, etc. It is extremely difficult on our part to
explain how this constituent element upabrmhana was supplant-
ed by the element u P a-guh ana , from increasing to fullness the
sodjo^t to charitably forbearing the defects in others. Aka-
knka s Rajavartika gives us a clue to understanding this transfor-
mation , The increasing of the soul-power is effected by means of
VtoHtekv.0, supreme forbearance, etc. One who practises utta-
l*ma etc not only increases his own soul's potency to

*

of <

of love and forbearance towards others. Persons who

go astray either through ignorance or incapacity are forgiven

'

themselves infull-

and thereby evince love and forbearance towards others
They are able to discern the element of goodness in things el'

CHAPTER VII 153

They may condemn evil but they sympathise with and forgive
the evil-doer. This attitude is beautifully illustrated in Christ's
words addressed to the woman taken in the act of adultery,
"Neither do I condemn thee. Go and sin no more." Thus
upaguhana is in short the result of updbrimhana, the fukiess of
power manifesting itself in forgiving and forbearance towards
the weak.

In this case there is no karmic bondage, resulting from non-
forbearance; nirjara., or shedding of past karmas alone remains
to be effected.

In the next gdthd the author gives a 'description of sthiti-
karana, non-wavering firmness in faith.

3jxft

Ummaggam,gachchantam sagamapi magge thavedi jo cheda
So thidikarane jutto sammaditthi mune yavvo (254)

234. He who, instead of going astray, establishes himself
firmly in the path of emancipation must be considered to be the
right-believer who is endowed with steadfastness.

COMMENTARY

In this case also since the right believer is firmly established
in the path leading to moksha, there is no wavering in him. Hence
there is no bondage due to the lack of firmness. Hence there is
only nirjara to be effected here also.

Next the author describes the constituent element vatsalja,
the attitude of love and devotion.

Jo kunadi vachchalattam tinhe sadhuna mokkhamaggammi
So vachchala bhavajudo sammaditthi mune yawo (235)

wrt ^rr^Tt jftsmw \

: I R ^ \\\

IJ4 SAMAYSARA

235. Whoever develops love and devotion to the three
jewels which constitute the right path to moksha, that person
is considered to be the right believer endowed with love and
devotion to the true path. "

COMMENTARY

Love and devotion sustain him in the right path. Hence
there is no lack of devotion and love and hence there is no kar-
mic bondage, consequent thereupon. There is only nirjara to
be achieved. .

Next is described the eighth constituent element of prabhd-
vana or proclaiming the truth (of pr&vachand or Divine Word)

Vijjaraha marudo mano raha payesu bhamayi jo cheda

So jinanana pahavi sammaditthi mune yavvo , (236)

236. The Self, which mounted on the Chariot of knowledge
roams about as it pleases (shedding the light of wisdom), is to be
considered a right-believer who is engaged in propounding the
Jaina faith.

COMMENTARY

This emphasises the social aspect of religious faith. A
person who is equipped with knowledge of reality and who is
therefore engaged in self-realisation should not be satisfied with
his own personal acquisition of the sublime wisdom. He must
place the benefit of his achievement at the disposal of the other
members of the society. There is no such thing as isolated
personal salvation. He is bound to share the wisdom with others
and he must take with him as many as are willing to walk the
path with him. This necessarily implies that the enlightened
person should not be confined to any particular place. He must
go about from place to place carrying the torch of light and wis-
dom thus spreading the true knowledge and true faith in all parts

CHAPTER VIII 155

of the country. This roaming about from place to place, spread-
ino- hope, wisdom and charity for the benefit of the whole society
is what is called dharma prabhdvana, one of the essential charac-
teristics of the right believer. This characteristic was present
at its maximum in the life of every Tirthankara. The Lord after
attaining kevala-jnana or Omniscience, spends the remaining
portion of his life-time in going about from place to place and
preaching the dharma for the benefit of mankind.

Thus the right-believer endowed with the above eight cha-
racteristics is free from new karmic bondage but has only to
achieve nirjara or the shedding of the past harmas.

Thus ends the chapter on Nirjara.

Wrjard quits the stage like a character cured of its infatuous
nature and filled with shanta-rasa or peace.

CHAPTER VIII

BANDHA OR BONDAGE OF KARMAS.
Then Bandha enters the stage.

TO tfrfr

r

Jaha nfimakovi puriso nehabhattodu renuvahulammi
Thanammi thayidunaya kareyi satlhimvayamam ^ (237)

"

Chchindadi bhindadi ya taha talitala kayalivamsa pindivo
Sachittachittanam ^ kareyi davvanamuvaghayam (238)

55lf^ I

' WFTTf^|f|

1 5 6 SAMAYSARA

Uvaghayam kuvvantassa tassa nanavihehi karanehim
Nichchhayado chintijjadu Mm pachchayagodu rayavandho (239)
'

ft frnipf

Jo so du nehabhavo tamhi riare tena tassa rayavandho
Nichchhayado vinneyam na kayachetthahim sesahim (240)

- '

n -?r

: 1 1 ^ Vo 1 1

Evam michchhaditthi vattanto vahuvihasu chetthasu
Rayayi uvavoge kuwanto lippayi tayeiia ' '

fetxf THTft ^

_ 237 to. 241: For instance, a man smeared with oil standing
in a place full of dust, performs exercises with a sword cuts or
breaks trees such as palm, tamala, plantain, bamboo, and asoka
andfe causes destruction .to objects, animate and inanimate
In the case of this person who is engaged in the destructive acti-
vity by assuming various bodily postures, what is the real condi-
tion causing dust deposit on his person? Certainly it is the oil
smeared on his body that must be considered to be the real cause
of the dust-deposit and certainly not his various bodily activities
in the same way a wrong believer even while he is engaged in
vanous activities, only if he performs those activities with feeling
of Attachment then certainly he gets covered with

COMMENTARY

Here is a person, smeared with oil all over the body, standing
^ natUa% fuU f duSt " He is '

R

He assumes various postures of his Tbody in his rapid

CHAPTER VIII 157

movement engaged in the destruction of objects animate and
inanimate. Certainly his body is covered with dust. What Is
the real cause of the dust deposit on him? Certainly it is not the
ground which is naturally full of dust. If that were so, another
person without oil-smear on the body standing in the same place
must also have the dust-deposit on his body. Is it the sword
exercise? Certainly not. For, another person without the oily
body performing the same exercise must get the dust-
deposit. Is it the destruction of objects animate and inanimate?
This cannot be. For a person similarly engaged without the
oily body must also get dust-deposit. In all these cases it is clear
that the dust-deposit does not occur when the oily surface is not
present and the dust-deposit occurs only when the oily surface
is present. This one common factor in the antecedent circums-
tances must be taken to be the real cause of the dust-deposit. ID
the same way a wrong believer, who, having the feeling of attach-
ment in himself and remaining in the world which is naturally
full of karmic particles is engaged in various activities of thought,
word and deed, directed to the destruction of animate and inani-
mate objects, gets covered with karmic dust. What is the real
cause of this karmic bondage. Certainly it is not the world which
is filled with karmic particles. If that were the cause, then even
the Sidhas, the Perfect Souls, because of their existence in the
same world must also be subjected to karmic bondage. Can it
be the action involving thought, word and deed? Such activity
is present even in the case of the Omniscient Arhat and in Him
there must occur the karmic bondage. Then is it due to destruc-
tion of objects animate and inanimate? Certainly not. For such
a destruction may happen even in the case of careful activities
which go under the name of foe.samffes. Here also the only
common factor is the antecedent circumstances; the feeling of
attachment, must be taken to be the causal condition of the kar-
mic bondage. Thus it is established through a practical illustra-
tion that the feeling of attachment towards objects in the environ-
ment is the real cause of karmic bondage.

SAMAYSARA

Jaha puna so cheva naro nehe savvamhi avaniye sante
Renuvahu lammi thane kareyi satthehi vayamam (242)

Chhindadi bhindadi ya taha talitala kayali vamsapindlvo
Sachchittachittanam kateyi' dawanumuva ghayarp (243)

Uvaghayam kuuvantassa tassa nanaviheliim karanehitn
Nichchhayado chintijjadu kim pachchyago na rayavandho (244)

\

>sft

Jo sodu nehabliavo tamhi nare tena tassa rayavandho
Nichchhayado vinneyam na kayachetthahim sesahim (245)

Evam sammaditthi vattanto vahuvihesu Jogesu

Akaranto uvavoge tagayi na Hppayi rayena (246)

242 to 246. On the othet hand a person entirely free from
oily smear on the body, standing in a place full of dust,, performs
exercises with a sword, cuts or breaks trees such as palm, tamala>
plantain, bamboo, and asoka and thus causes destruction to

CHAPTER VIII T 59

objects, animate and inanimate. In the case of this person who
is engaged in the destructive activity by assuming various bodily
postures, what is the real explanation for the absence of dust-
deposit on 'his person? Certainly it is the absence of oily surface
that must account for the absence of dust-deposit on his person
and not his various bodily activities. In the same way a right
believer even while he is engaged in various activities of thought,
word, and deed merely because of the absence of feeling of attach-
ment' in them, is not bound by karate particles.

COMMENTARY

In the above gdthas the causal relation between the feeling
of attachment and karmie bondage is established by citing posi-
tive instances on the one hand by which the presence of the cause
necessarily implies the presence of the effect and also by citing
negative instances on the other hand where the absence of the
cause implies the absence of the effect, thus adopting the princi-
ple which is known in Logic as the Joint Method of Agreement

*"* Nex Tthe^uthor describes the thoughts characteristic of the
nescient and the knowing Self.

frrftfr

Jo mannadi himsamiya himsijjamiya parehim sattehim
So mudho annani nani ettodu vivarido ^ (

247 He who thinks, "I kill other beings or 1 am killed by
othe, b'eings," is a deluded one, devoid of knowledge. But one
who thinks otherwise is the Knower.

COMMENTARY

The above-mentioned thought an s es tan lack of eb,^

l6o SAMAYSARA

in the Bhagavad Gita. "He who thinks of him as slayer, he who
deems him slain these both are void of judgment; he doth not
slay nor is he slain." 11.19.

Next the author explains why such thoughts imply ajndna
or lack of true knowledge.

*re*f

Avukkhayena maranam jivanam jinavarehim pannattam
Avum na haresi tumam kaha te maranam kayam tesim (248)

fFlt f^FT^t:

^T ?rd% ^f ^f C^TT ^OT i^f

248. It is declared by the Jinas that the death of living
beings is caused by the disappearance of their age-determining
karma. (Since) thou doth not destroy their age-determining
karma, how is their death caused by thee?

Avukkayena maranam jivanam jinavarehim pannattam
Avum jaa haranti tuha kaha te 1 maranam kayam tehim (249)

cR" ^f flT^f f^f t:

249. It is declared by the Jinas that the death of living be-
ings is caused by the disappearance of their age-determining
karma. (Since) they do not destroy thine age-determining kar t ma
how can thy death be caused by them.

COMMENTARY

Death of living beings results only when their age-determin-
ing karmas wear out. This wearing out of one's own age-
karma will be caused by its running its full course of duration and
not by any other means. When that causal condition is absent,
the result cannot be produced by any* other means. Hence no one
can think of causing the death of another. Therefore the
thought, "I kill or I am killed" is certainly the mark of ajndna,
or absence of knowledge of things real

CHAPTER VIII l6l

Next the author examines the statements expressing thoughts
relating to life, from the same two aspects.

Jo mannadi jivemiya jivijjamiya parehi sattehim

So mudho annani nam ettodu vivarido (250)

250. He who thinks, "I live (as caused by other beings)
and I cause other beings to live" is a deluded one, devoid of know-
ledge. But one who thinks otherwise is the Knower.

Next the author points out how this thought is the result
of ajnana.

Avuudayena jivadi jivo evam bhananti sawanhu
Avumcha 'na desi tumam kahamtaye jiviyam kayam tesim

fc

251 The Omniscient Ones declare that an organic being.
lives because of the operation of (its) ^-karma. (Since) thou
giveth not age-fern* (to living beings) how is their life caused
by thee.

Avu udayena jivadi V evam bhananti sawanhu
Avumcha na ditti tuham kaham nu te jiviyam kayam tehim

(252)

.

2.2 The Omniscient Ones declare that an organic bemg lives
becau eofthe operation of (its) age-^ (Sinde) they do not
give thee thine age-fer** how can they hfe be caused by them?

SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY f

The life of an organic being depends upon the operation of
its vgsrkarma. So long as the wgs-karma persists to operate,
the organic being continues to live. When that ceases to be,
life also ceases to be. Since the &gz-karma is entirely self-deter-
mined in its operation, it cannot be given by anybody else. There-
fore, by no means can one make another live. Hence, the
thought, "I am caused by others to live or I cause others to live/ 3
is certainly due to ajnana or absence of the knowledge of the
reals.

Next it is pointed out that the thought of causing happiness
or misery has the same significance.

f :

Jo appanadu mannadi duhida suhide karemi satteti

So mudha annani nani ettodu vivarido (253)

253. He who thinks, "I cause happiness or misery to other
beings and I am made happy or miserable by others," is a deluded
one, devoid of knowledge. The Knower thinks otherwise.

Next the author points out how this thought is the result of
ajnana.

Kammodayena jiva dukkhidasuhida havanti jadi savve
Kammam cha na desi Aumam dukkhidasuhida kaham kaya te

(254)

254. If all living beings become miserable or happy only
when their karmas begin to operate and since thou dost not give
them their karmas, how are they made miserable or happy by
thee.

CHAPTER VIII 163

Kammodayena. jiva dukkhidasuhida havanti jadi sawe
Kammam cha na dinti tuham. kadosi kaham dukkhido tehim

(255)

wt |:R4d*d:

255. If all living beings become miserable or happy only
when their karmas begin to operate and since they do not give
thee thy karmas., how art thou made miserable by them.

<

Kammodayena jiva dukkhidasuhida havanti jadi sawe
Kammam cha na dinti tuham kaha tarn suhido kado tehim

(256)

256. If all living beings become miserable or happy only
when their krauts begin to operate and since they do not give
thee thy karmas, how art thou made happy by them.

COMMENTARY

Whether a living being is happy or miserable, is entirely
determined by the operation of its karmas. If the causal condi-
tion is absent, the resultant experience will also cease to be. One s
^.cannot be got as a gift from another. It is acquired onty
by one's own conduct in life. Hence one cannot make another
hippy or miserable. Hence the thought, "I make others happy
or miserable or I am made happy or miserabk by others is cer-
tainly the mark of 4800. Tto* . through these gaihas the
author emphasises that death and life, misery and happiness are
all the result of the operation of one's own karma.

164 SAMAYSARA

Jo maradi joya duhido jayadi kammodayena so sawo
Tamha du maridode duhavido chedi nahu michcha (257)
^ft fipra*

257. One dies or one becomes miserable while alive; all
these happen as a result of the operation of one's own karmas.
Therefore, "He is killed by me and he is made miserable by me"
is not this view of yours entirely false?

Jo na maradi naya duhido soviya kammodayena cheva khalu
Tamha naridona duhavido chedi nahu michchha (258)

^rrfeft ^ |:tw^ti% ^r ^ ftr^rr

258. One does not die or one does not become miserable
while alive, this also is certainly the result of the operation of
one's own karmas. Therefore, "He is not killed by me and he
is not made miserable by me" is not this view of yours entirely
false ?

Next the author points out that this erroneous belief is the
cause of bondage.

Esa du ja mad! de dukkhidasuhide karemi satteti

Esa de mudhamayl suhasuhara bandhaye kammam (259)

259. This false notion of thine, "I make other beings miser-
able or happy" is illusory. This leads to the bondage of karmas
good or bad.

c

Dukkhidasuhide satte karemi jam eva majjhavasidam te
Tarn pava bandhagam va punjaassava bandhagam hodi (260)

CHAPTER VIII

260. "I make other beings miserable or happy". This
thought of thine 'causes karmie bondage of the nature of vice
or virtue.

^ 1 1

Maremi jivavemiya satte jam eva majjhavasidam te

Tarn pavabandhagam va punnassa va bandhagam hodi (261)

261 . "I kill other beings or I make them live." This thought
of thine' causes karmie bondage of the nature of vice or virtue.

Next it is pointed out that the thought to kill is the same
as killing.

\\\\\\\

Ajjhavasidena bandho satte marevu mava marevu
Eso bandhasamaso jivanam nichchhyanayassa (262)

; 3ffaRt

262 The will to kill is enough to bring bondage irrespec-
tive of the fact whether animals are killed or are not killed.
From the real point of view this in short is the mode of bondage
in the case of jfvas (or empirical selves).

Again the author points out how thought as the cause of
bondage and of papa or panya, vice or virtue.^

Evamaliye adatte abamhachare pariggahe cheva
Karayi ajihavasanam jam tena du vajjhaye pavam

I , ,

263, Thus (the will to kill), the vili.to He, to steal, to be

1 66 SAMAYSARA

unchaste and to acquire property (inordinately) leads to bondage
of evil karmas.

Tahavi ya sachche datte bambhe aparigahattene cheva
Kirayi ajjhavasanam jam tena du vajjhaye punnam (264)

qi=FT

264. Whereas (the will not to kill), the will not to lie., not
to steal, not to be unchaste and not to acquire property (inor-
dinately) leads to the bondage of good karmas.

^
COMMENTARY

The same truth is conveyed by Christ through His teachings
when he emphasises the inner purity of heart, "Blessed are the
pure in heart for they shall see God/' This clearly implies that
the realisation of the divinity in man is necessarily conditioned
by the purity of heart; whereas when the heart is impure, it brings
about sin. The following words of Christ make this clear. "Ye
have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shall not
commit adultery. But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh
on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her
already in his heart." St. Matthew .27 & 28.

Next it is pointed out that the objects in the external world
can neither be the cause of karmic bondage.
sf

Vatthum padhuchcha jam puna ajjhavasanam tu hodi jivanam
Na hi vattudo du bandho ajjhavasanena bandhotthi (265)

265. Thought in an empirical Self is always conditioned by
an object in the external world. Nevertheless it is not that exter-

CHAPTER VIII T "7

ml object that is the cause of bondage. It is by thought that
bondage is caused.

COMMENTARY

The direct cause of bondage is thought and not any external
obiect though this is the cause of thought itself. Then why
should external objects be tabooed? It is for the purpose of
condemning the thought based upon the external objects.
Thought without the basis of an external object never occurs in
the consciousness of Self. If it is possible to have thought with-
out the basis of an external object, then thought corresponding
to non-existing objects must also appear. In the case of a per-
son born of a real mother, you can entertain the thought, I am
going to kill her son". But in the case of a barren woman, the
loutht "I am going to kill her son", would be meaningless
becLt 'there can be no son born to abarren woman Hence ^ is
certain that there can be no thought without a basis n reality.
H nee "necessarily follows that condemnation of evil though
kads to the condemnation of corresponding objects of reality. For
is only by preventing the cause that the effect can be prevented
fern occuTrL. Could it not be maintained that because the exter-
S^ cause of thatcause which produce; .bondage, there-

which is common to boJi. It is not _

in

that is the cause of bondage.

I<5 8 SAMATSARA

Next the author points out that the thought which is said to
be the cause of bondage is false because of" the absence of objec-
tive evidence to corroborate it.

*rs*rf farw^nr srr

Dukkhidasuhide jive karemi vandhemi taha vimochemi
Ja esa mudamayi nirachchhaya sa hu de michchha (266)

3&K$f cPTT
' OT

266. "I make living beings miserable or happy; I bind or
release them." Such thought in you is meaningless. Verily it is false.

COMMENTARY

Happiness or misery of a person is entirely dependent upon
that person's nature and it cannot be due to any external influence
Hence the proposition, "I make him happy or I make Mm miser-
able" is false, because it is uncorroborated by objective reality
Mere assertion of a proposition cannot make it real. It cannot
create its own objective evidence of corroboration.. If it is possi-
ble for the asserted proposition to carry within itself , the corro-
borative evidence of objective reality, then such statements must
becomejeal by the mere fact of a^ertion as, <1 am gathering sky-
flowers. Hence no assertion by itself can carry its own truth-
value with it.

_ Next it is explained how such a thought is without corrobora-
tive evidence.

sT^roftrfirrf 3ifar v&tifo ^m ^^ ,
T*f% *TWfi fesr 3T 3 f% Hprmr a*f n W n

Ajjhavasananimittam vajjhanti Kammana jadiM
Mujjanti mokkhamagge tida ya te kinkarodi tumam (267)
3WTORftftRf ^T ^W ^u Zfc f| ,

a6 7 . ^ ff their own thoughts are the real condition by which

souls are bound by ^^orget released from themwhile standing
on the path of salvation, then what i s there that to canst achieve?

CHAPTER VIII 169

COMMENTARY

The proposition in thought, "I bind or I release" in order
to be true must have as its objective meaning, actual bondage or
release of jtvas, as ** corroborative evidence. But as a matter of
hctjtvas are bound or released according to their own thought
conditions. Another person's thought would be entirely ineffec-
tive, therefore, to bind or release other jwas. Hence your
thought, "I bind or I release other jtvas" is entirely false
since it is not corroborated by objective evidence. Hence your
claim, "I bind or release other jivaf 9 Is only illusory.

Next the author describes the behaviour of one who is delud-
ed by such ineffectual and fruitless thought.

Sawe kareyi jivo ajjhavasanena tiriyanerayiye
Devamanuveya savve punnam pavam cha aneyaviham (268)

\\\\6\\

268. The Self, by its own thought activity creates for itself
the form of beings sub-human, hellish, celestial, and human
and also various types of virtue and vice.

=5r

Dhammadhammam cha taha jlvajive aloyaloyam cha
Savve kareyi jivo ajjhavasanena appanam

269. Similarly, the Self through its own thought-activity
may identify itself with the categories of dharma or adkarma,
soul, non-soul, the Universe and the Beyond.

COMMENTARY

The will to do a thing pakes a person the doer of that act.
Thus the, will to kill makes him a killer, the will to steal makes
him a thief and o on. Thus a particular amative tendency m

1 70 SAMAYSARA

the Self makes that Self the agent of the corresponding action,
Similarly thought condition determining feirth as a hell inhabitant
when ripe will lead to the birth as a hellish being. Similarly
appropriate and efficient thought conditions will make the Self,
a celestial or human being. The same appropriate thought acti-
vity will cause him to do virtuous deeds or vicious deeds and
enjoy happiness or misery. The very same thought activity as
a process of knowledge, may bring in the categories of dkarma,
adharma, the world including animate and inanimate objects,
and space beyond as objects of knowledge related to Self. Bui
tliis very same thought vitiated by absence of right knowledge
may lead the Self to erroneously identify itself with the various
external objects. In all these cases the Self deviates from its own
intrinsic nature of purity and gets vitiated by alien influences on
account of which the Self through its vitiated thought activity
goes astray from his own nature assuming various forms unreal,
ephemeral, and impure. Thus the real rishis are entirely free
from such vicious and erroneous thought activity.
4 Next it is pointed out that those who are free from such
thought activity are not subject to karmic bondage.

W

Edani natthi jesim ajjhavasanani evamadini

Te asuhena suhena va kammena muni na limpanti (270)

^rr

270. The saints, in whom such thought activities are not
present, are not contaminated by karmas, good or bad.

COMMENTARY

The thought activities mentioned above, occur when the
intrinsic nature of the Self is not realised. The realisation of the
true Self implies the three aspects. Faith in the ultimate purity
of the self, knowledge of the ultimate self, and being identified
with that ultimate self-these three aspects constitute "the mschya
ratnatraya, the three jewels from the higher point of view. The

CHAPTER VIII

thought activities referred to in the preceding two gathas are
not based upon the experience of that Absolute Self. Therefore
they are associated with the empirical Self. Empirical Self implies
the opposite of the Transcendental Real Self. Therefore the
activities of belief, knowledge and conduct of the empirical Self
are from the real point of view, erroneous belief, erroneous know-
ledge and erroneous conduct. Therefore karmic bondage results
from them. Hence it follows that in the case of a saint equipped
with true knowledge of Self, these psychic activities are absent
and hence there is no karmic bondage.

Next the term Adhyavasana is explained.

3*

Buddhi vavasavoviya ajjhavasanam -madlya vinnanam
Eyattameva sawam chittam bhavoya parinamo (271)

_-

MKU*H:

271. 'Buddhi (understanding), vyavasaya' (resolving), adhya-
vasana (conative activity), mati (thinking), vtjnana (kno\vbg),
chttta (consciousness), bhava (conscious mode), and parinama
(conscious manifestation) all these words have the same meaning.
Nest the vyavaharanaya is denied by the nisfhayanaja.
ITef ^^fRWSft T^T^t ^TTW fTT^^-J|4i I
fui-caumqifeKT yr ^("1^ ^71^1% riqii IRvs^ll
Evam vavaharanavo padhisiddho jana nichchhayanayena
Nichchhayanayassida puna munino pavanti niwanam (272)

* "

272. Thus know ye that the practical point of view is con-
tradicted by the real point of view. It is by adopting the real
point of view that the saints attain Nirvana or Liberation.

COMMENTARY

The (nischaya) real point of view is based upon the Self. The
a) practical point of view is based upon external things.

X 7 2 SAMAYSARA

Thus from the real point of view, all the externally conditioned
thought activities because they constitute the causal condition
for kartaie bondage have to be rejected by the saints who have
renounced all. To renounce such thought activities, they have
to reject the practical point of view itself since that is based upon
external things. Spiritual liberation from karmic bondage ' is
possible only by adopting the real point of view. Hence one
who wants to reach the goal of Nirvana has to adopt the real
point of view and reject the practical point of view.

Vadasamidi guttio silatavam jinavarehim "pannattam
Kuwanthovi abhavivo annani michchhaditthi du ( 273 )
-

273. Persons incapable of spiritual liberation even though
they observe vows, carefulness, restraints, rules of conduct and
penance as described by the Jinas do remain without true know-
ledge and of false faith.

COMMENTARY

Various kinds of religious discipline prescribed by the Jina
are trom the tyavahara point of view. Hence they constitute
vjavahdra charitra, course of conduct prescribed for the ordinary
man. These rules of conduct may be observed even by abhavyas
-persons innately unfit for spiritual salvation. Even though such
an abhaya practises those rules of conduct, he cannot be consi-
dered to be equipped with the three jewels of the higher order
which are based upon the nature of the pure Self. Hence his
conduct is only of the lower order belonging to the three jewels
of the lower order. Hence from the absolute point of view
since the abhaya is endowed with the inferior jewels, his faith
and knowledge cannot be considered to be of the right kind
Therefore even the successful observance of the rules of conduct
does not entitle him to be classed among those of right knowledge
and right faith, Hence he must remain ajnani and mithadriM

CHAPTER VIII 173

Even when he is well-versed in the Scriptures, is he still to
be called an ajndni ? The answer is given in the next gdtha.

Mokkham asaddahanto abhaviyasatto do jo adhiyejja
Patho na karedi gunam asaddahantassa nanam tu (274)

ITT <

274. An abhavja, one unfit for spiritual salvation, has no
faith in moksha, hence though well versed in all the scriptures,
such a study does not endow him with right knowledge or qualifi-
cation because of the lack of faith.

COMMENTARY

The reality of moksha is not believed in by the abhavya
because he is devoid of the right knowledge of the pure nature of
the Self. Therefore he has no belief even in knowledge. Thus
devoid of right knowledge and right faith, his mastery of the
scriptures cannot make him the real Knower and it does no good
to him. Thus in spite of his learning, he remains devoid of know-

ledge.

Has he not by his observance of the rules of conduct, faith
at least in dharma ? The answer is given in the gathd below.

3Tt

Saddahadiya pattadiya rochediya taha punoya phasedi
Dhammam bhoganimittam nahu so kammakkhayanimittam

( 2 75)

275 No doubt he has faith in (a kind of) dharma, he ac-
quires it, he delights in it and practises it. But it is all with the
object of future enjoyment. Certainly not (that dharma which
leads to the) destruction of karoos.

*74 SAMAYSARA

Next moksha mdrga, path of salvation is described from the
vyavahara and nischaya points of view, the former to be rejected
and the latter to be adopted.

Ayaradinanam jivadidamsanam cha vinneyam
Chhajjivanikayamcha taha bhanayi charittam tu vavahard (276)

276. Let it be known that (knowledge of the scriptures
such as) Acharanga is right knowledge. (Faith in the categories
of) foa etc., is right faith. (Protection of ) the six kinds of orga-
nisms is right conduct. These, it is said, constitute vyavahara
(moksham a rga)tte path of salvation from the practical point
of view).

f *T^ WK 3TRT

Ada khu majjhananam ada me damsane charitte ya

Ada pachchakkhanam ada me samvaro jogo ( 277 )

STH^IcW
3TTWT

277. Whereas the Self is my right knowledge, the Self is
my right faith, the Self again is my right conduct. The Self is
renunciation, the Self is the stoppage of karmas and jogic medita-
tion. (These constitute the mschaja moksha marga, or Path of
Salvation from the real point of view).

Emotional states such as attachment are the cause of bond-
age. They are alien to the nature of the pure Self. Then how
do they occur in the consciousness of the Self? Do they result
torn direct manifestation of the Self or are they caused by alien
influences? This question is answered in the succeeding gdthds.

CHAPTER VIII 175

Jaha phaliyamani suddho na sayam parinamayi rayamayihim
Rangijjadi annehim du so raltadihim davvehim

w sn

Evam naai suddho na sayam parinamadi tayamayihini
Rayijjadi anuehim du so ragadihim ddsehim (279)

278-279. As a piece of crystal, itself being pure and colour-
less,, cannot appear red-coloured of its own accord, but in associa-
tion with another red-coloured object; it appears coloured red;
in the same way the Self, himself being pure cannot have emotional
activities such as attachment, etc., of his own accord. But when
influenced by alien impurities, he gets tainted by such impure
emotions of attachments, etc.

It is next pointed out that one who knows the real nature
of things realises that the Self, the Knower, is not the cause of
the impure psychic states such as attachment, etc.

Naya rayadosamoham kowadi nani kasayabhavam va
Sayamappano na so tena karago tesi bhavanam (280)

^TT^RFT

280. The Knower does not of his own accord produce in
himself attachment, aversion, delusion and such other grosser emo-
tions. Hence he is not the causal agent for those psychic states.

Next it is pointed out that the ego devoid of the knowledge
of the reals and immersed in nescience is causally responsible for
such impure psychic states.

qfwrat

SAMAYSARA

Ragamhiya dosamhiya kasayakammesu cheva jo bhava
Tehim du parinamanto ragadi bandhadi punovi ( 2 8i)

TFT ^T tt ^T ^TWW =f =T z

281. When the material karmas pertaining to attachment
aversion, and grosser emotions begin to operate, the empirical
ego begins to have corresponding psychic states. These psychic
manifestations of attachment, etc., of which he is the causal
agent do produce in their turn fresh karmic bondage.

==r

Ragamhiya dosamhiya kasaya kammesu cheva je bhava
Tehim du parinamanto ragadi bandhade cheda (282)

TFT

TFTT^f

282. The empirical ego which is manifesting in the psychic
states of attachment, aversion, and grosser emotions and which
identifies itself with those psychic states gets bound by corres-
ponding fresh karmic matter.

Next the author points out that the Self is not the causal
agent for the emotion of attachment, etc.

Apadhikkamanam duviham apachchakkhanam taheva vinneyam
Eyenuvayesena ya akarayo vanniyo cheya ' ( 2 8 3 )

283. Non-repentance is of two kinds and non-renunciation
also should be known to be similar. By such teaching the Self
of the nature of consciousness is said to be not their causal agent.

CHAPTER VIII *77

Apadhikkamanam duviham da we bhave taha apachchkhanam
Eyenuvayesena ya 'akarayo vanniyo cheya (284)

?TTt

284. Non-repentance is of two kinds, physical and psychi-
cal and so also non-renunciation; by such teaching the Self of
the nature of consciousness is said to be not their causal

agent.

3TRT ^TT *

JavanTapadhikkamanam apachchakhanam cha dawabhavanam
ICuwayi ada tavam katta so hoyi nayawo ( 28 5)

285. So long as the^Self does not practise renunciation and
repentance, both physical and psychical, it should be understood
that he is the causal agent of karmas.

COMMENTARY

Pratikramana implies confession and repentance for past
misdeeds. Apratikramana, therefore, means instead of confes-
sion and repentance, recalling to memory the past experiences
with implicit approval. This recalling to memory the past im-
pure experience is of two kinds, psychical and physical. Pratya-
khjdna implies restraining or abstaining from a desire for future
sensual enjoyment. Afratyaktiydna is its opposite. It means
the absence of that restraint and hence an uninhibited
longing for future pleasures. This is also of two kinds
matlial and psychical. The material karnnc condition
produces the corresponding psychic states of emotion either
approving the past experience or longing for future pleasures
The causal relation therefore exists between the material aspect
and the psychical aspect and these two aspects of afratikramana
and apratyakhyana since they imply the operation of materM
kamas and the appearance of psychic k*r* nave no relation to

iy8 SAMAYSARA

the pure Self of the nature of consciousness. Hence the pure
Self cannot be considered as the causal agent of these two types
of karmas. This is the Message of the Scriptures. But when
the pure Self forgets its own real nature and identifies itself with
the grosser emotions of the empirical ego, he is not able to repent
for the past experiences, nor refrain from the future ones. So
long as he is thus spiritually incapacitated to wipe out the past
and to reject the future, he feels himself responsible for all those
impure emotions caused by karmic materials and thus he becomes
the karta or the causal agent of those experiences.

How the material condition can produce psychic states
operating as nimitta and how the Self is concerned or related to this
causal process is elucidated by an example taken from ordinary life.

Adhakammadlya poggaladawassa je ime dosa

Kaha te kuwayi nani paradawagunavu je nlchcham (286)

286. How can the Self, the Knower, cause these defects
in the material things used in the, preparation of food since those
are the attributes of external objects.

Adhakammam uddesiyam cha poggalamayam imam dawam
Kaha tarn mama hoyi kayam jam nichchhamacheyanam vuttam

(287)

287. Even when food is prepared by others for me, the things
used are material in nature. How can these defects be considered
to be caused by me when they really pertain to inanimate objects.

COMMENTARY

In the case of the householder as well as the ascetic there

CHAPTER IX

lya kammabandhananam payesa payadhitthidiya anubhagam
Janantovi na munchayi munchayi so cheva jayi suddho (290)

288-290. As a person, who has been in shackles for a long
time may be aware of the nature of his bondage, intense or feeble,
and also its duration still so long as he does not make any effort
to break them, he does not get himself free from the chains and
may have to remain so, for a long time without obtaining freedom.
Similarly a person with karmic bondage, even if he has the know-
ledae of the extent, the nature, the duration, and the strength
of the karrnic bondage, does not get liberation (by this
mere knowledge) but he gets complete liberation if pure in

heart.

COMMENTARY

Separating the Self and bondage from each other is called

! Some maintain that mere knowledge of the nature of

uf bondage is able to produce rtbk or Liberation. But ths

"g Just as in the case of a person in chains mere know-

dTeof the chain is ineffectual in securing his freedom, so also

t knowledge of the nature of k^ic bondage meflec-

t1 in securing his spiritual liberation.

Ne^T L pointed out that mere thinking about the process
* envelopment of ^Vbondage does not lead to the bbera-
'tion of the Self.

Mat S'm* r
ferat *ft ft T

chintanto bandhanabaddho na pavavi

r

A bv (merely) thinking of bondage one bound m
shacHes dot gl re,t, so a,so the by merely ,hm b n g
of (hanii) bondage does not attam

I So SAMAYSARA

practice of pratikramana and pratyaktyana, disowning the past
and rejecting the future occurrence of those impure psychic
states. If on the other hand, the Self by abandoning the spiritual
discipline imposed by pratikramana and pratyakhyana, identifies
itself with the past impure emotions and readily commits himself
to future similar indulgences, he becomes fully responsible for the
defects thereof, and therefore gets bound by corresponding
karmas. This case, is therefore analogous to the case where the
person accepts the defective and impure food though he is not
concerned with the preparation thereof.

Thus ends the chapter on bandha or Bondage.

Thus bandha quits the stage.

CHAPTER IX
MOKSHA OR LIBERATION

Then Moksha enters the stage.

Jaha nama kovi puriso vandhanayammi chirakalapadhi-

baddho

Tivvam mandasahavam kalam cha viyajjaye tassa (288)

w ^ft

Jayi navi kunayi chhedatn na muchchaye tena bandhanavaso

sam

Kalena vu bahuyenavi na so naro pavayi vimokkham (289)

CHAPTER VIII

179

are important principles prescribed in the matter of food. Only
what is called pavitra-ahara or pure food is fit to be eaten by them.
But in the matter of preparing food there are various possibilities
of defects occurring 5 therein. The articles used may be defective
and may vitiate the quality of food prepared thereform. The neces-
sary things used for preparing food such as water., fire, etc. because
of careless selection may also Vitiate the food prepared. Whether
the preparation is made by yourself or by a cook under your
instructions., the defects which may be present in the food pre-
pared and which make it unfit for consumption are all defects of
material articles utilised in the preparation of food. The articles
used for the preparation together with the person engaged in
cooking are all external conditions to you. Food prepared forms
the effect of all these external causal conditions and this is also
external, the whole process of causal condition resulting in the
form of effect. The prepared food is completely external to the
person who is going to consume the food. He is not concerned
in the series of operating causes and the resulting effect. There-
fore he is neither concerned in the production of the defects pre-
sent in the food nor is he responsible for the same. They all
pertain to material inanimate objects in the external world. But
if he accepts that food which is defective and unfit for consump-
tion with the full knowledge of the fact that defective articles
were used and there was carelessness in preparation thereof, he
becomes responsible for those defects, and he is therefore subject
to demerit thereof. But if he rejects that food, he is not respons-
ible for the defects and therefore he will remain uninfluenced by
the demerits thereof. This illustration is quite parallel to the
previous case where the material karmic conditions produce-
corresponding psychic states of an impure nature. These im-
pure psychic states, since they are produced by material karmic
conditions which are different in nature from the Self and also
external to it, both the cause and effect remain external and
alien to the Self. Therefore the pure Seff is not directly
concerned in this causal series and hence is not responsible
for the defects and impurities present in the result. He can
maintain this unconcernedness and indifference only by the

182 SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY c

Others maintain that the concentration of mind on the idea
of bondage is itself the cause of moksha or spiritual liberation
This view also is wrong. By mere concentration of thought on
bondage one cannot obtain liberation, just as dbncenttated'atten
tion on the shackles cannot get freedom for the person in chains
^ What then is the cause of liberation? The answer is
below.

3

3ft fer

Jaha bandhe chhittunaya vandhanavaddho vu pavayi vimokkham
Taha bandhe chhittunaya ji vo sampavayi vimokkham

,

_ 292.. As one bound in shackles gets release only on break-
ing the shackles, so also the Self attains emancipation only by
breaking (karmic} bondage. 7 7

How is this to be effected? The method is shown below.

^ jTf^ tf> ^wr%ft^nf ^>if II^^Bii

Bandhanam cha sahavam viyanivo appano \ahavam cha
Bandhesu jovi rajjadi so kammavimokkhanam kunayi (293)

^rf ^ ssnrrcf %rm]c^R: ^>TR ^ i

. ^,, .

293 Whoever with a clear knowledge of the nature of
k*mc bondage as well as the nature of the Self, does not *et
attracted by bondage-that person obtains liberation frol

COMMENTARY

Thus the direct cause of liberation is determined to be the
separation of the Self and the bondage from each other

CHAPTER IX l8 3

Jivo bandhoya taha chhijjanti salakkhanehim niyayehim
Pannachhedanayena vu chhinna nanattamavanna (294)

294. The Self andbondage are differentiated by their intrin-
sic and distinctive features; cut through by the instrument of
discriminative wisdom, they fall apart.

COMMENTARY

The attribute of the Self is pure consciousness and the attri-
bute of bondage is the impure emotions of -anger, etc. based upon
wro na belief. These two by association get identified with each
other This identification of the Self with impure emotions due
to k^mc bondage is the foundation of the empirical Self m *-
sara These two entities, the Self and karmc bondage charac-
erised by their own intrinsic properties are linked together from
ti *e immemorial. This unholy alliance must be broken^
What is the effective instrument to cut these two apart ? Such an
instrument is said to be the discriminative wisdom. ^ This d-
criminative wisdom fully realises the pure nature of the SeLf and
its intrinsic difference from the impure emot^ns due to
bondage and aids the Self to reject the latter and to extricate
S This process of isolating the Self from^ emo-ns
then once effected through discriminative wisdom, keeps the
two entities permanently apart. _

What ought to be done, after the separation of Self and
bondage is effected, is indicated below. .

r3FT*

hhijjanti salakkhanehim niyayehim

-

- CT ^=r-7T- 5T3- STTcTTT ^Tft^T^r: ll^ < l\ll

"

1 84 SAMAYSARA

then by completely casting away all bondage, the pure Self
ought to be realised.

Thus it is emphasised that the very object of separating the
two is to realise the pure Self by shaking of all bondage. Next it
is pointed out how this object of self-realisation is to be achieved.

ff f^FT? ^qr TWIT* ^ff

Kaha so ghippayi appa pannaye so vu ghippaye appa
Jaha pannaye vibhatto taha panna eva ghittavvo (296)

^"fra" 3TTc*TT SRRT ^ c[ *r$3 STRATI \

5RRT f^RRRcr^ SRJ^T 'Tfl^r^T: I R ^ ^ 1 1

296. How is the Self realised? The Self is realised by dis-
criminative wisdom. Just as he is separated by discriminative
wisdom so also by the very same discriminative wisdom he is
realised.

How is the Self realised through discriminative wisdom?
The answer is given below.

3ft =t^T tft

%

Paruaaye ghittavvo jo cheda so aham tu nichchhayado
Avasesa je bhava te majjhaparetti nayavva (297)

WRT ^nr TTT

297. That (pure) conscious being which is apprehended
by discriminative wisdom is in reality the C T\ Whatever mental
states remain (besides) are all to be known to be other than "mine".

Just like pure consciousness, pure perception and pure know-
ledge are described to be the intrinsic attributes of the pure Self.

Pannaye ghittavvo jo dattha so aham tu nichchhayado
Avasesa je bhava te majjha paretti nayavva (298)

, a,
CHAPTER IX io >

298 . That seer who is apprehended by discriminative wisdom
is in reality the "I." Whatever mental states there are (besides)
are all to be known to be other than "mine."

sff WT^T <ETT 3Tf 5

wrr t T^ qr% WPT^T

Pannaye ghittavvo jo nada so aham tu nichchhayado
Avasesa je bhava te majjha paretti nayanva (299)

299 That knower, who is apprehended by discrimi-
native wisdom is in reality the "I." Whatever mental states
remain (besides) are all to be known to be other

"mine."

COMMENTARY

If the pure Self is of the nature of conscious unity, how can
he be the seer and the knower? Is not his nature transcending
these two aspects ? No. perception and knowledge are not attri-
butes to be transcended by the supreme consciousness, because
they are the attributes of the supreme consciousness itselt. It
the supreme consciousnesses to transcend these attributes it
will become an empty abstraction, for there can be no reality
without attributes. This universal postulate, no reahty withou
its attributes, is applicable to the supreme reahty also. Hence
an attributed reality is mere nothing Agam tf it is assumed
for arguments' sake, that a general substratum can ex st ; en
after the' elimination of its attributes, even then the po^on
would be untenable. For consciousness devoid of the attributes
of perception and knowledge will become practically a non-cons-
cious entity which cannot be the nature of the upreme S*.
Hence perception and knowledge inasmuch as they are atm-
tas resulting from the manifestation of pure ness
must be considered to be the intrinsic properties of he pure ctt,
Tee manifesting entity cannot be different from the mamfesta-

^ Thus, though the pure Self is'to be considered apart from

i86

SAMAYSARA

the characteristics of empirical consciousness, . it should not be
abstracted from all attributes as is done by the Vedantin. The
Vedantin relying upon the fact that the characteristics and attri-
butes of the empirical ego are entirely alien to the nature of the
Supreme Self, justifiably places the Supreme Self quite beyond
the empirical properties. Swami Kunda Kunda also emphasises the
same fact when he says that all other mental attributes are entirely
alien to "me." This justifiable denial of the empirical impure
attributes to the Supreme Self is immediately followed by the
predication of the attributes of .pure perception and knowledge
which are present in the Supreme Self even after transcending
the empirical nature. Of course it should not be misunderstood
that these properties of perception and knowledge are the same
as the process of perceiving and knowing associated with the
empirical ego. In the latter case though the properties are called
by the same names, they are entirely limited by physical conditions.
Whereas the pure perception and pure knowledge associated
with the Supreme Self are the unconditioned and unlimited mani-
festation of the Supreme Self. Thus it should be noted that the
Advaitin, though he keeps company with Bhagawan Kunda Kunda
to a considerable distance in the path of metaphysical investi-
gation, ultimately parts company and walks to a different
goal. Thus in short the Supreme Self of Sri Kunda
Kunda is not the same as the Supreme Self of the other
schools.

Next it is pointed out that a person who is equipped with
this kind of discriminative wisdom/wilT not consider alien men-
tal states to be his own.

q- Wf srpjfcfr 3TO ^ ll^o o||

Ko nama bhanijja vuho navum savve paroyaye bhave
Majjhaminam tiya vayanam jananto appayam suddham (300)

CHAPTER IX 187

300. What wise^man knowing the nature of the pure Self
and understanding all the mental states caused by alien conditions
would utter the words, "These are mine?"

That the Self which identifies itself with the external object,
is subject to karmie bondage is explained by an illustration from
ordinary life.

sft Doers' *ft s sfast TFTI i
Wfr sprier foreft n^n

Teyayl avarahe jo kowayi so sankido bhamayi

Ma vajjheaham kenavi chorotti janammiviyaranto (301)

TTT TO ^nfr^lr i% ^R fe^?r \\\\\\

301. He who commits crimes such as theft, while moving
among the people, 'is troubled by anxiety and fear, "I may be
arrested at any moment as a thief." -

*r

Jo na kunayi avarahe so nissanko vu janavaye bhamayi
Navi tassa vajjhidum je chinta uppajjayi kayavi (502)

"

113

^02 But one who commits no such crime freely moves
among the people without any such anxiety. Because in his case
no thought of arrest ever occurs.

JOT ^ni m w

Evam hi savaraho vajjhami aham to sankido cheya

Jayi puna niravaraho nissankhoham na vajjhami (303)

rr=f

,o, Similarly the Self which is guilty always has the fear,
I mlybe bound," whereas if guiltless the Self feels, I am fear-
less and hence I may not be bound."

188 ' SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

It is the law of the State that the criminal should be detected
and punished. Hence the criminal who commits theft always
moves in society with a guilty conscience and Ultimately he may
get arrested, punished and imprisoned. Whereas a person who
lives in society honourably without coveting others 3 property
always moves about freely without fear of being arrested. The
same analogy holds good in the case of Self. The Self which
commits the mistake of claiming alien characteristics as his own
is bound to face the consequences thereof that is, karmic bondage.
Whereas the Self that disowns all such impure states as alien has
the privilege of remaining free from bondage.

Next the author explains the term aparadha or guilt.

l" 3ft ^ %r *ft ftf s

Samsiddhiradhasiddham* sadhiya maradhiyam cha eyattham
Avagayaradho jo kalu cheya so hoyi avaraho (304)

113

304. Samsiddhi (attainment), radha (devotion to Self) sid-
hi (fulfilment), sadhitam (achievement), dradhitam (adoration), are
synonymous. When the soul is devoid of devotion to Pure Self,
then he is certainly guilty.

Jo puna niravaraho cheya nissankivo vu so hoyi.

Aranaye nichcham vattheyi ahamidi jananto (305)

305. When the soul is free from guilt, he is. also free from
fear. Thus realising the ego, he is ever engaged in adoration
of the Self. '

How is the pure spotless state of Self to be realised? Is it
by concentrated adoration of the Pure Self or by the practice of

CHAPTER IX l8 9

various kinds of moral discipline such as pratikramana, etc.? The
answer is given below.

f trf? TO qfTfrd '<*mr frnrat *
^tfr srgf^rt ^ fta^ft

Padhikamanam padhisaranam pariharo dharana myattip
Nindha garocha sohi atthaviho hoyi visakumbho

306. Pratikranrt* (repentence for past .misconduct), **-
(pursuit of the good), panbura ^(rejecting the e^ ), j^-
(concentration) ^/// (abstinence rom *^"^
nal objects) /& (self-censure), garha (confessing before ^ the
Lter) and suMn (purification by expiation), these eight kinds
constitute .the pot of poison.

srfxrr^ JT srfer srr^frt ara^fr u^ovsn

ApadWkkamanam apadhisaranam appariharo adharana cheva
Aniyattiya aninda agaruha asohi amayakumbho (11)

3rsrf^^^%^^^^^^rT ^ i

for past misconduct, non-pursuit

nectar.

COMMENTARY

These two gathas by their paradoxical statement will be

f^

SAMAYSARA

cipline, pratikramana, etc., become necessary, and desirable. Since
they promote the achievement of the good they must be said
to constitute the pot of nectar. Whereas the lack of the eight-
fold discipline must constitute the opposites that is the pot of
poison since there is a free vent to evil. This ordinary descrip-
tion is reversed in the two gdthds by Sri Kunda Kunda. He
is thinking of the transcendental Self which is quite beyond the
region of good and evil. Hence the question of discipline or
non-discipline is meaningless. And hence in the case of the
supremely pure state of the Self, to talk of pratikramana, etc., is
to drag it down to the empirical level and to postulate the possibi-
lity of occurrence of impure emotions which ought to be dis-
ciplined and controlled. Hence to talk of pratikramana, etc.
in this state will be a positive evil. Hence the revered author
considers the various kinds of moral discipline, to be things to
be avoided and calls them poison pot. Then .what is the signi-
ficance of the opposite, apratikramana, etc. which are described
to constitute the pot of nectar? Here the term aparatikramana
implies not the mere opposite of pratikramana. The mere oppo-
site of pratikramana would imply removing the disciplinary act
and giving free access to the impure emotions towards the focus
of attention. That would be positive degradation of the, Self.
Hence this interpretation of the term would be inapplicable to
the pure Self in the transcendental region. Therefore the ne-
gative pre-fix in the words apratikramana, etc. must be taken
to signify the absence of necessity to practise the discipline. When
the Self is absorbed in its own pure nature by attaining the
yogic samadhi, there is a full stop to the . series of impure
psychic states characteristic of the empirical Self. Hence there is
no necessity to practise the various kinds of discipline. The
very absence of those disciplinary practices produces spiritual
peace that passes understanding. It is in that stage there is
the pot of nectar. Such a spiritual peace necessarily implies
spiritual bliss which is the characteristic of the Supreme
Self.

Thus ends the chapter on moksha.
Here moksha quits the stage.

/

CHAPTER X I 9 I

CHAPTER X.
'ALL-PURE KNOWLEDGE.

Now enters All Pure Knowledge.

That the Self, from the real point of view, is not the doer
of karmas, is explained below.

^frif sf <dm*^ 'rqlir 3 ^ff[ STFRT srw i

ff ^rqi^rtt I T'^fl ^Ttf anTTftf H B, o^ll
Daviyam jam uppajjayi gunehim tarn tehim janasu anannam
Jaha kadhayadihim du pajjayehim kanayam anannarniha (508)

<

308. Whatever is produced from a substance, has the same
attributes as those of the substance. Know ye: certainly they
cannot be different,' just as bangles, etc. made of gold cannot be
other than gold.

Jivassa jivassadu je parinana du desiya sutte

Tarn jivamajivam va tehi manannam viyanahi ^ (309)

c

ZOQ Whatever modifications of the Self and the non-Self
are described in the Scriptures, know ye: that these modifications
are identical in nature with the Self and non-Self respectively and
not different.

*ft

Nakuyochivuppannojamhakajjamnatenasoada
Uppadedi na kimchivi karanamavUena na sa hoyi

'

3x0. The Self is not an effect because it is not produced

SAMAYSARA

by anything whatever, nor is it a cause because it does not pro-
duce anything whatever.

ftnft |

Kammam padhuchcha katta kattaram taha paduchcha kani-

mani

Uppajjantiya niyama siddhi du na dissaye anna (311)

1 1 ^? ? 1 1

311. The manifested effect conditions the nature of the
manifesting agent and similarly the manifesting agent determines
the nature of effects. This is the principle of causation that is
observed to operate in the world of reality and no other pri-
nciple is evident.

COMMENTARY

*
Whatever is produced by the direct self manifestation of

jwa, the living being, is also of the nature of the living being
and cannot be a non-living thing. In the same manner whatever
is produced by the direct manifestation of the non-living material
must also be of the nature of non-living material and cannot cer-
tainly be of the nature of the living being. Thus all things whether
animate or inanimate and their manifested products must be identi-
cal in nature just as gold and the ornaments made thereof. Thus
no substance can be really responsible as a causal agent for the
appearance of objects of entirely different nature. When this
principle is admitted, then it necessarily follows that the inanimate
effect cannot be caused by the living jjva. Hence it follows that
jiva or the self is akarta, that is, he is not a causal agent influencing
non-living karmic matter. It is -only from the un-enlightened
point of view that the Self is described as the causal agent,
whereas the real and enlightened view takes him to be
otherwise.

Next it is pointed that the bondage of the Self by karmic
materials is brought about by the wonderful potency of nescience
or ajnana.

CHAPTER X 93

Cheya vu pay%dhiyattam uppajjayi vinassayi

Payadhivi cheyayattam uppajjayi vinassayi (312)

312. The Self is born and dies because of the operation of
karmic prakriti. Similarly the karmic prakriti as conditioned
by the Self appears and disappears.

ft t

Evam bandho vu dunhampi annonna pajjaya have
Appano payadhi eya samsaro tena jayaye (313)

313. Thus the association of the two, the Self and karmic
prakriti is brought about by their mutual determination as the
instrumental cause. Thus by them, samsdra or the cycle of births
and deaths, is produced.

COMMENTARY

Birth and death are the intrinsic characteristics of organic
beings. An organic being which is subject to birth and death,
has two different aspects of existence, bodily and mental The
physical body of the organism is constituted by physical mole-
cules. The other aspect of the organic being, consciousness,
which may be present in varying degrees of development, is
entirely different from the matter of which its body is made.
Hence this element of consciousness is postulated to be the cha-
racteristic of a different entity altogether. It is called yjte or
Soul Thus an organism in the empirical world is brought about
by the combination of two different entities matter and soul,
inanimate and animate categories. How are these two brought
together; and how is the behaviour of the organism to be ex-
This is the crucial problem facing psychology and meta-

CHAPTER X 195

causes the building of a, body to itself out of the suitable parti-
cles in the environment. When once the building up of the
body is completed, then begins the career of the empirical Self
or samsara jtva having a series of births and deaths.

Jayesu payadhiyattam chye neva vimunchayi

Ayanavo have tavam michchhaditthi asanja vo (3*4)

314. So long as the conscious Self does not break this rela-
tion to karmic prakriti, he remains without enlightenment, with-
out right belief and without discipline.

Jaya vimunchayi cheya kamrna phala manantayam

Taya vimutto havayi janavo pasavo mum (315)

315. But when the conscious Self breaks up this relation
to the infinitely various fruits of karma, then the saint becomes
endowed with right knowledge and right belief and freedom
from karmas. But the enlightened one, when the fruits of karma
begin to appear, does not enjoy them but remains merely a specta-

tor.

Next it is pointed out that just as the real Self is not the pro-
ducer of karmas, he is not the enjoyer of the -fruits thereof.

Annanl kammaphalam payadhisahavatthivo du vedeyi
NanI puna kammaphalam janayi udidam na vedeyi (316)

* 16 The unenlightened Self conditioned by and identifying

.SAMATSARA

physics. Very often an easy solution is, attempted by reducing
the two categories as derived from the manifestation of one
and the same principle. This method of cutting the gordian knot
by the monistic metaphysician is not considered to be the correct
solution by the Jaina thinkers. The thinking entity, Self, and the
inanimate matter are kept distinctly apart and yet they are mu-
tually related in the case of an organic being in the ordinary
world. Psychologists in the West who accept the difference between
mind and matter, have adopted the psycho-physical parallelism
to explain the relation between the two. The changes in the
body are entirely according to the law of causation which is
observed to hold good in the physical realm. Similarly the
series of successive mental states, according to the operation of
the law of causation pertain to the realm of consciousness. Changes
physical and chemical in the material body do not directly
produce changes in consciousness and yet physical change
and conscious change mysteriously 'determine each other, each
functioning as the external determining condition of the other.
An attitude similar to the modern hypothesis of parallelism
is adopted by the Jaina thinkers. The body is subject to its
own causal law of operation. Consciousness has also its own
law of operation and yet one determines the other, operating
in the form of external nimitta condition. Conscious changes
constitute the nimitta condition for physical changes. Thus
the two causal series, though not directly inter-related are
indirectly related to each other; each determining the other only
as an external nimitta condition. Thus the two series are brought
together in the case of an embodied empirical ego who can be
said to be born ot to have died. The conscious Self, taken by
itself in its pure nature, apart from the association of tl^e body
is not subject to birth or death. It becomes subject to birth and
death only when it gets embodied, when it becomes samsara jwa.
How does it get embodied? The building up of the body of
an organic being is supposed to be due to its own mental acti-
vity. In the environment there are subtle material particles suit-
able for building the body. When the Self forgetting its own
pure nature manifests in the form of impure psychic states, if

SAMAYSARA

himself with the nature of the karmic prakriti, enjoys the fruits
of karmas. But the enlightened one* when tile fruits of karma
begin to appear, does not enjoy them but remains merely a spectator.

c

COMMENTARY

The ajnani or the unenlightened Self devoid of the knowledge
of the pure nature of the Self misunderstands the Self and the
non-Self as being identical, believes them to be the same and also
behaves as if they were identical Thus with the thought, "I am the
same as the karmic Prakriti" he enjoys the fruits of the karma. But
the enlightened one realising the pure nature of the Self, under-
stands the Self and the non-Self to be distinct, believes them to
be different and correspondingly behaves unconcerned with the
other. Thus being uninfluenced by external karmic conditions,
he does not enjoy the fruits thereof but remains merely aware of
their occurrence.

Next it is further emphasised that it is the ajnani, the Self
without right knowledge, that is the enjoyer.

fq-%> UT Troprr ftrfNrar frffa 113

Na munayi payadhima bhawo sutthuvi ajjhaivuna satthani
Gudhadundhampi pivanta na pannaya niwisa honti (317)

r fq^r^ft

317. The abbavya or the unfit Self, even though well-vers-
ed in the Scriptures, does not give up his attachment to karmic
prakriti just as a snake by drinking sweetened milk does not be-
come non-poisonous.

Next it is declared that the enlightened Self is not an enjoyer.

.

Niweyasamavanno nan! kammaphalam viyan eyi
Mahuram kadhuam bahuvihamaveyavo tena so hoyi (318)
?TFfr

CHAPTER > 197

318. The enlightened Self equipped with complete non-
attachment (merely) knows the fruits of various karmas, sweet
or bitter. He therefore remains the non-enjoyer,

COMMENTARY

The knower, because he realises his own true nature, is unin-
fluenced by the environment, his own body or other enjoyable
objects. Thus uninfluenced by these alien things and fully absorb-
ed in the transcendental bliss of his own pure nature, he is
not affected by the inferior type of pleasure-pain experience de-
rived from sense presented objects. Since he is unaffected by
the objects of the perceptual world, he remains the abhokta
or the non-enjoyer, though he is fully aware of the fact that good
produces pleasure and evil produces pain.

Navi kuvvayi navi vedayi nani kammai vahu payarayi
Janayi puna kammaphalam bandham punnam cha pavam cha

harm as.

t^ra* 5TFft

319. The knower neither produces the various kinds of
karmas nor enjoys the fruits thereof, nevertheless he knows the
nature of karmas and their results, either good or bad as well as
the bondage.

Ditthi sayampi nanam akarayam taha avedayam cheva
Janayiya bandhamokkham kammudayam nij jaram cheva (3 20)

f Mrt

320. Knowledge, too, like sight is neither the doer nor
the enjoyer (of karmas}; but only knows the bondage, the
release, the operation of karmas and the shedding of

198 SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

It is a well-known fact In our experience that visual percep-
tion and the perceived object are not causally related to each other.
Hence we cannot say that the>act of perception'produces the object
perceived. Hence the relation of perception to perceived object
is such that the perceived object is uninfluenced by the act of
perception. If the two are causally related to each other then
the perceiving agent, say in the case of fire perceived, must him-
self be combustible and burst into flame in order to produce
the flame perceived and similarly he must feel the heat of it in
his own body. No such thing happens in the perceiving agent.
This visual perception merely is aware of the object without in
any way producing it. The behaviour of knowledge is said
to be identical with that of the visual perception. The relation
between knowledge and the object known is exactly identical.
Knowledge is not in any way causally related to the objects known.
Knowledge therefore cannot be said to produce the objects known.
He&cejgana is said to be akaraka not a causal agent and also avedaka,
non-enjoyer in relation to bandha (bondage), moksha (release), etc.
which as objects of knowledge are merely known and not produced.

Those who see in the dtma a creator, like. ordinary people,
are not sages desiring emancipation.

fang- ^

Loyassa kunayi vinhu suranarayatiriya manuse satte
Samananampiya appa jayi kuvvayi chhavvihe kaye (321)

Tc^TT ^tcT q^^R sf^TFr 1 1 ^ ? 1 1

fq-

Loyasamananamekkam siddhantam jayi na disayi viseso
Loyassa kunayi vinhu samananampi appavo kunayi (322)

srfcr

CHAPTER X 199

fu|-<rc{ cfjoq^iuj ^^FFTSfRTT ^H 11? ^11

o o o

Evam na kovi mokkho disayi loyasamanana donhampi
Nichcham kowantanarn sadeva manuvosure loye (523)

^TPT

321 to 323: According to the ordinary people Vishnu crea-
tes all creatures celestial, hellish, sub-human and human; if accord-
ing to the Sramanas, the soul creates his six kinds of organic
bodies, then between the popular doctrine and the Sramana doc-
trine, both being identical, no difference can be perceived. For
the people it is Vishnu that creates and for the Sramanas it is the
Self that creates. Thus if the ordinary people and the Sramanas
both believe in the doctrine of perpetual creation of worlds, human
and divine, then there is no such thing as moksha or liberation
discernible in their doctrine.

COMMENTARY

Creative activity also implies desire to achieve something.
The moment a desire to achieve an ideal appears, there comes
a train of emotions such as attachment, aversion, delusion, etc.
Hence continuous creative activity implies perpetuation of sam-
sdra and hence there is no chance for liberation otaukti.

Nest when the Self and non-Self are so entirely distinct and
when there is no chance of association of any kind between
the two much less the causal relation, how does the feeling
of doer occur in the Self? The following gathds offer an
explanation.

a

Vavahara bhasiyena vu paradawam mama bhananti vidiyatha
Tananti nichchhayena vu naya mama paramanumetta mapi

1-' 1,5 Z

kimchi

200 SAMAYSARA

Jaha Kovi naro jampayi ahma gamavisaya nayara rattam
Naya honti tassa tani vu bhanayiya mohena so appa (325)
-

Sfcqif

Emeva michchliaditthi nani nissamsayam havayi eso

Jo patadawam mama idi jananto appayam kunayi (526)

Tamha na meti nichcha donham vi eyana katti vav^sayam
Paradawq jananto janijjo ditthirahiyanam ( 32? )

324 to 327. Those who know the nature of reality speak
of non-Self as "mine" using the language of the ordinary people
while they know really there is not even an atom of non^Self which
is "mine". Just when a person speaks of my village, my country
my town or my kingdom, those are not really Ms. That person
so speaks through self-delusion. In the same way, a person who
(deluded by the vyavahara point of view) understands non-Self
as his and identifies himself with it, certainly becomes one of
erroneous belief. There is no doubt about this. Among these
tvro (ordinary people and Sramanas) if a person knowing the truth
that no object of non-Self is his still persists in thinking of
the existence of a creative will producing the external reality
he does so being devoid of right belief. Let it be understood
to be the truth.

qtrr

CHAPTER X 201

Michchhattam jayi payadhi michchaditthi kareyi appanam
Tamha acheyana de payadhi nanu karago patta (328)

SPRIT: 1 1

328. If the karmic material, responsible for wrong belief
(by its own potency) makes the Self a wrong believer, then does
not your non-intelligent prakriti assume the role of an intelligent
doer ?

l^ft sffcff

Ahava yeso jiv5 poggaladawassa kunayi michchattam
Tamha poggaladawam michchaditlhi na puna jivo (329)

329. If, on the other hand, the soul causes wrong belief in
matter then it is matter that becomes a non-believer and not the
soul.

^ on

Aha jivo payadhi taha poggaladawam kunanti michchhattam
Tamha dohi kayam tarn donhivi bhunjanti tassa phalam (330)

T Wc

330. Again if soul and (inanimate) prakriti together create
wrong belief out of karmic materials, then they both must enjoy
the fruit of their actions.

1 1 33 ? 1 1

Aha na payadi na jivo poggaladawam kunampi michchhattam
Tamha poggaladawam michchhattam tantu nahu rnichchha

fir^rr

202

SAMAYSARA

331. Further neither karmic prakriti not Jim is able to
produce wrong belief out of karmic matter. Therefore it is not
karmic materials that become wrong-belief. Such a view is
entirely erroneous.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is established that the Self is the causal agent of the
karma which is the effect.

Next it is pointed out that nescience., etc. are all produced
by karma.

Kammehindu annanl kijjayi nani taheva kammehim
Kammehim suvavijjayi jaggavijjayi taheva kammehim (332)

Kammehim suhavijjayi dukkhavijja yi taheva kammehim
Kamrnehiya michchhattam nijjayi nijjayi asanjamam cheva

(333)

Kammehim bhamadliijjayi udhtamaho chavi tinyaloyamcha
Kammehim cheva kijjayi suhasuham jetlhiyam kimehi (334)

ffcT

Jamha kafnmam kuvvayi kammam deyi harathi jam kimehi
Tamha vu savva jiva-akaraya hunti avanna (335)

CHAPTER X 20)

332 to 335. It is by karma that the soul is nescient; it
is by karma that'he is made the Knower; it is by karma that
he is asleep and it is by karma that he is awake; it is by karma that
he is happy and it is by karma he is miserable; it is by karma he
is led to wrong belief; and by the same he is led to non-discip-
line- it is by karma that he is made to wander in the upper, middle
and nether worlds; and whatever good and evil is done, is also
by karma; because it is karma that does, karma that gives and
it is karma that destroys, therefore all jtos must become

akarakd or non-doer.

Puruskhchhyahilasi ichchhi kammam cha purisamaliilasayi
Esa ayiriya paramparagaya erisi du suyi ()> )

a na kovi jivo aban^achari vu tumha muvayese
kammaJ chevahi kammam ahilasayi ]am bhaniyarn

tfsfr

.. 7 The kamic material determining the male
sex create, a"onging for man and , *e .* matenal deter-

mentioned before. ^ ^r,

rrfe qf q^ 1 ^ ^"T^^ 5 ^ ^ ^ ^^ l 5

ll^^U

204 SAMAYSARA

Jamha ghayedi param parena ghayijjayeya sapayadhl
Eyenatlhena kira bhannayi paraghayanametti,, (338)

3rf?T

^f? ^fq"^ 1 1

Tamha na kovi jivo uvagha yavo atlhi tumha uvayese
Jamha kammam chevahi kammam ghayedi idi bhaniyam, (339)

^tsfq*
ff

338 to 339. One class of karma (prakritf) destroys another
or is destroyed by another; that class in this sense is c called "'Para-
ghata" (killing another being). Therefore no soul according to
your teaching (can be considered ) guilty of killing, because killing
is merely a matter of one material karma destroying another
material karma., as said above.

ITcf

Evam sankhuvayesam jevu paruvinti parisara samana
Tesim payadhl kuvvayi appa ya akaraya sawe (340)

1 1 ^ Y o 1 1

Ahava mannasi majjham appa appana mappano kunayi
Eso michchhasahavo tumam yeyam munantassa (34 1 )

340-341. If any Sramanas thus preach approving such a
Sankhya doctrine, then according to them prakriti (karmic mate-
rial) becomes the agent and all the souls would be inactive. On
the other hand, if you maintain, "my soul transforms itself by
itself", this opinion of yours is wrong.

CHAPTER X 20 5

Appa nichh asamkhijja padeso desivo vu samayamhi
Navi so sakkayi tatto hino ahivoya kavum je (34*)

^ft

342 In the Scripture, the soul is described to be eternal
and of immeasurable extension. Hence, of its own accord, it
is incapable of increasing or decreasing (its spatial form).

^Tsft 5TT*T

ft ftit

Jivassa jivaruvam vitiharavo jana loyamettam khu

Tatto so kirn hino ahivoya kaham kunayi dawam (343)

gr. ^r ft? ftifcfatf

,43 Know ye: that the soul, from the point of view of
extension is really co-extensive with the universe. Therefore,
how is this eternal substance caused to assume decreased or in-
creased spatial form.

Aha ianavodu bhavo nanasahavena atlhi itli mayam
Tamha navi appa appanam tu sayamappano kunayi (344)

^^rrn^F

^ It is accepted that the conscious principle remains of
t he nate of Lowle'dge. Therefore, the Self, of its own accord,
does not transform itself by itself.

COMMENTARY

206 SAMAYSARA

a mere spectator of the various changes physical and psychical
which both are due to prakrlti according to the Sankhya view.
Though the Purusha is. not responsible for any activity, he is
still considered to be enjoying the fruits of the .action of the pra-
kriti. Thus the Purusha is also the bhokta. This Sankhya des-
cription of the Self, that he is the knower, permanent, action-
less, and enjoyer is incompatible with the Jaina conception of
the Self. Obviously about the time of Bhagavan Kunda Kunda,
some Jaina thinkers must have had leanings towards the Sankhya
view. According to these Sramanabhasas, or the Jaina here-
tics, the karmic material played the part of the Sankhyan prakriti.
Every change and every activity was credited to the operation of
karmic material, the Self remaining an active spectator. This
attitude is condemned by our author by showing the utter unten-
ability of the Sankhya doctrine. If every change and every acti-
vity is attributed to'prakriti and if the Self is merely an unchanging
permanent spectator absolutely uninfluenced by the action of
karmas, he must remain for ever a moksha-jtva, a liberated Self.
It would mean the absence of samara. This conclusion is
contradicted by actual experience, because in actual experience we
have an empirical ego or samsara jwa as a fact of reality which
cannot be dismissed as unreal. This empirical state of existence
in which samsara jwa lives as a matter of fact certainly demands
an explanation. This explanation which is not supplied by the
Sankhya view is offered by the Jaina doctrine which is put forth
by our author as a corrective to the Sankhya view. The karmic
material is no doubt the main operative principle responsible
for the physical and psychic changes produced in the being of a
person. When the karmic material is operative, the Self does
not remain an inactive spectator according to Jaina meta-
physics. If the Self were so inactive, he would not be different
from the Sankhya Purusha. But the successful operation of
the karmic material and the consequent psycho-physical changes
are due to the attitude of the Self which has a suitable responsive
reaction. Without this responsive reaction on the part of the
Self, the kdrmic material would be impotent and will not be able
t o produce any change either in the body or in the consciousness.

CHAPTER X 207

This attitude of responsive reaction on the part of the Self, is res-
ponsible for the- psycho-physical changes when stimulated by
karmic material. The changes in the empirical Self therefore
are directly due tq the activity of the empirical ego in the form
of responsive reaction brought about by the operation of karmic
material. Thus for the changes in the consciousness, the ego
is responsible. Hence the empirical ego must be considered
to be an active agent capable of producing modifications in his
own consciousness in response to the operation of karma. Thus
the Self must not only be active but must also be liable to
change. As against the nature of Sankhya Purusha, who is said
to be ritya and akarta, the Jaina doctrine makes him anitya and
karta, a changing Self and an active agent. But to leave the posi-
tion here would be untrue. This description of the Self is appli-
cable only to the empirical ego which is the samara jiva. Though
he is i,nitya and karta, as an empirical ego, because of the absence
of discriminative knowledge between the Self and the non-Self,
still when he acquires this discriminative knowledge, when he
realises his pure nature, unsullied by karmic influence, he would
remain for ever without any change and without any action;
at that stage, certainly he is mtya and akarta. The Jaina meta-
physics combines both these aspects. From the absolute real
point of view, the Self is nitya and akarta, but from the em-
pirical or vjavaMrd point of view he is amtyn and karta. It is because
of the combination of such apparently conflicting views, that the
Jaina system is said to be thtawkanta view. All the other systems
which emphasise one aspect of reality or other exclusivelyd are
described to be ekanta-vadas and no 'ekdnta-vadi is able to offer
a complete and comprehensive solution for the problem of reality.
Sankhya is thus as an ekdnta system refuted because of its incapa-
city to explain the nature of concrete reality or samara.

Next another ekanta system is taken up for consideration
and refutation. The Bauddha system of metaphysics lays empha-
sis upon the changes in reality. This one-sided emphasis con-
verts reality into an impermanent and everchanging stream ot
existence. This doctrine is also considered to be inadequate as
is shown below.

208

SAMAYSARA

Kehim chidu pajjayehim vinassaye neva kehim chidu jivo
Jamha tamha kuvvayi so va anno va neyanto (, , \

*C. e-vr-c i- ' ' a~ ' - V345/

345- From some point of view (farydydrMka nayd) the
soul dies, but from an other point of view (dravydrthikanay.} the
soul never -dies. Because of this nitya-anitya nature of the
soul, the one-sided view that the soul (that enjoys) is the
same as the doer or entirely different from this would be
untenable.

Kehim chidu pajjayehion vinassaye neva kehimchidu jivo
Jamha tamha vedadi sova anno va neyanto ( 34 <a

346. From some point of view ($arydyarthika nayd) the soul
dies, but from an other point of view (dravydrthika nqya) the soul
never dies. Because of this nitya-anitya nature of the soul the one-
sided view that the soul (that acts) is the same as the enjoyer
(of the fruits thereof) or entirely different from him would be
untenable.

Jo cheva kunayi so chiya na veyaye jassa esa siddhanto

bo jivo nayawo michchhaditlhi anarihado ( 34y )

347. Let it be known that the person who holds the doc-
trine that the soul that acts is absolutely identical with the soul
hat enpys (the fruits thereof) is a wrong believer and is not of
the Arfiata faith.

CHAPTER X , 209

Anno kareyi anno paribhun jayi jassa esa siddhanto

So jlvo nayavvo michchhaditthi anarihado (34$)

g- sfret

348. Let it be known that the person who holds the doc-
trine that the soul that acts Is absolutely different from the soul
that enjoys (the fruits thereof) is a wrong 'believer and is not of
the Arhata faith.

Next the author explains through a practical illustration how
the - Self is the gctor and the action., the enjoyer and the enjoyed.

>sn| ftrN'sft ^ ^rnf sfpr^ *w ^s ^^ ^ \

Jaha sippivo vu kammam kuwayi naya so}na tammavo hoyi
Taha jivovi ya kammam kawayi naya tammavo hoyi (349)

349. As an artisan performs his work, but does not become
identical with it, so also the Self produces karma but does not
become identical with it..

Jaha sippivo vu karanehim kuwayi naya sovu tammavo hoyi
Taha jlvo karanehim kuwayi naya tammavo hoyi (35)

o 11

350. As the artisan works with his. tools, but does not be-
come identified with them, so also the Self acts through the instru-
mentality (of trlkarana, thought, wdrd and deed) but does not
become identified with them.

210 . SAMAYSARA

Jaha sippivo vu karanani ginhayinay^ so vu tammavo hoyi
Taha jlvo karananivu ginhayi naya tammavo hoyi (3 5 x )

sFwfrr Tsfgr ^ g* 5

351. As the artisan holds his tools (while working) but
does not become identified with them so also the Self makes use
of his organs tri-karana (while acting) but does not become identi-
fied with them.

TOW T3T5 tip? *T> ^ engraft

TOW

Jaha sippivo kammaphalam bhunjayi naya sovu tammvo hoyi
Taha jlvo kammaphalam bhunjayi naya tammavo hoyi -(352)

q-

352.^ As the artisan enjoys the fruit of his labour, but does
not become one with it, so also the Self enjoys the fruit of karma
but does not become one with it. *

a ^f ftf

Evam vavaharassa vu vattawam darisanam samasena

Sunu nichchhayassa vayanam parinamakayam tu jam hoyi (353)

353. Thus has the doctrine been stated briefly from the
vyavahara point of view; now listen to the statement from the
nischaja point of view which refers to changes resulting from
modifications (of the soul).

Jaha sippivo vu chittam kuwayi havayiya taha ariannaso
Taha" jlvovi ya kammam kuwayi havayi ya a^anno so (354)

CHAPTER X -211

354. As the artisan starts with the mental image (of the
object to be produced) and translates it into physical form by
his bodily activity and thus is one with it, so also the Self starts
with the mental counterpart of karma and is therefore one with
it.

If

Jaha chittam kuwanto vu sippivo nichcha dukkhivo hoyi
Tattosiya a^annotaha chitthanto duhl jlvo (355)

355. As the artisan making an effort (to translate the mental
image into physical form) always suffers thereby and is therefore
one with that suffering, so also the Self that acts as stimulated by
impure mental states undergoes suffering and becomes one with
it.

COMMENTARY

A casual observation of an artist at work will give us the
following particulars. The metal or marble which he is going
to shape, the instruments used therefore, his dexterity in handing
those instruments and the final value which he obtains for the
finished product, all these facts are external to the nature of
the artist who remains distinct from all the external facts. But
instead of such a casual observation if we try to understand the
creative activity of the artist then we have a different account of the
process. The artist starts with the vision of the object which he is
going to make. His creative activity consists in shaping out of the
shapeless metal or marble a figure exactly answering to his men-
-tal image. With this object in view he sets about to work. Thus
looked at from the inner side of the artist's mind, his whole acti-
vity is a continuous identical process of expressing in the form of
metal or marble what he has in his mind. The method of his work
and the instruments employed all become auxiliary and sub-ser-
vient to this one process by which the artist transforms his idea
obiective figure. .Here the artist cannot be differentiated

into an

212 SAMAYSARA

from the continuous process of creative p activity resulting in the
finished product of art. At every stage of this pr6cess we have the
progressive manifestation of the artist's mind and hence the pro-
cess of activity is the artist himself engaged in -the art of creation.
The artist while thus engaged in translating his idea into an objec-
tive figure has to undergo an amount of labour and suffering pecu-
liar to the creative activity of the artist. This feature of the artist
in both of the aspects is employed to explain the creative activity
of the Self according to the principle of analogy. The Self also
has to deal with external karmic matter. To shape this karmic
matter into 'various patterns, various instruments are employed.
The Self, like the artist has to manipulate these . instruments and
after shaping the karmic matter into various patterns he has to
experience the hedonic value of the finished product. All
these external facts are quite distinct from the nature of the Self
who cannot identify himself with any of these. The account
corresponds to the casual observation of the artist and hence
does not represent the real and true nature of the activity of the
Self. When we try to probe into the inner working of the
activity of the Self we have a complete parallel to the creative
activity of the artist. The Self also starts with an intellectual
pattern of the hape of things to be. Starting with such an in-
tellectual pattern, he approaches the karmic material in order
to create a material pattern exactly answering to the psychic pat-
tern which he attempts to translate into material shape. When
the process of expressing the intellectual pattern in physical form
is completed, he experiences the hedonic value thereof. Here
also we have an identical and continuous self expression and the
Self that expresses through this process of manifestation is iden-
tical with the process itself. The process, the product and the
value thereof are but the different stages in the creative activity.
Hence the Self cannot be taken to be distinct from the exertion
and suffering, characteristic of the creative activity of the Self.
Thus these two accounts of the activity of the Self, one from the
vyavahara point of view and the other from the nischaja point
of view, are parallel and analogical to the activity 'of the artist/
described above. ,

CHAPTER X

Next it is pointed out that though apparently an object of
reality seems to be capable of transferring its own attributes to
another object, really it cannot do so.

tferr *r *T

. u

Jaha setiya du na parassa setiya setiya ya.sa hoyi
Taha janavo du na parassa janavo Janavo sodu (356)

.3PTT tf^FT ^ ^T tn^T tf^^T tfe^T ^ ^TT ^f^% I
^T ?TFTW ^T T^I fTFFFt fTFT^: ^ 1 \\tt\\
356. As chalk (when applied to whiten the surface of an-
other thin*) does not become that thing but remains as chalk
(on the surface of that thing), so the Self (while knowing an object
remains as the knower and does not become the object known
(which is other than the Self). .

tfcrr | <r TW tftqr tferr T ^T ^ \

Taha setiya du na parassa setiya setiya ya so hoyi
Taha passavo du na parassa passavo passavo sodu (357)
?r ^T^T tfe^T

^ q .

, S7 As chalk (when applied to whiten the surface of an-

othe thing) does not become that thing but remams as chalk
("surface of that thing), so the Self (while petce.vmg an
Sect (remains as the .perceiver and does not become the ob )e ct
perceived (which is other than the Self). _^

\\

^ ^f^ft 1 T ^Ef <ER3?t ^3ft% l^V^l
Jaha setiya du na parassa setiya setiya ya so hoyi
Taha sanjavo du na parassa sanjavo san^vo wd G 5 8)

wtf^T^.TOTtf^T-tf^^^ ^cTI

T^OT^^^^ : ^ : ^^ Un

214 SAMAYSARA

the external possessions) remains as the disciplined abstainer
and does not become one with the renounced possessions (which
are other than the Self).

5 "

Jaha setiya du na parassa setiya setiya ya sa hoyi

Taha damsanam du na parassa damsanam damsanam tantu (3 5 9)

359. As chalk (when applied to whiten the surface of an-
other thing) does not become that thing but remains as chalk
(on the surface of that thing), so right faith in the Tattvas remains
as right faith and does not become one with the Tattvas.

cr

Evam tu nichchhayanayassa bhasiyam nanadamsanacharitte
Sunu vavaharanayassaya vattawam se samasena (36)

.

360* From the stand point of reality, knowledge, faith and
conduct have thus been described; now listen to a brief state-
ment of the same from the vyavahara point of view.

tferr

Jaha paradavvam setadi hu setiya appano sahavena

Taha paradavvam janayi naya visayena bhavena (361)

361. As chalk whitens another thing because of its intrin-
sic nature (of whiteness), so also the knower knows other things
because of his own intrinsic nature (of knowledge),

f^ 1 WJ^j ^rrtw n^^ it

CHAPTER X 2 *5

Jaha paradawam setadi hu setiya appano sahavena

Taha paradawam passayi jivovi sayena bhavena (362)

^| tfd^t^H:
V?33 ^^%

362. As chalk whitens another thing because of its intrin-
sic nature (of whiteness) so also the Self perceives other things
because of his own intrinsic nature (of perception).

tferr

wwr

Jaha paradawam setadi hu setiya appano sahavena
Taha paradawam vijahayi naya vi sayena bhavena (363)

365 As chalk whitens another thing because of its intrin-
sic nature (of whiteness) so also the knowing Self renounces ex-
ternal possessions because of his own intrinsic nature (of non-
attachment).

Taha paradawam setadi hu setiya appano sahavena

Taha paradawam saddahayi sammayitthi sahavena (364)

,64 As chalk whitens another thing because of its mtrm-
sic nlture (of whiteness), so also a right believer believes >, Mbe
external reality because of his intrinsi, nature (of flght bekef).

^

Evam vavaharassa 5 du vinichchhavo nanadamsana chantte
Bhaniyo annosu vi vajjayesu emeva nayawo^ ($65)

'

365 Thus

s^Pr wr tr ^Tc:

it has been stated the truth about knowledge,

21 6 SAMAYSARA

faith and conduct from the vyavahara point of view; the other
modes (of consciousness) should be understood similarly.

COMMENTARY

When chalk is used to .whiten an object., say a mud pot, though
chalk appears to transfer its white colour to the pot, it does not
become identical with the mud pot, nor does it lose its intrin-
sic nature. The relation is only external. The white surface
on the pot consists of chalk particles. This illustration of ex-
ternal relation of one thing to another, where two things are
related to each other without losing their respective intrinsic
nature is used to explain the relation between the knowing Self,
and the object known. The two are intrinsically different in
nature, one is chetana and the other achetana, conscious and non-
conscious, and yet the two are related to each other in the process
of knowledge as the knowing Self and the object known. The
relation between .the knower and the known is merely external.
In the process of knowing the knower and the known, both re-
tain their intrinsic nature. ]ndna or knowledge is compared by
the Jaina metaphysicians to light. Light by illuminating the ex-
ternal objects, makes 'them visible without in any way interfering
with their real nature, so also the external objects become known
through knowledge, they themselves remaining uninfluenced
by the process of knowing. This theory of knowledge according
to Jainism is incompatible with two other rival doctrines which
are refuted in these gathas, Brahma-Advaitic doctrine, and the
Buddhistic doctrine. Since knowledge implies the relation bet-
ween two entirely distinct reals, the pantheistic monism of the
first school cuts the gordian knot by deriving both the Self and
the non-Self from a primeval Brahman. This merely pushes the -
problem further without offering any real solution. How could
the same identical cause produce two contradictory effects, still
remains an insoluble mystery. Metaphysical monism offers
an easy escape from the problem of knowledge without offering
any satisfactory solution. The logical development of such a
doctrine must necessarily identify the primeval Brahman with
one of the two-~-~tktcbefana dratya andrau^t end by condemning

CHAPTER X 217

the external achetana world as maja or illusory,, an extremely In-

convenient, and o erroneous conclusion. The solution offered

by the Buddhistic metaphysics is equally unsatisfactory. The

process of knowledge" of jnana at any particular moment of

its existence manifests in the dual 'aspect of the knower and

the known. The metaphysical categories of Self and matter are

treated to be purely hypothetical and unwarranted assump-

tions. Jnana or knowledge is the only real and it manifests as

objects of knowledge in the process of knowing. This solution

of the problem of knowledge apparently gets rid of the diffi-

culty of explaining the relation between two contradictory cate-

gories, the Self and the non-Self, by reducing both to a simple

principle of jnana or knowledge. If the object of knowledge

is just the manifestation of knowledge itself, what happens to

it when there is no process of knowing. Absence of knowledge

must necessarily mean the disappearance of the external world.

This nihilistic conclusion or siinj:Md.i that when knowledge ceases

to be, then the Self and the external world cease to be is

contradicted by our, concrete experience. Hence both these

theories of knowledge are refuted by our author in the 'above

gdthas.

Impure emotional states such as attachment and aversion
are the results of absence of clear knowledge of the exact nature
of the reals. This is explained below.

f%

Damsanananacharittam timchivi nathi du acheyane visaye
Tamha' kirn ghadayade chedayida tesu visayesu ^ (566)

366. There is no faith, knowledge, or .conduct whatsoever
in a non-intelligent object; therefore what does the soul destroy
in those objects?

frfafr

f% 'TOR

21 8 SAMAYSARA

Damsananana charittam kirnchivi nathi du acheyana kamme
Taiftha kirn ghadayade chedayida tamhi kammammi (367)

367. There is no faith, knowledge or conduct whatsoever
in non-intelligent karmic material; therefore what does the
soul destroy in those karmas?

f f%f%fsr

Damsananana chavittam kimchivi nathi du acheyane kaye
Tamha kim ghadayade chedayida tesu kayesu (368)

\

f%

^

368. There is no faith, knowledge, or conduct whatsoever
in non-intelligent body; therefore what does the soul destroy
in those bodies?

wrsfr

Nanassa damsanassa ya bhanivo ghavo taha charittassa
Navi tamhi paggladavvssa koapi ghavovu niddittho (369)

1 1

369. Destruction of knowledge, faith and conduct (of the
erroneous kind by the soul) is spoken of; but destruction of
matter is ne^er indicated.

\

- ^

Tnft

Jivassa je guna keyi nathi kalu te paresu dawesu
Tamha sammaditthissa nathi rago vu visayesu (370)

rf% ^ t qif ?sw i '

TFTCcT

N.J \3 *

97d> Whatever attributes are present in a soul, those are
certainly not present in other substances; therefore in a right
believer there; is no attraction for sense objects.

CHAPTER X 219

IT^TTf

Rago doso moho jivassevaya ananna parinama

Eyena karanena vu saddadisu nathi ragadi (37 1 )

*frft ^ftapN" ^rnr^^rf^^ i

1 1 ? \s ? 1 1

*

371. Attachment, aversion and delusion are the soul's own
inalienable modes; for these reasons there is no attachment, etc.
in sound, etc.

COMMENTARY

A substance and its intrinsic property are so intimately related
to each other that if the substance is destroyed, the property is
also destroyed and, conversely, when the property is destroyed
the substance must also be destroyed. For example take a flame
and the light proceeding from it. If the flame will be destroyed there
will be no light and if the light will be destroyed there will be no
flame. But in the case of objects which do not have the intimate
relations, the destruction of one need not follow the destruction
of the other. For example take the case of lamp placed on a
stand. The lamp may be destroyed while the stand may remain
intact and conversely the stand may break without destroying
the lamp. Faith, knowledge and conduct are the intrinsic pro-
perties of the Self. In their impure form, they form the states of
the impure Self which blinded by nescience is incapable of realis-
ing its pure nature. Realisation of the pure nature of "the Self
necessarily presupposes the destruction of these impure states of
consciousness, wrong faith, wrong knowledge, and wrong con-
duct, These attributes of the Self are externally related to
karmic materials. Since the psychic attributes of the Self have
nothing to do with non-conscious matter which is only accidentally
and externally related to psychic states, the destruction of the
psychic states will not in any way result in the destruction of
matter. Otherwise destruction of the properties of the Self must
lead to the destruction of matter and, conversely, the destruction of
the properties of matter must lead to the destruction of the soul.

220 SAMAYSARA

This is absurd. Therefore the emotional states of attachment,
aversion, and delusion are only properties of the Self brought
about by ajnana and they can never be present in their objects.
But when ajnana or nescience disappears, the impure emotions
depending upon it will also * disappear and tlie Self will regain
its pure nature. The presence of impure emotions and their
destruction leading to the consequential restoration of the purify
of the Self neither of these things can be predicated of external
objects since the nature of the physical object cannot accommodate
these properties ( of consciousness.

Next the author points out that the property of one thing
cannot be produced by an entirely different thing.

Annadaviyena annadaviyassa no kirayi gunuppavo
Tamha vu sauva dawa uppajjante sahavena (372)

372, By one substance (draiya) the properties of another
substance are never produced. Therefore all substances are
produced by their own nature.

COMMENTARY

By this gdtha. the author once again emphasises the fact that
impure conditions such as attachment and aversion being attri-
butes of consciousness are not really produced by external objects.
Hence if a person dissatisfied with his impure states of conscious-
ness and actuated by sincere desire for self-reformation proceeds
with a righteous indignation to destroy those external objects
which he imagines to be the cause of his own impure emotions
of attachment and aversion, he merely exhibits his own ignorance
of the real nature of things and proceeds in a wrong path to achieve
his goal of self-reformation. It is this point that is elaborated in
the previous shgatbas and further emphasised in the present one.

CHAPTER X . 221

u

Nindiya santhuya vayanani poggala paririamanti vahuganl
Tani su nivuna rusayi tusayi puno aham bhanivo (375)

^^T t

373. Words of blame or praise are (only) sound produced
by material particles modified in various forms. On hearing them
one gets angry or pleased thinking, "I am addressed thus."

TOT

Poggala dawlm sadutta parinayam tassa jayi guno anno
Tania na tumam bhaniyo kimchivi kirn rusase abuho (374)

113 \sYl 1

3 74 As words are really produced by modification of material
particles, therefore their properties are entirely different from
that of yours. Hence you are not in any way addressed by them.
Why do you get angry? Oh, ignorant person.

Asuho suho va saddo na tarn bhanayi sunasu manti so che.a
Naya eyi viniggahiyum soya visayamagayam saddam (375)

,75 A bad or good word does not of its own accord say to
thee '^ear me". Even when the sound reaches the organ of
tig "does no, arrive there to sei 2 e your attention (by force).

%

Asuham suham cha ruvam na tarn bhanayi pechcha mant
viniggahiyum chakkhuvisayamagayam ruvam (376)

222 SAMAYSARA

376. An unpleasant or pleasant visual form does not of its
own accord say to thee, "See me." Even when the visual stimu-
lus reaches the organ of sight, it does not arrive there to seize
your attention (by force).

Ausho suhova gandho na tam bhanayi jiggha manti so cheva
Naya eyi viniggahivum ghanavisayamagayam gandham (377)

fer

377. Disagreeable or agreeable odour does not of its own
accord say to thee "Smell me." Even when the smell reaches
the organ of smelling, it does not arrive there to seize your atten-
tion (by force).

Asuho suhova raso na tam bhanayi rasaya manti so cheva
Isfaya eyi viniggahiyum rasanavisayamagayam tu rasam (378)

3RPT:

378. Bad or good taste does not of its own accord say to
thee, "Taste me." Even when the taste reaches the organ of
tasting (tongue) it does not arrive there to seize your attention
(by force).

cf ^T^ ^RT V fcT ^f

Asuho suhoya phaso na tam bhanayi phasamanti so cheva
Naya eyi vinaggahiyum kayavisayamagayam phasam (379)

q- =ti%- f^
379. Unpleasant or pleasant touch does not of its own

CHAPTER X 223

accord say to thee, "Touch me." When the contact stimulus
reaches the orgad of contact (body) it does not arrive there to
seize your attention (by force).

wr *r cf *rw^ PE 3 1% tft

c

Asuhu suhova guno na tarn bhanayi ujjhamanti so cheva
Naya eyi viniggahiyum buddhivisayamagayam tu gunam (3 80)

I

380. The bad or good quality (of an object) does not of its
own accord say to thee, "Think of me." Even when the
quality reaches the organ of thinking (mind), it does not arrive
there to seize your attention (by force).

Asuham suham va dawam na tarn bhanayi ujjhamanti so cheva
Naya eyi viniggahiyum buddhivisayamagayam dawam (381)

\

381. A bad or good substance does not of its own accord say
to thee, "Think of me." , Even when the (idea of) substance
reaches'the organ of thinking (mind) it does not arrive there to
seize your attention (by force).

Evam tu jani davvassa uvasatnam neva gachchhyi mudh6
Niggahamana parassaya sayam cha buddhim sivamappatto

(382)

282 Thus devoid of a clear understanding of the nature of
the objects of knowledge and incapable of abstaining from exter-.
nal influence and himself not attaining mental happiness, the
ignorant person does not go along the path of peace. .-

224 SAMAYSARA

COMMENTARY

Here is a beautiful picture of an individual perceiving agent
situated in the midst of an environment abounding in sense sti-
muli of various kinds. Th6 environment is always full of sense-
stimuli pertaining to sound, sight, smell, taste, and touch. These
stimuli proceed from physical objects situated in the environment
and hence they are also of physical nature. These stimuli
of physical nature may reach the appropriate sense organs
of the individual person. Sound stimulus may reach the ear,
light may reach the eyes, odour may reach the nose, taste stimu-
lus may reach the tongue, contact stimulus the skin of the body.
The mere presence of the stimuli in the environment and even
their coming into contact with the respective sense organs may
not be effective enough to produce the psychic reaction in the
consciousness of the individual. Many sound stimuli may not
even cross the threshold of 'consciousness. One or two may
appear in the field of consciousness and yet may flit away
without being noticed. The same is the case with the other
sensestimulL That particular sense stimulus which is capable
of producing the corresponding psychic reaction does so because
of the selective attention on the part of the individual This
selective attention on the part of the individual is prompted and
directed by his own interest in the thing. It is this interest that
he takes in the particular thing towards which his selective atten-
tion is directed that is mainly responsible for that particular sense
perception^ Whether the sense perception is auditory or visual
or of any other kind in each case the individual chooses a parti-
cular stimulus, attends to it because of his personal relation to it..
Thus the immediate causal condition of the psychic fact of percep-
tion is the individual himself. Whatever interests him will be
perceived by him and others which are of no interest to him will
pass away unnoticed. When once the psychic fact of perception
is thus brought about by the selective attention on the part of the
individual consciousness, the perception further brings a'bout
the hedonic reaction in the individual consciousness of pleasant-*
ness or unpleasantness. This feeling of pleasure or pain associa-

CHAPTER X 22 5

ted with the psychic fact of perception is also determined by
the attitude of individual consciousness. When perception and
its hedonic reaction in the consciousness are thus entirely deter-
mined by the psychological attitude of the individual, it is
merely ignorance to take external^ objects of the perceptual
world to be responsible for the hedonic reaction in one's self.
The objects in the external world from which the stimuli proceed
are entirely physical in nature and hence cannot be directly respon-
sible for the psychic modification, perceptual and hedonic, occur-
ring in the individual consciousness. It is this important psycho-
logical truth that is imparted by the author to an unenlightened
person who is ignorant of the real nature of perception and the
hedonic reaction thereby. If you set your mind in order, if you
cease to take interest in the objects of the perceptual world,
if you direct your attention on your own Self and thus get
absorbed in contemplation of the truth and beauty of the
Pure Self then the innumerable sense stimuli present in the
environment which bombard your sense-organs constantly
will be absolutely impotent to disturb you from your self-
absorption, and you will remain enjoying the spiritual bliss which
transcends all pleasures derivable from the sense-presented

world. . r " r i .

Next it is pointed out that the Self which is free from the
impure psychic states of attachment and aversion, which remains
the pure Knower, *ill also be rid of the consciousness of berng
the agent, enjoyer of karmas, and continue to be only the pure
consciousness of the Knower.

5ft

Kammam jam puvvakayam suhasuhamaneyavitlharavisesarn
Tatto niyattaye appayam tu jo so padikkamanam (383)

,8, When a person turns his Self away from his previous
kar^s good or bad" and of multifarious kinds, then that Self is
certainly the mschaya pratikramana, teal repentance.

15

SAMAYSARA

cTcft ftTO *ft *ft TS^mFf ^ ^TT 1 1 3 <YI I
Kammam jam suhamasuham jamhiya bhavamhi bajjhayi

bhavissam

Tatto niyattaye jo so pajjkkhanam havayi cheya (384)

* ^

384. When a person keeps his Self away from future
bondage likely to be caused by impure psychic states resulting
from karmas good or bad, then _that Self is certainly the
nischaya pratyakhydna or real renunciation.

Jam suhamasuha mudinnam sampadiya aneyavittharavisesam
Tarn dosam jo cheyayi sa kalu aloyanam cheya (385)

*e c ll )r i

385. That soul which reaUses as evil all those psycliic states
of multifarious kinds which arise at present (in the consciousness)
due to the operation of karmas is certainly the nischaya dlocbana
or real confession.

fopssf ^ft ^

Nichcham pachchakkhanam kuwayi nichcham joya padik-

kamadi

Nichcham alochuyayi so hu charittam havayi cheya (386)

386. That Self which is always engaged in the practice of
these-real repentance, renunciation and confession, is certainly the
nischaya chdritra or real right conduct.

COMMENTARY
The Self which is thus of real pure conduct is the same as the

CHAPTER X 227

Self which has realised his own pure nature of jnana or
knowledge.

5ft 5

*l" c

Vedanto kammaphalam appanam kuoayi jo du kammaphalani
So tarn punovi bandhayi viyarn dukkhassa attaviham (387)

387. One who experiencing the fruit of karmas identifies
the Self with the fruit of karmas, again sows the seeds of karmic
bondage and misery of eight different kinds.

^ft cf 5"ftf?r ^

Vedanto kammaphalam maye kayam munayi jo du kamma-

phalam

So tarn punovi bandhayi vlyam dukkhassa attaviham (388)

f cf

*r era;

388. One who experiencing the fruit of karmas thinks that
he has brought it about, again sows the seeds of karmic bondage
and misery of eight different kinds.

Vedanto kammaphalam suhido duhido ya havadi jo cheda
So tarn punovi bandhayi vlyam dukkhassa atthaviham (3 89)

389. The soul that experiencing the fruit of karmas is made
happy or miserable thereby, again sows the seeds of karmic bond-
age and misery of eight different kinds.

COMMENTARY

The consciousness that, 'I am other than jnana or pure
knowledge' is ajnana chetana or nescient consciousness. That

228 SAMAYSARA

is of two kinds, "karma chetana, and karma-phala-chetan. The
feeling that, 1 produce all these things other than jndna is kar-
ma~chetana. The consciousness that, 1 enjoy the fruits of all
things other than jndna is karma-phala-ctytana. These two
constitute the seed for samara, because they form really the
cause of the eight kinds of karmas which form the causal condi-
tion of samsdra. Therefore the person who wants to attain
moksha must destroy these two, forms of ajndnd-chet0na y nescient
consciousness. In order to achieve this end, he must renounce
all karma or action and also renounce all karma-phala or the fruits
of his action. It is only by that method he can realise his divine
nature of (suddha-jndna chetana) pure consciousness of know-
ledge which will be his permanent heritage.

Next it is pointed out that the nature of knowledge is entirely
distinct from that of other objects.

WFT w

Satham nanam na havayi jamha satham na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam amiam satham jina vinti (390)

W 5TFT ^T

390. The Scripture is not knowledge, because the Scrip-
ture knows not anything* Therefore the Jinas have said that
knowledge is entirely different from Scripture.
ufitrf 137

Saddo nanam na havayi jamha saddo na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam saddam jina vinti (39 1 )

391, Sound is not knowledge, because sound knows not
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said. that knowledge is en-
tirely different from sound.

CHAPTER X ^229

^ w ^TFT^ ?%f% i

3piuf WFI sprof ^ fspJTT fw% ll^^ll
Ruvam nanam na havayi jamha ruvam na yanaye kimchi

Tamha annam* nanam annam ruvam jina vinti (39 2 )

WFT ^ ^fqf^" ^WK 1 ? ^T ^TTTl%

c\

T f^RT ^f^cf II

392. Visual form is not knowledge, because visual form
knows not anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that know-
ledge is entirely different from visual form.

cjwft Tjrpjf *T ^s ^i^T ^raft W ^TFT

cF^T sprof ^TW ^T^" ^"^ f%WT f%1%
Vanno nanam na havayi jamha vanna na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam vanriam jina vinti (393)

5rnf ^ ^rf^r ^r^iswf ^ srRr1%

* f^FTT

393. Colour is not knowledge, because colour knows not
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is en-
tirely different from colour.

*

Gandho nanam havayi jamha gandho na yanaye kimchi
Tamha nanam annam annam gandham jina vinti (394)

fTFf ^T

394. Smell is not knowledge, because smell knows nor
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is en-
tirely different from smell

f^TT f^fcT

Raso du havayi nanam jamha du raso na yanaye kimchi.
Tamha annam 'nanam rasamya annam jina vinti^ (395)

"

230 SAMAYSARA

395. Taste is not knowledge, because taste knows not any
thing. Therefore the Jinas have said tha r t knowledge is entirely
different from taste.

3{tnjf ufpjf sjwf ^Rf f^TT f%1%

Phaso nanam na havayi jamha phaso na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam phasam jina vinti (396)

WFf

f^FTT ^f^cT 1 1

396. Touch is not knowledge, because touch knows not
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is en-
tirely different from touch.

Kammam nanam na havayi jamha kammam na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam kammam jina vinti (397)

397. Karma is not knowledge, because karma knows not
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is en-
tirely different from karma.

WTW ^r p^; wt^j ^raft

STKif WFT ^r^f STR 1 f^FTT

Dhammo nanam na havayi jamha dhammo na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam dhammam jina vinti (398)

f^FTT ^f^cT 1 1
398. Principle of motion is not knowledge, because the
principle of motion knows not anything. Therefore the Jinas
have said that knowledge is entirely different from the principle
of motion.

f%1%
f%1%

CHAPTER X 231

Nanam aclhanimo na havayi jamha adhammb na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annafn nanam annamadhammani jina vinti (399)

399. The principle of Rest is not knowledge, because the
principle of Rest knows not anything. Therefore the Jinas have
said that knowledge is entirely different from the principle of
rest.

f^fWT f^1

Kalo nanam na havayi jamha kalo na yanaye kimchi
Tamha annam nanam annam kalam jina vinti (400)

5TFT 'T

WFT sp^f ^FT^ f^FFT

400. Time is not knowledge, because time knows not any-
thing. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is entirely
different from time.

w

t^rr f^ffcr

Ayasampina nananam jamha ayasam na yanaye kimchi
Tamha ayasam annam nanam annam jina vinti (401)

<T WFf

401. Space is not knowledge, because space knows not
anything. Therefore the Jinas have said that knowledge is en-
tirely different from space.

WFT ^^WTW

cf^T

Najjhavasanam nanam ajjhavasanam achedanam janilia

annam nanam ajjhavasanam taha annam (402)

II V o ^ II

402. Effort is not knowledge, because effort knows not

232. SAMAYSARA

anything. Therefore knowledge is one thing and effort quite
another.

Jamha janayi ' nichchhani tamha jlvodu janayo nani
Nanam cha janayado avvadirittam mune yawam (403)

ffPT^t f

403. As the characteristic of the soul is to be always knowing,
therefore the soul is certainly the subject of knowledge, the Know-
er, par excellence. It should be understood that knowledge and
the knower cannot be differentiated from each other.

WT

Kfanam sammaditlhi du sanjamam suttamangapuwagayam
Dhammadhammam cha taha powajjam abbuvanti buha (404)

404. Knowledge is the same as right belief, discipline, Scrip-
ture consisting of angds purvds, merit and demerit and asceticism,
So declare the wise.

COMMENTARY

The investigation into the nature of Self or samayasdra has
resulted in the above definitions of the dtma. The definition
is both negative and affirmative. Negatively it states what it
is not and affirmatively it states what it is. All the facts which
are distinct in nature from that of the Self are excluded from
the scope, of definition, whereas all the facts which are of the
nature of Self are included. Thus the definition is logically
. accurate inasmuch as it is free from the usual fallacy of definition
of either being too wide or too narrow. These two defects
according to Indian Logic are called respectively ativyapti and
avyapti. The former indicates the defects of including the things
which do not come into the concept defined, and the latter refers

CHAPTER X

to the neglect of not including the facts which should come
under the scope of definition. The definition in its affirmative
form therefore emphasises the intrinsic identity between the thing
and its attributes,.^ and jndna$d and Knowledge. A thing
and its attributes are not different categories brought together
by a third category called samavaya, a view maintained by other
schools of thought. According to Jaina metaphysics draiya and
guna are inseparable and indivisible unity no draiya without
guna and no guna without draiya. This leads to the funda-
mental proposition which states the identity of the Self with know-
ledge. The Self, the Knower, is identical with knowledge, jaatia
zodjnata are one and the same. The definition further implies
as its corrollory that the different aspect and modifications of
the Self are also identical with the Self or attaa. Thus right belief,
right knowledge, and right conduct, which are but different aspects
of the same Self become identical with the Self, These three con-
jointly constitute the moksha marga-^t path to spiritual salva-
tion, and the mksha mdrga also must be located in the nature
of the Self as it is identical in nature with that of the Self m as-
much as it represents a stage in the development of the Self.
Thug it is clearly pointed out that the Kingdom of Heaven is
within you. One who deserves to reach the goal of liberation
or 'mksha has nothing to do with the non-conscious external
things since he has within himself everything that is necessary
to realise his purpose. The spiritual development therefore
consists in the continuous development of the Self to a higher
and higher state followed by the progressive widening of know-
ledae till the Self becomes perfect and knowledge becomes com-
pletely co-extensive with the reality. At this stage the Self be-
comes both sawjaa and paramStma, the Omniscient and the
Absolute Self. This is the end of samara and the goal of lite
from which there is no return.

lijnana is thus completely different from other things how
c^jnana be the eater of food. The answer is given below.

If *

SAMAYSARA

Atta jassa amutto nahu so aharavo havayi evam
Aharo kalu mutto jamha so paggalamavo TU (405)

^TPcff. *T

405. Since the Self is non-corporeal, he is certainly not the
eater of food, because food being of the nature of matter is cor-
poreal.

UT fa g-cfcf^ fsfxf >sf ur* fa sftrr >sf q- vsf

fa^wl 1 ^rfa

Navi sakkayi ghittum jam na vimottum jam ya jam paradawam
So kovi ya tassa guno pavvggiya vissaso vavi (406)

1 1 Y o ^ 1 1

406. It has no attribute either acquired or natural to enable
it to grasp or give up foreign matter.

f%fafa

Tamha vu jo visuddho cheya so neva ginhaye kimchi
Neva vimunchayi kimchivi jlvajlvanadawanam (407)

3fT

1 1 Y o \s 1 1

407. Therefore that Self which is of the nature of pure
consciousness neither grasps anything nor relinquishes anything
of objects, animate or inanimate.

COMMENTARY

These gdthas are obviously intended to refute the Upanishadic
doctrine that dtma is anna-maya and kosa-maya for valid reasons.

Next it is pointed out that adopting any bodily insignia or
mark as a means for realising moksha Is certainly inadequate
because the body is shown to be the eater of food and hence cor-
poreal and distinct from the non-corporeal Self.

CHAPTER X 255

ITST f^rf^rw ^Tw ; R^rTi% n

O i

Pakhandiyalingani va gihalinganiva vahuppayaranl

Ghittum vadanti mudha lingaminam mokkhamaggotti (408)

1T5T fenfire *ftSrPRTf 1% MVo<J||

408. Fools put on various types of insignia of false ascetics
or householders and maintain that this outer mark constitutes
the path to moksha.

: 'fl^'3' :i: r ri ft

V:3 . ] A

Nadu hoyi mokkhamaggo lingam jam dehanimmama ariha
Lingam muchittu damsanananacharittani sevanti (409)

ITR

409. Bodily mark is not certainly the path of emancipation
(as is evident from the fact that) the Arhats discard the bodily
mark by disowning the body itself and devote their attention
only to right belief, knowledge and conduct.

ff TTW

Navi esa mokkhamaggo pakhandi gihamayani lingani
Damsanananacharittani mokkhamaggam jina vinti (410)

f^PTT ^f% I IX ^ o ||

410 The insignia of false ascetics or householders never
(constitute) the path of emancipation. The Jinas declare that
faith, knowledge and conduct (together constitute) the path of
emancipation.

COMMENTARY

Thus it is further emphasised that it is not the bodily
mark but the spiritual qualities that constitute the path to
salvation.

236 SAMAYSARA

Jamha jahittu linge sagaranagara ehimva gahiye
Damsanananacharitte appanam junja mokkkapahe (411)

i iv? ?n

411. Therefore, giving up the insignia adopted by house-
holders and the homeless ones, direct the Self to faith, knowledge
and conduct, the path of emancipation.

COMMENTARY

Hence the saint has to discard all bodily marks as they are
useless and concentrate upon the three jewels or Right Belief
Right Knowledge, and Right Conduct which are spiritual in
nature and which are therefore the true path.

ITT

Mokkhapahe appanam tavchi tarn cheva jhahi tarn cheva
Tatheva vihara nichcham maviharasu annadawesu (412)

i iv ^ ii

412. Keep the Self on the path of emancipation, meditate
on him, experience him, always move in Him, do not move among
other things.

COMMENTARY

It has already been shown that the three jewels which consti-
tute the moksha mdrga are really of the nature of the Self. There-
fore the directions to establish, to experience, to meditates etc.,
refer to the Self. Thus it is emphasised that you are always to
live, move and have your being in the Self and never to look beyond
to the outer world. This is the surest method for self-realisation.

Next it is pointed out that those who are devoid of real
knowledge and who put their faith on bodily garbs alone, cannot
realise the Absolute Self.

CHAPTER X 237

WFT

-

Pakliandi lingesu va gihalingesu va vahuppayaresu
Kuwanti je mamattam tehim na nayam samayasaram (413)

tin ^)i

o

413. The real Self is not seen by those who put on the garb
of ascetics or householders and fancy that therefore they are the

real seers.

Next it is emphasised that bodily insignia are therefore ir-

relevant and useless.

Vavahario puna navo donnivi lingani bhanayi mokkhapahe
Nichchhayanavo na ichchayi mokkhapahe sawalingani (414)

414. Although, the vyavabara point of view declares the two
(classes of insignia) to be the path of emancipation, the standpoint of
reality does not want any insignia whatsoever for the path of
liberation.

COMMENTARY

Those who maintain that what is obtained from the yyava-
hdra point of view is the real and ultimate truth can never realise
the samayasara or the Supreme Self. Realisation of samaya-
sara or True Self is possible only by adopting the mscbaya point
of view which is the only way to reach the Absolute Reality.

spr ^pTCfTi^Tpjr qw c

^ 5if|fe w *fr frf| ^fFf g^ IIY^II

Jo samayapahudhaminam pathivuna atachchavo navum
Atthe thahi cheya so hojayi uttamam sokkham (415)

f'R Tfe^" sr^r^cft *n^rr i

23 8 SAMAYSARA

415. That person who, having read the Samaya Pahuda,
and having known its real meaning, firmly holds to the truth
thereof will attain Supreme Bliss.

COMMENTARY

' In the last gdtha the author indicates the benefits that will
accrue to one who carefully studies the work dealing with the
nature of the Supreme Self. It is a well-known fact that the value
of a study depends upon the nature of the book whereas the book
itself derives its value from the subject matter dealt therein. This
book by Bhagavan Kunda Kunda has as its contents and investi-
gation into the nature of the Supreme Reality called samqyasdra y
by the author which is synonymous with paramdtma on the para
brahman or the Supreme Self. The nature of this parama brah-
man is said to be jndna-maya y knowledge, par-excellence y which
illuminates the whole of reality and comprehends it within Itself.
This Self is the Light that illuminates the whole of reality since
it has transcended completely the toil and turmoil of the world
of samsdra, a world full of jarring discord and, since the Self has
reached the place of Perfect Harmony and Supreme Bliss, He
is also designated to be ananda-maya or of the nature of Supreme
Bliss. This parama brahaman characterised by jndnamaya and
dnandamaya, all-knowledge and all-bliss, constitutes the subject
matter of this book. Hence the book itself is therefore described
as Sabda Brahman, the Word Divine, the name which it derives
from its contents. This Sabda Brahman is therefore the gate-
way to ,the Realm of Ultimate Reality, the parama brahman !
One who studies this work carefully and who comprehends clearly
its meaning has therefore the privilege of entering into the pro-
mised Land of Paradise, the Realm of the Real, the Place of the
Paramdtma. This privilege which he acquires through study
leads to the falling off of scales from his eyes. He sees a vision.
He is face to face with the light that lights up the whole Universe.
His own personality is in tune with the infinite. His whole being
throbs in a responsive melody to the divine and perfect harmony.
Being in that atmosphere of Supreme Bliss, He himself feels a
thrill of joy unsurpassed verily a great boon for a noble effort.

INDEX OF THE ENGLISH INTRODUCTION

A Charvakas, c.

Adhyasa, cvi, clii, ck, clxi. Christ, lx ' ,

Agamemnon, xli. Christianity, liv.

Ahimsa, xlviii, xlix, xcviii, xck, cxxi, J? rat > era > . cxxxv '

cxx ; v ' Columbus, xvi.

Ajatastru, xlvi, xlviii, Ixviii, Ixix. Copernicus, xvi.

Akbar, li.

Alexander, cxxxv. ^

Amrka Chandra, cl. Dark ages, xvi.

Apasthambha, Lxxxvi. Darwin, xix.

Apollo, xi. Darwinian, xciii.

Arhanta, cxv. David, Ixxxv.

Arhatamata, -cxv. Delphic oracle, xii

Arishta Nemi, cxviiL Descartes, xvii, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii,

Aristotle, xiii, xvi, liii. XC 3 cvi.

Aryan, xlii, xlk, 1, Ixxx, Ixxxii. Deussen, xliv, xlv, xlvi, lii, liii, liv.

Aryan Protestantism, xxxix. Dialectic, xxxv.

Assissi, xliii. Dravidian, Ixxxvi.

Aswamed'ha, Ixvi, Ixxxiv, Ixxxix. Dwijas, c.

Athene, xi.

Athenian Academy, xii.

Atmavidya, xlvi, xlix, Ixxiv, xcix, cxxvi. Egyjptian, 1.

Ayodhya, xxxix, Ixxviii. Euclid, xix.

Euripides, xli.

B Fichte, xxxiii, xxxiv, ex.

Bacon, xviii, xx. ^ ranc j s B f. con ' xvii -

Belfast, cxlii. Francls > xlm '

Berkeley, xxv, xxvii, xxx, cii, ex.

Bhanderkar, Ixxxii.

Bharata, cxix. Garbe, xlvi.

Bible, IH. Gaudapada, cv, cvii.

Boga'Bhumi, cxviii. Gentiles, xiii.

Brahmavidya, xlvi, Ixv. ' Girnar, cxviii. \

Brahman, xl, cxx. Gita > lxxxiv -

Brahmasutras, cv. Gardian knot, cxiii.

Buddhism, xxxviii, xlvi, xlvii, Ixxvii, Gough, li.

Ixxxii, Ixxxiii, Ixxxv, cxvii. Govinda, cv.

Buddhistic, xxxLx. Greeks, xi.

Gunaratan, Ixxxv, Ixxxvii.

C

H

Cartesian, xxn, xxv, xxvi.

Cartesianism, xix, xx. Harappa, cxxii.^

Causation, xviii, xix, xxviii, xxix. Hanuman, cxxiii.

Chandogya, xlvi. Hafibhadra, Ixxxiii.

24 INDEX OF THE ENGLISH INTRODUCTION

Hebrew, xiv. >t

Hegel, xxxiv, xxxv, xxxvi, xxxvii, Maga dha, f xlvii, xhiii, xlix, Ixxix.

xxxviii, liii, cxxx. Mahavira, xlviii, xlix* Ixxix, cxvii.

Hinduism, li, cxvii. Mahabharat, Ixxxiv, Ixxxvi, cxviii.

Homeric, xv. > ,. Maitreyi, Ixx. *

Hume, xxv, xxvii, xxviii xxix, xxx, cxiv. Manu> } xxv jji.

Marichi, Ixxxiii.

Marudevi, cxviii,
Idola, xvm. ^ t Marx Rarlj xxxviiL

Ikshavaku, xxxix, Ixxvm, xcix, Malebranche, xxii, xxiu, xxv. '

Indra, lix, ixxx. Maxmuller, xli, xliv, Ixxvii, Ixxxvii.

Islam ' k " Maxwell, xciii.

r McDonald, xliv.

Tabala, Iv. Mohenjadoro, cxxii.

Jaina, xxxix, xlviii, Ixxxiii, Ixxxvi, c, cii, Monads, xxiv.

cxiv, cxli. js^

Jains, xxxix ? cxv.

Jainism, xlvii, xlviii, Ixxvii, Ixxviii, Nabima'haraj, cxviii.

Ixxxii, cxiv, cxvii. Nachiketas, Ix.

Janaka, xlviii, xlix, 1, Ivii, Ixviii, Ixxi, Narad, Iviii, Ixxxii.

Ixxii, Ixxiii, Ixxxii. Naturalism, xix.

Jehovah, xHi. ' Naumena, xxxii, xxxiii.

Jesus of Nazareth, xiii, xiv. Nihilism, xxviii.

Junagadh, cxviii. Nirgranrcha, cxvi.

Nitya Punya Bhoomi, xlix, Ixxix.
K Novmenal, xxxii, xxxiii.

Kailas, cxix. Novum. organon, xvii.

Kalidas, xxxix, cxx.

Kandaz'hi, cxvi. " ^ O

Kant Immanual, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii, Odysseus, xli.

xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxv, Hi, liii, cii, ex. Oldenberg, xliv.
Kantian idealism, liv.

Kapila, Ixxxiv, Ixxxv, Ixxxvi, Ixxxvii, P

Ixxxix, xc, xciv, xcv, xcvi, xcvii, p a dma Puran, cxxiii.
xcviii, ciii. Palestine, xiii.

Kapilvastu, Ixxxiii. Pali, Ixxx.

Kashi, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, Ixxix. Parivrajaka, xliii, Ixxxv.

Kathyayana, Ixxxvi. Parmenides, lii.

Kosala, xxxix, xlvii, xlviii, Ixxix. Parsvanatha, xlviii, Ixxix.

Krishna, Ixxxv, cxviii. Pasuptha, civ, clx.

Kumarila, cv, cxiv. ^ Persian, li.

Kuru panchala, xxxix, xlvii, Ixv. Ixvi, pl ato? x ii ? x iii, liii, Ix.
Ixxiv, cxxvi. Pracchanaa Bouddha, cxii.

Prakrit, Ixxxvii.

k Ptoleymaic, xvi.

Lakshmana, cxxiv. Pythogares, Ixxxvii.

Lanka, cxxiii. Pythagorean, xiv, Ixxxvi.

Latin, li. .'.-:'

Leibniz, xxiv, xxv. ^

Locke, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, xxx. Raghuvamsa, cxx.

Loeb, cxliii. Rahu, lix.

INDEX OF THE ENGLISH INTRODUCTION 241

Rama, cxxiv. Thirthankar, cxv, cxvii, cxviii.

Rarnanuja, Ixxxvi. , " Tholkapya, cxvi.

Ramayana, Ixxxiv. Thompson, xciii.

Ratnatraya, cxxviii. Tyndall, cxiii.

Ravana, cxxiii. >

Renaissance, xvii. -y

Rigveda, xl, Iv, Ivi, lix, Ixvii, Ixxviii.

Rishab'ha, xiix, cxviii, cxxii. Uddalaka, Ivil

Rockhill, Ixxix. Umaswami, cxxvi.

Roman, xiii, xv.

V

Sagara, Ixxxiv. Vachaspati, Ixxxvii.

Sakya muni, cxvii. Va J a Sane f a Samhita, xlvm.

Samaya Sara, cl, cli. Vanaprastha^xliii.

Sankar, xliv, xlv, Ixxxvi, cvi, cvii, cviii, }' asis ; lta > x { vu -

cix, ex, cxii, cxxxvii, cxivii, cli, cliv, ^ % V 'i '

civii clix clx clxi Vedanta Sutra, civ.

Sankhy 'pravatihan sutra, Ixxxvii. Ye ff' xx f ?' ! 5.' c f iv ' t .. t .

Sanyas xiiii ' Videha, xlvn, xlviii, xlix, !xv, Ixxn,-kxix.

Sariputta, cxvii. ' Videhakshetra, xlix.
Satpath Brahmans, xlvii, xlviii, xlix, Ixvi. Vignanabikshu, Ixxxvi, Ixxxvii.

Satya Kama, Iv. Vignanavad^clv.

Schopenhauer, Hi. Vishnu, _ xxxix
Shad Darsan Samuohaya, Lxxxiii, Ixxxvii. Viswamitra, xlvii, Ixxxii.

Shahajehan, li. Viswasena, xlvm, Ixxix.

Shristi Karta cxli. Vratyas, Ixxx, Ixxxi.

Siddha, cxvi! ' Vrishabha, Ixxix, Ixxxiii, xcix, cxviii,

Sisna Deva, cxxii. CX1X *
Socrates, xi, xii, Ix.

Socratic Dialectic, xi. ' *

Sophist, xi. ^ Yagnavalkya, xlix, Ixx, Ixxi, Ixxii, cxxv.

Sudd'hodana, Ixxxiii. Yatis Ixxx.

Sudra, Ixxvii. Yo^a, ci.
T

Tamil, Ixxxvi, cxvi.

Tatvartha Sutra, cxxvi. Zoroastrianism, li.

INDEX OF THE TEXT WITH COMMENTARY

Abhavya, 173.
Acliaritra, 117.
Actor, 134.
Addressed, 221.
Adoration, 35.
Age-Karma, 161, 162.
Aparadha, 188.
Apra'tibudha, 28, 29.
Artisan, 209, 210, 211.

B

Baltapa, 112, 113.
Bangles, 191.
Bauddha, 207.
Bhagwatgita, 160..
Bihashya, 18.

C

Chalk, 213, 214, 215, 216.
Chariot, 85, 154.
Child-wife, 123.
Christ, 166.
City, 35.
Cloth, 85.
Colour, 229.
Conch-fish, 146.
Criminal, 188.
Crystal, 117, 175.

D

* Dasas, 19.
Death, 160.

Dharma-Prabh'avana, 155.
Discriminative Wisdom, 185.
Drama, 134.
Dvikriyavada, 75.

E

Ego-in-itself, <">".
Elephant, 111.
Exercises, 156.

F

Fall of man, 4,
Fat, 125,

Fear, 149.

Female, 203.
Flame, 219.
Flesh, 125.

G

Gautama, 8.
Gold, 103, 109, 128, 145, 191.

H

Hypocrite, 167.

I

. Idealistic theory, 69.
Iron, 109, 145.

Jain Sidhanta., 139.

Jaina, 206, 207.

Jayasena, 15.

Jitamoha, 37. i j-^c

Joint method of agreement and difter-

ence, 159.
Judaism, 4.

K

Kshanikavada, 16.
Kill, 159, 164, 165, 169.
Killed/ 159, 64, 165, 169.
King, 28, 48, 49, 91, 92, 148.
Kingdom of God, 9.

Light, 219.

M

Male, 203.

Materialistic monism, 59.

Mayavada, 75.
Metaphysical doctrine, 90.
Mimanskas, 5.

N

Nectar, 189, 190.

Nirvana, 171.

Nishchaya Shrutakevali, 20, 21.

Non-possession, 141.

244

INDEX OF THE TEXT WITH COMMENTARY

Oil, 156.

Parallelism, 194.

Paroksha, 10.

Perfect Harmony, 238.

Pithika, 23.

Poison, 133, 189, 190.

Pratikramana, 177, 189, 190.

Pratyakhyana, 38, 177.

Puiingas, 19.

Puranic Hinduism, 7.

R

Rajvartika, 152.
Rest, 231.
Road, 57

Sa'baras, 19.

Sakas, 19.

Saint, 167.

Samaya Pahuda, 238.

Samkhya, 97, 99, 206, 207.

Sankara, 18.

Shackles, 181.

Slumber, 41.

Smell, 229.

Social aspect, 154.
Space, 23 1.
Suddhopayoga, 141.
Svasamaya, 4, 6, 7.
Sword, 156.

Taste, 230.
Thief, 187.
Time, 231.
Touch, 230.

U

Upabriinhana, 152.

V

Vaislieshike, 5 .
Vedantins, 5.
Vishnu, 199.
Vyavhar Srutakevali, 21.

W

War, 91.
Waves, 73.
West, 194.
Wind, 73.
World consciousness, 40.

Yavanas, 19.

HS-0